property. Therefore, to counteract this undue temptation, it was natural for such proprietors, in their own defence, to apply to the state for additional and accumulative penalties against the invaders of their right. In which, they act but as the State itself doth for the security of Government in general; when, for the support of that natural allegiance, which all men owe to the society under which they chuse to live, and whereby they are protected, it addeth, by positive laws, the additional sanction of oaths, and other solemn engagements. Now if the State, in this case, can never be supposed to have waved or superseded its natural claim to alle giance, and to rest it solely on the oaths taken, or the engagements made; what reason have we to think that the subject, in his turn, when he applies to the State for protection, in the instance in question, should give up or peach his natural right, while his only purpose is to seek additional security for the enjoyment of it?

This leadeth us to our second question, Why the Magistrate and Legislature restrain this additional sanction to a certain term of years. And the reason is evident. The petitioners neither require more; nor doth the State find, that more is needed. The great temptation to invade this property being while the demand for it is great and, frequent; which is, generally, on the first publication of a book, and some, few years afterwards. While this demand continueth, the proprietor hath need of all additional sanctions, to oppose to the force of the tempta tion: But when, in course of years, the demand abateth, and, with it, the temptation; the common legal security of natural rights, is then sufficient to keep offenders in order.

Howeyer, as clear and undoubted a property as this is by nature, and the common principles of society, it cannot be denied, but that the Legislature may abridge, sus pend, or abrogate it within its own jurisdiction, as it is accustomed to do, with several other the like rights, for the sake of the whole. But, then, it must be done by express, declaration and decree: implication, inference, or any mere law-consequence, or even a mistake of judg ment in the Legislature, going on a supposition that there was no natural right where indeed there was, would

be,

be, simply, insufficient to abrogate it. And the reason is plain, because the believing a thing to be no natural right, doth not infer a judgment, that the enjoyment of it as such, would be hurtful to the Society; which judg ment is the only cause of the Legislature's abridging or abrogating a natural right.

This was necessary to premise, in order to set a case in its true light, which hath, above all others, encouraged the invasion of property; though the Act, from whence it arises, was solely contrived to prevent that invasion. I mean the Act of the Eighth of Queen Anne; which ig norance and knavery have concurred to represent as a restrictive, and not accumulative law; and consequently, to suppose it the sole foundation, instead of an additional support, of literary property. It is intitled, An Act for the Encouragement of Learning; in which an exclusive right of property, under certain conditions, is secured, by particular penalties, to authors, and booksellers claiming under them, for the term of one and twenty years.

Now in this Act, we are so far from finding any declaration to abridge, suspend, or abrogate this natural right (which, as we say, would be indeed sufficient to dissolve it) or any expression intimating the opinion of the Legislature against its existence (which, as we say, would not be sufficient); that, on the contrary, there is in the preamble of it, an expression plainly declarative of their opinion, that authors had a right, prior to this Act; and, towards the conclusion, a proviso, which leaves the question of the right, free from, and undeter mined by, what is, in this statute, enacted concerning property.

The expression is this,-hereas Printers, Book sellers, and other Persons, have of late frequently. taken the Liberty of printing, reprinting, and pub-i lishing, or causing to be printed, reprinted, and pube lished, Books, and other Writings, without the Consent of the Authors or PRDPRIETORS of such Books or Writings, to their very great Detriment, and too often to the. Ruin of them and their Families, Now, could the injured parties, here mentioned, be proprietors of that in which they had no property?

&

Or

Or did the Legislature, in a law for the regulation of sa momentous a branch of what was deemed and claimed as property, use the terms of the subject in question inaccurately or unfitly? If it were possible to think so of a British Legislature, the supposition would be excluded here; because, not only the expression, but the senti ment, necessarily supposes that they used the word PROPRIETORS in its strict and and exact signification: it being a representation of the bad effects from the liberty taken of printing and reprinting books, without the consent of the authors, or their assigns.

