gous experiments, leads naturally to the interminable expansion of inquiry and of know. ledge:-but observation, for the most part, centres in itself, and tends rather to gratify and allay our curiosity, than to rouse or in flame it. stances with which that science is conversant; | have been but a remote and casual auxiliary but over other substances which stand in some to him whose genius afterwards found the relation to them; and to which, accordingly, means of employing those phenomena to that science is capable of being applied. It guide him through the trackless waters of is over the earth and the ocean that we have the ocean.-Epxeriment, therefore, necessari extended our dominion by means of our know-ly implies power; and, by suggesting analeledge of the stars. Now, applying this case to that of the philosophy of Mind, and assuming, as we seem here entitled to assume, that it has invested us with no new power over mind itself,-what, we would ask, are the other objects over which our power is increased by means of our knowledge of mind? Is there any other substance to which that knowledge can possibly be applied? Is there any thing else that we either know better, or can dispose of more effectually in consequence of our observations on our own intellectual constitution? It is evident, we humbly conceive, that these questions must be answered in the negative. The most precise knowledge which the metaphysician can acquire by reflecting on the subjects of his consciousness, can give him no new power over the mind in which he discovers those subjects; and it is almost a self-evident proposition, that the most accurate knowledge of the subjects of consciousness can give him no power over any thing but mind. There is one other little point connected with this argument, which we wish to settle with Mr. Stewart. In speaking of the useful applications that may be ultimately made of the knowledge derived from observation, we had said, that for the power or the benefit so obtained, mankind were indebted-not to the observer, but to him who suggested the application. Mr. Stewart admits the truth of this-but adds, that the case is exactly the same with the knowledge derived from experiment-and that the mere empiric is on a footing with the mere observer. Now, we do not think the cases exactly the same;-and it is in their difference that we conceive the great disadvantage of observation to consist. Whoever makes an experiment, must have the power at least to repeat that experiment -and, in almost every case, to repeat it with some variation of circumstances. Here, therefore, is one power necessarily ascertained and established, and an invitation held out to increase that power, by tracing it through all the stages and degrees of its existence: while he who merely observes a phenomenon over which he has no control, neither exercises any power, nor holds out the prospect of acquiring any power, either over the subject of his observation, or over any other substance. He who first ascertained, by experiment, the expansive force of steam, and its destruction by cold-or the identity of lightning and electricity, and the consequent use of the conducting rod, plainly bestowed, in that instant, a great power upon mankind, of which it was next to impossible that some important application should not be speedily made. But he who first observed the periodical immersions and emersions of the satellites of Jupiter, certainly neither acquired nor bestowed any power in the first instance; and seems to After having thus attemped to prove that experiment has no prerogative above mere observation, Mr. Stewart thinks it worth while to recur again to the assertion, that the philosophy of mind does admit of experiments; and, after remarking, rather rashly, that "the whole of a philosopher's life, if he spends it to any purpose, is one continued series of experiments on his own faculties and powers," he goes on to state, that hardly any experiment can be imagined, which has not already been tried by the hand of Nature; displaying, in the infinite varieties of human genius and pursuits, the astonishingly diversified effects, resulting from the possible combinations, of those elementary faculties and principles, of which every man is conscious in himself. Savage society, and all the different modes of civilization; the different callings and professions of individuals, whether liberal or mechanical; the prejudiced clown;-the factitious man of fashion ;-the varying phases of character from infancy to old age;the prodigies effected by human art in all the merce,-religion:-but above all, the records of objects around us;-laws,-government,-comthought, preserved in those volumes which fill our libraries; what are they but experiments, by which Nature illustrates, for our instruction, on her own grand scale, the varied range of man's intellectual fashioning his mind?"