and extensive researches, which form the accomplished scholar, and elevate the refined jurist; which ennoble the patriot, and shed a never dying lustre round the statesman. The establishment of the National Government, and of courts to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction, will, it is to be hoped, in this respect, operate with a salutary influence. Dealing, as such courts must, in questions of a public nature; such as concern the law of nations, and the general rights and duties of foreign nations; such as respect the domestic relations of the states with each other, and with the General Government; such as treat of the great doctrines of prize and maritime law; such as involve the discussion of grave constitutional powers and authorities; it is natural to expect, that these courts will attract the ambition of some of the ablest lawyers in the different states, with a view both to fame and fortune. And thus, perhaps, if I do not indulge in an idle dream, the foundations may be laid for a character of excellence and professional ability, more various and exalted than has hitherto belonged to any Bar under the auspices of the common law;-a character, in which minute knowledge of local law will be combined with the most profound attainments in general jurisprudence, and with that instructive eloquence, which never soars so high, or touches so potently, as when it grasps principles, which fix the destiny of nations, or strike down to the very roots of civil polity.

In comparing the extent of American jurisprudence with that of England, we shall find, that, if in some respects it is more narrow, in others it is more comprehensive. The whole ecclesiastical law of England, unless so far as it may operate on past cases, is obsolete. The genius of our institutions has universally prohibited any religious establishment, state or national. Nor is there the slightest reason to presume, that the imposition of tithes could ever be successfully introduced here, except by the strong arm of martial law, forcing its way by conquest. It was always resisted during our colonial dependency; and would now be thought at war with all, that we prize in religion or civil freedom. The numerous questions respecting tithes and moduses, quare impedits, and advowsons, and presentations, the fruitful progeny of that establishment, are gone to the same tomb, where the feudal tenures repose, in their robes of state, in dim and ancient majesty. In the next place, the right of primogeniture being abolished, and all estates descending in coparceny, and entails being practically changed into fee simple estates, there is no necessity for those intricate conveyances, settle

ments, and devises, with which the anxiety of parents and friends to provide against the inconveniences of the law has filled all the courts of England. Of this troubled stream of controversy we may indeed say, "It flows, and flows, and flows, and ever will flow on." In the next place, we are rid, not only of the feudal services and tenures, but of all the customary law, of our parent country, the ancient demesnes, the copy holds, the manorial customs and rights, and the customs of gavelkind, and borough English. The cases, in which prerogative or privilege can arise, are few, and limited by law. Long terms, and leases, and annuities, charged on land, are rare among us; and the complicated questions of contract and of rent, which fill the books, are of course scarcely heard of in our courts. We have no game laws to harass our peasantry, or to form an odious distinction for our gentlemen; and the melancholy inventions of later times connected with them, the spring-guns, and the concealed spears, and the man-traps, never cross our paths, or disturb our fancies. The penalties of a præmunire cannot be incurred; for we neither court nor fear papal bulls or excommunications. Outlawry, as a civil process, if it have a legal entity, is almost unknown in practice. An appeal of death or robbery never drew its breath among us; nor can it now be brought forth to battle in its dark array of armor, to astonish and confuse us, as it recently did all Westminster Hall. These are no small departments of the common law. A few of them, indeed, are almost obsolete in England; but the residue form a body of principles so artificial, and so difficult, that they leave behind them few, which can in these respects justly claim precedency.

With all these abridgments, however, our law is still sufficiently extensive to occupy all the time, and employ all the talents, and exhaust all the learning, of our ablest lawyers and judges. The studies of twenty years leave much behind, that is yet to be grappled with and mastered. And if the law of a single state is enough for a long life of labor and ambition, the task falls still heavier on those, who frequent the national courts, and are obliged to learn other branches of law, which are almost exclusively cognizable there. When it is considered, that the equity jurisprudence. of the courts of the United States is like that of England, with the occasional adoption of the peculiar equities of local law; and that their admiralty jurisdiction takes within its circuit, not merely the prize and maritime law, but seizures also for the breach of municipal regulations; when to these are added the interpretation of the treaties

and statutes of the United States, and the still more grave discussion of constitutional questions, and the relative rights of states and their citizens, in respect to other states ; — it cannot well be doubted, that the administration of justice is there filled with perplexities, that strain the human mind to its utmost bearings.

The most delicate, and, at the same time, the proudest attribute Jof American jurisprudence is the right of its judicial tribunals to decide questions of constitutional law. In other governments, these questions cannot be entertained or decided by courts of justice; and, therefore, whatever may be the theory of the constitution, the legislative authority is practically omnipotent, and there is no means of contesting the legality or justice of a law, but by an appeal to arms. This can be done only, when oppression weighs heavily and grievously on the whole people, and is then resisted by all, because it is felt by all. But the oppression, that strikes at a humble individual, though it robs him of character, or fortune, or life, is remediless; and, if it becomes the subject of judicial inquiry, judges may lament, but cannot resist, the mandates of the legislature.

