peculiar character of the man; which you consider in three different capacities, of the orator, the statesman, the philosopher; and contend, that he not only contradicts in one, what he affirms in another, but is inconsistent with himself, even when he speaks from one and the same person: Yet, from the best attention that I have been able to pay to his history, I find in him but one general, consistent, glorious character, of a great and good man, acting and speaking on all occasiong, what the greatest prudence with the greatest virtue would suggest. As an orator, it was his business to inforce, with all the power of eloquence, whatever he thought serviceable to his client, and useful to the cause that he was defending. Of this part he acquitted himself with glory; and tells us himself, what the nature of the thing would tell us for him, that we are not to expect his real sentiments Here. As a statesinan, the case is still the same. In his harangues to the people, he gives a different account, you observe, of the same fact, from what he had done in the Senate; that is, he adapts his style and arguments to the different genius of each assembly; to engage them both the more effectually to promote the measures, that he was then pursuing. As a philosopher; if we join the character of an Avademic, we shall find him equally consistent. For I cannot help agreeing with Bentley, in taking this for the key of his philosophical writings, as much as I do with you, in your fixing the time of his changing the Academy. This was the philosophy, that he professed through life; and to which he professes himself indebted for all his success in it: And this clew will lead us through that labyrinth of contradictions, which you seem to discover in his works. In his Book of Divination, you say, he combats all Augury; but in his Book of Laws declares for it'; in a manner too serious to suspect him of feigning. Yet all the matter is, that in the one he acts the philo sopher; in the other the statesman: In his Treatise on Divination, he asserts and establishes it in the first book, in the person of his brother, by all the arguments, that can ༣༽ can be brought for it; and refutes them all in the second, in his own person. This is the true spirit of the Academy; after examining both sides, to reject what has nothing solid in it. Yet in his Treatise on Laws, he recommends Augury; and no wonder: for though he laughed at it as a philosopher; he had a great opinion of it as a politician: And always speaks of the invention of its ceremonies, and the making them part of the civil constitution, as an instance of the greatest wisdom and prudence in their ancestors. For it was wholly agreeable to that scheme of policy, which he constantly pursued from the beginning to the end of life, of throwing the chief influence and balance of power in state matters into the hands of the better sort. Again you take notice, that in his Book on the Nature of the Gods, he reflects on those, as too curious or impertinent, who were calling upon him on all occa sions to declare his own opinion: Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt, quam necesse est. (I. 1. § 5.) yet in his Academic Ques tions, he swears that he always speaks what he thinks : Jurarem ...me et ardere studio veri reperiendi, et ea sentire, quæ dicerem. (1. 4. § 10.) In the first of these Works, he professes only to collect what the old Philosophers had taught; and, according to the method of the Academy, to combat the opinion of one sect, with that of another, without declaring his own: So that the difficulty of discovering it is not owing here, as you intimate, to any obscurity in delivering it; but to his not delivering it at all. But in the Academic Questions, as far as I can understand the passage without the context to assist me, he does not swear, as you render it, that he always speaks what he thinks, but only, that he thinks what he is there speaking: And if so, it confirms what I have been saying of the Academy, and its being the true key of his sentiments. } But you assert, that his sentiments are not to be collected from any of his writings, that were designed for the public, which include all but his Letters, because, in all his writings of that kind, he affected an obscurity. This is the first time that I have ever 3 seen the character of obscure applied to Tully's writings: EE 4 ings Surely no man's style was ever farther removed from it, or more remarkably shining and perspicuous. than his. But the whole charge of obscurity, and all the contrast of sentiments found in different parts of his works, may casily be solved, by considering only the different circumstances, in which they were delivered. By attending to this, we shall find his very contradictions to be consistencies, and nothing else but what was pru¬ dent and proper to be said by one and the same man; acting the different parts of the orator, the statesman, 3/ the philosopher. To come then at last to the principal point in question; the discovery of his real thoughts concerning a future state, which are to be collected only, you say, from his Epistles. And so far I agree, that in familiar letters we may expect to find him more open, and undisguised, and as far as he touches any subject, treating it with less reserve, than in works designed for the public: Yet all his letters, as you allow, are not of this sort: In many of them it was his business to say, not so much what was true, as what would please. But let us see what he has actually said in the testimonies, that you r have produced from them. In a letter to Atticus, (1. 