-Prel. Diss. pp. xlv, xlvi. faculties, and the omnipotence of education in If experiment be rightly defined the intentional arrangement of substances in our power, for the purpose of observing the result, then these are not experiments; and neither imply, nor tend to bestow, that power which enters into the conception of all experiment. But the argument, in our apprehension, is chargeable with a still more radical fallacy. The philosophy of mind is distinctly defined, by Mr. Stewart himself, to be that which is employed "on phenomena of which we are conscious;" its peculiar object and aim is stated to be, "to ascertain the laws of our constitution, in so far as they can be ascer tained, by attention to the subjects of our consciousness;" and, in a great variety of pas sages, it is explained, that the powers by which all this is to be effected, are, reflection upon our mental operations, and the faculty of calm and patient attention to the sensations of which we are conscious. But, if this be the proper province and object of the philoso phy of mind, what benefit is the student to receive from observing the various effects of manners and situation, in imparting a peculiar colour or bias to the character of the sav age and the citizen, "the prejudiced clown, and factitious man of fashion?" The obser vation of such varieties is, no doubt, a very 89 As this part of our speculations has incurred more of Mr. Stewart's disapprobation than any thing which we have hitherto attempted to defend, we think ourselves called upon to state the substance of his objections, in his own eloquent and impressive words. After quoting the sentence we have already transcribed, he proceeds:— Curious and a very interesting occupation;-|sation, in respect both to the certainty and the but we humbly conceive it to form no part, or, extent of its application; at the same time at least, a very small and inconsiderable part, that we felt ourselves constrained to add, that, of the occupation of a student of philosophy. even as to this habit of the mind, Philosophy It is an occupation which can only be effec- could lay no claim to the honours of a distually pursued, in the world, by travelling, and covery; since the principle was undoubtedly intercourse with society; and, at all events, familiar to the feelings of all men, and was by vigilant observation of what is shown to acted upon, with unvarying sagacity, in almost > us, by our senses, of the proceedings of our every case where it could be employed with fellow-men. The philosophy of mind, how- advantage; though by persons who had never ever, is to be cultivated in solitude and silence thought of embodying it in a maxim, or at-by calm reflection on our own mental ex- tending to it as a law of general application. periences, and patient attention to the sub- The whole scheme of education, it was ob Yrjects of our own consciousness. But can we served, has been founded on this principle, ever be conscious of those varieties of temper in every age of the world. "The groom," it and character that distinguish the different was added, "who never heard of ideas or asconditions of human life?—or, even independ-sociations, feeds the young war-horse to the ent of Mr. Stewart's definition-is it reconcila- sound of the trumpet; and the unphilosophible to common usage or general understand- cal artists who tame elephants, or train dan ing, to call our attention to such particulars cing dogs, proceed on the same obvious and the study of the philosophy of mind?-Is it familiar principle." not, on the contrary, universally understood to be the peculiar and limited province of that philosophy, to explain the nature and distinctions of those primary functions of the mind, which are possessed in common by men of all vocations and all conditions?-to treat, in short, of perception, and attention, and memory, and imagination, and volition, and judgment, and all the other powers or "This argument, I suspect, leads a little too far faculties into which our intellectual nature for the purpose of its author; inasmuch as it con may be distinguished?-Is it not with these, cludes still more forcibly (in consequence of the that Hobbes, and Locke, and Berkeley, and great familiarity of the subject) against Physics, Reid, and all the other philosophers who have strictly so called, than against the Science of Mind. reasoned or philosophised about mind, have force of gravity, yet knows how to add to the mo The savage, who never heard of the accelerating been occupied ?-or, what share of Mr. Stew- mentum of his missile weapons, by gaining an emiart's own invaluable publications is devoted nence; though a stranger to Newton's third law of to those slighter shades of individual charac-motion, he applies it to its practical use, when he ter, to which alone his supposed experiments have any reference? The philosophy of the human mind, we conceive, is conversant only with what is common to all human beings and with those faculties of which every individual of the species is equally conscious: and though it may occasionally borrow illustrations, or even derive some reflected light from the contemplation of those slighter varieties that distinguish one individual from another, this evidently forms no part of the study of the subjects of our consciousness, and can never be permitted to rank as a legitimate part of that philosophy. the shore: in the use of his sling, he illustrates, This exhausts almost all that we have to say in defence of our supposed heresies as to the importance and practical value of the philosophy of mind, considered with refer-matical accuracy with which he adapts the obliquity ence to the primary and more elementary both cases (in that of the man as well as of the of his body to the rate of his circular speed. In faculties of man. With regard to the Asso- brute) this practical knowledge is obtruded on the ciating principle, we have still a word or two organs of external sense by the hand of Nature to add. In our original observations we ad- herself: But it is not on that account the less useful mitted, that this principle seemed to stand in to evolve the general theorems which are thus em a situation somewhat different from the sim-bodied with their particular applications; and to combine them in a systematical and scientific form, pler phenomena of the mind-and that the for our own instruction and that of others. Does elucidations which Philosophy had furnished it detract from the value of the theory of pneuma with regard to its operations, were not so easily recognised as previously impressed on our consciousness, as most of her revelations. We allowed, therefore, that some utility might be derived from the clear exposition of this more complicated part of our mental organi tics to remark, that the same effects of a vacuum, and of the elasticity and pressure of the air, which afford an explanation of its most curious pheno coeval with the first breath which we draw; and mena, are recognized in an instinctive process exemplified in the month of every babe and suck ling?"