Far different is the case in our country; and the privilege of bringing every law to the test of the constitution belongs to the humblest citizen, who owes no obedience to any legislative act, which transcends the constitutional limits. Some visionary statesmen, indeed, who affect to believe, that the legislature can do no wrong, and some zealous leaders, who affect to believe, that popu'lar opinion is the voice of unerring wisdom, have, at times, questioned this authority of courts of justice. If they were correct in their doctrine, we might as well be without a written constitution of government, since the minority would always be in complete subjection to the majority; and it is to be feared, that the experience of mankind has never shown, that the despotism of numbers has been more mild or equitable than that swayed by a single hand. This heresy, as questionable in point of sound policy, as it is unconstitutional in its language, has hitherto made but little progress among us. The wise, and the learned, and the virtuous, have been nearly unanimous in supporting that doctrine, which courts of justice have uniformly asserted, that the constitution is not the law for the legislature only, but is the law, and the supreme law, which is to direct and control all judicial proceedings.

The discussion of constitutional questions throws a lustre round the Bar, and gives a dignity to its functions, which can rarely belong to the profession in any other country. Lawyers are here,

emphatically, placed as sentinels upon the outposts of the constitution; and no nobler end can be proposed for their ambition or patriotism, than to stand as faithful guardians of the constitution, ready to defend its legitimate powers, and to stay the arm of legislative, executive, or popular oppression. If their eloquence can charm, when it vindicates the innocent, and the suffering under private wrongs; if their learning and genius can, with almost superhuman witchery, unfold the mazes and intricacies, by which the minute links of title are chained to the adamantine pillars of the law; - how much more glory belongs to them, when this eloquence, this learning, and this genius, are employed in defence of their country; when they breathe forth the purest spirit of morality and virtue in support of the rights of mankind; when they expound the lofty doctrines, which sustain, and connect, and guide, the destinies of nations; when they combat popular delusions at the expense of fame, and friendship, and political honors; when they triumph by arresting the progress of error and the march of power, and drive back the torrent, that threatens destruction equally to public liberty and to private property, to all that delights us in private life, and all that gives grace and authority in public office.

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This is a subject, which cannot too deeply engage the most solemn reflections of the profession. Our danger lies in the facility, with which, under the popular cast of our institutions, honest but visionary legislators, and artful leaders may approach to sap the foundations of our government. Other nations have their security against sudden changes, good or bad, in the habits of the people, or the nature of their institutions. They have a monarchy gifted with high prerogatives; or a nobility graced with wealth, and knowledge, and hereditary honors; or a stubborn national spirit, proud of ancient institutions, and obstinate against all reforms. These are obstacles, which resist the progress even of salutary changes; and ages sometimes. elapse before such reforms are introduced, and yet more ages before they are sanctioned by public reverence. The youthful vigor of our constitutions of government, and the strong encouragements, held out by free discussion to new inquiries and experiments, expose us to the opposite inconvenience of too little regard for what is established, and too warm a zeal for untried theories. This is our weak point of defence; and it will always be assailed by those, who pant for public favor, and hope for advancement in political struggles.

Under the pressure of temporary evils, or the misguided impulses of party, or plausible alarms for public liberty, it is not difficult to per

suade ourselves, that what is established is wrong; that what bounds the popular wishes is oppressive; and that what is untried will give permanent relief and safety. Frame constitutions of government with what wisdom and foresight we may, they must be imperfect, and leave something to discretion, and much to public virtue. It is in vain, that we insert bills of rights in our constitutions, as checks upon legislative power, unless there be firmness in courts, in the Vhour of trial, to resist the fashionable opinions of the day. The judiciary in itself has little power, except that of protection for others. It operates mainly by an appeal to the understandings of the wise and good; and its chief support is the integrity and in✔dependence of an enlightened bar. It possesses no control over the purse or arms of the Government. It can neither enact laws, nor raise armies, nor levy taxes. It stands alone in its functions, without the countenance either of the executive or the legislature to cheer or support it. Nay, its duty sometimes arrays it in hostility to the acts of both. But while, though few, our judges shall be fearless and firm in the discharge of their functions, popular leaders cannot possess a wide range of oppression, but must stand rebuked in their ambitious career for power. And it requires no uncommon spirit of prophecy to foresee, that, whenever the liberties of this country are to be destroyed, the first step in the conspiracy will be to bring courts of justice into odium; and, by overawing the timid, and removing the incorruptible, to break down the last barrier between the people and universal anarchy or despotism.

These are dangers common to all the states of the Union; but there are others, again, not less formidable to the National Government. State jealousies and state excitements, arising from accidental causes, or stimulated by local feelings or political disappointments, will continually create a pressure on the constitution of the United States, or shake those provisions, which are destined to hold Vthe state sovereignties in check. We have lived to see the pointed prohibitions, that no state shall coin money, emit bills of credit, make any thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debt, pass ex post facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts, receive, under the guidance of a spirit of over refined speculation, or the pressure of public calamities, a construction, which, if correct, will annihilate their supposed importance; which will make them an unreal mockery; a false and hollow sound; a dead and polluting letter; a letter which killeth, when the spirit would make alive. We have lived to see this constitution, the great bond and