moving that the House disagreed with the Lords in this amendment. The incident attracted very little attention, but it fore- shadowed what proved to be a very exasperating topic of controversy in the next Parliament.

The chief subject to which Opposition criticism was directed at the beginning of the Session, was the policy of the Government in Afghanistan. What did they mean to do to restore order? On what principle were they to regulate our future relations with the country? How long did they propose to continue the occupation of Afghanistan by British troops? Was the occupation permanent or temporary? Did they mean to retain, permanently, any part of the territory beyond the new frontier? In the February number of the Nineteenth Century an article by Sir H. Rawlinson appeared, which was generally supposed to foreshadow the Government policy, though both he and the Ministry expressly disclaimed connection with one another. Sir Henry advised the permanent retention of Candahar and Jellalabad, and the distribution of the Ameer's territories among mutually independent chiefs, each of whom should consent to accept a resident English agent. This he regarded as the only possible solution of the problem. He advocated also the formation of a new alliance with Persia, on the basis of the occupation by this Power of Herat.

Lord Granville failed to extract any definite declaration of their intentions from the Government. "Surely, my Lords," he said, "Her Majesty's Government should give us, not vague generalities, but some clear indication of what their policy really is." Lord Beaconsfield, in reply, protested that he did not know what Lord Granville wanted to be told. The assertions made in the press about the whole country being against England, had no guarantee of reality. "In point of fact, only one tribe, and a very limited portion of the country were against us." ❝ Our policy," Lord Beaconsfield went on, "is a policy opposed to annexation, and we should wish to see the Afghans governed by a chief of their own choosing, but we must retain and maintain that military frontier which will be adequate to the defence and safety of our Indian Empire. . . . Although we have an English interest, which is to secure our Empire, our next interest is that we should have neighbours who are happy and contented, and who should not be under the control of any unfriendly influence. . . . We are taking those steps which we think are calculated to bring about the results we desire; but they are not things to be done in a morning. You cannot say those things as you would at a morning visit. You have a vast country with warlike populations, and these warlike populations quarrel among themselves. They are ready to make any engagements, provided you meet their particular wishes; but you have the great and difficult duty to ascertain how far gratifying their wishes may lead to the tranquillity of the country. If we sanction, by any way, the position and authority of individuals, we incur great responsibility if we do it to men whom the great body

...

of the people have no confidence in. It requires great care to bring a country like Afghanistan in its present state into a state of tranquillity and prosperity, but there are all the elements of peace and prosperity in that country, and the noble lord is acting under a most erroneous impression when he supposes that the great body of the people are opposed to England. Not one-tenth of the people are. I am not talking of those who are immediately controlled by our regiments, but of those who really represent great classes— the great chiefs of great tribes, who place themselves in confidential and friendly communication with her Majesty's Government, and from whose declarations, and from a wise calculation of the motive that actuates them, we have a right to infer that they are sincere in their desire to bring about a settlement of the country. And I believe that settlement of the country will be brought about, and that we shall have neighbours in Afghanistan upon whom we may depend for their tranquillity, and for their desire for commercial intercourse, and totally irrespective of the great object we have obtained in strengthening our frontier, and that result will be highly favourable to the population."

A blue-book of correspondence relating to Afghanistan was issued on the second day of the session, but it added nothing to the statement of the Government position given by Lord Beaconsfield. One of the despatches, sent to Lord Lytton in December, showed, indeed, that the Government were then under the impression that it would be impossible to re-establish the authority of any one ruler. But nothing appeared to have been decided; even on this point the Government professed to be waiting till they should hear the opinion of the Governor-General and his Council. The Blue-book contained very few traces of the researches which General Roberts was understood to be making into the internal politics of Afghanistan, the leanings of different tribes, the influence wielded by individual chiefs. It did not contain the evidence for Lord Beaconsfield's assertion that only one tribe and a limited portion of the territory were hostile to us, unless this inference were to be drawn from Sir F. Robert's opinions in his diaries before the great rising in December-opinions which that rising proved to be in error.

