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man body and mind is capable of, we may look for better results, for just so long as there is a tendency to strive to work trainmen beyond the limit of human endurance we may look for wrecks and other casualties.

The Worm Turning.

It is gratifying to those who are interested in the advancement of the working classes to learn that the nonunion garment workers of several of the notorious sweatshops of New York have struck for better conditions-many of them applying for membership in the unions. Numerous articles have recently been written, descriptive of life in the tenements and sweatshops, and it is refreshing to learn that the efforts of organized labor are beginning to obtain results. Conditions must indeed be execrable when those poor unfortunate creatures who have never been permitted to enjoy one day of relief from toil, unless it be during their journey across the ocean, since their early childhood, rebel. Their environments must be indeed revolting, when the product of the European human filth puddle can not tolerate them. Let the good work go on. Practicing what we preach will cause the desired conditions to obtain where the sweatshops now exist.

O. R. C. Official Changes.

The appointment, by the President, of Bro. E. E. Clark to a position on the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the resignation of Bro. C. H. Wilkins, Grand Senior Conductor, necessitates changes all around in the official family of the Order of Railway Conductors. Assistant Grand Chief Conductor, Bro. A. B. Garretson, assumes the duties of Grand Chief by right of succession, and Bro. L. E. Sheppard, Grand Junior Conductor, has been promoted to the position of Assistant Grand Chief Conductor. The positions of Grand Senior and Grand Junior Conductor have been filled by the appointment of Bro. E. P. Curtis, of Division No. 256, of Smithville, Tex., to the former and Bro. W. M. Clark, of Division No. 1, Chicago, Ill., to the latter position.

The choice made by the Board of Trustees is indeed a happy one, and no better reward could be given a member of a la

bor organization than the well-merited recognition of these two brothers.

Brother Curtis was for many years, connected with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, and was identified with the Joint Protective work on the M., K. & T. Ry. He was also prominent in several of our conventions, and those remembering him, together with his many friends outside of the Brotherhood, will be glad to learn of his deserved promotion. Brother Curtis has for many years past been in the employ of the M., K. & T. Ry. in various capacities, and when he received the above appointment held the position of conductor. He is a man who readily makes friends, and will doubtlessly make a good man for the position,

Bro. W. M. Clark has long been known in railroad circles. He has for several years past been actively identified with the interests of the organization, and at the time of his appointment was holding the office of Chief Conductor of his division, which is the largest in point of membership in the entire organization. Brother Clark has been a conductor on the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern for upwards of thirty years, during which term of service his congeniality and pleasing disposition has won for him a host of friends who will be pleased to learn of his advancement in the counsels of the organization. He is peculiarly well fitted for the office he has been called upon to fill, and the Magazine extends to him and all the other worthy brothers who have benefited by the change its heartfelt congratulations.

Anniversary.

The International Correspondence Schools of Scranton, Pennsylvania, will celebrate their fifteenth anniversary on the 16th of the current month. When the magnitude of this institution is considered; when it is realized that eightyfive thousand students have either completed the courses for which they were enrolled, or substantial portions thereof, and that 225,000 other students have completed the study of mathematical, physical and drawing subjects, and that it has more than two hundred courses of instructions in nearly every trade and profession, it will be interesting to note the small beginning from which this great educational enterprise has grown.

Fifteen years ago. Thomas Foster, the

editor of a newspaper in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, introduced a method of teaching through the mails by means of special home-study text-books and a system of correction of students' work, the object being to enable the coal miners of that State to pass the required examination for foremen. Although the enterprise was of great interest in the mining communities, even those who were most sanguine concerning its success never dreamed that it would ever develop into a system whereby thousands all over the world could, without leaving home, obtain an education.

The first student enrolled, then a laborer, now a mine superintendent, is expected to be present at the anniversary celebration, as are also representative students in architectural, civil, electrical, mechanical and steam engineering; also in drafting, chemistry, commerce, etc. Few of these students have ever seen their teachers or the large buildings and perfect system of the schools. The event will be of deep interest to all concerned.

The day will be taken up with appropriate exercises and an interesting exhibit of the schools working, preparing and printing home-study text-books, and correcting the recitations of the students sent in from all parts of the civilized world. A banquet will be given the guests in the evening.

