the provable. Yet dare we conclude there is nothing beyond? The mind recoils from such a conclusion, and in that very recoil falls back on Faith; demands it. Here the function of Doubt is not to pre-occupy the mind; it is that of inspector and guard. It puts Reason on the alert to keep out pretenders and turn out intruders. When it goes beyond this; when it denies to Faith a sphere, it transcends its function, becomes abnormal; becomes, in fact, a disease. We must accept something beyond and beneath what our science can ordinate-something which cannot be proved-else our science wants a basis. And whatever we accept can be matter only of Faith. Faith here is not antagonistic to Reason; on the contrary, Reason reposes on it, and feels that it must, Finite in its range, as inhering in a finite subject, it can deliver itself from endless contradictions no otherwise than by accepting what only Faith can recognise. Reason has still a funtion here, but it is not destructive. It is only discriminative and critical. It is to protect Faith from being imposed on by the Absurd and Contradictory.

But must not the range of faith become limited, as that of science extends? Not within its own appropriate sphere. On the contrary, as the horizon of science extends, that of faith keeps widening still beyond. Faith is twin-sister to sympathy; and the progress of science, and the consequent advance of society, do not more certainly widen and deepen the scope of human experience, than that experience calls aloud for a corresponding expansion and deepening of Faith. Our Modern Doubt is but the measure of this need. It is its anxious, or its querelous cry. The wider and deeper sympathies and yearnings of humanity must be met by something other than humanity or nature supplies. Remove or displace their only sure resting place and refuge-the bosom of a Divine Father-and every nook and cranny of the world shall ring with the wail of our despair. The poet's ear has caught this deep wail of our times and he has imaged it in—

"An infant crying in the night:

An infant crying for the light:
And with no language but a cry."

X.-A DIGGING FOR THE ROOT OF MORAL SCEPTICISM.

Or the mistakes in which the settled Sceptical or infidel spirit originates, the grossest is, that by rejecting or discrediting the Scripture Revelation, we rid ourselves of the difficulties attaching to belief in a Divine Government of the world. It is not the Scripture Revelation that has raised such difficulties; they are found in the constitution of

the world, in the condition and relations of many of the animal tribes, and especially, in the condition of man. They culminate in the existence, and dire effects and issues of moral evil; which remains an universal, stubborn, irreducible fact, not less after we have discarded the Scripture Revelation than before. Not less, do we say? Nay, much more. The Christian Revelation may, on the one hand, have deepened the pressure of this great enigma, by disclosing to us the depth, the virulence, the all-devouring malignity of moral evil, but, on the other hand, it ought to be remembered, that it supplies the only key to the moral anomalies (as they appear to us) which exist, altogether apart from the facts and declarations of the Scripture Revelation, in the constitution and state of the world. If the Scriptures declare, illustrate, and enforce the clear and necessary supremacy of one thing above all, it is the supremacy of the moral system. But the more clearly and fully we realize what a moral system is what moral being and moral government, by their very nature, involve the more do anomalies disappear from that constitution of things amidst which we are placed. And they do not simply disappear; under this fresh light, they are seen as the types, adjuncts, or elements of the Moral System.

Speculative Scepticism arises from ignorance of the true nature and prime conditions of a moral system; and practical Scepticism-or a state of chronic rebellion against the essential conditions of a moral life-if it have not absolutely the same root, has one in close affinity with it. The difference lies mainly in this, that the one springs more out of the exercises of the intellect, the other from the pressure of the desires and the will. But be the Scepticism more of the one sort or of the other, it either disallows moral restraints, or misconceives of their essential character and necessary implications. In both cases there is a failure in the highest exercise of the rational faculty. Hence it is, perhaps, that the "sinner" and the "fool" are constantly used in Scripture as interchangeable designations. Doubt has its function, but chronic Scepticism or infidelity is a disease—a perversity of the Moral Reason at least, -if it have not a still deeper rooting in the heart and will.

