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Without the rage for definition so obvious in Aristotle, their distinctions were happier, more accurate and more agreeable to nature.
Ούτοι δε οι λόγοι ασυνακλοι. εγω σε πλύσιωθερος ειμι, εγώ σε αρα χρειάσων. εγω σε λογιωτερος, εγω σε αρα κρείσσων. εκείνοι δε μαλλον συνακλοι" εγω σε πλυσιωτερος ειμι,
ή εμη αρα κλπους της σης κρείσσων. εγω λογιωτερG», η εμη αρα λεξις της σης κρείσσων. συ δε γε οτε κλησις 'ει, ελε λεξις.
EpicT. ENCHIR. C. 66.
These expressions are not just—"I am richer than thou, therefore I am better. I am more eloquent, and therefore better.” It would be more correct to say I am richer than thou, therefore my property is better. I am more eloquent, therefore my language is better. For thou thyself art neither money nor language. I shall select a few specimens from another
' of the same school, and characterised by the same peculiarity of expression.
Sara7%. δε γε και ζωη, δοξα και άδοξια, πονος και ηδονη, πλοίο. και πενια, παντα επισης συμβαινη ανθρωπων τοις θε αγαθοις και τους * xaxois, órs xala oyla, öle aloxga.
Anton. lib. " Death and life, honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure, riches and poverty, these alike happen to the good and the bad, and the rea
son is, that they are in themselves neither good nor dishonourable."
Το ανθρωπινο βια ο μεν χρονο, σιγμή και δε όσια, ρευσαν και δε αίσθησις, αμυδρα. ή δε όλα τα σωματε- συγκρισις, έυσηπος: η δε ψυχη δομβος και δε τυχη, δυσεκμαρτον και δε φημη ακριθον, Cυνελονι δε ειπειν, παντα τα μεν τα σωματG., πολαμο τα δε της ψυχης, όνειρός και τυφος. ο δε βιος, πολεμΘ. και ξενα επιδημια και υπεροψημια δε, ληθη. τι αν το παραπεμψαι δυναμένον; έν και μονον, φιλοσοφια. τελο δε, εν τω τηρειν τον ένδον δαιμονα ανυβρισον, και άσινη, ηδονών και πονων κρείσσονα, μηδεν έικη ποιονία, μηδε διέψευσμενώς και μεθ' υποκρισεως, ανενδεη τι άλλον ποιησαι τι, ή μη ποιησαι.
ANTON. lib. ii. C. 17.
16. The extent of human life is but a pöint; existence is constantly flowing "away ; perception dark and obscure; 'the body delicate and allied to corruption; the soul a vapour; fortune difficult to foretel; fame injudiciously distributed. In a word, what belongs to the body flows away like a river; what belongs to the soul is a dream or a bubble. Life is a warfare oria pilgrimage; and posthumous fame is, with respect to ourselves, oblivion. What then is permanent and satisfactory ? Philosophy alone; and this consists in keeping the soul free from injury and disgrace, superior to pleasure and pain, without dissembling, falsehood or hypo
crisy, and as to happiness independent of the motions of another”.
έδαμο γαρ έ7ε ησυχιωθερον, 37ε άπραγμoνεςερον άνθρωπος αναχωρει, και εις την εαυθω ψυχην μαγισθ' όρις έχει ένδον τοιαυλα, εις & έγκυψας εν παση ευμάρεια ευθυς γινεται.
Anton, lib. iv. c. 3.
66 A man cannot retire into any place more quiet, or less disturbed, than into the recesses of his own soul, especially if he has treasured up such things there as he can contemplate with satisfaction."
Nor is there wanting a higher philosophy for a basis to these reflexions : speaking of death
Το δε εξ ανθρωτων απελθειν, ει μεν θεοι εισιν, έδεν δεινον κανω γας σε υκ αν περι βαλoιεν· η δε ει τι έκ εισιν, ή και μελει αυθοις των άνθρωπειων, τι μου ζην εν κοσμο κενω θεων, ή προνοιας κενο και άλλα και εισι, και μελει αυθους των ανθρωπίνων.
IB. lib. ii. c. 11.
" To depart from earthly things is no calamity. If there are gods they will suffer no evil to be fal thee; if there are none, or if they totally disregard human affairs, what advan. tage is it to live in a world without gods, or without a Providence. But that there are sitperior beings, and that they regard human events, is beyond dispute.'
Τα των θεων προνοιας μεσα. τα της τυχης έκ άνευ φύσεως, ή ( κλωσεως, και επιπλοκης των προνοια διοικημενων.
ANTON. lib. ii. c. 3.
66 All is full of the Divine Providence. What is called fortune or chance is not without naz ture at the bottom, and that connexion and chain of causes which is ordered by Providence.”
It must, however, be confessed of the Stoic morality, that much of it is extravagant, and some of it trifling; that it is founded upon too few principles, abounds with repetition, and, perhaps, justly incurs the censure of (I think) Lactantius; that it was calculated for actors on a theatre, and not for men in the world.
The most regular and methodical tract upon ethics, which is contained in the whole scope of classical literature, is the offices of Tully ; this valuable fragment contains much excellent reasoning, and much sound observation ; but, still it appears to me but a fragment. Whether
the lively and desultory, genius of Cicero revolted against the toil of a laboured, methodical, scientific production, or whether he was interrupted in the progress of his task, the work is certainly imperfect; there are several useful topics entirely omitted, and even the system it. self is left in an unfinished state.
In the other beautiful rhapsodies of Tully, in vain shall we look for any thing like system or method. No man, however, can read his Cato Major, his De Amicitia, his Tusculan Disputations, without moral improvement; his Letters, and all his writings, abound in animating and interesting reflexions, in excellent maxims. There is a point, a force, a climax, too, in his observations, which cannot be too greatly admired, and carries the mind along with it, and which gives a novelty even to what is common place in itself:
“ Et nomen pacis dulee est, & ipsa res salutaris ; sed inter pacem & servitutem plurimum interest : Pax est tranquilla libertas, servitus postremum malorum omnium, non modò bello, sed morte etiam repellendum."-Cic. in M. Ant.
"The very name of peace is delightful, and