Labor Interests in the Courts.*

Rescission of Release.-James B. Cade sued the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railway Company for damages, claiming injury to his knee on two separate occasions, alleging negligence of the company's employes as the cause, he being at the time a fireman in the company's employment. He recovered a verdict for $10,000, less a deduction, and from this the company appealed.

Plaintiff was shown to have executed a release, in consideration of $700 paid to him by defendant, which recited in substance that it was a full discharge of all claims, demands, and causes of action against defendant which has or may accrue to plaintiff for all damages, of whatsoever nature, received in or resulting from an accident at San Antonio on the 6th day of March, 1900, as follows, to wit: "While working as fireman I was *Preared for the Locomotive Firemen's Magazine by Geo. H. Murdoch, Jr., St. Louis,

Mo.

injured; the nature and extent of such injury not being definitely known at this time, it is expressly understood and agreed that the above sum is paid me by said company, and accepted by me in full settlement for injury to my left knee, and for all claims for injuries, disabilities, and damages, which may hereafter develop in consequence of said accident and injury to my knee, as well as for those injuries, disabilities, and damages now known and apparent. No promise of employment nor other agreement not herein expressed has been made by the company." The defendant pleaded this release, and its execution and receipt of the money consideration was shown, and it was claimed that because plaintiff did not tender or offer to return the $700 before the suit, and did not as shown by the pleadings and the undisputed evidence, make a continuing tender and deposit in court of said sum and interest, but refused to do so, he was as a matter of law not entitled to recover, and a peremptory instruction should have been given for defendant. In this connection the court said:

"The original petition did not refer to the release and it was first pleaded by defendant. In the first supplementary petition plaintiff pleaded that the release was obtained from him by misrepresentation and fraud of the defendant, etc., and tendered the $700, and interest. In the second supplementary petition, filed in lieu of the above, plaintiff set forth the facts fully concerning the said alleged fraud and misrepresentation and tendered to the defendant the sum of $700 with interest. Plaintiff admitted in his testimony that he had read the release, and signed it, having first asked a question about the clause with which the instrument concluded relative to promise of employment, which the claim agent said he had no authority to scratch out.

"The above proposition, and a second one raised by defendant, which is that plaintiff was estopped as a matter of law, from disputing the terms of the release, are based on what is involved in the foregoing facts. A third proposition is that plaintiff did not disavow the contract promptly or within a reasonable time, and did not make an effort within a reasonable time to restore the consideration to appellant, but on the contrary kept and used a part of the consideration after discovery of the alleged fraud, and has never rendered to appellant any part of it. And his acts and conduct, there

fore, constitute a ratification and estoppel against him as a matter of law. The money was never deposited in court, but it appears that plaintiff's pleadings expressed a tender of it, and it appears also that on the first trial of this cause appellee's attorney offered in open court to deliver to appellant's attorney the $700 and interest. This was also done at the recent trial. In both instances appellant's attorneys declined to receive it for want of authority to do so, but requested its deposit in the registry of the court, which appellee's attorney's refused to do. We believe the third proposition can not be maintained in this character of case. It is our opinion that where there is, or can be, no question, in the particular case, of rights of innocent third persons intervening, or of the defendant being prejudiced in some way by delay on the part of the plaintiff in disavowing the contract sought to be rescinded, it is not essential that plaintiff signify his repudiation immediately or in a reasonable time, or at any time short of the time prescribed by the statute of limitations. In this case there was no property involved and no possibility of third persons acquiring rights which would be affected by plaintiff's repudiation of the contract, nor can we possibly perceive how the defendant, if plaintiff had valid grounds upon which to repudiate the contract for fraud practiced by defendant upon him in its procurement, could have any equitable reason to complain of plaintiff's delay in disaffirming the contract or in instituting the suit. The statute of limitations allows a plaintiff a certain period within which to bring his suit, and his right to assert his cause of action within that period is not affected by delay, unless for some reason recognized by courts of equity, his conduct in delaying ought in good conscience to work an estoppel. No such consideration seems to inhere in a case like the present one, and certainly not in any facts appearing in this case. The delay in the present case, though considerable, could not, as a matter of law, be pronounced unreasonable. The witnesses and the testimony generally seem to have been procurable as well when the action was tried as they would have been at any previous time. If circumstances were developed tending to show that defendant was placed at a disadvantage by the delay, an issue might have existed as to whether or not plaintiff's laches should bar his suit. It will be seen, however, that de

