that His word is the sovereign standard of truth.- In this verse the doctrine of "free grace" is conspicuously developed; and herein we may see how entirely it is consistent with the doctrine of election-indeed how completely they are one and the same doctrine. The elect are "chosen to be holy and without blame before" their heavenly Father in love;" showing that in their natural state they are as completely devoid of any merit in themselves or of any claim upon Divine favor as the rest of mankind; and that it is the free, sovereign, unmerited grace of heaven, which, selecting them as subjects for the operations of the Holy Spirit, makes them holy and acceptable in the sight of heaven and prepares them for an inheritance at his right hand. Those who view the doctrine in this light must, certainly, find stronger cause for great and humble gratitude to the giver all good, for the undeserved mercy which has been extended towards them, than those persons who suppose that their own well-doing, affords them some title to the favor of heaven.-In the following verse we are taught the blessed means through which the saints are "predestinated unto the adoption of children;" namely, the atonement of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ; "In whom we have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of sins according to the riches of His grace. To the intervention of this compassionate Saviour, the elect are to ascribe all the immeasurably glorious hopes which they are permitted to indulge; and no wonder that in the overflowings of his thankfulness-the Apostle Paul should magnify the riches of that grace which without any merit of his own--nay at the very time when he was "breathing out threatenings and slaughter" against the saints of the Most High, had called him from "darkness into light" and had elected him to eternal blessedness.—In the 9th verse, we read of God, "having made known unto us the mystery of his will according to His good pleasure which He had purposed in Himself;" and again "In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." In these passages, the Almighty, most unreservedly, asserts His Sovereign authority over all the creatures He has made; and again confirms the truth that the saints obtain their inheritance according to His divine appointment and foreordination. He, not enly, superintends the larger concerns of our world and ordains the general laws of nature; but His special controul is over “all things," even the minutest; and He not only permits them so to be as consequent upon what some call the nature of things' but He, immediately ordereth and "worketh" them "after the counsel of His own will." He asks advice of no one in managing the affairs of His boundless empire; and whilst His Omnipotent arm sustains the inyriads of systems which swell the vastness of the material universe, He hears with special benevolence, the cry of the hunY young raven and "numbereth the hairs of our heads. "-We

are, farther, ink...med that the elect are saved to show forth the glory of God, nat we should be to the praise of His glory who first trusted in Christ;" and in other parts of sacred writ, we are informed that He created all things for His own glory and that He is a God who is jealous of His glory. Now we would invite those who advance a doctrine which supposes that many things have happened in our world, in opposition to the the pleasure of Him "who doeth according to His will in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth to learn from this constderation a lesson of humility. God has created us not for ourselves, but for his own glory? He has brought us into being and deals out to us the breath of life, not that we should boast of our independence, but in order that we might become the humble instruments of developing thebrightness of his own infinite perfections. As this object is dear to Him, it is evident, if He is all-wise and omnipotent, that he will take the most proper and desirable means to ensure its accomplishment; nor will he permit the existence of any thing which does not, on the whole, tend to the effectuation of this, His sovereign purpose. Hence the conclusion is irresistible-that all things are upon the whole in accordance with His Divine pleasure and choice, and will certainly promote his glory: and hence the presumption and absurdity of the doctrine, which, if consistent with itself, must admit the possibility that Jehovah may be disappointed in His plans, and that a thousand things may happen without His consent, when He has directly declared "My Counsel shall stand and I will do all my pleasure."

We might refer to numerous parts of sacred writ, besides the passage we have thus, briefly, considered, which, it is believed either immediately assert, or indirectly inculcate, the doctrine we are discussing. Passages in the 8th and 9th chapters of Romans are examples of this; Christ, directly tells his disciples "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you;" and inspiration declares that "the way of man is not in himself," and that it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps."-We should transcribe a large portion of scripture were we to adduce all the passages which it is believed, assert this doctrine; the texts already quoted may serve as specimens of their general character and import.-But the question will now suggest itself, is this doctrine, indeed, so revolting to reason that these many various and unequivocal declarations of scripture must be rejected because we cannot clearly comprehend how it is to be reconciled with other parts of the divine administration? It would indeed be a proper reply to this objection, to ask the proposer of it whether our earth or the farthest fixed star is nearest the centre of infinite space? or how it is possible that all the ages and mighty transactions of endless futurity can stand in present prospect to the mind of Deity? It is presumed that these things would appear as perfectly mysterious to the eye of reason if reason did not deduce them to be facts, as the supposition

that the actions of a free agent may all be predetermined. Butitis believed that the truth of this doctrine, reason as satisfactorily sanctions as it does the belief that God is omniscient or that there can be no centre to boundless space. We are then, indeed, making bad use of reason, when we reject the mysteries it declares merely because they are mysteries.-We are all conscious of free-agency; yet it is believed that reason and Revelation declare that all our actions are predestinated. It is therefore concluded that the two doctrines are consistent with each whether we comprehend it or not. The doctrine of predestination has been proved by a train of reasoning of which the following is perhaps, nearly, the substance. There was a time in past duration when Jehovah lived alone." Omniscient, He could survey all possible things, and contemplate, perfectly, whatsoever might be brought to pass. Infinitely wise, He could propose to himself the best possible end and devise the best possible means for its accomplishment. Omnipotence furnished Him with the necessary materials for the success of His plans and secured Him from failure in their execution; whilst boundless benevolence, justice and goodness afforded the utmost possible security that He would "choose the existence of all those things whose existence was on the whole desirable and of no others." Under these circumstances, the Universe of which our world is a part, sprang into being at His divine command. If it is not upon the best possible plan, God was either unwilling or not sufficiently benevolent to make it so, neither of which will be pleaded. If all things do not happen, upon the whole, exactly as God wishes they should happen, it is because He either does not foresee the existence of these things, or foreseeing them, chooses that they shall exist contrary to His choice-which is an absurd contradiction. For it is "the choice of God that things should exist which is the sole cause of existence." No man in the exercise of his senses will dispute this with regard to the creation of "beings and existences." The only question which is, generally. made, in this connexion, respects "events and actions." But if God chose the existence of beings to whom He imparted certain faculties with the perfect knowledge that these faculties would be exerted to produce certain given actions, it is clearly evident, that He chose the existence of the actions themselves. It is to say the least an extraordinary view of Deity to suppose that He would create an intelligent being not caring what actions he should be the author of, or what end he should answer in the Universe in which He placed him. There is no greater evidence of folly in any being than to act in a way so vague and aimless. If then God had a de sign in the creation of such a being, and if He gave him certain energies, foreseeing, perfectly, under what circumstances these energies would be exercised and what actions they would produce. we must call in question the perfections of Deity, if we deny that

