it immediately attracted universal attention in England. It was soon considered as an indispensable part of the library of every statesman and private gentleman. It invigorated the ambition of students, and relieved them at once from many of the discouragements and difficulties, which previously embarrassed every step of their progress. There are lawyers yet living, who can attest the prodigious change, which it once produced in our country. Law was no longer considered a dry and sterile study. It at once became fashionable; and this circumstance, combining with the nature of our political institutions, (which make a legal education, if not a prerequisite, at least a very important qualification, for political distinction and public office,) has contributed in a very high degree to that great increase of the bar, and that ascendency in society, which distinguish the profession, in this, more than in any other country.

It was almost impossible, that such a strong excitement should not awaken the ardor of other gentlemen of juridical learning and leisure, to follow out into its regular details a design, which had been so nobly conceived and executed by the illustrious commentator. Accordingly, there has been a larger number of treatises on the leading topics of the common law produced within the last half century, than in all preceding time. And these treatises are, in general, distinguished by a scientific distribution, exact method, propriety of style, and clear exposition of principles and authorities, which are rarely to be found in any of our older juridical essays or dissertations. In fact, the bulk of former elementary works was little more than a collection of decisions under general heads, without any successful attempt to systematize the matter, or subject it to a critical analysis. Among the most striking exceptions to this remark (for some exceptions exist) on the civil side, are the law tracts of Lord Bacon, the profound, but imperfect treatises of Lord Chief Baron Gilbert, the ingenious sketch of the Law of Tenures by Sir Martin Wright, and the brief, but very exact treatise on Equity, attributed to Mr. Ballow; and, on the criminal side, the very learned and authoritative works of Lord Hale, the copious digest of Mr. Serjeant Hawkins, and the truly admirable discourses. of Sir Michael Foster. We forbear to speak at present of Comyn's Digest, intending hereafter to notice it in another place.

Among the modern works, of which we have been speaking, there are not a few on subjects of the very first importance, and of almost daily occurrence in practice, for exact information in which

the student would have searched in vain in the abridgments and treatises of former ages. Where, for instance, shall we look for a work, like Mr. Fearne's Essay on Contingent Remainders and Executory Devises? This subject, which constituted one of the most obscure, and must for ever remain one of the most intricate titles of the common law, had been already sketched out by the masterly hand of Lord Chief Baron Gilbert; but, like all his other writings, it was left in a detached and imperfect shape. It was reserved for Mr. Fearne to honor the profession by a treatise so profound and accurate, that it became the guide of the ablest lawyers; yet so luminous in method and explanations, that it is level to the capacity of every attentive student. He has, in fact, exhausted the subject; and this chef d'ouvre will for ever remain a monument of his skill, acuteness, and research. All, that the most accomplished lawyer can reasonably hope, is to add a commentary of new cases and principles, as they arise, without venturing to touch the sacred fabric of his master. The treatise of Lord Redesdale on Pleadings in Chancery is of the same masterly and original character. It has traced out the nature and extent of the jurisdiction and practice of courts of chancery with so much brevity, perspicuity, and analytical exactness, that probably to this, more than any other work, we owe some of the most valuable improvements in the principles, as well as the proceedings, which regulate the administration of equity. Later works on the same subject (such as Mr. Cooper's) have added much valuable matter, founded on recent decisions; but the basis of these, as well as of all future works, must rest on the solid foundations, laid by the noble Chancellor. Lord Eldon pronounced its eulogy in his best manner, when he declared, that "it is a wonderful effort to collect what is deduced from authorities, speaking so little what is clear, that the surprise is not from the difficulty of understanding all he has said, but that so much can be understood."

There are many other treatises upon particular titles of the law, which might properly be taken notice of in this place, in vindication of the opinion we have expressed; but it is beside our present purpose to analyze the merits of juridical authors. We cannot, however, close these brief remarks, without calling the attention of our readers to the very excellent treatises of Mr. Park and Mr. Marshall on Insurance, which have done so much towards giving a

* See Bacon's Abridgment, Guillim's Edition, title, Remainder and Reversion.

scientific cast to doctrines so recently incorporated into the common law. Their merit is unquestionably of a very high order; and yet, probably, the most perfect theoretical work on Insurance is that of the learned Emerigon, which (strange to tell) has never been translated, although we have been almost overrun with transfusions from German and French sciolists by the enterprise or selfishness of English booksellers. We trust, that the time is not far distant, when Pothier, and Emerigon, and Valin will be accessible in our native tongue to every lawyer, and will be as familiarly known to them, as they now are to the jurists of continental Europe.

