is vital to a free government, the latter not. One Representative in the British Parliament would probably have prevented the American Revolution. Be it so. But if the doctrine be sound, does it not plainly apply as well to the Senate as to the House? If it be not unequal or unjust in the House, how can it be so in the Senate? Is not Berkshire with its two Senators, or Barnstable with its one Senator, or Worcester with its four Senators, upon this principle just as fully represented in the Senate, as Suffolk with its six Senators? The argument of the gentleman may therefore be thrown back upon himself.

The gentleman from Worcester has illustrated his views, by a reference to the structure of the two houses under the constitution of the United States; and he conceives the Senate of the United States as analogous to his system of representation in our House, a representation of corporations. It certainly bears no analogy to his basis of representation for the Senate. I take it, that the Senate of the United States is a representation of sovereignties, coördinate and coequal, and in no respect like our system, either of the House or Senate; for neither towns nor districts have an equal representation here, for the reason, that they are not independent sovereignties. But when we come to the House of Representatives of the United States, which is founded on the basis of population, we find, that it is accompanied with another principle, that representation and direct taxation shall be apportioned according to population. Not that population alone shall be the basis; but that they, who enjoy the right, shall also bear the burden. I have no objection to adopting this principle here. Let Worcester send her six Senators, and Berkshire three; and let them consent, also, to bear a proportionable share of the public taxes; and then, and then only, will there be a well founded analogy to the constitution of the United States. I thank the gentleman for his illustration; an argument more pertinent to my purpose could not have been found.

I beg, however, for a moment, to ask the attention of the committee to the gross inequalities of the plan of the gentleman from Worcester, respecting the House of Representatives. There are two hundred and ninety-eight towns in the state, each of which is to send one Representative. And upon this plan the whole number of Representatives will be three hundred and thirty-four. There are but twenty-four towns, which would be entitled to send more than one Representative. These twenty-four towns, with a population of one hundred and forty-six thousand, would send fifty-eight

Representatives, or only one, upon an average, for every two thousand, five hundred, and twenty-six inhabitants; while the remaining two hundred and seventy-four towns, with a population of three hundred and thirteen thousand, would send two hundred and seventy-four Representatives, or one for every one thousand, one hundred, and forty-four inhabitants. I lay not the venue here or there in the Commonwealth, in the county of Worcester, or the county of Essex; but such would be the result throughout the whole Commonwealth, taken in the aggregate of its population. Salem would send one Representative for every three thousand, one hundred, and thirty inhabitants; and Boston one for every four thousand, two hundred inhabitants; while every town, but the twenty-four largest, would send one for every one thousand one hundred and forty-four inhabitants. What, then, becomes of the favorite doctrine of the basis of population? I would ask the gentleman, in his own emphatic language, Is not this system unjust, unequal, and cruel? If it be equal, it is so by some political arithmetic, which I have never learned, and am incapable of comprehending.

A few words upon the plan of the Select Committee, and I have done. Sir, I am not entitled to any of the merit, if there be any, in that plan. My own plan was to preserve the present basis of the Senate, not because I placed any peculiar stress on the basis of valuation; but because I deemed it all-important to retain some element, that might maintain a salutary check between the two houses. My own plan for the House of Representatives was representation, founded on the basis of population in districts, according to the system proposed by the gentleman from Northampton. Finding that this plan was not acceptable to a majority of the committee, I acquiesced in the plan reported by it. I have learned, that we must not, in questions of government, stand upon abstract principles; but must content ourselves with practicable good. I do not pretend to think, nor do any of its advocates think, that the system. of the Select Committee is perfect; but it will cure some defects in our present system, which are of great and increasing importance. I have always viewed the representation in the House under the present constitution, as a most serious evil, and alarming to the future peace and happiness of the state. My dread has never been of the Senate; but of that multitudinous assembly, which has been seen within these walls, and may again be seen, if times of political excitement should occur. The more numerous the body, the greater the danger from its movements, in times, when it cannot or

