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intuitional consciousness' (p. 347). And so this intuitional consciousness' is not only subject to almost unlimited variations itself, but tends in consequence to propagate endless variations of interpretation and opinion. A rare source of religious certitude truly!

In respect to inspiration, the conclusion our author comes to is just such as might be expected. It implies nothing different from or higher than the current religious feelings and convictions of the writers of Scripture:- The word is the natural and spontaneous expression of the Divine life which the inspired Apostles received immediately from God' (p. 158). Thus every Christian is inspired exactly in the same manner and the same sense as they were. Should we confine the privilege to Christians? On this theory, certainly not.

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Near to the commencement of his chapter on inspiration, our author says: It is not our purpose at present to discuss the nature of miracles philosophically considered' (p. 152). greater misconception as to the character of miracles than is revealed in this brief sentence, it is impossible to conceive of. If the nature of miracles is capable of being philosophically considered, then they cease to be miracles. They can become a subject of philosophy only by becoming physical processes. To talk of considering miracles philosophically, is equivalent to a proposition to consider creation philosophically, which, as we have already seen, can only become a subject of philosophy by ceasing to be creation, and becoming mere physical development. Miracles must be received as supernatural facts, altogether beyond the sphere of philosophy, or they are no miracles at all. Miracles are either the results of the immediate action of the Deity on natural objects, or they are such a use of physical agencies as entirely overbears their established action; in either case they must ever remain alike inexplicable. That this extraordinary misconception is not a mere lapse of the pen is shown by other expressions; as, for instance, in contrasting the power of performing miracles with inspiration, he says, that the former demanded an extraordinary physical power.' If miracles are wrought by physical power, then they are clearly at an end.

Inspiration is, in its modus, equally inexplicable with miracles and creation. It is one of the instances of direct Divine acting, of which it is the very nature that no account, coming within the comprehension of the human understanding, can be given. And it is surely a marvellous inconsistency to find such a stickler for 'pure reason, intuitional consciousness,' and 'Christian consciousness,' as altogether distinct from and above the sphere of the understanding; yet, attempting with continuous purpose and incessant

labour,

labour, to bring the modus of the most special and peculiar instances of immediate spiritual action within that sphere.

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Yet so it is throughout the whole discussion. His transcendentalism ever and anon belies its character, and is but the same naturalism everywhere. Thus, The proper idea of inspiration, as applied to the Holy Scriptures, does not include either miraculous powers, verbal dictation, or any distinct commission from God' (p. 165). Inspiration depends upon the clearness, force, and accuracy of a man's religious intuitions.' As an internal phenomenon it is perfectly consistent with the natural laws of the human mind—it is a higher potency of a certain form of consciousness, which every man in some degree possesses' (p. 166). And again-The effort of theology is always to give a definite form and scientific basis to our religious life' (p. 196). Yes, indeed the whole labour alike, of eclectics, transcendentalists, and 'natural historians of creation,' has ever been to find a scientific basis of life, but they will return blind and baffled from the search to the last hour of time.

Apart altogether from the opinions expressed, we regret Mr. Morell's mode of putting some of his statements and arguments respecting the authority and value of the Scriptures. It is very unfortunate, and in unhappy taste, to say the least of it, and may appear to some readers to indicate more hostility than is expressed. As instances, we would point to paragraphs on pp. 159, 160, 161, 176, 177, 181, 186, which we cannot quote in extenso. With a similar disapproval we must refer to his again and again telling us that the New Testament Scriptures were written long after Christianity had established itself. Has not this too much the aspect of a sinister playing into the hands of the Straussian school? At all events, in this and other too numerous instances, there is indicated an animus towards what are held to be orthodox notions in this country, not consistent with the impartial calmness of the real truth-seeker, but characteristic rather of the special advocate. Besides, ere one set himself so systematically to loosen the hold which the Scriptures have hitherto had on all Protestant Christians as the authority in religion, one would need to be pretty sure as to what he had to substitute in their place. We should not like to incur the responsibility of such an attempt, even though we had the collective spiritual intuitions of the angelic hierarchy to offer to mankind in their stead.

In reference to Christian theology Mr. Morell finds that it has just these two essential pre-requisites'-'A religious nature awakened by the development of the Christian life; and the application of logical reflection to the elements of Divine truth, which that life spontaneously presents' (p. 202). From this he

anticipates, very naturally, that some may be surprised, that in enumerating the essential conditions of Christian theology, he should say nothing about the Bible.' His explanation of this rather singular omission is to the following effect.

Referring to his views and arguments in his chapter on Inspiration, he says, 'It will be seen that the existence of the Scriptures, as such, was not essential to the rise and maintenance of Christian theology at all. Take the case of any of the very early churches which had perhaps heard, or perhaps had not heard the preaching of the Apostles, but who certainly never enjoyed a sight of their writings. These churches, assuredly, could enjoy the power of true Christianity, and could have possessed a valid Christian theology as well as we. And yet there were no Christian Scriptures in the case there could be, therefore, no poring over the letter-no induction of passages-no verbal criticism whatever. There could be simply the awakening of a new religious life by the proclamation of human sin and human recovery by Christ, the chosen of God on the one side, and their own attempts to bring such religious feelings and instructions into a clear reflective statement on the other' (pp. 202, 203).

