POLICY OF AUSTRIA.

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to prevent her armies penetrating to the south, when the time for carrying her ambitious projects into execution arrives?

We shall turn our eyes, perhaps, to Austria in this emergency; but what interest has that power in preserving India to England? or in checking the growth of Russia, provided she, herself, gains strength in a like ratio? Does not one glance at the map of modern Europe show what the interest of Austria will be, if not what her intentions now are? Her territories, stretching along the eastern shore of the Adriatic, whilst they shelter the attack of the Russians on Constantinople, place her in a position to seize on her portion of the spoil, whenever-throwing off the mask-these two ambitious powers determine on dividing the Ottoman dominions between them. The impotent kingdom of Greece will offer no resistGreat Britain, from her outportsCorfu and Zante-will have the satisfaction of witnessing a catastrophe, which her distance deprives her of the possibility of averting : and France will, in all probability, be other

ance.

wise occupied. Indeed, no very urgent reason can be advanced, why France may not be tempted to join in the crusade-" L'Expédition de l'Egypte n'y est pas oubliée" has been stated by a recent writer; and may she not be actuated by a "morbid desire" of aggrandizement, as well as Russia? Has her conduct, of late years, been such as to warrant our coming to a different conclusion?

It behoves Great Britain, therefore, to leave no means untried of averting the impending danger; and, though the subjugation of Turkey in Europe appears inevitable, to endeavour to render that calamity as little disastrous as possible, by taking up a position herself, and forming fresh combinations amongst the Asiatic nations, for driving back the Kalmucs to their native steppes, should they attempt to penetrate yet further to the south.

To do this, a new power must be called into existence in Asia Minor, and every support given to the tottering empire of the 2 Shah. The possession of the Island of Candia becomes also imperatively necessary, to

POLICY OF ENGLAND.

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enable Great Britain to watch the operations of the enemy, and serve her as a rendezvous for an army, which, thus centrically situated, could threaten so vast an extent of coast. The power that must be called into existence is clearly Egypt; for, though that country itself is far distant from the seat of war, yet its frontier possessions have wisely been advanced to meet the coming danger: so that, whilst her armies will be at hand to move forward on the first alarm, her inexhaustible resources will remain in perfect security; and, under the protection of an English fleet, can be forwarded quickly to the scene of ope

rations.

But England ought not to rest satisfied here. It is her policy to increase the power of Egypt by every possible means, and not only to acknowledge but to guarantee her independence, and even ensure the succession to the throne to the present dynasty. Her frontiers should be extended until they reach the Tigris on the side of Persia, and come in contact with Russia to the North: so that any

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PRESENT CONDITION OF PERSIA.

further encroachments on the part of that power would at once occasion a rupture. In fact, to meet Russia with a chance of success, the order for the first cossack to cross the Balkan should be the signal for Ibrahim to advance on Scutari and Trebizonde; for the English fleet to take possession of Smyrna and the castles on the southern bank of the Dardanelles; and for the transfer of Candia to the protection of Great Britain.

Persia, far too feeble to contend singlehanded against Russia, and cut off by her position from receiving any effectual assistance from Great Britain, might, nevertheless, by the help of such an ally as Egypt would then become, be able to resist any further encroachments upon her territory.

The aggrandizement of Russia, at the expense of Persia, has, of late years, been rapid indeed; but far more detrimental to the interests of England have been the insidious intrigues of that Northern Power at the Court of Tehraun, than even the success of her arms in the field. The influence of Russia is already

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nearly equal to that of Great Britain; and should a Prince ever be placed by her means upon the throne of Persia, our preponderance will cease altogether, and the invasion of India need no longer be regarded as so Quixotic an enterprise as it appears to be at the present day; for the base of operations for such an enterprise might then be considered as advanced to Esterabad; between which place and Astrakhan, the undisputed possession of the Caspian Sea, and the use of steamers, would render the transmission of troops and supplies both certain and immediate.

It is, therefore, only by threatening the last named place that such a plan could be thwarted; and, from the Egyptian territories (if advanced to the shores of the Bosphorus and Euphrates) this might be done: whereas, if they continue, as at present, to be confined to the narrow strip of coast at the eastern extremity of the Mediterranean, it would be impossible to undertake an operation of the kind, leaving Persia on the right flank.