:

true this is Equivocation; and cannot be defended, unless the groffeft Violations of Sincerity can be defended too. For the Intent of using Language to deceive is equally evident in both and the Contrivance of couching the Deceit in Phrafes liable to no Sufpicion, adds to the Crime greater Deliberation, and confequently more heinous Guilt.

We are now therefore led to confidet,

II: The Pleas, which are urged to justify fome Sorts of direct Lying.

For more than a few speculative, and fome pious Men, have imagined, that this Practice in certain Cafes may do much Good, and can do no Hurt and then is both allowable and commendable. Speech; they fay, was given to Mankind folely for their common Benefit: nor confequently is it ever ufed amifs, when it contributes to that End. And this Opinion they endeavour to confirm by several Instances of Falfehoods, which good Perfons are recorded in Scripture to have uttered knowingly. But, befides that fome Inftances, which they produce, are not Falfehoods, or were directed by an exprefs Authority, which can fuperfede ordinary Obligations: good Perfons may too poffibly both fay and do what they VOL. V.

K

ought

ought not, through Ignorance of their Duty, or Infirmity; and their Commiffion of known : and great Sins is not always related with Cenfure, it being unneceffary: to which it must be added, that fome of their Actions may be praised in holy Writ on the Whole, without - the least Intention of approving the Circumstances of Infincerity, or other Imperfections, with which they were accompanied.

Another Argument in Favour of their Notion they draw, somewhat furprisingly, from the Apostle's Words: putting away Lying, Speak every Man Truth with his Neighbour : for we are Members one of another d. The Precept, they fay, muft not be extended further, than the Reason of it extends: which being only, that because of our mutual Relation, we ought to confult our mutual Advantage; where adhering to Truth will not promote this, Falfehood may be justly subftituted. But, though mutual Advantage is a very ftrong Tie upon us to fpeak Truth, St. Paul hath not told us here, that it is the only And we experience ourselves to be under another more immediate. We feel a natural Reluctance in our Confciences to lying d Eph. iv. 25.

.one.

and

and deceiving, as fuch, without looking forward to Confequences: and even they who have perfuaded themselves that doing it is, in fome Inftances, lawful, cannot do it however, without an inward Senfe of Shame and Guilt. Now it deferves to be well confidered, whether tranfgreffing, in order to attain some fuppofed End of general Utility, this Dictate of our moral Nature, the Principle of which God hath planteth there, be any more allowable, than tranfgreffing the Dictates of Juftice or any other moral Obligation, with the fame View: whether, in fhort, it be not, what the Apoftle himself mentions with Abhorrence, and that in the very Cafe of a Lie, Doing Evil, that Good may come e.

Or, though still any one should think, that our native Antipathy to speaking Falsehood, no more proves it to be always forbidden, than our Unwillingness to give others Pain, which notwithstanding we may and must give them fometimes, for the Sake of a Benefit more confiderable: yet it must be obferved, that the Scripture both allows and requires Pain and even Death to be inflicted in fome Cafes but uniformly forbids Lying,

without intimating in any one Precept or Declaration concerning it, the Poffibility of an Exception. But were the Confideration of Scripture to be set aside, which it never ought; still on the Footing of mere Reafon and Experience, a most important Question would remain, what those Instances are, in which, on balancing the two Sides of the Account, Violation of Truth is more beneficial than detrimental to Mankind. For fuppofing any fuch can be found, it must be violated in them only. But if none fuch can be found, or if the Advantage be at all doubtful, or not exceeding great, or attainable any other Way, in the fame or but nearly the fame Degree: the plain and the fafe Rule evidently is, that of Simplicity and godly Sincerity in all Cafes.

The Cafe indeed of an Attack upon our own or our Neighbours Property, or Life, may seem a very favourable one to the Opinion, which we are now examining. For here it is argued, that affuredly no one hath a Right to rob or to murder; nor confequently fuffers any Wrong, when he is prevented from doing either. And if telling him a Falsehood be the likelieft Method of Prevention: hath he

f 2 Cor. i. 13.

not

not forfeited all Claim to our telling him Truth? And is it not much better in every View, that he should be deceived, than accomplish his wicked Purposes? Why, undoubtedly it seems very hard, efpecially upon the Party endangered, to fay otherwise. Yet this may and ought to be faid, that on the one Hand, all the little Good, which a Lie, that will scarce be credited, hath any Chance for doing, may commonly with Prudence be done without it, either by avoiding to answer, or by general and undetermined Answers, which are very different Things from Untruths: and that on the other Hand, inftead of Good, a Lie do much Harm: as the vile Wretches who attempt to commit fuch Crimes, when they have once or twice found themselves, or others like them, impofed upon, may be provoked by it to grow much more fufpicious and barbarous, than they would have been elfe. Therefore it may be doubted whether, in the Main, Tranfgreffion of Truth, even in these Circumstances, prevents or produces Mischief. Surely then he, who refuses to tranfgrefs it, acts a worthier Part: and, if he fuffers any Thing on that Account, he suf

may