have entire and perfect obedience of his subjects; for ligenti (as Baron Heron said well) must have four qualities: 1. Pura & simplex; 2. Integra & solida; 3. Universalis no localis; 4. Permanens continua, & illasa. Divide a man's heart, and you lose both parts of it and make no heart at all, so he that is not an entire subject, but half-faced, is no subject at all." Apply this solid sense to the condition of the American citizens, after their allegiance was renounced by the king's acknowledgment of the sovereignty of the United States, and the subjection of their citizens was also disowned by the king's solemn act, under a constitutional trust; yes, say some, the United States are sovereign and independent, the American citizens owe no allegi ance or subjection, yet do they claim their birthrights. The proper answer to such pretensions is, you have lost your birthrights by your own acts, and the operation of law upon your several acts; ab assuetis non sit injuria. When the king, acting in pursuance of a solemn trust derived from the constitution, renounced all claim of government over you, and of course released your subjection, the king thereby signified the assent of the nation that you should be no longer subjects but aliens; for in making every treaty, the king, as trustee for the nation, binds the nation by his diplomatic acts, and lex nil jubet frustra. Who sees not, that the Lord chancellor, in what he said above, glanced at the extra-judicial resolution and illogical reasoning of the judges before mentioned? What sort of logic was it to reason in a circle? It never was a principle of the law of England that subjects could be ad fidem utriusque regis, as we have already seen in the learned Craig's discussions. It never was a principle of the law of nature, as we may learn from our Saviour's declaration, though there might be exceptions to the general rule, under special privilege, as the Earl marshal, who was mentioned by Bracton; so, in the treaty of Utrecht, article 21, the French king engaged to cause justice to be done to the family of Hamilton concerning the dukedom of Chatelherault, and to the Duke of Richmond concerning such requests as he had to make, and to Charles Douglass concerning some lands to be claimed by him, and so of others. Thus might the Duke of Hamilton, and the Duke of Richmond, and the Duke of Queensberry, owe a double allegiance; but this exception only proves the general principle. Well, but, says Sir Edward Coke, naturalization, due by birthright, cannot, by any separation of the crowns, afterward be taken away; yet how was it before and after the treaty of Northampton, 1328, of which Sir Edward seems to have been but lamely informed? In the 21st of Edward I. Macduff, a Scotsman, appealed against a judgment of his sovereign, John Baliol, to Edward, as his superior lord, and the King of England received the appeal and caused justice to be done; * but when the sovereignty of England was renounced by that treaty, the homage of the Scottish king and people was determined and they became aliens, † and therefore no such appeal or suit can be shewn in any record under the treaty of Northampton, as Scotland was now alien to England, as hath been already shewn: so after King John lost the Norman provinces, the two kingdoms, with their people, became aliens to each other, as hath been already shown, and as Bracton tells. Those two Riley's Placita, 152, 157. + Molloy, 375. great precedents from well vouched history and record clearly prove that a natural subject, by birthright, may become alien by such matter, ex post facto, and thus doth Sir Edward Coke fail in his argument. Then, as. to the general resolution of the judges, not upon the case referred to them, but upon a case which might by possibility happen, in the progress of time and chance: What is it but a mere petitio principii, begging the very question which ought to be answered? How does it stand with the fundamental principle of the feuda! law, which is quoted by Craig, the profound feudist, unus et idem duorum dominorum hom ligius esse non pot st? How does it consist with the law of nature, as quoted by our Saviour, no man can serve two masters, for he will hate the one and love the other? How does it quadrate with the general law, as to alienage of the European nations? Doth it not tear up by the roots the chief grounds of all those laws, in respect to alienage? Doth it not pretend to out-argue the historical facts which have been quoted as to the loss of the English dominion, in Scotland, and in France? Magis docet, qui prudenter interrogat, said the Lord chancellor Egerton. Lord Mansfield, indeed, in delivering the opinion of the king's bench in the case of the king against Cowle, with regard to the legal state of Berwick, whether within the jurisdiction of that court, and reprobating some o'iter opinims in the case of Calvin, remarked of Sir Edward Coke, "that he was very fond of multiplying precedents and authorities, and in order to illustrate his subject, was apt, besides such authorities as were strictly applicable, to cite other cases, which were not applicable to the particular question under his consideration." After all those considerations, can it be doubted within Westminster-hall or without, whether the judges regard themselves as at all bound by manifest error? Lord Mansfield, in delivering the opinion of the King's bench in the case of the king against Cowle, rectified two mistakes of very great lawyers: It is manifest, said his Lordship, that Coke is mistaken in sayirg, generally, "that Berwick was not governed by the laws of England; for in criminal matters the fact is undoubtedly otherwise:" and, his Lordship added, the Lord Chief Justice Hale is clearly mistaken in saying, "that Berwick sends members to the parliament of England by charter;" for it is by writ of summons that they send them thither, in consequence of their being a borough. We may thus perceive that the vigilance of even the greatest lawyers cannot always be awake; as the minds of men, according to Johnson's remark, cannot be constantly attentive to evanescent actions. We are told by Sir William Blackstone, that an appeal lies from the colonies to the king and council. * The commentator seems to have borrowed this form of words from Sir Matthew Hale's History of the Common Law; but great names and high authority cannot justify such inaccuracy of language and of law. The appeal is to the king in his council. Sir Matthew Hale had said, that naturalization can only be by parliament, and not otherwise. Naturalization, saith Blackstone, cannot be performed but by act of parliament, copying again Sir Matthew Hale, though without using his idle expression, and not otherwise; but such general positions cannot * Comment. 12th edit. 1, 108. Vent. Rep. 419-20. That position of Hale is true, in a particular sense, but is not true in a general sense. stand against known facts, as well as juridical policy; and it was overruled by the court of king's bench in the case of Campbell and Hall, while the policy of considering aliens, conquered in war, and ceded by treaty, as subjects, was confirmed as law. The whole observations of Sir Edward Coke, in support or explanation of the hypothetical resolution of the judges before-mentioned, may be considered as mere mistakes, and extra-judicial inferences, leading to little information and to mischiev ous consequences. We all know the fatal effects of double allegiance during the latter periods of our do mestic history.* "Indeed," saith Blackstone, † "the natural-born subject of one prince, to whom he owes allegiance, may be entangled by subjecting himself absolutely to another; but it is his own act that brings himself into those difficulties of owing service to two masters; and it is unreasonable that, by such voluntary act of his own, he should be able at pleasure to unloose those bands by which he was connected to his natural prince." But I have done. I have shown, satisfactorily, I trust, in what manner millions of subjects may become aliens, by mere act and operation of law, as millions of aliens, by the same operation of law, may become subjects. February, 1, 1814. G. C. (1.) The opinion of Sir Lloyd Kenyon, in 1783, on the question, whether the goods imported from the United States must pay alien duties, and are subject to the regulations of the arts of navigation. * See Foster's Crown Law; 184, &c. f Comment. 1, 370. |