Now it never fell to our lot to peruse a weaker paragraph than this. The Bible is not an essential element in order to the construction of a Christian theology, because the Christians of the apostolic age might have built up such a theology before the books composing the New Testament were written. But out of what materials?-the very same which we have now in these New Testament Scriptures, and which they received directly from the lips of living inspired teachers, who had been witnesses of the unparalleled facts these Scriptures record. What a puerile sophism to assign as a reason for not including the Bible among the essential elements of a Christian theology! But we cannot now enter on the questions which would here open up before us, and it is the less necessary, as we had occasion to discuss the relation of the Scriptures to Christian theology in a late number of this Journal.a

In Mr. Morell's chapter on Religious Certitude, of course the subjective is exalted at the expense of all objective grounds. The trustworthiness and value of the intuitional consciousness' as a ground of certitude we have already investigated. To that investigation we have no intention of formally recurring. Nor can we enter at present on the abstract question what measure of certitude is compatible with the nature of religious truth, and the

a Journal of Sacred Literature, No. III.-' Relation of Scripture to Human Inquiry.'

conditions

conditions of moral agency. All we can do at present is to examine one or two of our author's assumptions and arguments having a bearing on the position and value of the facts of Christianity.

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Viewed objectively, Christianity is a religion resting on a basis of supernatural facts; and viewed subjectively, it is a state of the soul induced by a belief of those facts. Our conviction of this, instead of being shaken, is confirmed by such objections as the following:- To regard Christianity as a question of facts, and make its certitude rest upon this basis, is eluding the whole point and stringency of the question, inasmuch as these facts are not resolved into their real elements, nor the grounds of their religious value exhibited' (pp. 307, 308). What may be meant by resolving facts, and especially the supernatural facts of Christianity, into their real elements, we can have no conception. But the Scripture narratives not only embody the facts on which Christianity rests, but the relation of those facts both to the Divine character and government, and to our spiritual nature and moral condition. If this is not exhibiting the grounds of their religious value, we know not what could do so. 'God so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life.' In this brief sentence we have three stupendous facts-the love of God-the consequent gift of his son-and the eternal salvation of the believer in him; and to the Christian consciousness, the religious value of the whole, irradiates that statement, with a light clearer than that of noon. But perhaps it is to the logical consciousness' that Mr. Morell desiderates the exhibition' of the religious value' of the facts of Christianity; if so, we only say, that such an exhibition is not only apart entirely from the primary purpose of the Scripture revelation, but essentially inconsistent with what Mr. M. labours throughout his whole book to show must be the generic character of revelation. 'The act of revelation is always a case of pure intuition' (p. 145); and the whole result is one lying beyond the reach of the logical understanding' (p. 126). It were, therefore, the grossest inconsistency in Mr. Morell to demand that the inspired narratives of the facts of Christianity should embody a logical exhibition of their religious value.' And yet we fear he does nothing less than this in the paragraph before us, for he desiderates their being resolved into their real elements,' and analysis' is the function of the logical consciousness' (p. 48).

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b For a discussion of that question we may refer the reader to an article on ‘Authority in Religion,' in No. 7 of the British Quarterly Review.

The italics here and, with some few exceptions, throughout all the quotations are Mr. Morell's.

Our

"

Our author goes on to say: Testimony can only refer to facts, and can have no validity as evidence beyond the value of the facts to which it testifies. The authenticity of a book, for example, can be known by testimony; its title to a divine origin must rest on grounds entirely different' (p. 308). The testimony of the evangelists not only embodies the facts, that a divine person appeared in the ordinary form of humanity, lived, taught, acted, and suffered for the salvation of the world, but also embodies the evidence he afforded of his being divine. The record not only embraces the public life and death of the man Christ Jesus,' and the moral bearings of that life and death; but also the evidence of his claim both to a divine personality and a divine mission. These facts while occurring on earth, and under the ordinary relations of humanity, yet evince always the presence in them of an element transcending all terrestrial and human agencies. And the one blends so uniformly with the other, that we cannot admit the mundane and human elements, without admitting also the divine. On the facts of Christianity, therefore, in all their historical integrity we take our stand, conscious that while we can maintain this position, we are secure of all that is essential to our faith.

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But the importance of this question leads us to remark on yet another of Mr. Morell's statements in this connection :—“The very most that testimony can do,' says he, is to place us in the same position as the persons who witnessed the facts in question; and just as those persons accepted the spiritual truth on grounds with which testimony had nothing to do (because it did not in their case intervene), so also must we accept the truth, not because the witnesses asserted their belief of it, but because we have the same grounds for belief presented to us, upon testimony, as they had directly presented through their senses' (p. 309). If the reasoning in this paragraph be not sophistical, it is certainly exceedingly illogical and confused. The persons who witnessed the facts' on which Christianity is based, accepted the spiritual truth conveyed to them on grounds with which testimony had nothing to do. Did they indeed? Was not much of this 'spiritual truth' conveyed to them by the testimony of Jesus'? And as to the attempt to depreciate the value of testimony, because they received the facts independently of it, inasmuch as it did not in their case intervene' nothing could, we conceive, be more puerile. What was the ground on which they received those facts, and the spiritual truths they involved and exhibited, what but that of actual observation-they saw and believed.' The need of testimony of course is superseded where there is the opportunity of personal observation. And they witnessed the facts -'That

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