The despatch in the Blue-book which attracted most attention, was one in which Sir F. Roberts gave an account of a conversation with Yakoob Khan, touching the Russian inclinations of his father. It was Yakoob's opinion that his father's alienation from England began in 1873, after the famous Simla negotiations. From that time, dissatisfied with Lord Northbrook's assurances, he began to entertain serious thoughts of a Russian alliance. General Roberts was convinced that Russian intrigue had been carried much farther than had been supposed, and his conclusions, although, in point of fact, his reasons for them, as given in his despatch, did not go beyond what had been stated in the Cabul Diaries of a Native Vakeel, and published in the Blue-book of December 1878, were placarded by

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some of the newspapers as "astonishing disclosures." It was rumoured that the Government had in their possession papers discovered at Cabul, of a much more compromising character for Russia than any then published. But they declined to produce them, on the ground that it was not for the public interest that they should be laid before Parliament.

The Duke of Argyll made a formal motion for the production of these papers on February 20, and seized the opportunity for fulfilling a promise which he bad made on the first night of the session, that he would originate a full debate on the whole Government policy in Afghanistan. The Duke of Argyll's excuse for passing once more in review all the main incidents in our intercourse with the rulers of Cabul from the time of the treaty with Dost Mohammed in 1857, was that his own policy, when he was at the head of the India Office, was persistently misrepresented by ministerial speakers. His opponents did not, of course, admit the validity of this excuse, and taunted him with having occupied the House for nearly two hours and a half with the restatement of opinions and the discussion of incidents which had been not merely debated in the fullest manner before, but decided by an overwhelming majority. Who cared now, it was asked, for the treaty with Dost Mohammed; or what passed at Lord Mayo's conference with Shere Ali at Umballa ; or the precise nature of the assurances given or withheld by Lord Northbrook at Simla; or the negotiations at Peshawur between the Ameer's envoy and Sir Lewis Pelly? People were anxious to know what arrangements were to be made to settle present difficulties; they had long ago made up their minds about the past. As a statesman of experience in Indian affairs, the Duke of Argyll should have offered advice for the present, and let the past alone. The answer made to this was that ministerial orators would not let the past alone, and that they habitually misrepresented the Duke of Argyll's share in it.

The speech made by Lord Northbrook in this debate attracted a great deal of attention. He was praised by the Times and the Pall Mall Gazette, because, unlike the Duke of Argyll, he dealt with the existing situation. Lord Northbrook excused himself for not entering minutely into the details of the Afghan problem. The Government, he said, had not supplied outsiders with materials for forming an opinion in matters of detail, and he was therefore obliged to confine himself to general principles of policy. The efforts of the Government, he said, reiterating the principles on which Mr. Gladstone's Government had acted, should be mainly directed towards establishing a friendly understanding with Russia. He refused to believe that there was any danger from Russian intrigues in India, but he was not therefore insensible to the critical position of the relations between England and Russia. "We have advanced," he said, "into Afghanistan. We hear of the assembly of Russian troops in Russian Turkestan. Troubles may arise in Afghan Turkestan, possibly actually, certainly sup

posed to be, fomented by Russian influences. Within a few months we shall be so placed that any day the indiscretion of some officer or the caprice of some Asiatic chief may produce a situation in which one of two high-spirited nations may have either to submit to what may appear a rebuff or a humiliation, or to appeal to arms. Is it necessary, my lords, that this should continue? Can no stop be put to a rivalry which is detrimental to the interests of both countries? To any one who looks beyond the events of the moment, there is something almost appalling in the position of the British and Russian Empires in Asia. These two gigantic forces, which have hitherto moved, each in its own sphere, over the mountains and plains of Asia, diffusing, on the whole, peace and order over countries which were formerly the prey of anarchy and rapine, appear now to be impelled by some fatal attraction to meet in deadly conflict. It is the duty and the privilege of statesmen at the head of affairs to foresee and to avert such calamities."

