Pp. 94-117 define behaviorism in psychology, and apply the concept to the "social behaviorism" of human groups genetically considered. 3. Giddings, Franklin: Studies in the Theory of Human Society. Ch. XV. presents the author's conception of "pluralistic behavior." The reader should consider whether it is identical with the "collective,” 'group," or "social" behavior of other writers.

"

4. Goldenweiser, Alexander A.: Early Civilization. Pp. 224-231 treat the ghost-dance religions of the N. American Indians, referred to in Reading 1, above.

5. Park and Burgess: Introduction to the Science of Sociology. Ch. XIII. "Collective Behavior." Very important for concrete illustrations and psychological analysis.

6. Ross, Edward A.: Social Psychology. Pp. 65-76 present numerous examples of mob mind in all realms of human activity. 7. Wallas, Graham: The Great Society. Ch. VIII. "The Psychology of the Crowd."

CHAPTER XXX

GROUP EXPANSION

HE expansion of groups into larger and larger peace-areas is

THE one of the outstanding processes of world history. During all

earlier ages it was brought about by conflict and conquest, but during very recent years economic and humanitarian motives have come to play a larger part.

Perhaps nothing in the entire course of social evolution is more striking than this tendency toward the formation of leagues to enforce peace in every nook and cranny of the world. In fact it is by this process that all the great, national states and empires of our present-day world arose, and the prevalent beliefs, sentiments and practices which center around the fortunes of these groups constitute what we know as nationality, and the nationalistic spirit. It expresses the egoism of the national group. Every nation, without exception, considers itself complete and final, the last word, the ne plus ultra of social evolution. But so does the handful of naked savages which makes up a miserable forest horde. The two groups are precisely alike in principle, and differ only in size and complexity. Neither one has any sound reason for considering itself the final work, the masterpiece, of social evolution, although, to be sure, reason has little or nothing to do with such ethnocentrism. It is essentially an emotional attitude, a set of sentiments in the populace, the feeling-tone which accompanies the self-seeking activities of a competing group. But as for the logical merits of this nationalistic doctrine of finality, it is nothing but sheer dogmatism, and a nation of a hundred million Americans can no more hope to arrest the world-wide march of social integration than could a wandering score of Wood Veddahs in Ceylon.

Whether it concerns the League of the Iroquois Tribes or the proposed League of World Powers, social reconstruction means the redirection of immemorial predispositions toward new objects, by means of institutional arrangements more compatible with social expediency as perceived by reason. It proceeds not by infinitely slow changes in the human constitution, but by the swifter methods of legislation and education, the former stretching the warp, the latter filling in the woof, of the new social activities which, in their totality, constitute the new social order. While the process requires no alteration in the original equipment of body or mind, it does involve a change of mind, both as its cause and its effect. The collective result is that altera

tion in the traditions and institutions of men which constitutes social reconstruction. These are the living, changing fabric of the social order. The rigid frame-work of the loom of life, represented by environment and psycho-physical constitution, is fixed and rigid, as a loom should be, although even it is not absolutely unyielding. The threads of belief, sentiment, and practice, i.e., of social attitudes, on the other hand, are indefinitely pliable, the richness and variety of the pattern depending largely upon the skill of the weaver. And the weaver in this case is the rational, idealizing, self-directing power of the collective, or social mind. With the same loom and yarn a thousand different patterns are possible. In both cases the figures that chanced to be woven earlier may determine to some extent the possible patterns of the future; or, in the language of ethnology, culture is predetermined in large degree by antecedent culture, or values by earlier values and attitudes.

The objections which are directed today against the proposed international league might have been urged with equal propriety, and in fact were urged in large part, when a similar league between the thirteen American colonies was under discussion. The world was full of very intelligent people at the end of the eighteenth century who were just as sure that American union under a constitution was a chimerical travesty on human nature as their spiritual descendants of today are certain that the League of Nations is a beautiful but pernicious dream. Against any who might attempt to argue that the two cases are not fairly analogous the facts seem overwhelming. The evident truth is that the two events are much more than analogous. They are identical. That is to say, they are nothing else but phases of a single social process, two stages in the same historical spiral, two upwellings of one continuous stream of tendency in the life of humanity.

