LETTER

III.

LETTER III.

Additional obfervations relating to Mr. Hume. His account of the nature of belief defigned to exclude reafon from any share in it. A tranfcript of a paper containing an examination of Mr. Hume's arguments in his Essay on Miracles. Obfervations upon it. The evidence of matters of fact may be fo circumftanced as to produce a full affurance. Mr. Hume artfully confounds the evidence of past facts with the probability of the future. We may be certain of a matter of fact after it has happened, though it might seem beforehand very improbable that it would happen. Where full evidence is given of a fact, there must not always be a deduction made on the account of its being unusual and extraordi nary. There is strong and pofitive evidence of the miracles wrought in attestation to ChriStianity, and no evidence against them. The miraculous nature of the facts no proof that the facts were not done. A fummary of Mr. Hume's argument against the evidence of miracles. The weakness of it fhewn. Confidering the vast importance of religion to our happinefs, the bare poffibility of its being true fhould be fufficient to engage our compliance.

I

SIR,

Shall now proceed to lay before you fome additional obfervations relating to that part of the fecond volume of the View of the

Deiftical

II.

Deiftical Writers, which contains remarks on LETTER Mr. Hume.

It is obferved, p. 24. that Mr. Hume himself acknowleges, That "no durable good can ever "be expected from exceffive fcepticism:"

And that "nature will always maintain her "rights, and prevaileth in the end over any "abstract reasoning whatsoever." After this let it be immediately added line 4 from the bottom And if fo, I think we may juftly conclude, that any abftract reasoning which is contrary to the plain voice of nature ought to be rejected as false and trifling, and of no real use or fervice to mankind.

In p. 41. it is fhewn, That " we may reason"ably argue from the traces of excellencies in "ourselves to the infinitely fuperior perfections "in the great Author of the univerfe, ftill "taking care to remove all those limitations "and defects with which they are attended in "us." Let it be immediately fubjoined line 11 from the bottom. This is what Mr. Hume himself elsewhere allows in his Effay on the Origin of our Ideas. "The idea of God, "faith he, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, "wife, and good Being arifes from reflecting

on the operations of our own minds, and augmenting those qualities of goodness and "wisdom without bound or limit." See his Philofoph. Effays, p. 24, 25.

It is obferved, p. 90. that Mr. Hume taketh great pains throughout his whole Effay on Li

F 3

berty

n

LETTER berty and Neceffity to fhew, that there is as great III. a certainty, and as neceffary a connexion, in

what are called moral causes as in physical. Let it be there added, line 14.-This author undoubtedly in that Effay carrieth it too far, when in order to fubvert human liberty, he would have it thought, that in all cafes the power of motives worketh with as neceffary a force upon the mind, as any phyfical caufe doth upon the effect. But that in many particular cafes things may be fo circumftanced with regard to moral caufes, as to afford a certainty equal to what arifes from phyfical, cannot reasonably be denied. And fuch is the cafe here put.

In p. 134. line 4. from the bottom, a paffage is quoted from Mr. Hume, in which he faith, That" our most holy religion is founded on "faith, not on reason." After reason let a mark of reference be put, and the following note be inferted at the bottom of the page.

This author who takes care to make the prin ciples of his philofophy fubfervient to his defigns against religion, in the fifth of his Philofophical Effays, where he undertakes to treat of the nature of belief, gives fuch an account of it as feems to exclude reafon from any fhare in it at all. He makes the difference between faith and fiction to confift wholly in fome fentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the former, not to the latter. That the fentiment of belief is nothing but the conception of an objcct more lively and forcible, more intense

and

and steady than what attends the mere fiction LETTER of the imagination; and that this manner of conception arises from the customary conjunc tion of the object with fomething prefent to the memory or fenfes. See his Philofophical Effays, p. 80-84. This gentleman is here, as in many other places, fufficiently obfcure, nor is it easy to form a diftinct notion of what he intends. But his design seems to be to exclude reafon or the understanding from having any thing to do with belief, as if reason never had any influence in producing, directing, or regulating it; which is to open a wide door to en thusiasm. But this is contrary to what we may all obferve, and frequently experience. We in feveral cafes clearly perceive; that we have reafon to regard fome things as fictitious, and others as true and real. And the reasons which fhew the difference between a fiction and a reality, fhew that we ought in reafon to believe the one and not the other: And so reason may go before the fentiment of belief, and lay a juft foundation for it, and be inftrumental to produce it. And in this cafe the belief may be said to be ftrictly rational.

What I fhall next produce is a much larger addition, occafioned by a letter I received from a gentleman of fenfe and learning, foon after the publication of the fecond volume of the View of the Deiftical Writers, and which particularly related to that part of it which is defigned in answer to Mr. Hume. He was F 4

pleafed

LETTER pleased to fay it gave him uncommon fatisfacIII. tion, and at the fame time sent me a paper

which he seemed to be very well pleased with,' that had been drawn up by a young gentleman then lately dead. It was defigned as a confutation of Mr. Hume upon his own principles, which he thought had not been fufficiently attended to in the answers that had been made to that writer; and he allowed me, if I fhould be of opinion that any thing in it might be ferviceable to a farther confutation of Mr. Hume, to make ufe of his fentiments either by way of note or appendix, as I thould judge most convenient. I returned an anfwer in a letter which I fhall here infert, as it containeth fome reflections that may be of advantage in relation to the controverfy with Mr. Hume. But first it will be proper to lay before the reader the paper itself here referred to, which is concisely drawn, and runs thus;

An EXAMINATION of Mr. HUME's Arguments in his ESSAY ON MIRACLES.

THE objects of human understanding may be diftinguished either into propofitions afferting the relation between general ideas, or matters of fact.

In the former kind, we can arrive at certainty by means of a faculty in our fouls, which perceives this relation either inftantly and inti

mately,