S. 1726, Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era Act of 1996, Or "Pro-CODE" Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session, June 26, 1996U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996 - 138 sider |
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Administration Administration's algorithm American attack Chairman Clipper Chip committee companies competition CONG CONGRESS THE LIBRARY criminal cryptography policy cryptosystems decryption democracy Diffie electronic commerce Electronic Privacy Information encryption products Encryption Standard encryption technology EPIC export controls Federal foreign Global Information Infrastructure going hardware hearing individuals industry interception Internet users issue Jerry Berman Karn key escrow key length key-escrow law enforcement LIBRARY OF CONGRESS National Security Agency Philip Zimmermann Pretty Good Privacy privacy and security Privacy Information Center Privacy International problem programs proposal public key RARY regulations RESS restrictions security and privacy Senator ASHCROFT Senator BURNS Senator WYDEN statement strong encryption Subcommittee surveillance Telecommunications telephone terrorists Testimony of Jerry Thank threat tion U.S. Government USACM Voters Telecommunications Watch Washington White House Whitfield Diffie wiretapping ZIMMERMAN
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Side 83 - Pr'ythee, lead me in: There take an inventory of all I have, To the last penny ; 'tis the king's : my robe, And my integrity to heaven, is all I dare now call mine own.
Side 44 - The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a public interest research center in Washington, DC It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging privacy issues relating to the National Information Infrastructure, such as the Clipper Chip, the Digital Telephony proposal, medical record privacy, and the sale of consumer data. EPIC is sponsored by the Fund for Constitutional Government and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. EPIC publishes the EPIC Alert and EPIC Reports,...
Side 11 - At least that's how it works in conventional "single-key" cryptosystems. In conventional cryptosystems, such as the US Federal Data Encryption Standard (DES), a single key is used for both encryption and decryption. This means that a key must be initially transmitted via secure channels so that both parties can know it before encrypted messages can be sent over insecure channels. This may be inconvenient. If you have a secure channel for exchanging keys, then why do you need cryptography in the first...
Side 41 - Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Side 40 - Administration has made clear on a number of occasions, the key-escrow encryption initiative is a voluntary one; we have absolutely no intention of mandating private use of a particular kind of cryptography, nor of criminalizing the private use of certain kinds of cryptography. We are confident, however, of the quality and strength of key-escrow encryption as embodied in this chip...
Side 106 - A Study of the International Market for Computer Software with Encryption...
Side 8 - ... with Government-designed encryption protocols. Probably most people will acquiesce to that. But perhaps some people will prefer their own protective measures. Senate Bill 266, a 1991 omnibus anti-crime bill, had an unsettling measure buried in it. If this non-binding resolution had become real law, it would have forced manufacturers of secure communications equipment to insert special "trap doors" in their products, so that the Government can read anyone's encrypted messages.
Side 7 - But this renaissance in electronic digital communication brings with it a disturbing erosion of our privacy In the past, if the government wanted to violate the privacy of ordinary citizens, it had to expend a certain amount of effort to intercept and steam open and read paper mail, and listen to and possibly transcribe spoken telephone conversation...
Side 9 - When making public policy decisions about new technologies for the Government, I think one should ask oneself which technologies would best strengthen the hand of a police state. Then, do not allow the Government to deploy those technologies. This is simply a matter of good civic hygiene.