It has been doubted by some persons, whether the present facilities in the study of law have a tendency to make as profound and accurate lawyers, as the old dry and desultory course. It is supposed, that the comparative ease, with which the student may now advance into the most intricate doctrines, impairs, if it does not extinguish, that ardor of pursuit, which distinguished and disciplined the lawyers of the black-lettered times. For ourselves, we do not perceive the slightest foundation for the opinion, and we deem it radically erroneous. It might as well be contended, that turnpikes through every part of a thickly settled country have a tendency to obliterate the knowledge of its surface or its cities. It is true, that thereby the old roads are less known and less travelled; but who can doubt, that by such means the facility of intercourse, and the interchange of every thing important in the commerce of life, are greatly augmented, and that public improvements circulate with tenfold rapidity and force? Nor is it very easy to perceive, how any particular science can be injuriously affected by the thorough development of its principles and practice. If the lucubrations of twenty years were necessary in former times, (as Fortescue informs us they were,) to acquire a competent knowledge of the law for ordinary practice; and if the whole of that mass can, by modern helps, be mastered in half that period, it is certainly so much time gained in the business of life; and time, in the science of law, as well as in almost every thing else, is of incalculable importance. The modern works do not teach the law in any new and superficial manner. There is no royal road to this, any more than to the science of mathematics. But the principles are now more closely investigated, the problems more fully enunciated, and the boundaries between the known and unknown more exactly defined. Instead of sparse and scattered maxims, we have regular systems, built up with general symmetry of parts; and the necessary investiga

tions in new and difficult cases are conducted with more safety, because they are founded on inductions from rules better established and more exactly limited. Yet, with all these advantages, to become an eminent lawyer is now a task of vast labor and difficulty. The business of the profession has extended itself, as we have already intimated, incalculably, both in quantity and variety. The most diligent study and practice of a long life are scarcely sufficient to place any gentleman beyond the necessity of continual exertions to keep pace with the current of new opinions and doctrines. It is true, that, in the humbler walks of the profession, men cf feeble talents and acquirements may now obtain a maintenance, and sometimes, perhaps, accumulate a fortune; but this is no more than what the experience of all ages has shown. There have always been obscure attorneys, whose industry, or cunning, or patronage has given them the command of that portion of business, which is not without profit, if it be not attended with honor. But the sphere of professional activity is now greatly enlarged; and talents and acquirements are more easily measured, since the mysteries of the science are equally accessible to all; and little room is now left in the obscurities of a barbarous language for imaginary excellence, or for the concealment of quackery in the repetition of a technical jargon. That some titles of the common law are not as well understood, as in former times, may be safely admitted; and it is because they are either obsolete, or their relative importance is greatly diminished. But as to all the law in modern practical use, we are distinctly of opinion, that the science is better understood than in any former age. A philosophical spirit of investigation now pervades the bar and the bench, and we are freed from the blind pedantry and technical quibbles of the old schools. Many of the doctrines relative to the feudal tenures, such as reliefs, premier seisin, escuage, chivalry, villanage, grand sergeanty, homage, frank marriage, profession, attaints, and others of a similar nature, are now very little known; but, surely, it is not to be inferred, because subjects so utterly insignificant have sunk into obscurity, that the law has lost its vigor, or the profession lack learning. Probably few, if any, lawyers in our country are intimately acquainted with the law of copyholds and advowsons; yet it would be strange to assert, that the want of such knowledge was a gross defect in professional education, when the subject-matter, upon which it can operate, has no existence in the United States.

The same remarks are in a good degree applicable to real actions, with all their accompaniments of process, essoins, aid prayers, vouchers, receit, &c. The irresistible tide of time has swept away the actions of assize, the writs of aiel, besaiel, and mort d'ancestor, cessavit, quo jure, ne injuste vexes, de rationabilibus divisis, secta ad molendinum, nuper obiit, quod permittat, and the trial by battle; and though, in our own state, writs of entry, formedon, and right still exist, yet they have been moulded into so simple a form, that most of the ancient peculiarities are utterly extinct; and in England, as well as in most of the states of the Union, they are gone with the years beyond the flood, and the action of ejectment has almost universally superseded all real actions. It is, perhaps, just matter of regret, that real actions have so entirely sunk into disuse; since many doctrines applicable to modern remedies can scarcely be thoroughly understood, without reference to this department of antiquated learning. Many principles in every system of municipal law must be purely technical, and sometimes of arbitrary regulation; and the reason of them may be lost, long before the principles themselves disappear in practice. As long as such principles continue to exist, it is important to preserve the knowledge of the original reasons, on which they are founded, and the limits, which regulate their application. An instance illustrative of these remarks occurred in the modern case of Taylor vs. Horde (1 Burr. R. 60.) It there became material to ascertain the exact nature of disseisins in the ancient law. Lord Mansfield on that occasion said, "The precise definition of what constituted a disseisin, which made the disseisor the tenant to the demandant's precipe, though the right owner's entry was not taken away, was once well known, but it is not now to be found. The more we read, unless we are careful to distinguish, the more we shall be confounded."-We have heard it questioned by a late learned judge, whether Lord Mansfield had gone to the bottom of this doctrine. But, however this may be, the case abundantly instructs us, how many distressing doubts may arise from the partial eclipse of

We take this occasion to correct an error, into which Mr. Hoffman has inadvertently fallen, in supposing, (p. 144,) that real actions are in daily use in Massachusetts, with all their concomitants of voucher, counterplea of voucher, &c. &c. Real actions are here in use, and with them all those pleadings and proceedings, which are necessary for the furtherance of justice between the parties. But all the peculiarities of process, essoins, and vouchers, and counterpleas, &c., are obsolete, and superseded by a great simplicity of proceeding, greater, perhaps, than attends even the formal proceedings in ejectments.