the theme was so pleasing, that he could not refrain from dwelling upon it with peculiar satisfaction. --He should not now detain the house any longer than whilst he could state some circumstances respecting the action, which were not generally known. By these circumstances it would appear, that the victory had been more decisive, and the defeat of the enemy more complete than was at first supposed. Sir John Stuart had correctly stated the amount of his own force as under 5,000 men. But, when he wrote his dispatch, he had not the means of ascertaining with accuracy the force of the enemy. In that dispatch it had been stated at nearly 7,000 men, but it should have been stated at nearly 8,000 men. This fact had been discovered from returns found upon the persons of some of the officers that had been killed. The next circumstance he had to mention, respected the amount of the enemy's loss. Sir John Stuart stated the numbers killed, at 700. But it had been afterwards ascertained by observations made on the spot, that the number killed in the action amounted to 1,300. Fifteen hundred prisoners had been the immediate fruit, and a great number more had fallen into our hands from the consequences of the action. So that thus, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, a number of the enemy had been disposed of, nearly equal to the whole of the British force.

Another consequence of the atchievement was, that it had set the Calabrians free from the presence of the enemy, and had totally broken up the force of general Regnier in those provinces, which amounted to 1,300 men.

It was not perhaps necessary to

have dwelt so much on the advane tages that resulted from the battle. But the glory that had been acquired in it, he held to be of infinitely greater importance, than any immediate benefits that had been derived from the action. This it was that would carry the effect of the brilliant exploit beyond the single instance, by restoring the military renown of this country, which had been called in question. He who gave glory to his country, gave that which was far more valuable to it, than any acquisition whatever. Glory alone was not to be taken away by time or aɛcidents. Ships, territories, or possessions, might be taken from a country, but the mode of acquiring them could never be forgotten. The acquisitions that were the conse quence of the glorious days of Cressy and Poictiers, had long since passed into other hands: but the glory of those illustrious atchievements, still adhered to the British name, was immortal. It was that fine extract, that pure essence which endured to all ages; whilst the residuum, the grosser parts, passed away, and were lost in the course of time. On this ground it was that, in his opinion, the victory of Maida would stand as high as any exploit upon the records of our military atchievements, and that the glory of general Stuart, and his army, would descend to the latest posterity, unless the country should at any time sink into such a state of degradation, that the memory of former glory would be reproach to existing degeneracy.-Even in such a state of degradation, he was sure, that such an instance as this, was calculated to rouse a nation to emulate the exploits of its ancestors.

and

brave

Mr. Windham having moved the

same

same resolutions as those moved in the house of peers by lord Grenville; Sir John Doyle rose to second the motions.-Having witnessed, he said, upon many tryin; occasions, the zeal, discipline, skill, and courage, in this instance, so brilliantly displayed, by that gallant officer and his brave companions, he could not reconcile it to his feelings to confine himself to a passive and cold assent. The thanks of parliament were never better deserved, nor would they be any where more highly prized. "I know, sir, so well the feelings of those gallant men, that whatever privations they may have endured,

whatever labours sustained, or whatever dangers encountered, they will find themselves amply repaid by the approbation of a beloved sovereign, and the approbation of a brave and free people.-I rely upon the good feelings of the house to pardon this effusion so naturally drawn forth, and which if I were willing, I am unable to suppress."-The motions were agreed to nem, con

Lord Howick presented the pa pers relative to the late negociation with France. The day fixed for taking them into consideration, was Monday the 2d of January.

CHAP.

stances. He was therefore of opinion, that the only basis on which we ought to treat with France, was that of actual possession. This country being a great maritime and colonial power, and France a great continental power, there would be no reciprocity of cession between the two powers, that could in any degree tend to their mutual advantage. The conquests made by this country, could be of no use to France, unless she would become a great commercial and colonial power: the conquests made by France, could be of no use to this country, unless this country would become a great continental power.