-Prel. Diss. p ix. lxi. Now, without recurring to what we have | is it to be believed, that there can be many already said as to the total absence of power occasions for its employment in the gover in all cases of mere observation, we shall ment of the human mind, of which ma merely request our readers to consider, what have never yet had the sense to bethink is the circumstance that bestows a value, an themselves? Or, can it be seriously mainimportance, or an utility, upon the discovery tained, that it is capable of applications as and statement of those general laws, which much more extensive and important than are admitted, in the passage now quoted, to those which have been vulgarly made in pas have been previously exemplified in practice. ages, as are the uses of Newton's third law Is it any thing else, than their capacity of a of motion, compared with the operation of more extensive application ?-the possibility the savage in pushing his canoe from the or facility of employing them to accomplish shore? If Mr. Stewart really entertained any many things to which they had not been pre- such opinion as this, it was incumbent upon viously thought applicable? If Newton's third him to have indicated, in a general way, the law of motion could never have been em- departments in which he conceived that these ployed for any other purpose than to set afloat great discoveries were to be made; and to the canoe of the savage-or if the discovery have pointed out some, at least, of the new of the pressure of the atmosphere had led to applications, on the assumption of which nothing more than an explanation of the alone he could justify so ambitious a paral operation of sucking-would there have been lel. Instead of this, however, we do not any thing gained by stating that law, or that find that he has contemplated any other discovery, in general and abstract terms? spheres for the application of this principle, Would there have been any utility, any dignity than those which have been so long conceded or real advancement of knowledge, in the mere to it—the formation of taste, and the conduct technical arrangement of these limited and fa- of education: and, with regard to the last and miliar phenomena under a new classification? most important of these, he has himself reThere can be but one answer to these in- corded an admission, which to us, we will terrogatories. But we humbly conceive, that confess, appears a full justification of all that all the laws of mental operation which phi- we have now been advancing, and a sutflosophy may collect and digest, are exactly cient answer to the positions we have been in this last predicament. They have no ap- endeavouring to combat. "In so far," Mr. plication to any other phenomena than the Stewart observes, "as education is effectual particular ones by which they are suggested and salutary, it is founded on those princi and which they were familiarly employed to ples of our nature which have forced them produce. They are not capable of being ex- selves upon general observation, in consetended to any other cases; and all that is quence of the experience of ages." That gained by their digestion into a system, is a the principle of association is to be reckoned more precise and methodical enumeration of in the number of these, Mr. Stewart certainly truths that were always notorious. will not deny; and our proposition is, that all From the experience and consciousness of the principles of our nature which are ca all men, in all ages, we learn that, when two pable of any useful application, have thus or more objects are frequently presented to-"forced themselves on general observation" gether, the mind passes spontaneously from many centuries ago, and can now receive one to the other, and invests both with some-little more than a technical nomenclature and thing of the colouring which belongs to the description from the best efforts of philosophy. most important. This is the law of association; which is known to every savage, and to every clown, in a thousand familiar instances: and, with regard to its capacity of useful application, it seems to be admitted, that it has been known and acted upon by parents, pedagogues, priests, and legislators, in all ages of the world; and has even been employed, as an obvious and easy instrument, by such humble judges of intellectual resources, as common horse-jockies and bear-dancers. If this principle, then, was always known, and regularly employed wherever any advantage could be expected from its employment, what reason have we to imagine, that any substantial benefit is to be derived from its scientific investigation, or any important uses hereafter discovered for it, in consequence merely of investing it with a precise