his book on the gnarled bark of a fig-tree (in S. Giovanni Crisostomo, Venice), painted in 1513, when he was eightyseven years of age, he appears like an aged monarch who retains all his governing faculties, but lays aside etiquette. In his representations also of outer nature he seems to assert, at last, the right of painting for his own pleasure. In the landscape in the National Gallery, the figures, fine as they are, merely serve to give a name to a scene of which we only know that in hill, bridge, and town, and mass of evergreen branch and foliage, all glowing, not under direct sunshine, but in the soft suffusion of southern light, it is truly and enchantingly Italian.

Over Giovanni Bellini the genuine lover of Italian art will fondly linger, as over the last act but one in the great drama of pictorial development-the act which led in every scene to that apogee beyond which there was no higher stage--to the full glories of Venetian colour, to the radiant blossom of Titian and Giorgione.

We must draw this article to a close. To few has it been given, as to Mantegna and Giovanni Bellini, to bequeath a style so capable, in their great successors, of expansion, and, in their minor followers, of imitation, modification, and variation. The number of the last named is Legion; and never before have the ramifications of the Mantegnesque and Bellinesque, and the combination of the two, been so carefully explored. The Mantegnesque impress continued through the fifteenth century, and expired with it; having inspired the quaintly classic Vivarini, the gorgeously fantastic Crivelli (sometimes mistaken for Mantegna), the mysterious painter or painters who bear the name of Ercole Grandi, of Ferrara, and spread itself, under varying disguises, as a firm substructure never entirely concealed, from Venice, through every north Italian town, to Milan, and even to Cremona.

Bellini's impress can only be said to have died with Venetian art; wherever glorious colour, noble forms, and delicious landscape prevail, whether in Cima, Titian, Giorgione, or Palma, there Bellini lives. It is his art throughout, with every splendid quality full grown-less moral in effect, never spiritual, but developed into the highest sensuous poetry of life. From Venice it spread in a luminous stream all along the head of Italy, upheld in the form of stately altar-pieces and grand portraits by such names as Romanino, Savoldo, and Moretto,carried into the mountain recesses of the Friuli by fresco painters of the highest order-Pellegrino di S. Daniele and Pordenone-each and all surrounded by clusters of minor

branches from the same parent stock, till the land stretches before us in one vast panorama of colour. Nor can we forbear alluding to one, minor branch as he might be, who, equally a descendant of Bellini, coquetted with every master in succession; by turns the happy counterfeit of them all; whose very powers of imitation amount to originality; gifted and wayward, brilliant and fantastic, alternately graceful and affected, Lorenzo Lotto is fascinating in every mood he pleases to assume. We are thankful for any light thrown upon one, for whom our authors justly say, it is easy to be 'enthusiastic.' Long have other masters borne his sins and worn his laurels; and though beginning to be detected under many an alias, yet where is the gallery that does not still exhibit some Lotto in disguise; our own National Collection not excepted?

We have dwelt purposely more on Signor Cavalcaselle's researches than on his opinions. Respecting the first there can be no possible variety of judgment; about the last it is a vain proverb that says there is or should be no disputing. Every connoisseur is entitled to his private predilections and prejudices; there is no such stimulus, as perhaps this very article may have shown, in the perplexing questions of identity, as a few dominant crotchets. But our authors have done what none before have attempted--they have rectified the errors and filled up the omissions of Vasari, and he will be a bold man who undertakes to do the same by them.

ART. VI.-1. Der Krieg im Jahre 1870. Von M. ANNENKOFF. Berlin 1871.

2. Das Train-Communications und Verpflegswesen, vom operativen Standpunkte. Von H. OBAUER und E. R. Von GUTTENBERG. Wien: 1871.

3. La deuxième Armée de la Loire. Par le Général CHANZY. Paris: 1871.

4. La Guerre en Province pendant le Siége de Paris, 1870-71. Par CHARLES DE FREYCINET, ancien délégué du Ministre de la Guerre à Tours et à Bordeaux. Paris: 1871.

SINCE the beginning of the Crimean war the energies of

many of our greatest engineers, machinists, and chemists have been devoted to improving the implements of destruction, or to devising fresh means of protection against the new weapons. But we rise from an attentive perusal of the

accounts which have been published of the late Franco-German war, and especially the interesting history of the failures of the French army published by General Faidherbe and General Chanzy, and by M. de Freycinet, with the conviction that the art of war has been changed not so much by the new implements of destruction as by inventions whose object is commerce and whose mission is peace. No doubt the alteration in weapons has done much; the battle is no longer a mere hand-to-hand fight; the needle-gun and the chassepôt leave but little. scope for the bayonet. Success now rests with those who can move with the greatest certainty and rapidity, shoot with accuracy, and possess steadiness in open order; and not, as in the old times, with the stalwart soldier whose mere personal energy bore down his opponents in a close fight. The field of battle is enlarged, the general in command is unable to take in the whole situation at a glance as he could do in the old times, and he must therefore revert to new methods for obtaining a knowledge of the varying phases of an engagement. The part which in former times was played by a general's own eyes, or by his aides-de-camp, now falls to the electric telegraph.

