altogether deny the satisfaction of Christ, suppose, that God might have pardoned sin without it; but that it was more expedient to make a demand of it, than not, inasmuch as his honour, as the Governor of the world, is secured thereby, and therefore that his demanding satisfaction, is the result of his will; and accordingly, that he might have required and accepted of a satisfaction, less valuable than what was given him by our Saviour: This opinion is equally to be opposed with the former, as derogatory to the glory of the divine perfections.

Now, when we assert the necessity of satisfaction, we mean, that God could not, in consistency with his holiness and justice, pardon sin without it; and that no satisfaction, short of that which Christ gave, is sufficient to answer the end designed thereby, or worthy to be accepted by God, as a price of redemption.

And, when we assert that satisfaction was necessary, we would be understood as intending it in the same sense, as forgiveness of sin, or salvation is so; the necessity hereof being conditional, or founded on this supposition, that God designed to save sinners. This, indeed, he might have refused to have done, and then there would have been no room for satisfaction to be given to his justice: But, since God designed to be reconciled to his people, and to bring them to glory, we cannot but assert the necessity of satisfaction in order thereunto; and, to prove this, let it be considered,

1. That the necessity hereof appears from the holiness of God; and accordingly,

(1.) Inasmuch as he is infinitely perfect, he cannot but will and love that which is most agreeable to his nature, and which contains the brightest display of his image, which consists in righteousness and true holiness, as it is said, The righteous Lord loveth righteousness, Psal. xi. 7. And it follows, from hence,

(2.) That he cannot but hate, and have an infinite aversion to, whatever is contrary hereunto; for, if his love of holiness be founded in the perfection of his nature, then his hatred of sin, which is opposite to it, must be founded therein: Thus it is said, Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity, Hab. i. 13. and elsewhere, Thou hatest all workers of iniquity, Psal. v. 5. Now God's hating sin, consists in his infinite opposition to it, and so it is natural to him, or in his will, to punish it; and consequent thereunto, in his actual punishing of it. If the first of these be necessary, the others must be so likewise; or, if he be an holy God, he cannot but determine to punish sin, and afterwards put his determination in execution.

men to death, as the proper punishment of their sins; how can it be proved to be unjust and unfit in God, to receive the death of Jesus Christ, for the same ends ?” HUMAN REASON.

(3.) It is fit he should manifest his hatred of sin, otherwise he could not be glorified by his creatures, as an holy God; for he cannot have the glory of any attribute ascribed to him, unless there be a visible display thereof; therefore it is necessary to demonstrate his hatred of sin, by punishing it; and, hence an obligation arises from a necessity of nature, and not barely from an act of his will, to bring to condign punishment all sin, even that which he designs to pardon: But this could not have been done without a demand of satisfaction to be given, by a surety, in the sinner's behalf, which plainly evinces the necessity of satisfaction, which was the thing to be proved.

2. This farther appears, from the punishment threatened by the law of God, which is also necessary. For the understanding of which, let it be considered,

(1.) That God cannot but give a law to intelligent creatures, who, as such, are the subjects of moral government, and therefore under a natural obligation to yield obedience to him: But this they could not do, if the law were not given and promulgated.

(2.) It was necessary for God to annex a threatning to his law, in which respect punishment would be due to those who violate it, whereby obedience might be enforced, and that fear, which is excited by it, would be an additional motive hereunto; otherwise the sinner would be ready to conclude, that he might go on in his rebellion against God with impunity.

(3.) If this law be violated, as it is by sin, the truth of God, as the result of the threatning annexed to it, obliges him to punish it, either in our own persons, or in the person of our Surety, that so the honour of his law might be secured, which he is obliged to vindicate, as it contains a bright display of the glory of his perfections.

3. If God could, consistently with his own perfections, pardon sin without satisfaction, he would not have sent his wellbeloved Son to suffer for it. This plainly appears from his wise dom and goodness. It is not consistent with the glory of his wisdom, for him to bring about a thing with so much difficulty, and with such displays of his vindictive justice, in punishing one who never offended him, if he could have answered the great end hereof on easier terms or have brought about the work of our salvation without it; neither does it consist with his goodness to inflict puishment, where it is not absolutely necessary, since, agreeably to this perfection, he delights rather to extend compassion, than to display his vindictive justice, if it might be avoided. Accordingly he is described, in scripture, (speaking after the manner of men) as punishing sin with a kind of regret, or reluctancy, Hosea. xi. 8. Thus it is said to be his strange work, Isa. xxviii. 21. and that he doth not afflict wilingly, nor grieve the children of men, Lam. iii. 33. but on the

other hand, delighteth in mercy, Micah vii. 18. Therefore if he could, consistently with his perfections, have pardoned sin without satisfaction, he could not have commanded the sword of his vindictive justice to awake against the man that is his fellow, Zech. xiii. 7. as an expedient to bring about an end, that might have been attained without it.