will not deliberate. I came here, therefore, willing and ready to make sacrifices to accomplish an essential reduction in that body. It was the only subject relative to the constitution, on which I have always had a decided and earnest opinion. It was my fortune for some years to have a seat in our House of Representatives; and for a short time to preside over its sittings, at a period, when it was most numerous, and under the most powerful excitements. I am sorry to say it, but such is my opinion, that in no proper sense could it be called a deliberative assembly. From the excess of numbers deliberation became almost impossible; and, but for the good sense and discretion of those, who usually led in the debates, it would have been impracticable to have transacted business with any thing like accuracy or safety. That serious public mischiefs did not arise, from the necessary hurry and difficulty of the legislative business, is to be accounted for, only from the mutual forbearance and kindness of those, who enjoyed the confidence of the respective parties. If the state should go on, increasing in its population, we might hereafter have eight hundred, or nine hundred, Representatives, according to the present system; and, in times of public discontent, all the barriers of legislation may be broken down, and the government itself be subverted. I wish, most deeply and earnestly, to preserve to my native state a deliberative legislature, where the sound judgment, and discretion, and sagacity of its best citizens may be felt, and heard, and understood, at all times, and under all circumstances. I should feel the liberties of the state secure, if this point were once fairly gained. I would yield up the little privileges of my own town, and of any others, that our children may enjoy civil, religious, and political liberty, as perfectly, nay, more perfectly than their fathers. With these views I am ready to support the report of he Select Committee, not in part, but as a whole, as a system; and if part is to be rejected, I do not feel myself bound to sustain the rest. Indeed, upon no other ground than a great diminution of the House of Representatives, can I ever consent to pay the members out of the public treasury. For this is now the only efficient check against an overwhelming representation. By the plan of the Select Committee, the small towns are great gainers; a sacrifice is made by the large towns, and by them only. They will bear a heavier portion of the pay of the Representatives, and they will have a less proportionate representation than they now possess. And what do they gain in return? I may say, Nothing. All that is gained is public gain; a really

deliberative legislature; and a representation in the Senate, which is in fact a popular representation, emanating from and returning to the people, but so constructed, that it operates as a useful check upon undue legislation, and as a security to property.

I hope, that this system will be adopted by a large majority, because it can scarcely otherwise receive the approbation of the people. I do not know, that it is even desirable, that the people should, nay, I might go further, and say, that the people ought not to, adopt any amendment, which comes recommended by a bare majority of this Convention. If we are so little agreed among ourselves, as to what will be for the future public good, we had much better live under the present constitution, which has all our experience in its favor. Is any gentleman bold enough to hazard the assertion, that any new measure, we may adopt, can be more successful? I beg gentlemen to consider, too, what will be the effect, if the amendments, we now propose, should be rejected by the people, having passed by a scanty majority. We shall then revert to the old constitution; and new parties, embittered by new feuds, or elated by victory, will be formed in the state, and distinguished as Constitutionalists, and Anti-constitutionalists; and thus new discontents and struggles for a new convention will agitate the Commonwealth. The revival of party animosities, in any shape, is most deeply to be deprecated. Who does not recollect with regret the violence, with which party-spirit in times past raged in this state, breaking asunder the ties of friendship and consanguinity? I was myself called upon to take an active part in the public scenes of those days. I do not regret the course, which my judgment then led me to adopt. But I never can recollect, without the most profound melancholy, how often I have been compelled to meet, I will not say the evil, but averted eyes, and the hostile opposition of men, with whom, under other circumstances, I should have rejoiced to have met in the warmth of friendship. If new parties are to arise, new animosities will grow up, and stimulate new resentments. To the aged in this Convention, who are now bowed down under the weight of years, this can, of course, be of but little consequence; for they must soon pass into the tranquillity of the tomb. To those in middle life it will not be of great importance; for they are far on their way to their final repose; they have little to hope of future eminence, and are fast approaching the period, when the things of this world will fade away. But we have youth, who are just springing into life; we have children, whom we love; and families,

in whose welfare we feel the deepest interest. In the name of Heaven let us not leave to them the bitter inheritance of our contentions. Let us not transmit to them enmities, which may sadden the whole of their lives. Let us not, like Him of old, blind, and smitten of his strength, in our anger seize upon the pillars of the constitution, that we and our enemies may perish in their downfall. I would rather approach the altar of the constitution, and pay my devotions there; and, if our liberties must be destroyed, I, for one, would be ready to perish there in defending them.