lights once so familiarly known. It ought not, however, to be forgotten, that real actions have not gone into disuse by any sudden and arbitrary abolition, but from the intricacies and delays in the ancient proceedings therein, and from their unfitness for a convenient investigation of numerous questions arising from the complicated conveyances of modern times. For example, it is often a question of serious difficulty to decide, whether an estate be a fee simple, a fee tail, or an estate for life; the limitations of estates are sometimes very numerous, and the cases, in which they have lapsed, and the links of descent and heirship, are often imperfectly known. In all these cases there must be very great embarrassment thrown in the way of a demandant in a real action, and he may be turned round several times before he can obtain a decision upon his title. He may successively be driven from writs of entry of every degree to a formedon, and even to a writ of right; and, after all, he may be defeated by a mistake in the pleadings, (which he will not be allowed to amend,) having little or nothing to do with the merits of his cause. So that, if something be lost by the disuse of real actions, much (at least in England) has probably been gained in substantial justice and convenience, and even certainty of remedy.

It has been also suggested, that special pleading has suffered greatly by the modern changes in the study of law; and that it is every day less and less understood. If this were true, it might be satisfactorily accounted for upon grounds altogether distinct from the decline of professional learning. In most of the actions in modern use, special pleading is rarely necessary or advisable. When the action of assumpsit was first introduced, special pleas and issues were very common; but for more than a century they have disappeared in practice; and almost every defence, except that of the statute of limitations, is now determined under the general issue. With the exception above stated, a special plea is never heard of in actions on promissory notes, bills of exchange, policies of insurance, nor, indeed, any other simple contracts; and these form by far the largest portion of the business, which at present occupies the attention of courts of justice. In actions, too, for the recovery of real estate, whether the ancient real actions, or the modern action of ejectment, almost every defence is tried under the general issue. The same remark applies to trover, and, in general, all other actions on the case; and, with the exception of actions of debt, covenant, trespass, slander, and replevin, which are, comparatively speaking, infrequent, special pleading is entirely

out of use. Even in these actions, by the laxity of practice and the provisions of statutes, the use of it has been very much abridged.

These considerations disclose a sufficient reason, why special pleading may be less regarded in practice, than in former times, and why its relative value may not always be duly appreciated in the profession. It is unquestionably a branch of learning of vast, nay, of indispensable, importance to every lawyer. Without an accurate knowledge of its principles, it is impossible to frame actions or declarations for a variety of cases arising in common practice; and, if the foundations are not well laid, the superstructure cannot stand. It is the best, and perhaps the only, method to obtain a thorough and exact knowledge of the proper boundaries of actions, upon which, frequently, the success or loss of a cause may ultimately depend. Lord Ashburton, in his celebrated letter to a student of law, observes, It is usual to acquire some insight into real business under an eminent special pleader, previous to actual practice at the bar. This idea I beg leave strongly to second ; and, indeed, I have known few great men, who have not possessed this advantage." Nor should it be forgotten, that special pleading has a most salutary effect in disciplining the mind for an accurate investigation of principles, and accustoming it, by a sort of intellectual chemistry, to the most subtile analysis and combinations. It has been truly asserted by Lord Mansfield, that "The substantial rules of special pleading are founded in strong sense and the soundest and closest logic; and so appear, when well understood and explained; though, by being misunderstood and misapplied, they are often made use of as instruments of chicane." We remember to have heard the late Chief Justice Parsons (who was an excellent special pleader) declare, that, in knotty and difficult cases, he always found more certain and satisfactory results in trying them by the rules of special pleading, than by any other method. Sir William Jones, in his preface to the speeches of Isæus, has beautifully illustrated the same thought. "Our science," says he, "of special pleading is an excellent logic; it is admirably calculated for the purpose of analyzing a cause, of extracting, like the roots of an equation, the true points in dispute, and referring them, with all imaginable simplicity, to the court, or the jury. It is reducible to the strictest rules of pure dialectic; and, if it were scientifically taught in our public seminaries of learning, would fix the attention, give a habit of reasoning closely, quicken the apprehension, and invigorate the understanding, as effectually as the famed peripatetic system, which, how ingen

ious and subtile soever, is not so honorable, so laudable, or so profitable, as the science, in which Littleton exhorts his sons to employ their courage and care." Such commendation supersedes the necessity of all farther discussion of the importance of pleading.

