He now appears before the public as a teacher of the art of war; and so great was the avidity with which his book was read on the continent, that three or four large editions were sold in the course of the years 1812 and 1813. We rejoice from the heart that the present circumstances of Europe, render it unnecessary for us to enter so fully into an examination of this work as we might have been tempted to do six months ago: in a brief account of it, we may select a passage or too which some of our readers will peruse with interest.

The entire object of this work, is to establish what the author calls this gratifying truth,' namely,

That a good garrison, entrusted with the defence of a fortified place, and animated with the noble enthusiasm of distinguishing itself, can (as long as supplied with provisions and ammunition) successfully resist the most determined efforts of a force ten times its number, and eventually effect the destruction of the besieging army?

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The volume is divided into two parts. The duties of an officer entrusted with the defence of a place being reducible to two. 'Ist. To be in the firm resolution to perish rather than to surrender; and 2dly, To make himself perfectly master of all the means that industry can supply to insure its defence:'-the author founds the division of his work on these two points. It is a maxim with M. Carnot, that the real defence of a place commences when the enemy has got within the works' and he employs much labour and ingenuity in refuting what he deno.minates false objections to this principle. We cannot say that his reasonings have altogether satisfied us; though, as we are not soldiers, we may be incompetent judges. He descants, however, and, at times, rather eloquently, on the responsibility of an officer to execute the orders with which he is entrusted, the impropriety of his inquiring into motives, or reflecting upon consequences, the importance of fortresses as military points, -the contemptuous disregard which ought always to be paid to the threats of an enemy,-the power of opinion in a besieged town, and the absurdity of those calculations which pretend to determine the duration of a siege. He concludes the first part with official papers relative to its contents; and an historical illustration of the principles he has advanced, included in two sections. 1. Containing examples drawn from ancient history 2. Examples taken from modern history. Several of those which are taken from ancient history seem merely added to swell the size of the book, and might very well have been omitted.

The second part, which relates to the best method of defending fortified places, is almost entirely practical. It contains many observations and directions, relative to the steps to be taken by commandants and engineer officers, on their arrival at a

place entrusted to their charge,-to the defensive arrangements of the place in reference to artillery,-provisions and supplies of all kinds, and to the measures dictated by circumstances in the actual siege, such as the investment, opening of the trenches, distant defence, near defence, &c. The whole is interspersed with numerous anecdotes of celebrated warriors who have flourished during the last two centuries; and with prescriptions, proclamations, and directions, calculated to impress most deeply the minds of moralists and philosophers. What, for example, will be thought of the monarch who could confer the government of a town on a general, under such terms as the following.

Napoleon, by the grace of God, and the Constitution of the State, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine.

The town of Antwerp being declared in a state of siege, we have resolved to nominate and appoint for its commander a distinguished officer, whose zeal and fidelity has [have] been tried in many actions.

We have taken into our consideration the services of the General of Division Senator Calend, and we have appointed him, and hereby do appoint him, "commandant of the place of Antwerp," now in a state of siege. Conformably to [with] our decree of the 11th instant, by which he is appointed governor of the said place, we order him to be there by theand never to go beyond

a musket shot of the ramparts and advanced works; frequently to inspect and visit the provisions for the garrison, and the magazines for the artillery, and to take care that they are abundantly supplied, and secure from the attacks of the enemy as well as from the weather. We enjoin him to take all necessary precautions to increase occasionally the supplies of the place, and also to ensure provisions for the inhabitants, even greater in proportion than those for the garrison. He will employ, within forty-eight hours after his arrival at Antwerp, commissioners, civil and military, to ascertain and certify that the said supplies are actually in the place: he will oblige the inhabitants to provide themselves with buckets, and to keep them constantly filled with water: three inspectors appointed to each street will make domiciliary visits to see that this order is attended to. He will take care that the engines be in the best possible state; they will be stationed as a sort of reserve, and as much as possible sheltered from the enemy's fire. He will take the necessary measures to augment their number. He will give directions to collect a great quantity of fascines, palisades, and also all the timber for blindages that can possibly be procure.

"We order him to preserve the place, and never to think of surrendering it on any pretence whatsoever; in case of its being invested and blockaded, he must be deaf to all reports from the enemy. He must equally resist insinuations and attacks, and never suffer his courage to droop. His constant rule must be to have as little communication with the enemy as possible. He will always hear in mind the dreadful and inevitable consequences of disobedience to our

orders, or of neglect in the execution of his duties. He must never forget that, in losing our esteem, he incurss the severity of military law; and that this law condemns him, and his staff to death, if he surrenders the place; even if TWO LUNETTES WERE TAKEN, AND A PRACTICABLE In case the enemy

BREACH MADE IN THE BODY OF THE PLACE.

should have blown up the counter-scarp, he must prevent the consequences that might result from this by intrenching himself in the interior of the bastions. In short, we most positively do order and command him to run the chances of an assault, for the purpose of protracting his defence, and increasing the loss of the enemy. He must recollect that a Frenchman should think his life of no value the moment it is put in competition with his honour; this idea must be to him and to his subordinate officers, the main spring of all their actions; and as the reduction of the place must be the last term of his efforts, and the result of the total impossibility to resist any longer, we forbid him to accelerate that unfortunate event by his consent, EVEN BY ONE HOUR, and under pretence of obtaining an honourable capitulation.

. We direct that whenever the council of defence shall be called together to consult on the operations, these "lettres patentes" shall be read in an audible and intelligent voice.