4. 10.) Sed de illa ambulatione, fors videret, aut si qui est, qui curet, deus. To Torquatus, (Ep. fam. 1. 6. 3.) Sed hæc consolatio lecis est: Illa gravior, qua te uti spero, ego certe utor: Nec dum ero, angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa: Et si non ero, sensu omnino carebo. Again, (ib. 4.) Deinde quod mihi ad consolationem commune tecum est, si jam vocer ad exitum witæ, non ab ea republica avellar, qua carendum esse v doleam, præsertim, cum id sine ullo sensu futurumou sit. To Toranius, (ib. 21.) Cum consilio prefici nikit possit, una ratio cidetur, quicquid evenerit, ferre moderate, præsertim, cum omnium rerum mors sito extremum.-Nothing, you say, can be more express than these passages, against a future state: Andor that Tully speaks in them his real sentiments, there is not the least room to doubt. They were letters of consolation to his friends, when he himself, by reason of the ill state of public affairs, most wanted consolation. As As to the first of these passages; you allow it to be a compliment to the philosophy of his friend Atticus, who was an Epicurean: and why is it not so too in the rest? In the first to Torquatus, as in that to Atticus, the case is put hypothetically, si non ero and the very use of such a topic in consolation, implies, that these friends also: were Epicureans, and that he was administering comfort from their philosophy, not his own, as likely to have the more weight with them; or arguing, as we say, ad hominem, not expressing his real sentiments." But as this is only conjectural, and, as some may think, contrary to fact; let us try what other defence can be made, and what use in this case of our key of the Academy. Though I have often reflected on these passages, yet my notion has always been, that Tully did believe a future state. The whole turn of his writings, and the tenor of his life, shew it: he lived expecting it, and always, so as to deserve it; and declares it to be a favourite opinion; which, though possibly an error, he was resolved to indulge. But we must remember still, that he was an Academic; that is, that he believed it only to be probable; and as probability necessarily admits the degrees of more and less, so it admits a variety likewise in the stability of our persuasion: and as Tully himself says, on another occasion, quis autem èst, tanta quidem de re, quin varie secum ipse disputet? In a melancholy hour, when the spirits are low, and the mind under a dejection, an argument appears in a very different light; objections acquire strength; and what humours the present chagrin, finds the readiest admission. These passages were evidently of this kind, written in his desponding moments; and, as you say, when he himself most wanted consolation. And if we allow them therefore to express what he really thought at the time, yet they prove nothing more, than that he sometimes doubted of what he generally believed; consistently with the character and principles of an Academic, who embraced no opinions as certain. 2 Thus, Sir, I have given you my free thoughts on what you were so good as to communicate with regard to Tully: I will not be answerable for the exactness of them; they are such only as my recollection could furnish, without without the help of Tully's Works to refresh, or any testimonics to support them. But as I reserve the more exact consideration of this argument to the part of Tully's life, which was the most employed on philosophy, under Cesar's tyramy, so I shall be obliged to you for imparting any further thoughts on the subject, either to confirm or confute what I have here offered: and if any occasion of books or friends should invite you again this winter to Cambridge, where I propose to be about Michaelmas, I beg you to be assured, that no man will be more ready to serve you in any manner there, or better pleased to enjoy as much of your company as your time and other friends will allow to, Sir, Your most obedient servant, P. S. I should be glad to hear that your great Work goes on successfully; and as a sure omen of satisfying others, that you find more and more satisfaction from it yourself. When I was last in London, I met with a little piece, written with the same view and on the same plan with yours: an anonymous Letter from Geneva, evincing the divine mission of Moses, from the institution of the sabbatic year. The author sets out, like you, from this single postulatum, that Moses was a consummate lawgiver; and shews, that he could never have injoined a law so whimsical, impolitic, and hazardous; exposing the people to certain famine, as oft as the preceding or following year proved barren; if He, who has all nature at command, had not warranted the success of it. The letter is ingenious and sprightly, and dresses out, in a variety of colours, the absurdity of the institution, on the supposition of its being human. It is in French, and published in Bibliotheque Germanique, tom. 30. gene .. But will not this gaiety of censuring the Law be found too adventurous, and expose your postulatum itself to some hazard? Especially when there is a fact, rally allowed by the learned, that seems to overturn all this specious reasoning at once; viz. that this law of the sabbatic year was never observed. For if so, it may |