The operations of an army are mainly regulated by two conditions, viz., the power of bringing forward supplies, and the power of moving troops. In respect of both of these conditions the influence of railways is enormous. In former wars months were often required, after placing an army on foot, to bring it into the desired strategic position to commence warlike operations, and this could only be effected. after tedious marches, occasioning loss by stragglers and wear of material. Now, a well-arranged network of railways enables the largest armies to be concentrated, with all their stores and appliances, in a few days. It is not, however, only in the concentration of troops that railways play an important part. They facilitate the supply of the daily wants of an army, and thus impart to it a considerably increased freedom of manœuvring. Thus in former times, especially in the case of extended operations, it was necessary for an army to remain stationary during considerable periods of time whilst a fresh base for supplies was being formed, or whilst new depôts for reserves of stores and provisions were being established in the rear of the advancing force. But now, with the assistance of a railway, the supply can keep place with the most rapid movements of an army, and food and ammunition can be delivered to it at the required moment, and in ample quantity.

These considerations have been brought forcibly home to our minds by the perusal of the works at the head of this article; for, although they might be classed with the fugitive publications of the day, they are really contributions to military science, and they will be no less valuable to the future historian. M. Annenkoff's pamphlet is a brief but most perspicuous summary of the causes which established the superiority of the German over the French armies; and it may be regarded as the testimony of an impartial observer, for M. Annenkoff is himself a distinguished Russian officer. The second work on our list proves that the lessons of the war have not been lost on the staff of the Austrian army: it is the production of two accomplished members of that corps, who immediately applied themselves to the consideration of the problems raised by the new system of war with reference to the defence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These officers have calculated, with a minuteness and precision which leave nothing to be desired, the exact amount of the demands to be made on the railway system, if it were called upon to support the movements of an army of 300,000 men on the North-eastern frontier. They have ascertained the number of trains which would be required to convey the men, horses, and guns to the theatre of war on the Vistula, and to transport food and munitions of war for such an army in the field. They determine the exact weight and space for which railway accommodation must be provided, and the exact time within which the movement could be effected. Their work is therefore one of singular novelty and instruction to the military student; for similar calculations must henceforth be made by every Power which seeks to place a large army in the field. The French works which we have added to our list are chiefly remarkable for the total absence of any such calculations. But M. de Freycinet demonstrates, nevertheless, how vast and extraordinary were the efforts made to create a fresh army after the disasters of Sedan and Metz, though the generals show that no great use could be made of these raw materials against an enemy who had prepared himself to encounter and defeat all the adverse chances of war in a hostile country. We propose

in the following pages to present to our readers a brief summary of the results of these discussions; and in our observations we shall follow principally the course of M. Annenkoff's excellent commentary.

In all great strategical operations there are three essential things to be considered. Supplies must be provided, as far as possible, beforehand, or the means of obtaining them secured,

in the territory about to be occupied by the troops. Thus, before the campaign of Russia, Napoleon created enormous magazines in Poland and North Prussia. The forces themselves must be conveyed to the scene of action. And during the campaign an enormous amount of transport in both directions must be kept up in the rear of the army. For these three purposes a good system of railway communication is of inestimable value.

The principal advantages which railways afford in the special matter of supplying an army may be summed up as follows:

1. Railways enable supplies to be drawn from almost unlimited distances; formerly, an army was dependent for its food upon a small circle of country from which the supplies had to be conveyed by a laborious process of cartage.

2. The loss or damage suffered by the supplies in transit is considerably diminished.

3. The number of reserve magazines or depôts which it is necessary to establish in the rear of an army as it moves forward is materially lessened.

4. The cost of transport is enormously diminished, and especially the number of men necessary as escorts or drivers. It has been calculated, as an illustration, that one day's supply for an army of 85,000 men can be conveyed 400 miles by one train in 40 hours. The same amount of supplies conveyed by road would require 275 light carts (two horses each), and from 25 to 30 days on the road. A train would require an engineer and fireman, and three or four breaksmen or guards, whilst each cart, at least, would require one driver. In the concentration of troops it is calculated that railway locomotion has increased the facilities sixfold. These calculations have been worked out in detail by Major Obauer.

Railways are, however, equally valuable for an army in the movement of troops. The troops can be rapidly concentrated without fatigue or loss by stragglers, by means of railways, before the commencement of operations. Moreover, they afford a means of bringing masses of troops on to the battle-field, or rapidly moving them from one place to another during a battle. But in such cperations the working of the traffic-that is to say, the arrival, unloading, and despatch of the return trains requires a very complete organisation conducted by well-practised hands. The measures for forwarding the troops by railway had been prepared with great care in Berlin by a mixed Committee of Staff Officers and employés of the Ministry of Public Works. It was decided that twelve full and twelve empty trains were to run daily on the single lines of rail