The proviso, in the conclusion, is in these words ----Provided that nothing in this Act contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, either to PREISDICE OR CONFIRH aup RIGHT that the sais Universities, or any of them, or any PERSON or Persons have, or claim to have, to the printing or reprinting anp Book or Copy already printed ar HEREAFTER TO BE PRINTED Now,

though it may be easily granted, that one purpose of this proviso was to leave undecided all claims, or pretences of claim, to exclusive printing, from patents, licenses, &c. yet the large wording of it appears to have a particular ann at obviating such misconstruction of the Statute, as if the additional temporary security, thereby given, either implied that there was no right of property before, or else abrogated what it found. And the having these two things in its intention, viz. the natural right, and that which is founded on patents, seems to be the reason of its saying that it neither PREJUDICED NOR CONFIRMED It being unjust to prejudice a plain natural right; and inexpedient to confirm an unexamined claim by patent. For what the Legislature's sense was of this natural right, appears from what hath been observed of their use of the word proprietors, in the preamble.

But lastly, in cases where the sense of the Legislature is uncertain or obscure, There the interpretation of the supreme Magistrates of Justice hath been always deemed to have the force of a legal decision. And this decision hath been made in favour of property, on the Act in question. For, in the High Court of Chancery, actions for damages have been sustained, where the action for forfeiture

forfeiture and penalties on this statute was not competent in any other Court: Which shews, that that great Magistrate did not consider this Act as a restrictive, but as an accumulative law. It being a rule, that positive correctory laws, are to be strictly interpreted. For in every civil society, experience shews, that the subject in many cases, must be put under restraint with regard to things in themselves lawful, merely because of the bar consequences, to the public, by the abuse of liberty. But, in all such restrictice laws, right reason, at the same time, forbids these lays to be extended, in the smallest particular, beyond the letter of the Act. To do otherwise would be abridging liberty, without authority of law, which is the same thing with private violence. This plainly shews the judgment of the High Court of Chancery to be, that there was a right of property previous to the Statute; which the Statute had neither abro gated nor abridged; and, on that right, the action was sustained, where the action for forfeiture and penalties was not competent. For an additional security of property, made for the benefit, and at the request of the proprietors can never be deemed to exclude them from having recourse, at pleasure, to that legal remedy, which, on the common principles of a Court of Equity, they had a claim to, prior to the grant of such additional security.

+

All this laid together, it seems abundantly evident, that no right is taken away by this Act, which authors, or their assigns, had before the making of it. And consequently that it is no restrictive, but an accumulative law, brought in aid of a natural right, whose reality 【 have here endeavoured to support.

But now, Sir. when I consider to whom I have addressed these reflections, I find myself in the foolish situation of that old Greek Sophist, who would needs entertain Hannibal with a lecture on the art of war. And if impertinence escape his censure, I shall be in debted only to your distinguished character of politeness, and general candour, as well as to your known partiality and friendship for the Author: For I have ventured to give my thoughts on a question of law, before One, to

whose

whose superior eminence in that profession, we see joined a force of reason and splendor of eloquence, which make truth reverenced by those it detects; and justice amiable even to those it punishes. But where should an author turh, if not to him who hath, on all occasions, so generously lent his ministry to the support and protection of letters, whenever they have been reduced to apply to justice for relief; and to whose successful patronage they are principally indebted for that share of security which they, at present, enjoy? For (to conclude my application to you, in behalf of learning, with the words of your favourite AUTHOR) "Non causidicum nescio quem, neque proclamatorem, aut rabulam conquirimus, sed eum virum qui primum sit ejus artis antistes: Qui "scelus fraudemque nocentis possit dicendo subjicere "odio civium, supplicioque constringere; idemque in"genii præsidio, innocentiam judiciorum pœna liberare; idemque languentem labentemque populum aut ad "decus excitare, aut ab errore deducere, aut inflammare "in improbos, aut incitatam in bonos, mitigare."

I am, &c.