Settled religious Scepticism, thus originating either in ignorance of the true nature and requirements of a moral system, or in practical rebellion against its laws and limitations, becomes a matter of the deepest social importance. It is so, because our whole voluntary conduct in society depends on what we accept or believe as truth, and on what we recognise as matter of moral obligation. And, as we have before had occasion to remark, the urgency of such clear personal guidance becomes ever greater as the range of personal liberty is extended. Hence, if the "influence of moral truths" is found, in any case to diminish with the progress of society, this, so far from meriting to be recognised as a law of that progress, is to be taken as clear indication and warning that progress has taken an unhealthy direction.

such principle guarantees, is, of all other defects, the most socially injurious. Other defects, e. g., limited intelligence, or want of taste and refinement, may appear in large numbers of a community, and yet, if they are not general, may little retard its progress, and little affect the general well-being. Such persons, when their conduct is regulated by religious principle, may be useful members of the community, and do much of its common, everyday, indispensible work. Moreover, the influence of religion is largely compensatory. Implying, in itself, the highest form of culture —-viz., the culture of the moral feelings and moral activity, it, at once, promotes all other forms of culture, and, in a measure, supplies in their default. But this is true of religious and moral culture only, not of culture of the intellect or of the æsthetic susceptibility. No other form of culture will compensate for defect in moral principle, or neutralise the evil of the loose habits attendant on it. There can be no breach of morality which is not socially injurious, and, because morality is the most fundamental and imperative condition of social well-being. But so far is the well-known aphorism of Burke, that "vice, in losing all its grossness, loses half its evil,” from being true, that vice becomes thus only more insidiously, more deeply, pervasively, mischievous. Vice neutralises the influence of the refinement with which it may be associated, and being, in its nature, grovelling, must tend to induce grossness. On the other hand, there need be little anxiety about the diffusion of taste and refinement in a community, if only its moral health can be preserved. Intelligence, scientific acquirement, taste-each is good in its place; but one thing is higher than all. Only one thing can be relied on to secure the progressive and abiding elevation of the individual, in all that constitutes, distinguishes, and differentiates man. That one thing is a practical sense of our responsibility to God throughout the whole of our activity; in other words religion. All else, all mere knowledge, all other forms of culture, take hold only of parts of the mind. There is none of them but leaves loose and uncontrolled some of the moving springs of our activity, and some which may become master forces. But Religion commands the whole, or, at least, it is its aim, scope, and nature, to do so. It must ultimately attain the supremacy over all, else it is a failure and a delusion.

And it stands to reason that it should be so; that what is broadest, embracing the whole activity, what is deepest, going down to the ultimate springs of action, should mould, regulate, and control the whole; should be the master-force in determining what Man Social is to become. What else can subordinate every passion and pursuit, inimical to the well-being of our fellows? Utility ?-If John Stuart Mill's last paper (on Justice) has any practical issue, it is, to make it almost superfluously clear, not only that there can (as things are) be no security that justice shall be done, but that it is hopeless to determine what is just in almost any relation. And it would be so, were there no sense of right and wrong in us, independent of what we discern to be profitable or pleasant.

On the habit of self-control, based on moral principle, all reliable social advancement, all stable Civilization, depends; Self-government in the individual, is the only thing that can guarantee political freedom. To have a free constitution, you require first to have free men. But the primary constituent of freedom is awanting where men are the slaves of lust or passion. The well-being of Society requires that such men be put under restraint. A preponderance of such makes a community fit material for the despot; and, existing in more limited proportion, they yet in like proportion, mar Civilization-obstruct its progress, and preclude its universality.

