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126

LOSS OF THE TURKISH FLEET.

Turkey no longer offers a barrier against the designs of Russia. The loss of her fortresses was the unavoidable consequence of the destruction of her fleet; and thus, by the influence of one "untoward event," was the Ottoman empire laid crouching at the feet of her persevering and implacable foe. "Not a hundred English line-of-battle ships on the Euxine would now affect the march of a Russian army on Constantinople."* The attempt of Turkey to resume her station amongst the European powers, by re-modelling her army on their plan, is but a fruitless waste of money. She possesses not, within herself, the materials required for the accomplishment of such an undertaking. Her crafty enemy, well aware of this, encourages her in the vain attempt, which helps to drain her resources, and watches but the favourable moment to effect the long-meditated plan of effacing Turkey from the map of Europe.

Great Britain, having thus suffered the first and great outwork that secured her Indian * Slade's Turkey.

POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

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possessions to be razed to the ground, must, necessarily, erect some other barrier for their protection, and Egypt presents herself as that best suited to the purpose. Whilst, therefore, it is the policy of England to strengthen the new power that has started into existence in every possible way, it is, on the other hand, the interest of Russia to keep Egypt in its present half-dependent state;-not exactly subject to the Porte, because Turkey would be thereby strengthened-and Turkey is permitted to drag out its existence yet a few years longer and not altogether independently of the Porte, because the power of Egypt would be thereby doubled, and, consequently, the better prepared to resist the ulterior ambitious projects of Russia.

The policy of Great Britain (whatever may be its intention) tends rather, I fear, to assist Russia in her designs, and-for the sake of retaining some paltry commercial advantages -to keep Egypt in a state of dependence upon the Sultan. The outcry that has been raised at the iniquity of assisting Mohammed

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EGYPT AND TURKEY.

Ali against his liege lord (so consistent in a people that, in the same breath, advocates the independence of Poland) is too absurd to be listened to.

Has not England been the abettor—if not the prime mover-of most of the revolts and rebellions that have distracted both hemispheres during the last quarter of a century, whenever it was her interest to be so? Has she been deterred by any such fine chivalric feeling as she is called upon to display in the case of Egypt and Turkey, from acknowledging the independence of the Brazils, of Mexico, Columbia, Greece, Belgium, &c.? And is she to be prevented, by a senseless clamour, from interfering in the case of two perfectly distinct people-connected by no one bond of common interest or affection-in whose separation no ties of family are torn asunder, no one class of men ruined to enrich another, no misery inflicted on the liberated people beyond the onerous wartaxes necessarily imposed upon it, to meet the expenses of the immense establishments

DESIGNS OF RUSSIA.

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kept up to secure its independence ?—evils for which Egypt is indebted to the vacillating policy of the great European powers, (but, above all, that of England) in not frankly recognising the independence of Mohammed

Ali.

Our delaying this act of justice to the Egyptian people is so completely playing the game of Russia, that, in the event of the present Viceroy's death, and a determination on the part of the Sultan to resist the succession of his son Ibrahim, it will afford that power an excellent pretext for interfering openly in reducing revolted Egypt to subjection. May not, indeed, the secret treaty that binds Turkey hand and foot to Russia contain some provision of the sort?

Russia, since the days of Catherine II., has been constantly persevering in an insidious scheme of aggrandizement. At the conclusion of each succeeding war, she has invariably, either under the pretence of protection, or as an absolute conquest, added some portion of her adversary's territory to her dominions;

VOL. II.

K

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DESIGNS OF RUSSIA.

thereby furnishing herself, in the former case, with a never-failing pretext for engaging in another war; in the latter, with the means of re-commencing hostilities with increased advantage.

All this has been effected in so subtile a manner, with so many declarations of good faith and such professions of moderation, as to allay the fears of the other European powers; which, however sensible of the advantages obtained by Russia to their eventual prejudice, still scarcely thought each fresh aggression of sufficient consequence in itself, to dispute at the cost of a general war. Thus, without being absolutely duped by the protestations of Russia, the southern powers of Europe have quietly shut their eyes to her ulterior designs.

In the mean time, that power has neglected no opportunity of improving and augmenting her navy, which now rides in undisputed possession of the Black Sea, ready to favour her operations against Egypt, Persia, or, perchance, India; and what power will be able

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