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> opposite to such pure, holy love. And there is nothing

in nature more directly opposite to perfectly disinterested love, than interested love, or selfishness. So that all sin consists in the free, voluntary exercise of selfishness. As true love is a free, voluntary exercise of a moral agent; so false love is a free, voluntary exercise of a moral agent. And as a mere want of love is not obedience to the law; so a mere want of selfishness is not a transgression of the law. A mere want of any thing has no properties, either good or evil. It follows, that nothing short of the positive exercise of true love is obedience to the law; and nothing short of the positive exercise of selfishness is a transgression of the law. There is, indeed, a distinction often made between internal and external obedience ; and between internal and external disobedience. But this distinction is merely apparent and not real; for all real obedience is internal and lies in the heart and not in the outward act. And so all real disobedience is internal and lies in the heart and not in the outward act.--This ought to be remembered, when we come to speak of the first sinful exercises, which take place in the human heart.

Having considered what sin is, I proceed to show, II. When mankind become capable of sinning. If sin be a free, voluntary, moral exercise, it must be supposed, that they are not capable of sinning before they become moral agents. Here then it seems necessary to inquire, what mental powers and faculties are necessary to constitute a moral agent. Perception, memory and volition appear to be the essential powers or properties, which constitute a free agent. Animals are free agents. They act freely and volun

tarily in the view of motives.

The ox knows his own

The ox has percep

er, and the ass his master's crib. tion, volition and memory. The ox, as well as the ass, knows his master and his master's crib, and remembers where he was fed and freely and voluntarily goes to the place he remembers, to be fed again. He is, therefore, a free, voluntary agent. But he is not a moral agent; for his perception, memory and volition cannot give him a capacity to know what is right and what is wrong. He does not know that it is right to feed at his master's crib, and wrong to feed at another man's crib. No animals have any higher mental powers, than perception, memory and volition; and therefore, they are not, and cannot be made moral agents, at any period of their existence. But God has made man wiser than the beasts of the field and fowls of the air; and endued him not only with perception, reason, memory, and volition, but with a moral faculty to discern moral good and moral evil.— This moral faculty is what we call conscience, by which we discover what is right and what is wrong in ourselves and others. The faculty itself has no moral excellence in it, and is called a moral rather than a mere natural faculty, because it enables us to distinguish moral actions or exercises from mere natural actions. Having found what mental powers and faculties constitute a mere agent; and what mental powers and faculties constitute a moral agent, we may, perhaps, easily and certainly determine when a little animal becomes an agent and when a little child becomes a moral agent and capable of acting right, or wrong. We know, that a little lamb becomes an agent, as soon as it possesses perception, memory, and volition; for so

soon we see it move and act freely and voluntary in the view of motives or external objects. Why then do we not as certainly know, that a little child becomes a moral agent, as soon as it possesses perception, reason, conscience, memory, and volition? And why

must we not suppose, that the little child becomes possessed of all the mental powers and faculties, which constitute him a moral agent as early as the little lamb becomes possessed of all the mental powers and faculties which constitute it a natural agent?--We are obliged in both cases to judge by actions and not by words. Does not the little child appear to move and act freely and voluntarily in the view of motives, long before it is capable of speaking? Why then may it not become a moral agent, as early as the little lamb becomes a natural agent? Or at least, why may it not become a moral agent before it is capable of speaking? We know that a child discovers volition before it is capable of speaking, for it exercises choice and prefers one thing to another. choses light rather than darkness and to be with one person rather than another. It discovers memory before it can speak; and recollects what it has found to be agreeable to it. And it discovers reason and conscience, before it can speak those words. For if it be unreasonably and unjustly corrected, it will manifest a sense of the injury it suffers, by sighing and sobbing, rather than crying. If we may judge by analogy between little children and larger children, or between little children and those that are universally allowed to be moral agents, we must be apt to believe, that little children are moral agents, before they are capable of uttering a single word. The only objection against

It

children's being so early moral agents is, that they have not knowledge enough to be moral agents. But who can tell how much knowledge they must have, before they become moral agents? Every one will allow that a child seven years old is a moral agent and capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong. Almost every body will allow, that a child four years old is a moral agent and capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong. And those, who allow, that a child four years old is a moral agent and knows what is right and wrong, will generally allow, that a child two years old is a moral agent and knows what is right and what is wrong. And where shall we stop? Why may we not suppose, that a child one year old, or half a year old is a moral agent and knows what is right and what is wrong in some cases? It is not necessary, that a child should know, that there is a God, or that the bible is his word, in order to know, that it is right to obey its parents and wrong to disobey them; or that it is right for one child to have its own playthings and wrong for another to take them away without his consent. The bare light of nature, or the dictates of conscience are sufficient to teach little children what is right and what is wrong, in the cases that have been mentioned and in a multitude of other similar cases. If children do not become moral agents as soon as they possess and exercise the mental powers and faculties, which render them capable of moral agency, we can never know when they do become moral agents. They are men in miniature and not mere animals. Their free, voluntary exercises and actions are moral exercises and actions; and essentially different from the free and voluntary actions

of a young lamb, or any other young animal, which is destitute of conscience, or a faculty of distinguishing between moral good and evil. But that they do sin, as soon as they are capable of sinning, is a point still to be proved. Accordingly, I proceed to show,

III. That they do sin as soon as they become capable of sinning. As soon as they become capable of exercising selfishness, they become capable of exercising benevolence; or as soon as they become capable of exercising morally good, they are capable of exercising morally evil affections. Their first moral exercises must be either morally sinful, or morally good. For as soon as they possess those mental powers and faculties, which render them capable of moral agency, they must act in the view of the objects they perceive; and either love or hate them, in a sinful, or holy manner. They must act as moral agents; and their first free and voluntary exercises must be either morally good or morally evil. There is certainly a time, when they begin to act as moral agents; and the question now before us is, whether at that time they always begin to sin?

Now, so far as we can derive any evidence from observation, on this subject, we must conclude, that they begin to sin as soon as they become moral agents, or as soon as it is possible they should begin to sin.--They certainly discover, as early as possible, impatience, obstinacy and revenge, which are sinful exercises in any moral agent, that can distinguish between right and wrong. And that children, before they can speak or walk, do know that these are evil exercises, appears from their conduct, when they are corrected for them. Correction directly tends to restrain and