paffions, he will not allow that the Creator hath implanted in the human mind any thing that can be called a natural fenfe of good and evil, of right and wrong. He treats those as enthufiafts in ethics, and as rendering natural religion ridiculous, who maintain that there is "a moral fenfe or inftinct, by "which men diftinguish what is morally good from what is "morally evil, and perceive an agreeable or difagreeable intel"lectual fenfation accordingly.” "This, he fays, may be acquired in fome fort by long habit, and be true philofophi"cal devotion, but that it is whimsical to affume it to be na"tural a."

And now we may form fome judgment, how far our author's declarations concerning the abfolute clearnefs, as well as certainty, of the law of nature are to be depended on which he makes with a view to fhew that all extraordinary revelation is entirely needlefs.

He tells us, that "the law of nature has all the clearness, "all the precision that God can give, or man defire." Which he proves, because "the nature of our fyftem, as far as the

morality of actions is concerned, is fufficiently known to us, "and the laws of our nature confequently, fince they refult "from it." It is to be observed, that the clearness and precifion he here attributes to the law of nature is fuppofed by him to be of fuch a kind as to be obvious to all mankind. And the only way he allows to any of the human race for knowing that law and his own duty, is by fending him for information concerning it to the works of God, and especially to the human system, and the laws that refult from it. And is this fo eafy a task to every man, even the most illiterate ! Can it be faid that this is, as he affirms, "intelligible at all "times, and in all places alike, and proportioned to the meaneft "understanding "." Is every man well qualified to fearch into the fund of his nature phyfical and moral; and to form his conclufions accordingly, and draw up a system of religion, of laws and rules for his own conduct? How can he confiftently suppose, that the human fyftem is fufficiently known to all, when according to him fome of the wifeft men in all ages, and mankind in general, have been mistaken even in a point of fuch importance relating to it, as the fuppofing the foul to be a diftinct fubftance from the body? Befides which, the knowlege of the human fyftem takes in a due confideration of our

fenfes, reason, appetites, and paffions. All these must be confidered, that we may know wherein confifteth the proper order and harmony of our powers, which of them are to be fubordinate, and which to govern; what are the juft limits of our appetites and paffions; how far, and in what inftances they are to be gratified, and how far restrained. And is every particular perfon, if left to himself, able by the mere force of his own reason to confider and compare all these? and from thence to make the proper deductions, and acquire a particular knowlege, as our author requires, of thofe laws that are deducible from this fyftem ?

He has another remarkable paffage to the fame purpose which it may be proper to take fome notice of. "Whether

"the word of God, faith he, be his word, may be, and hath "been difputed by Theifts: But whether the works of God "be his works, neither has been nor can be difputed by any "fuch. Natural religion therefore, being founded on human "nature, which is the work of God, and the neceffary conditions of human happiness, which are impofed by the whole fyftem of it, every man who receives the law of nature re"ceives it on his own authority, and not on the authority of "other men known or unknown, and in their natural state as "fallible as himself. It is not communicated to him only by "tradition and hiftory: It is a perpetual standing revelation, "always made, always making, and as prefent in these days as in the days of Adam to all his offspring d." Here every man is directed, in, forming a fcheme of the law of nature for himself, to defpife all other authority, and rely wholly on his own. It is even mentioned as an advantage, that he receives it on his own authority, i. e. that he has no other proof or authority for it, but the deductions he himself forms by his own reason: Though that reason is, as this writer owns, for the most part influenced and overborne by the appetites and paffions. And this is cried up as a standing revelation to all the fons of Adam. But if we apply this magnificent talk concerning the divine certainty and clearness of the law of nature, to what our author plainly intends by it, the deductions drawn by every man for himself concerning his duty, and what he thinks most conducive to his happiness, the fallacy of his way of arguing will immediately appear. For though the works of God are certainly the works of God, and it will not be denied that the human nature is his work, it doth not follow that the

Vol. v. p. 92.

con

conclufions formed by every particular perfon from that nature, and from the works of God concerning duty and moral obligation, are to be certainly depended upon. When therefore he afferts, that the contents of the law of nature are objects of fuch a certainty, as the author of nature alone can commu"nicate," if the defign be to fignify, that the judgment every man forms for himself by his own reafon, and upon his own authority, as he expreffeth it, concerning the law of nature, hath fuch a divine certainty in it, it is manifeftly falfe. He confounds the objective certainty of the law as founded in the nature of things, with the certainty of the judgment men form concerning it: Which are very different things. However certain the law of nature is in itself, men may greatly mistake and misapprehend it. And it is certain in fact that they do stand in great need of particular inftruction to enable them to acquire a right knowlege of it. And furely a divine inftruction concerning it by perfons extrordinarily fent and commiffioned to publish a revelation of the will of God to mankind, and who give fufficient proofs of their divine mission, must be of the highest advantage.