fendant had the benefit of a submission of the issue of reasonable delay, and has no ground for complaint. As to plaintiff not having paid or offered to pay the $700, and interest, before the suit, or not having deposited it with the court, we think the point not well taken. All that is necessary we think in an action of the kind is to express a tender or a willingness in the pleadings to allow the sum against any judgment that may be rendered. If plaintiff should recover and the same be deducted from the recovery, defendant would be as well off as if the money had been on deposit. If plaintiff should fail to recover, the money, if deposited, would not go to defendant. From defendant's standpoint, in either event, no useful purpose would be served by the payment of the money into court. And such a rule would work a hardship on a plaintiff who had not the money to deposit, and would amount to a denial of relief in a meritorious case, and at the same time the application of the rule would be of no practical benefit to the defendant.

"As to the second proposition. The ground for annulling the release was that the inducement, which caused plaintiff to execute it, was the fact that plaintiff was induced to believe by certain false and fraudulent representations made to him by defendant's physicians and claim agent, that he had recovered and was able to continue his work as fireman; the same being made to him for the purpose of deceiving and inveigling him into signing, he having confidence in said physicians and fully believed what they said, and relying thereon, believed he was well and able to work as fireman, when in fact his injury was permanent and permanently incapacitated him from filling the position, which said physicians knew or ought to have known when they made the representations and procured the release. The point made is that plaintiff having read the release and understood its provisions, he was estopped to question the recitations, viz.: 'While working as fireman, I was injured. The nature and extent of such injury not being definitely known at this time, it is expressly understood and agreed that the above sum is paid to me by said company, and accepted by me in full settlement for injury to my left knee and for all claims for injuries, disabilities, and damages, which may hereafter develop in consequence of said accident or injury to my knee, as well as for those injuries, disa

bilities, and damages, now known and apparent.' Appellant's brief states: "This contract was entered into with due deliberation several months after the accident, and after his knee had entirely healed, and all suffering, pain, and disease had disappeared. Nothing remained but the dislocated cartilage, which could have been instantly removed by a simple and painless operation as appellant's evidence showed.' The point made is well indicated by the statement in the brief as follows: 'It could not be material what the doctor and claim agent said to him about the condition of the knee, because in his contract he himself in effect says: 'I will take your $700, and release you from liability, whatever the future results may be, whether as you predict or not. In this matter I am acting on the uncertainty of future developments on my own account, and at my own risk, and for this risk in part I accept your money.' It would be against public policy and a violation of all rules of law or equity to allow him now to say: 'I did not take the risk, admitting at the same that he understood the terms of the contract.' There was testimony showing that defendant's agent drew the contract, and insisted on its being signed as written. Defendant states in its brief, that when it was signed the knee had entirely healed, and all suffering, pain, and disease had entirely disappeared, and only the dislocated cartilage remained which could have been remedied by a simple and painless operation. Plaintiff testified that he made the settlement because thought he was well. Dr. Graves, the chief surgeon of defendant, told him he was well, that his knee was well and that he could go to work. He related the circumstances under which he signed. The claim agent, Mr. Gilbert, came and told him he had come to settle the claim against the company; that he had just come from the doctor, and the doctor had said he was well, and to come up and settle and go back to work. Plaintiff said he would see the doctor himself, and went down and saw the doctor, who told him: 'Sure, you are well and able to go to work, and have been for four or five weeks. You might as well settle and get through with it.' He then introduced plaintiff to a gentleman in the claim department, and made a thorough examination of the knee, and showed plaintiff this and showed him that, and finally plaintiff agreed to settle. Plaintiff testified that he had all confidence in Dr. Graves

he

when he told him he was well and able to go back to work, and believed him. That he had known Dr. Graves ever since he (plaintiff) had been in San Antonio; that his father had known him, and the family in general had known him about sixteen or eighteen years.