Moreover, if God could have pardoned sin without satisfaction, then his giving his own Son to perform it for us, would not have been such a wonderful instance of divine grace, as it is represented to be in scripture; for it could not have been the only expedient to bring about our salvation, if satisfaction were not absolutely necessary thereunto. (a)

IV. We are now to consider what kind of satisfaction God demanded, for the expiating of sin. There are many who do not pretend, in all respects, to deny the necessity of satisfaction; but, when they explain what they mean by it, it amounts to little more than a denial thereof: Thus the heathen, who had learned, by tradition that sacrifices were to be offered, to make atonement for sin, concluded that these were sufficient to satisfy for it, and thereby to deliver from the guilt thereof. And some of the Jews, in a degenerate age of the church, seemed to have nothing else in view, and to have no regard to the spiritual meaning thereof, or their reference to Christ's satisfaction, as types of it, when they rested in them, as supposing, that the multitude of their sacrifices were sufficient to satisfy for those vile abominations, which they were guilty of; upon which occasion, God expresses the greatest dislike thereof, when he says, To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? I am full of the burnt-offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts, and I delight not in the blood of bullocks or of lambs or of he-goats, Isa. i. 11. And elsewhere he tells them, I spake not to your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices, Jer. vii. 22. He does not mean that these were not instituted by him; but it is as though he had said, I did not hereby intend that they should be reckoned a sufficient price to satisfy my justice for sin. And, to fence against this supposition, the apostle says, that it is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins, Heb. x. 4. for they were far from being a sufficient price to satisfy God.

"Moreover, the Papists speak much of human satisfactions, consisting in various penances, fastings, leading a mortified life, parting with their estates, and submitting to voluntary po verty, with a design to make atonement for sin. The main foundation of this opinion, is their supposing, that, whatever satisfaction God demands for sin, it is the result of his will, and

(a) All the reasons upon which pardons are granted in human governments fail in the Divine.

therefore he might accept of the smallest instance of obedience and suffering, as sufficient to compensate for it, because he has deemed it so; and therefore they distinguish between giving satisfaction to God and to his justice. God, say they, may accept of, or be satisfied with the smallest price, instead of that which is most valuable; whereas nothing can, properly speaking, be said to satisfy justice, but that which has in it a value in proportion to what is purchased thereby. As to the former branch of this distinction, we deny that God can accept of any thing as a price of redemption, but what has a tendency to secure the glory of his perfections, and that, nothing less than an infinite price, can do, and therefore the distinction is vain, and nothing to their purpose; or, if they suppose that God can be satisfied with what justice does not conclude sufficient, then it is blasphemous, and derogatory to the divine perfections. Therefore we can allow of no satisfaction, but what tends to set forth the glory, and fulfil the demands of divine justice; (a) accord

(a) "The scripture insists on full atonement, and yet every where holds up the deliverance of sinners as an act of pure grace. This is a gordian knot in divinity. Let us not by violence cut it asunder, but attempt fairly to untie it.

Before we proceed, it may not be improper to observe, that the greatest difficulty with which this part of the subject is embarrassed, appears to have originated in the want of an accurate definition of justice and grace. Theologians have said much about these, yet few have defined them with sufficient accuracy to render them intelligible, or make them appear consistent. I shall therefore, First, explain the meaning of the word grace. Secondly, the meaning of the word justice.

Thirdly, apply these explanations to this part of the subject, with a view to solve the difficulty with which it is embarrassed.

First. What are we to understand by the word grace?