name, and stating, under one general theorem, the common law of its operation? If such persons as grooms and masters of menageries have been guided, by their low intellects and Bordid motives, to its skilful application as a means of directing even the lower animals, The sentiments to which we have ventured to give expression in these and our former hasty observations, were suggested to us, we will confess, in a great degree, by the striking contrast between the wonders which have been wrought by the cultivation of modera Physics, and the absolute nothingness of the effects that have hitherto been produced by the labours of the philosophers of mind. We have only to mention the names of Astrono my, Chemistry, Mechanics, Optics, and Navigation;-nay, we have only to look around us, in public or in private,-to cast a glance on the machines and manufactures, the ships, observatories, steam engines, and elaborato ries, by which we are perpetually surrounded, —or to turn our eyes on the most common * Upwards of thirty years have now elapsed since this was written; during which a taste or metaphysical inquiry has revived in France, and been greatly encouraged in Germany. Yet I am its votaries can yet point; or what practical improve not aware to what useful applications of the science ment or increase of human power they can trace to its cultivation. in its infancy, and that it will bear its fruit in due season. The truth is, that it has, of necessity, been more constantly and diligently cultivated than any other. It has always been the first object with men of talent and good affections, to influence and to form the minds of others, and to train their own to the highest pitch of vigour and perfection: and accordingly, it is admitted by Mr. Stewart, that the most important principles of this philosophy have been long ago "forced upon general observation" by the feelings and experience of past ages. Independently, however, of this, the years that have passed since Hobbes, and Locke, and Malebranche, and Leibnitz drew the attention of Europe to this study, and the very extraordinary genius and talents of those who have since addicted themselves to it, are far more than enough to have brought it, if not to perfection, at least to such a degree of excellence, as no longer to leave it a matter of dispute, whether it was really destined to add to our knowledge and our power, or to produce any sensible effects upon the happiness and condition of mankind. That society has made great advances in comfort and intelligence, during that period, is indisputable; but we do not find that Mr. Stewart himself imputes any great part of this improvement to our increased knowledge of our mental constitution; and indeed it is quite obvious, that it is an effect resulting from the increase of political freedom-the influences of reformed Christianity-the invention of printing-and that improvement and multiplication of the mechanical arts, that have rendered the body of the people far more busy, wealthy, inventive and independent, than they ever were in any former period of society. articles of our dress and furniture,-on the | accomplished, by an instrument which has mirrors, engravings, books, fire-arms, watches, hitherto effected so little? It is in vain for barometers, thunder-rods and opera-glasses, Mr. Stewart to say, that the science is yet but that present themselves in our ordinary dwell ings, to feel how vast a progress has been made in exploring and subduing the physical elements of nature, and how stupendous an increase the power of man has received, by the experimental investigation of her laws. Now is any thing in this astonishing survey more remarkable, than the feeling with which it is always accompanied, that what we have hitherto done in any of these departments is but a small part of what we are yet destined to accomplish; and that the inquiries which have led us so far, will infallibly carry us still farther. When we ask, however, for the trophies of the philosophy of mind, or inquire for the vestiges of her progress in the more plastic and susceptible elements of human genius and character, we are answered only by ingenuous silence, or vague anticipations and find nothing but a blank in the record of her actual achievements. The knowledge and the power of man over inanimate nature has been increased tenfold in the course of the last two centuries. The knowledge and the power of man over the mind of man remains almost exactly where it was at the first development of his faculties. The natural philosophy of antiquity is mere childishness and dotage, and their physical inquirers are mere pigmies and drivellers, compared with their successors in the present age; but their logicians, and metaphysicians, and moralists, and, what is of infinitely more consequence, the practical maxims and the actual effects resulting from their philosophy of mind, are very nearly on a level with the philosophy of the present day. The end and aim of all that philosophy is to make education rational and eflective, and to train men to such sagacity and force of judgment, as to induce them to cast off the bondage of prejudices, and to follow happiness and virtue with assured and steady steps. We do not know, however, what modern work contains juster, or more profound views on the subject of education, than may be collected from the writings of Xenophon and Quintilian, Polybius, Plutarch, and Cicero: and, as to that sagacity and just ness of thinking, which, after all, is the fruit by which this tree of knowledge must be ultimately