"It is true that said recitals of the instrument indicated the matter differently in providing for the contingency of the injury continuing. There is no question, however, if the jury believed plaintiff's testimony that he was induced to sign it by the confidence he had in the surgeon's statements and insistence. The very fact that he had faith in what the surgeon stated to him, would naturally lead him to sign a release, even though it dealt with future suffering and disability from an injury which was apparently well, and which he was persuaded by an agent of appellant, who was in a position to know, and whom he believed did know, from special knowledge and skill on the subject, would not occur. To him it was made to appear an immaterial matter in the contract. The stipulation would be, under such circumstances, no absolute bar to his contending that the release was obtained by fraud. The release indicated that future results might occur, and ordinarily he would be held to have dealt with the subject-matter on that theory. But at the same time appellant through its agents were holding out to him as a fact within their knowledge that he was entirely well; and on that theory he was persuaded to sign. His confidence in the surgeon may have been such, that had the latter made the statement not as a fact, but as his professional judgment, plaintiff would have signed the instrument as it had been prepared, believing the fact to be as the surgeon stated, and we are not prepared to say even in such a case, that plaintiff might not have had it set aside if there was evidence that such opinion was expressed with fraudulent purpose. It was for the jury to determine from the evidence whether or not, after all, plaintiff was induced to sign and treat as meaningless the recitals of the instrument by what was represented to him by appellant through its surgeon. The testimony was sufficient to avoid the instrument. The testimony of the surgeon was directly the reverse of that of the plaintiff. He denied making any such statement as plaintiff charged. He testified that, prior to the settlement, he told plaintiff he would never be a well man

until operated upon. The jury did not have to find the fact entirely on plaintiff's testimony, for they had before them circumstances which had a tendency to contradict the surgeon, and to indicate that the idea of an operation was not advanced by the surgeon until after the settlement. Before that he had told each of the parents of plaintiff that he was entirely well. Soon after the settlement, he gave plaintiff an order to the effect that he was now able for duty. Plaintiff went back to work, and his knee was injured a second time, and he again went under the surgeon's care, who afterwards gave him another order to go back to work, which read: 'I find that Cade is now able for duty: but he will never be entirely well until he has an operation performed.' Plaintiff testified that this was the first time he ever heard about an operation. Certainly from this the jury could have inferred that the plaintiff's version was the true one, and against the testimony of the surgeon."

The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

has been constant and general, and so vast as to be almost beyond comprehension. Under such circumstances it is unavoidable that we should have on every hand frequent examples of the accumulation of great wealth. It seems to be the foreordained good fate of this country to receive from fortune's hand lavishly, and when was there a time when men did not most see fit to regard this goddess as fickle, and as giving in a fashion which they could not understand? No, wealth is bound to come among us, question its propriety as we may.

Granted that this is so, and supposing that our vast resources had been handled entirely by individuals, and in no sense by trusts or combines of invested capital, would not the result in any event have been the same, individuals acquiring great wealth as the result of their enterprise and sagacity? In other words, the inevitable issue that some are bound to amass large fortunes with our growing prosperity is hardly to be laid at the door of the trusts.

Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Cade, while a 93 S. W. (Tex.) 124.

The Trust Problem.*

In all probability there is no one problem which is receiving more thought and attention today than that relative to the trusts and the combines, which seem to be a peculiarity of this age, and which can not but arouse many questionings in the minds of all for their very prominence.

On every hand we hear the trust question under discussion today. Business men are continually talking about it; the politicians have much to say about it; the civilian in every waik in life is quite familiar with it, and even the courts are finding it necessary to wrestle with it. What is to be the outcome of it all may well be seriously asked.

The writer does not by any means presume to be able to grapple with the question more efficaciously than any one else, and yet a few suggestions of thoughts which have come to him in relation to it may perhaps prove of interest with the reader, and surely the field is an open one, from which none are barred. First of all, then, in dealing with this whole matter it is well to bear in mind that the growth in wealth of this country

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And secondly, is it not also true that few are growing inordinately rich the many are at the same time growing moderately so? What classes of men are there among us whose circumstances are not improving daily? What a revolution of improvement in the condition of the working classes there has come about in modern timeş! porary well states it, "In the time of Alfred the Great windows were glazed with horn or paper, and so fitted were a In the time of Elizabeth the luxury. common Englishman had rushes for a bed and a log for a pillow. Century by century since the scale of popular living Wealth is things; has been rising. money is the representative and title of things; and the largest fact of history down to this hour is that the common more things and more of people get things. This fact is progress; and in view of that, what does it signify how many men have millions and multi-millions?" The advance in the condition of all classes of citizens has been marvelous, and the most striking fact about it is that it has made its most rapid strides during the so-called period of the trusts.

From the earliest times a fundamental principle which has been taught unfailingly and unfalteringly is that in combination of means, strength and purpose is to be found the surest and most commendable road to accomplishment. In union there is strength, is the lesson

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