But we doubt the fact, that special pleading is not as well understood, as in former times. On the contrary, we incline to believe, that by eminent lawyers its principles are now more fully comprehended, and more philosophically examined, than in any preceding period. The age of scholastic quibbling and petty subtilty has passed away, and the quaint trifling, which disfigured and disgraced the science, is no longer in fashion. Special pleading is now applied to its original and proper purpose, the attainment of substantial justice, and the introduction of certainty of remedy. The good sense and sound logic of modern times has substituted, for the artificial pedantry and narrow maxims of the dark ages of the law, rules, which commend themselves to all men, by their intrinsic propriety and excellence for deciding contested rights. The best ancient treatise on the subject is Mr. Euer's Doctrina Placitandi, a book, which Lord Chief Justice Willes pronounced, in his time, to contain more law and learning than any other book he knew (2 Wils. R. 88.); yet what is this, when compared with the finished elementary and practical treatises of Mr. Lawes or Mr. Chitty? It were, indeed, desirable, that modern pleaders should endeavour to imitate, more generally, the pointed brevity and precision of Rastall's Entries, and waste fewer words in their drafts of declarations, which,

"Like a wounded snake, drag their slow length along."

It might not be useless for them to consider, that the great aim ought to be, not how much, but how little, may be inserted with professional safety. Here, at least, the study of the ancients would amply repay all their toil, and subserve, essentially, the public interests. There is certainly some danger, that the current of public opinion, aided by legislative enactments, and not a little accelerated by a distaste for the prolixity of modern pleading, may bring the science itself into disrepute and neglect. If such an event should happen, it will be matter of most serious regret. We hope, that the few observations, which we have hazarded, may attract the attention of the rising generation, and call forth abler pens in the vindication and support of its principles and practice.

There are some other topics, upon which it was our intention to trouble our professional readers with a few observations, in proof of the opinion, that the law, as a science, never was so well understood, nor so well taught, as at the present period, and yet that a profound and comprehensive knowledge of it never was of more difficult attainment. We may, however, safely pass from general reasoning, and appeal to facts within the reach of every professional gentleman. In our own country the advancement of the knowledge of the science has been truly wonderful. The bar and the benches of almost every state in the Union have, within the last twenty years, very strikingly improved. There are lawyers and judges amongst us, who would sustain the weight and dignity of Westminster Hall. And some of our reports exhibit arguments and opinions, which, for propriety, and force, and logic, and acuteness, and erudition, have not been excelled in the proudest days of the law. This rapid improvement has, without doubt, been greatly aided by the invigorating influence of the modern treatises in almost every branch of law; but it has also owed much to the increased diligence, which a lofty ambition of excellence has stimulated among the master spirits of the profession.

But it is time for us to call the attention of our readers to the immediate subject of this article. Mr. Hoffman has published a Course of Legal Study, which he modestly addresses to students, but which is well worthy the perusal of every gentleman of the bar. Many works have been heretofore written, professedly for the direction of persons engaged in the study of the law; but, for the most part, these works have, in a didactic form, laid down elementary precepts for the moral conduct, the preparatory attainments, or the style of elocution and oratory, proper for an eminent advocate. Some, indeed, are little more than a distillation from Quinctilian's Institutes and Cicero's Orator, without preserving the pungent essence or eloquence of the originals. Mr. Hoffman's work, on the contrary, is almost entirely practical; and it contains a complete course of legal study, with a catalogue of the principal books to be consulted or read under all the titles of the law. The introduction is written with a good deal of force and good taste, and in a tone of strong and sensible argumentation. In point both of matter and manner, it is highly creditable to the talents and acquirements of the author.

The general course of study, proposed by Mr. Hoffman, is summed up in the following general syllabus

"I. Moral and Political Philosophy.

"II. The Elementary and Constitutional Principles of the Municipal Law of England; and herein,

"1st. Of the Feudal Law.

"2d. The Institutes of the Municipal Law generally.

"3d. Of the Origin and Progress of the Common Law.

"III. The Law of Real Rights and Real Remedies.

"IV. The Law of Personal Rights and Personal Remedies. "V. The Law of Equity.

"VI. The Lex Mercatoria.

"VII. The Law of Crimes and Punishments.

"VIII. The Law of Nations.

"IX. The Maritime and Admiralty Law.

"X. The Civil or Roman Law.

"XI. The Constitution and Laws of the United States of America. "XII. The Constitution and Laws of the several States of the Union.

"XIII. Political Economy." p. 32.

This is followed by a particular syllabus under every title of the general syllabus, in which are collected the best works on every successive subject belonging to the heads, under which they are arranged. Connected with these heads is a series of notes, or perpetual commentary upon the character and relative value of the authors, whose works are cited, or the history and relative importance of the topics, which they discuss, interspersed with many judicious observations of a more general nature, which exhibit to great advantage the liberality, sound judgment, and juridical knowledge of the author. As a specimen of the style and spirit of the work, we subjoin the note on the reading of reports, and particularly of leading cases.

These observations of Mr. Hoffman are perfectly practical, and, for the most part, accurate and just. In respect to the praise bestowed on Mr. Viner's Abridgment, we are constrained to differ from the learned gentleman. We are far from thinking it the safest abridgment for reference. It is a very irregular fabric, built up on the basis of Rolle's Abridgment, with an incorporation of the principal matter of Fitzherbert, and Brook, and other old abridgers. It abounds with inaccuracies and repetitions; and it