The danger of Parliament falling into discredit was a topic which had often been mooted in the course of last session, and had often been referred to during the recess. The blame was chiefly laid upon the Irish Obstructives; but there was also an impression that the leader of the House had not shown sufficient energy in his efforts to put down the growing evil. The vindication of the dignity of Parliament was thereby elevated into one of the subjects upon which there was urgent and imperative need of legislation. If the Irish members had been less pertinacious in their opposition to the Address and the Relief Bill, and had shown any signs of giving up their practice of wasting Parliamentary time, Sir Stafford Northcote would probably have been able to resist the pressure put upon him by the advocates of drastic measures, and follow out what was apparently his own inclination-to leave the cure of the evil to the operation of time and the good sense of the offenders. But the speech-making on Irish Distress seemed so purposeless-unless on the supposition that it was deliberately intended to waste timethat those who held that the evil would grow unless checked by a sharp and immediate remedy found their case very much strengthened.

A private member, however, was the first to propose action. Early in the session Mr. Newdegate gave notice that he would move the adoption of a new rule, empowering any member to draw the attention of the Speaker to the fact that any other member was obstructing the business of the House. The Speaker was thereupon to put the question whether this was so, without allowing amendment or debate, and if the majority were of opinion that there had been obstruction, the offending Member was to be suspended for a time from the service of the House. A night was fixed for the hearing of Mr. Newdegate's proposal, but on that night another question had precedence-another matter involving the maintenance of the dignity of the House.

The action taken by the leader of the House in this matter was

hailed with less unanimity than the announcement of his intention to relieve Mr. Newdegate of the task of putting down Obstruction. Mr. Plimsoll was indicted by two members for a breach of the privileges of the House. In view of the disasters to grain ships recorded during the previous year, Mr. Plimsoll had obtained leave to introduce a Bill, making compulsory the loading of all grain cargoes in sacks or bags. Sir Charles Russell, one of the members for Westminster, and Mr. Onslow, member for Guildford, had given notice of opposition to the second reading; the effect of which was, that under the rule of the House about opposed business, the Bill could not come on after half-past twelve. Mr. Plimsoll immediately, in his indignation, had the walls of Westminster and Guildford placarded with a violent denunciation of his opponents to their electors. The object of the Bill, he declared, intended as it was to prevent a great yearly sacrifice of human life, was approved of by all the shipowners in the House of Commons: at least, no one was found to oppose it. "There was no shipowner," the Westminster placard went on, "willing to put down the fatal notice" [of opposition to the Bill]. “It was, however, put down by Sir Charles Russell, your member. I ask, is it your wish that next winter should be as this, and that hundreds of precious human lives, and hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of property, should be lost? I ask you to say whether, if Mr. Onslow has done this of his own motion, it is not inhuman? And if he is merely the catspaw of some who wish to oppose (but dare not openly, for fear of their constituents), is it not degrading? Electors of Westminster, I appeal from your representatives to yourselves."

Mr. Plimsoll was asked whether he accepted responsibility for the placard to which his name was appended. He accepted full responsibility, maintained that his statements were correct, and at first was disinclined to make any apology for the strength of his language. But when, upon this refusal, Sir Charles Russell gave notice that he would make formal complaint of his conduct as a breach of privilege, Mr. Plimsoll sought to anticipate censure by making an unreserved withdrawal of his injurious imputations. He made the amplest acknowledgment that he had been mistaken in attributing to the members for Westminster and Guildford the design of wilfully obstructing the passage of his Grain Cargoes Bill. Sir C. Russell and Mr. Onslow declared themselves satisfied with his apology, and there the matter might have ended; but Sir Stafford Northcote was of opinion, that though the personal question between Mr. Plimsoll and the members whom he had attacked was terminated by his apology, the dignity and independence of the House demanded that some notice should be taken of Mr. Plimsoll's conduct. He maintained that the publication of such placards as Mr. Plimsoll had caused to be posted in Westminster was "distinctly opposed to the liberties of the House." He went back to the Bill of Rights, and advanced the doctrine there laid down, that the freedom of speech, debates, and proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any place out of Parliament. This