And, indeed, in what does Civilization begin? What differentiates the civilized community, from the savage horde? Is it not a practical preference of future good to immediate gratification, foregoing a present gratification which is certain, for a future good, which is more or less contingent? Civilized men act for future results, in respect to which they often experience disappointment. Yet they continue to act for such, notwithstanding, else Civilization could not be sustained. Ceasing to do so, Society would soon relapse into the savage state. Civilization has therefore a species of faith as the very basis on which it rests. In that state, man acts for the unrealised, and as yet, unseen. In the absence of religious motives he will do so. But in that case he has regard only to his own apparent interest. Of this we have impressive illustration in modern competition. Perfectly free trade to be healthy and compatible with the good of all, demands a high moral state in the communities where it obtains. When you dispense with legal checks, in the absence of the appropriate moral ones, the weak must suffer. Will the highest secular knowledge, or the highest skill in applied physical science, prevent this? So far from it, they only furnish to the astute and clever selfist, subtler, and more various means and instruments for accomplishing his designs. We see this signalised, not only in scientific murderers, like Palmer, but in every one who uses chemical knowledge for the adulteration of food, or the telegraph for supplanting his rival trader.

It remains to be seen how freedom will operate where religious motive is not paramount. And, already, indeed, it does not remain altogether" unillustrated. The now Confederated States of North America give us a prominent exemplification. They have revolted from the Federal Government, in order that they may keep 4,000,000 of their fellow creatures in slavery-that they may rivet and seal their perpetual degradation. The blessings of such civilization are for the White alone, and it can be main- ~ tained only by entailing the curse of bondage on the Black. If reminded that these men are nɔt irreligious—that they are Christians, we need only reply, that they themselves give the most emphatic testimony to what the religion of Christ induces and requires in our relations with each other. They feel that as Christian professors they can justify slavery only by denying the claim of the black man to be a brother.

One of the prevalent forms of Scepticism-and one lying very near the root of the malady as a chronic evil-is an abiding and practical non-recognition, or denial, of the wisdom and beneficence of the conditions under which, at least, the great majority of men have to live and act. If so much is not said, yet are these habitually regarded as unfavourableas against our interest, our progress, our advancement, our well-being. This state of feeling is-wherever it obtains settled possession of the mind -neither more nor less than practical atheism. But it is, generally, in great measure, due to ignorance of the distinctive nature of moral action, and the true object-as regards those placed under it-of moral law. Such misconceptions are rooted deep in human thought, and imbedded in human speech. Innumerable terms of contrast embody them"Favourable" and "unfavourable," "advantageous" and "disadvantageous,' ,""facilities" and "difficulties," &c. Few recognise the necessity of difficulty and hardship, as well as of advantages and facilities. Yet, until this is done, we have got no true idea of life—are ignorant of the very alphabet of moral knowledge.

For, let us just only consider what sort of a being man is-that he is not created full-grown-that he is a creature whose powers are to be evoked, developed, and disciplined. He begins life as an animal; and, without hindrances and difficulties, as well as opportunities and facilities, he would continue to live and demean himself as an animal. He is raised, and can be raised, only by means of checks to the current of animal appetite and desire,—through temptations to be resisted, on the one side, through difficulties to be overcome, on the other. As matter of fact, do we not see that, in countries where his natural wants are supplied with least difficulty, he rises least, or has sunk nearest to the animal level. It is not an evil to have difficulties to contend with; on the contrary, it is a blessing; it is a necessity of our being. No one will ever become a man without them. The question then becomes one of kind and measure, and it were an impeachment of Providence, to say that God leaves difficulties absolutely insurmountable in the way of any man. At the very worst, there is no one who cannot either vanquish the adverse conditions amid which he is placed, or die, carrying the appeal into that higher court of the Immortals, where-if every inequality is not compensated, every wrong will be redressed.

All obstruction or frustration of the true development of LIFE in any man, must spring from one of two sources-from himself or from others. The more the matter is investigated, the more will the fact come out into light, that it is not circumstances apart from conduct-his own or that of others. So far otherwise is it, so far is nature or destiny (as the modern philosophic jargon has it) from being blameable, that the whole. normal mechanism of the world and of society is one wondrous system of adaptations for the development of true manhood-for the nutriment and nurture of fullest and highest life. Nay, so skilfully and speci