known, we are not aware of many modern performances that exemplify it in a stronger degree, than many parts of the histories of Tacitus and Thucydides, or the Satires and Epistles of Horace. In the conduct of business and affairs, we shall find Pericles, and Caesar, and Cicero, but little inferior to the philosophical politicians of the present day; and, for lofty and solid principles of practical ethics, we might safely match Epictetus and Antoninus (without mentioning Aristotle, Plato, Plutarch, Xenophon, or Polybius,) with most of our modern speculators. Where, then, it may be asked, are the performances of this philosophy, which makes such large promises? or, what are the grounds upon which we should expect to see so much To us, therefore, it certainly does appear, that the lofty estimate which Mr. Stewart has again made of the practical importance of his favourite studies, is one of those splendid visions by which men of genius have been so often misled, in the enthusiastic pursuit of science and of virtue. That these studies are of a very dignified and interesting nature, we admit most cheerfully-that they exercise and delight the understanding, by reasonings and inquiries, at once subtle, cautious, and profound, and either gratify or exalt a keen and aspiring curiosity, must be acknowledged by all who have been initiated into their elements. Those who have had the good fortune to be so initiated by the writings of Mr. Stewart, will be delighted to add, that they are blended with so many lessons of gentle and of ennobling virtue-so many striking precepts and bright examples of liberality, high-mindedness, and pure taste-as to be calculated, in an eminent degree, to make men love goodness and aspire to elegance, and to improve at once the understanding, the imagination, and the heart. But this must be the limit of our praise. The sequel of this article is not now re printed, for the reasons already stated. NOVELS, TALES, AND PROSE WORKS OF FICTION. As I perceive I have, in some of the following papers, made a sort of apology for seek. ing to direct the attention of my readers to things so insignificant as Novels, it may be worth while to inform the present generation that, in my youth, writings of this sort were rated very low with us-scarcely allowed indeed to pass as part of a nation's permanent literature -and generally deemed altogether unworthy of any grave critical notice. Nor, in truth in spite of Cervantes and Le Sage-and Marivaux, Rousseau, and Voltaire abroad-and even our own Richardson and Fielding at home-would it have been easy to controvert that opinion, in our England, at the time: For certainly a greater mass of trash and rubbish never disgraced the press of any country, than the ordinary Novels that filled and supported our circulating libraries, down nearly to the time of Miss Edgeworth's first appearance. There had been, the Vicar of Wakefield, to be sure, before; and Miss Burney's Evelina and Cecilia -and Mackenzie's Man of Feeling, and some bolder and more varied fictions of the Misses Lee. But the staple of our Novel market was, beyond imagination, despicable: and had consequently sunk and degraded the whole department of literature, of which it had usurped the name. All this, however, has since been signally, and happily, changed; and that rabble rout of abominations driven from our confines for ever. The Novels of Sir Walter Scott are, beyond all question, the most remarkable productions of the present age; and have made a sensa tion, and produced an effect, all over Europe, to which nothing parallel can be mentioned since the days of Rousseau and Voltaire; while, in our own country, they have attained a place, inferior only to that which must be filled for ever by the unapproachable glory of Shakespeare. With the help, no doubt, of their political revolutions, they have produced, in France, Victor Hugo, Balsac, Paul de Cocq, &c., the promessi sposi in Italy-and Cooper, at least, in America.-In England, also, they have had imitators enough; in the persons of Mr. James, Mr. Lover, and others. But the works most akin to them in excellence have rather, I think, been related as collaterals than as descendants. Miss Edgeworth, indeed, stands more in the line of their ancestry; and I take Miss Austen and Sir E. L. Bulwer to be as intrinsically original;—as well as the great German writers, Goethe, Tiek, Jean Paul, Richter, &c. Among them, however, the honour of this branch of literature has at any rate been splendidly redeemed;—and now bids fair to maintain its place, at the head of all that is graceful and instructive in the productions of modern genius. (July, 1809.) Tales of Fashionable Life. By Miss EDGEWORTH, Author of "Practical Education," "Belinda," ," "Castle Rackrent," &c. 12mo. 3 vols. London: 1809. If it were possible for reviewers to Envy the authors who are brought before them for judgment, we rather think we should be tempted to envy Miss Edgeworth ;-not, however, so much for her matchless powers of probable invention her never-failing good sense and cheerfulness-nor her fine discrimination of characters-as for the delightful consciousness of having done more good than any other writer, male or female, of her gene ration. Other arts and sciences have their use, no doubt; and, Heaven knows, they have their reward and their fame. But the great art is the art of living; and the chief science the science of being happy. Where there is an absolute deficiency of good sense, cannot indeed be taught; and, with an extra ordinary share of it, they may be acquired these |