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This writer himself, though he so often extols the absolute clearness, certainty, and perfection of the law of nature, i. e. of the judgment men form by reafon concerning it; yet at other times makes acknowlegements which quite destroy the argument he would draw from it against the neceffity or usefulness of extraordinary revelation: He had affirmed in a passage cited above, that "natural revelation, for fo, fays he, I will call "it, produces a series of intuitive knowlege from the first principles to the laft conclufions." Where he seems to make both the great principles of the law of nature, and the conclufions that are drawn from it, to be infallibly certain. And yet he elsewhere declares, that the laws of nature are general, and intimates that a multitude of false deductions, and wrong applications have been often made of that law f. Among feveral paffages to this purpose there is one that deferves particular notice. After having faid, that "it is in vain to attempt to "know any thing more than God has fhewed us in the actual "conftitution of things;" he adds, that "even when we judge of them thus, and make particular applications of the general laws of nature, we are very liable to mistakes."That there are things fit and unfit, right and wrong, just " and unjust in the human fyftem, and discernible by human

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• Vol. v. p. 23.

5

Ib.

P. 154.

" reason,

1

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reafon, as far as our natural imperfections admit, I acknow"lege most readily. But from the difficulty we have to judge, "and from the uncertainty of our judgments in a multitude "of cafes which lie within our bounds, I would demonftrate "the folly of those who affect to have knowlege beyond them. They are unable on many occafions to deduce from the con"stitution of their own fyftem, and the laws of their own "nature, with precision and certainty, what these require of "them; and what is right or wrong, just or unjust for them "to do." To this may be added the acknowlegement he hath made, that "the law of nature is hid from our fight by all the variegated clouds of civil laws and customs. Some gleams of true light may be feen through them: But they "render it a dubious light, and it can be no better to those "who have the keeneft fight, till thofe interpofitions are re"moved "." So that after all his boasts, as if the law of nature were fo clear and obvious to all men that they cannot mistake it, he owns it to have been hid from our fight, by the clouds of civil laws and customs, and that it is rendered a dubious light, even to those who have the keeneft fight. And furely nothing can be more proper to remove and difpel thefe interpofitions of contrary laws and cuftoms, than the light of divine revelation enforced by a divine authority. He himself obferves, that "Eufebius in his first book of his evangelical "preparation gives a long catalogue of abfurd laws and "cuftoms, contradictory to the law of nature in all ages and "countries, for a very good purpose, to fhew in feveral in"ftances, how fuch abfurd laws and cuftoms as these have "been reformed by the Gofpel, that is, by a law which re"newed and confirmed the original law of nature 1."

These observations may fuffice with regard to what Lord Bolingbroke hath offered concerning the law of nature in general, and its abfolute certainty and clearness to all mankind: I fhall now proceed to make fome particular reflections on the account he gives of the contents of that law, or the duties which are there prescribed: As alfo of the grounds of the obligation of that law, and the fanction whereby it is en forced.

Self

I. With regard to the contents or matter of the law of nature, he obferves, that "felf-love directed by instinct to mutual pleasure, made the union between man and woman. "love made that of parents and children: Self-love begat soh Ib. p. 105, i Ib. p. 100, 101.

g Vol. v. p. 444• .

ciability:

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k

ciability: And reason, a principle of human nature as well as instinct, improved it; and extended it to relations more remote, and united feveral families into one community, as "instinct had united several individuals into one family." See the third of his Fragments and Effays in his fifth volume. And he treats this more largely in the fixth of thofe Effays, where he obferves, that "there is fuch a thing as natural reafon implanted in us by the author of our nature; but "that reafon would come too flowly to regulate the conduct "of human life, if the All-wife Creator had not implanted "in us another principle, that of felf-love; which is the original spring of human actions, under the direction of instinct "first and reafon afterwards *."-" That inftinct and reafon " may be confidered as diftinct promulgations of the fame. "law. Self-love directs neceffarily to fociability. Instinct "leads us to it by the fenfe of pleasure, and reafon confirms us in it by a fense of happiness."" Sociability is the "foundation of human happiness: Society cannot be main"tained without benevolence, juftice, and other focial virtues. "Those virtues therefore are the foundation of fociety. And "thus are we led from the inftinctive to the rational law of "nature.-Self-love operates in all thefe ftages. We love "ourselves, we love our families, we love the particular fo"cieties to which we belong. And our benevolence extends at laft to the whole race of mankind. Like fo many differ66 ent vortices the center of all is felf-love: And that which is "the most distant from it is the weakest m."

It appears from this account of the law of nature, that he makes felf-love to be the original spring of all human actions, the fundamental principle of the law of nature, and center of the moral system to which all the lines of it tend, and in which they terminate. And yet he elsewhere calls "univerfal bene"volence, benevolence to all rational beings, the great and "fundamental principle of the law of nature "," And afferts, that "the first principle of the religion of nature and reason "is a fociability that flows from univerfal benevolence "." In the paffages above cited, he had exprefly affirmed that felf-love begets fociability, and had refolved benevolence into felf-love as the original principle from which it flows. But here he makes fociability to flow from univerfal benevolence. I do got well fee how this can be made to confift upon his scheme.