the actions thus produced result in accordance with His sovereign choice and pleasure.

It is objected to this doctrine, that by God's marking out a particular course of action for every man, and predetermining his final destiny, it places his fate beyond the sphere of his own control, and renders him a passive machine in the hands of his Maker.To this it may be answered as before; it is believed that the doctrine is satisfactorily proven both by reason and by revelation, and as all parts of the Divine dispensation harmonize, it is therefore consistent with the free-agency of man. This certainly, ought to satisfy any one who is disposed to submit his puny judg ment to the declarations of Divine Truth. But, indeed, I cannot see how the denial of the doctrine in any degree relieves the difficulty which is made in this connexion. The foreknowledge of God with respect to the actions of men, assuredly, renders their -existence as certain as would His decrees. For to assert that God foreknows all things, contingently, is as much as to say that He does not foreknow all things. If the Divine Being contemplates an event to come as a contingency, then He must wait until the contingency eventuates before His knowledge upon the subject, is complete. But He informs us that all things, past and to come, are eternally present to His view; and if this be so, He must know the result of every contingency, and so, of course, there can be no contingency with him at all. All things, therefore, will happen certainly and determinately, as he foreknows their exisbence; and by this fixedness, will as much destroy free-agency, as though we were to give the doctrine the equivalent term of predestination. But going even farther than all this, and leaving out of the question, decree, foreknowledge or any thing of the sort which is supposed to clog the free-agency of actions and events, let us concede for a moment that things come to pass in the haphazard way that some would contend for. If the universe is upheld, it is still certain, even in this extreme case, that things will eventuate in some way or other. It is still self-evident, that every action must come to its particular result. Under these circumstances, suppose a traveller to commence a journey to a distant land, no being in the universe foreseeing any thing with regard to the progress or result of his expedition. After travelling a little distance, he begins to argue with himself in this way: "Now, it very certain that on this day one month, I shall either be at the end of my journey or I shall not. If I am to be there by that time, I will be there, if I am not to be there, I wont be there. It is now most certain, that one of these things will be true when the time arrives, and whichever it is to be it will be, however indolent or industrious I may be on the way. I will not, therefore, trouble myself about it, but go a while in another direction, and if I am to get to the end of my journey by the time appointed, I will be there, at any rate." The folly of such a palliation for in

is

dolence, all would condemn. But is this folly any greater than that of the sinner who should excuse his indifference with regard to his soul's salvation by saying, "If I am one of the elect I shall be saved, and if I am not, I shall be lost, let me act as I may." There is no shadow of essential difference between the two cases. The traveller had no reason to expect that he should arrive at his place of destination unless he persevered in pursuing his journey; either had he any reason to conclude that he would fail in arriving, within the appointed time, if he continued to travel. So also God has promised to the sinner that if he will seek he shall find, and that if he will strive, in the use of the proper means, to enter into the kingdom of heaven, he shall not be denied admittance. If he, therefore, perseveres in seeking, he has as much reason to expect acceptance, as the traveller who journeys day by day has to anticipate an arrival at the place for which he set out. The result, in each case, is alike unknown to the persons concerned; and cach has the same reason to expect that this result will eventuate in accordance with that course of conduct which he may pursue. Again, a soldier goes into the field of battle, and whilst awaiting the signal for the commencement of the combat, he enters into soliloquy with himself to the following effect: "When this battle is ended, I will either be among the number of the slain, or I shall escape alive. Now, if I am to be killed, I shall be killed, and if I am to escape, it is very certain that I shall escape. whether I fight valiantly, or.fly from the scene of danger. I will, therefore, stand still, and neither expose myself to peril by mixing in the front of the battle, nor defend myself if I am attacked; for as one of two events must happen to me, and as that one which is to be will be, why it is useless for me to endeavor to controul the event. which will, inevitably, come to pass." Now, this, as before, all will say is bad reasoning. We can easily perceive, in this case, that although there necessarily, is this fixedness of things, yet events are brought about by the instrumentality of means; and that no one has a right to expect a given result, without the use of certain intermediate means which, naturally, effectuate this result. That this is alike the case with him who argues as the soldier does, and with one who believes that his final state is predestinated, is most evident to every candid mind; and the only objection which, with any shadow of reason, can be made in this connexion, is the assertion that, in the one case, the event depends upon the agent's own act, and is, therefore, a contingency which his own choice decides; whereas, in the other instance, the result is, already, decided for him, before any exercise of choice, on his part, has been made. To this, it is answered, that, in the latter case, the result as truly eventuates in agreement with the choice which the agent himself makes, as it does in the former; and that he is, as truly, unconstrained in the exercise of that choice as though when free from the supposed constraint which predestina