• Given this 11th day of August, 1809, and of our reign the 6th.'

If the commissions given to the generals commanding armies were at all analogous to the above, there can be no wonder that some of them have been very tardy in declaring their adhesion' to the new order of things.

Our author never writes more like a Frenchman, or less like a prophet, than when he is teaching his readers to treat with contempt the threats of an enemy.

• When the immense preparations necessary for the regular siege of a well defended place are taken into consideration, the greatest confidence must result from a treble line of fortresses, such as surround France.'

• Fortresses established on various points of such a river as the Rhine, which serves as a limit of the empire, render an attack on that part of the frontier almost impracticable, and excessively dangerous to an enemy. For, as these points always occupy, or command, the most favourable places to cross over, it renders the passage of the river extremely difficult; and even admitting that the enemy had succeeded in his passage, it exposes him, if he perseveres in his invasion, without being able to take the fortresses, to be attacked in the rear, and cut off from his own country; in addition to any diversion that might be effected from these points: but, if acting with caution, the enemy is determined to secure their possession before he advances, such sieges will offer him the greatest difficulty, in consequence of the river separating the different corps of his army, and exposing them to be surprized and beaten in detail.'

Such was the language of M. Carnot in 1812; we leave our

readers to contrast it with the language of facts, as they speak for themselves in 1814, and shall now turn to the translator.

The Baron de Montalembert, who dedicates this translation to the Duke of York, wishes his Royal Highness to view it as an endeavour on his part to render himself worthy of his approbation, and competent to the duties of the situation he holds on the staff of the army. This, we confess, we do not comprehend for we do not think that even the most attentive perusal of such a book as M. Carnot's, would prepare an officer to discharge the duties of assistant quarter master general;' and if the perusal of such a work would not have that effect, neither would the translation of it. As to the translation itself, it may be characterized as dasliing and spirited, not always correct, and never elegant. The translator abounds excessively in the frequent fault of those who render French military works into English, that of giving many words and phrases in their original language. A fault like this, ought to be particularly guarded against in military performances; because a very heavy proportion of the technical words in military science, are already pure French. What, then, will be thought of the translator, who actually presents to his English reader as unsusceptible of accurate translation, among many others, such words and phrases as appui, accidens du terrein, couronnement, debouché, deploy, elite, en ligne droite, enceinte, en materiel, ensemble, lettres patentes, moral, and reddition? But besides this, the Baron often takes such liberties with the language current in these realms, as but few of his brother officers, we hope, would tolerate. He talks for example, of these kind of matters, and of tolerable good' contrivances; which we humbly conceive furnishes tolerable good' evidence that he is not much versed in these kind' of undertakings.

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A still more serious cause of dissatisfaction with the present translation, is on the ground of omission.

My principal object,' says the Baron, next to that of faithfully adhering to the spirit of the original, has been to adapt the translation to the use of the officers of the British army in general. I have therefore thought it unnecessary to translate the three additional memoirs at the end of the work. They were written expressly for engineers, and are quite unconnected with the rest of the publication. They are in fact technical, particularly the third; containing much of that mechanical part of the art, already published in the Pocket Gunner, James's Military Dictionary, and several other useful works.

With a view, also, to lessen the price and size of the book, and, by that means, to enable captains and subaltern officers of infantry, to carry it with them on service, I have selected sixteen of the most

useful sieges, suppressing those which I conceived would convey very little interest to the mind of a British officer.

For the same reason, I have likewise omitted the compliments paid by M. Carnot to his Emperor, and also the translation of several passages which appeared to me to contain only an unnecessary repetition of instructions and arguments, which had been previously fully laid down and discussed.

It appears, then, from the Baron's own acknowledgement, that his publication is not what, in its title page, it professes to be. It is not a translation of Carnot's Treatise, but selections from it. This is a species of deception against which, if we could imagine it to be intentional, we should think it our duty loudly to protest. Among the particulars omitted, and not in any way specified by the translator, we notice, a preliminary discourse attached by M. Carnot to his third edition, (published in February, 1813,) in which he shows the necessity of abandoning an imperfect system in order to adopt another which the progress of the art of attack has rendered necessary; and two valuable chapters, viz. chapters fourth and fifth of part II, of which the latter presents a detailed comparison of the respective serieses of operations of attack and defence, from the commencement of the siege to its termination. The French edition also contains eleven beautiful illustrative engravings, not one of which is given by the Baron de Montalembert. Really, when a translator takes such liberties as these with his original, we think it is his bounden duty to advertise the preface instead of the title-page of his publication.

The reasons assigned by the Baron for his omissions, are by no means satisfactory. He omits part, because it was written expressly for engineers;' as if engineers had nothing to do in the defence of fortified places. Again, he suppresses matter, because it is technical; as though military men, for whom his translation is intended, were to remain ignorant of the technology of their own profession. And he omits all but sixteen of the accounts of sieges, being determined to retain none but those which will be most interesting to British officers' in the present day; and behold he retains descriptions of the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, and the siege of Jerusalem by Titus!

Some portions of M. Carnot's work are omitted, because they are already published in the Pocket Gunner, and James's Military Dictionary.' The first of these is a useful little. book; but it is intended solely for the use of the artillery, and contains very little that has any direct reference to the subject of Carnot's performance and as to Major James's Dictionary,. we are really obliged to the Baron for having directed our at VOL. II. N. S.

H