We are to understand by it the exercise of favour, and consequently the bestowment of good where evil is deserved, and may in justice be inflicted. Where there is no exposure to evil, there is no room for the exercise of grace. He who is not guilty is not a subject of pardon. He who does not deserve punishment cannot be said to be freed from it by an act of favour. Grace therefore always implies, that the subject of it is unworthy, and would have no reason to complain, if all the evil to which he is exposed were inflicted on him. Grace will appear great according to the view which the sinner has of his own ill desert, and the consciousness he possesses of the punishment or evil from which he is delivered. Grace and justice are opposite in their nature. Grace gives; justice demands. Their provinces are entirely separate. Though they are united, yet they are not blended in man's salvation. Hence that remarkable passage in Rom. xi. 6; " If by grace, then it is no more of works, otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace, otherwise work is no more work."

Secondly. What are we to understand by the word justice? It assumes three denominations;-commutative, distributive, and public.

1. Commutative justice respects property only. "It consists in an equal exchange of benefits," or in restoring to every man his own.

2. Distributive justice respects the moral character of men. It respects them as accountable creatures, obedient or disobedient. It consists in ascertaining their virtue and sin, and in bestowing just rewards, or inflicting just punish

ments.

3. Public or general justice, respects what is fit or right, as to the character See Doddridge's Lectures, p. 190; and also Dr. Edwards' third sermon, preached at New Haven, 1735.

ingly, we are to consider, that the satisfaction which was demanded by the justice of God, for the expiation of sin, must contain in it two things; namely,

of God, and the good of the universe. In this sense, justice comprises all moral goodness, and properly means the righteousness or rectitude of God, by which all his actions are guided, with a supreme regard to the greatest good. Justice, considered in this view, forbids that any thing should take place in the great plan of God, which would tarnish his glory, or subvert the authority of his law. Thirdly. Let us now apply these explanations to the solution of the difficulty

under consideration.

1. Did Christ satisfy commutative justice? Certainly not. Commutative justice had no concern in his sufferings. Men had taken no property from God, and consequently were under no obligation to restore any. But do not the scriptures represent Christ as giving himself a ransoin, and as buying his people with a price? They do. They also represent men, while under the influence of sin, as prisoners, slaves, captives. These expressions are all figurative, borrowed from sensible to express moral or spiritual things, and therefore are not to be explained as if literally true. If we say that Christ hath redeemed us, that he has bought us, that he has paid the debt and discharged us-if we have any consistent mean. ing, it must be this: That in consequence of what Christ has done, we are de livered from sin, in as great a consistency with justice, as a debtor is delivered from his obligation, or the demands of law, when his debt is paid. That is, God extends pardon in such a way, through Christ, that he does not injure the autho rity of his law, but supports it as effectually as if he inflicted punishment.

2. Did Christ satisfy distributive justice? Certainly not. Distributive justice respects personal character only. It condemns men because they are sinners, and rewards them because they are righteous. Their good or ill desert are the only ground on which distributive or moral justice respects them. But good and ill desert are personal. They imply consciousness of praise or blame, and cannot be transferred or altered so as to render the subjects of them more or less worthy. What Christ did, therefore, did not take ill desert from men, nor did it place them in such a situation that God would act unjustly to punish them according to their deeds. If a man has sinned, it will always remain a truth that he has sinned, and that according to distributive justice he deserves punishment. In this sense justice admits the condemnation of Paul as much as it does of Judas. The salvation of the former is secured, and his condemnation rendered impossible by another consideration.

3: Did Christ satisfy public justice? Undoubtedly he did. This is evident from what has already been advanced respecting the necessity of atonement, in order to a consistent exercise of mercy. Christ's sufferings rendered it right and fit, with respect to God's character and the good of the universe, to forgive sin. The atonement made by Christ presented the law, the nature of sin, and the displeasure of God against it, in such a light, that no injury would accrue to the moral system, no imputation would be against the righteousness of the great Legislator, though he should forgive the sinner, and instate him in eternal felicity. Perfect justice therefore is done to the universe, though all transgressors be not punished according to their personal demerit. The death of Christ therefore is to be considered as a great, important, and public transaction, respecting God and the whole system of rational beings. Public justice requires, that neither any of these be injured, nor the character and government of the great Legislator dis respected, by the pardon of any. In these respects public justice is perfectly sa tisfied by the death of Christ. This is evident from the following passages of scripture. Rom. iii. 21; "But now the righteousness (rectitude or justice) of God is manifested without the law, being witnessed by the law." Before the introduction of these words, the apostle had demonstrated, that the whole world, Jews and Gentiles, were all under sin and condemnation. "Now," says he, "we know that whatsoever things the law saith, it saith to them that are under the law, that every mouth may be stopped, and the whole world become guilty be VOL. II.

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