Men fix the bounds of the peace-group according to their widest conception of a common interest, and this conception, or perception, has grown as the thoughts of men have widened with the process of the suns, and, to put it prosaically, with the processes of world trade. Moreover it has expressed not only a conception of a common life that ought to be, but a perception of a community of interest which actually existed, both as fact and potentiality. Whenever the expanding range of common interests created by the developing industrial, intellectual, and moral relations of men has required it, the peace-group has never failed to extend its circle, and the patriotic devotion of humanity has in every instance undergone a corresponding enlargement; for where the treasure is there will the heart be also. In view of these simple facts of history there could be no greater piece of sheer dogmatism than the militaristic creed that patriotic devotion to the national state is the last word in the moral life of mankind.

The present movement toward a League to Enforce Peace is the concrete expression of men's growing perception of an actually existing

unity in the life of the globe which is denied and outraged by the political disunity and anarchy that blights the life of the whole international neighborhood.

In Reading Professor Giddings shows with a few master strokes the steps in this world-old process of group expansion. Then in Reading 2 Dr. Pyle traces the present-day plan for a league of nations to its earliest historical beginnings. In Reading 3 we present a few paragraphs which indicate the most recent definite steps toward the actual establishment of a world-league and thus of a world peace-group.

1. Enlargement of the Peace-Group through Social Evolution 1

While evolution continues, two standards are inevitable, and we must try as best we can to reconcile or coördinate them. As long as coördination is still imperfect, we must at one time be hostile, at another time benevolent; at one time remorseless, at another time compassionate, unless we are prepared to see all moral activity disappear in brutality on the one hand, or in degeneration on the other.

This is exactly what the practical world has always avowed, and what the theorists, dogmatists, and uncompromising idealists have always tried to get away from. The Nietzsches would go to one extreme, the Tolstoïs to another. Meanwhile, men in general try to find the reciprocal limitations of their conflicting standards.

The attempt has not been guided to any great extent by philosophy. The adjustment has been made tentatively, experimentally, more by groping than by thinking, and it has been continued through a long historical process. Only by glancing back over this history in rapid review can we discover whether, on the whole, we are still the primitive egoists that Nietzsche would approve, or sympathetic, if not always close and believing, followers of Count Tolstoï.

We must go back to that little group of blood kindred which was the earliest human community. A few brothers and sisters, recognizing their maternal kinship, maintained a common lair or camp, struggled together against beast and nature, and together obtained food supplies. Within that little band the competition of the Darwinian struggle had, in a measure, ceased. Toward all life that lay beyond the circle the rule was unrelenting war. Here, then, at the outset of human life, the two standards were already established.

1 From Democracy and Empire, by Franklin Henry Giddings; pp. 354-356. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1901. Reprinted by permission.)

Helpfulness, compassion, forgiveness even, were right and expedient within the group. Remorseless enmity, cruelty, treachery, any expedient was right toward those men or creatures against which the band must struggle for its own existence.

By the combination of such small hordes, in relatively large aggregates, tribes were formed. By the federation of tribes, leagues or confederacies were formed. By the consolidation of leagues, nations and states were formed. By the consolidation of petty states, the vast territorial nations of modern times were formed. And practically all of this integration was accomplished by war.

At every stage in this progress the double standard of conduct has been assumed and maintained. Those within a society organized by confederation or consolidation have regarded themselves as allies, and as having more to gain from a suppression of the harsher features of the struggle for existence among themselves than by permitting them to continue. This conclusion they have derived from their experience of what Professor Karl Pearson has called the "extra-group struggle." That is to say, a nation has always obtained a larger sum total of benefits from a struggle en masse with other nations en masse than it has obtained from lesser struggles of its component groups against one another, or from still more minute struggles of its individual units against one another. This has happened because the extra-group struggle of nation against nation has afforded abundant opportunities for individuals to distinguish themselves and to develop their distinctive qualities, even when conflicts with tribal brethren or fellow-citizens have ceased; and because, also, the hardships of the extra-group struggle the poverty, pestilence, and taxation resulting from warhave exterminated great numbers of the unfit within each nation. In short, intertribal and international struggles have thus far continued the processes of natural selection; and, notwithstanding the growth of sympathy and benevolence within the nation, panmixia has not yet in more than one or two important instances prevented a gradual accumulation of power, while its differentiation has continued.

A closer examination of the internal phenomena of human societies shows us, furthermore, that the extension of sympathy and the gentler virtues from horde to tribe, from tribe to nation, has proceeded only as fast as a conception of likeness among the incorporated elements of the enlarged community has grown up in the minds of the people. The notion of the stranger and the notion of the enemy were identical