But, though the state of actual possession was the only basis that appeared to his majesty's ministers to be a proper basis for their negotiation with France, it did not follow that such a negotiation was to exclude the necessary discussion of equivalents to be given for certain cessions to be agreed on. And such a discussion became the more necessary where a negotiation involved the interests of allies. When his majesty's present ministers came into office, they found a treaty concluded by their predecessors with Russia, by which each party bound itself not to conclude peace without the consent of the other. That he considered as a wise, and a fair measure. But, even supposing that the treaty with Russia had not been wisely concluded, still the sacred engage. ment of the sovereign having been given to Russia, his majesty's ministers were bound to fulfil its conditions.

Our allies might be divided into two classes: those to whom we are bound by treaty; and those to whom we are bound by the circumstances

which had occurred during the war, and the situations in which they were placed in consequence of the events of that war. Of the former class of our allies were Sweden and Portugal; and of the latter, Naples and the elector of Hanover. With respect to Sweden and Portugal, nothing more was required than to guarantes to those powers their state of actual possession. The king of Naples stood in a different situation. He had been deprived by the power of France of all his dominions on the continent of Europe. Lord Gren ville had no hesitation in saying, that he would have consented to make sacrifices, not merely valuable in finance, in revenue, or in commerce, but even sacrifices of safety and of strength, to procure the restoration of the kingdom to the king of Naples. But no sacrifices that we could make, could have been an equivalent to France for the restoration of that kingdom.-With respect to Sicily, the king of Naples was still in pos session of that island, or rather it was in the possession of a brave, and, as it had been proved, an invincible British army. That army had en tered the island with the consent of the king of Naples, who had received them there in the full confidence that they would defend it bravely, and that it would not be given up to the enemy. Would it not therefore, have been an indelible disgrace to this country to have given up Sicily to France on her offer of an equi valent? It was not for us to barter it away for any equivalent without the consent of the sovereign. As to Hanover, it was sacrificed to injus tice on the part of France, for the express purpose of injuring this country. Would it not therefore, be disgraceful in us not to insist on

the restoration of Hanover to its sovereign, from whom it had been taken, solely ou account of its connection with this country? The restoration of Hanover, thus unjustly seized, was therefore insisted upon as an indispensable preliminary to the negotiation. The principle on which ministry acted during the whole of the negotiation, was, that of good faith to our allies: that of the French government to effect a separation between us and our allies as clearly appeared from the negotiation from first to last, which was divided into four stages.

The first, when we were offered terms, which might have been considered as the fair price of peace; had we been concerned for ourselves only, but which were offered as the price of dishonour, as the price of the desertion of Russia, our faithful ally.

The second stage of the negotiation was, when the French government, partly by threats, partly by promises and inspiring hopes, contrived to persuade the Russian mini. ster at Paris, M. D'Oubri to sign a separate treaty of peace. This being done, there was in the tone of the French government, a very remarkable alteration. "No," said they to our ministers, we cannot now grant you the same terms we were willing to do before. The signature of a separate peace with Russia, is equivalent to a splendid victory." An expression not loosely used in conversation, but forming a part of the written sentiments of the French government upon that

event.

66

The French government, finding the treaty would not be ratified, immediately offered the English negoti. ators better terms, in the hope of be,

ing able, though they could not sepa. rate Russia from this country, to separate this country from Russia, And this was the third stage of the negotiation.

The fourth and last stage of the negotiation, was, when the French ministers, finding that Great Britain and Russia were inseparable; at length agreed to the negotiation to be carried on conjointly for the interests of Russia and Great Britain. They refused to agree to the terms asked on behalf of Russia, and again offered terms to this country on the principle of a separate negotiation. The rupture of the nego. tiation followed of course

Had Russia insisted upon extravagant terms, or on points trifling and uninteresting, it would have been painful to lord Grenville to have stated, that the rupture of the negotiation arose from any such conduct on the part of Russia. But the very contrary of all this was the case. The terms insisted on by Russia were very moderate, and directed only to the security of her allies. She demanded the guarantee of Sicily to the king of Naples, and that the French troops should eva. cuate Dalmatia, which was not necessary to the vast empire, obtained by the arms of France, and could be held by this power, only as a post of offence towards Austria and the Porte, and of hostility towards Russia. The guarantee of Sicily to the king of Naples was clearly a British object. That Russia, in requiring the evacuation of Dalmatia, confined her demand to that object, and did not make a demand of the territory, was also of importance to this country as well as to our ally. With this good faith and moderation on the part of