time to time as aforefaid, and the whole thereof divided into THREE lots of equal value, or as near thereto as possible."

"And that the premises contained in ONE SUCH LOT shall be conveyed to the use of the ELDEST MALE LINEAL DESCENDANT THEN LIVING (and who shall be entitled to the choice of such allotments) of my

said son Peter Isaac Thellusson in tail male; with remainder to the SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, AND ALL AND EVERY OTHER MALE LINEAL DESCENDANT OR DESCENDANTS, THEN LIVING, WHO SHALL BE INCAPABLE OF TAKING AS HEIR IN TAIL MALE OF ANY OF THE PERSONS TO WHOM A PRIOR ESTATE IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO BE LIMITED, OF MY SAID SON PETER ISAAC THELLUSSON SUCCESSIVELY IN TAIL MALE: with remainder in equal moieties, TO THE ELDEST AND EVERY OTHER MALE LINEAL DESCENDANT OR DESCENDANTS THEN LIVING OF MY SAID SONS GEORGE WOODFORD THELLUSSON AND CHARLES THELLUSSON, as tenants in common in tail male, in the same manner as herein before directed WITH RESPECT

TO THE ELDEST AND EVERY OTHER MALE LINEAL DESCENDANT

AND DESCENDANTS OF MY SAID SON PETER ISAAC THELLUSSON; with cross remainders between or among such male lineal descendants as aforesaid of my said sons George Woodford Thellusson and Charles Thel-. lusson in tail male; or in case there shall be but ONE SUCH MALE LINEAL DESCENDANT, then TO SUCH ONE in tail male; with remainder to the use of them the said Matthew Woodford James Stanley and Emperor John Alexander Woodford their heirs and assigns for ever, upon the trusts and for the intents and purposes herein after-mentioned expressed and declared of and concerning the same."

"And that the premises included in one other of such allotments and which shall compose the same, shall be conveyed to the use of the ELDEST MALE LINEAL DESCENDANT THEN LIVING (who shall likewise be entitled to the second choice of such allotments) of my said son George Woodford Thellusson in tail male; with remainders to the SE

COND, THIRD, FOURTH, AND ALL AND EVERY OTHER MALE LINEAL DESCENDANT OR DESCENDANTS THEN LIVING, WHO SHALL BE INCAPABLE OF TAKING AS HEIR IN TAIL MALE OF ANY OF THE PERSONS TO WHOM A PRIOR ESTATE IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO BE

LIMITED OF MY SAID SON GEORGE WOODFORD THELLUSSON SUCCESSIVELY IN TAIL MALE; WITH REMAINDERS IN EQUAL MOIETIES TO THE ELDEST AND EVERY OTHER MALE LINEAL DESCENDANT OR DESCENDANTS THEN LIVING OF MY SAID SONS PETER ISAAC THELLUSSON AND CHARLES THELLUSSON AS TENANTS IN COMMON IN TAIL MALE, in the same manner as is herein before directed with respect to the eldest and every other male lineal descendant or descendants of my said son George Woodford Thellusson, with cross remainders between or among such male lineal descendants as aforesaid of my said sous Peter Isaac Thellusson and Charles Thellusson in tail male, or in case there shall be but one such male lineal descendant then to such one in tail male; with remainder to the use of the said Matthew Woodford James Stanley and Emperor John Alexander Woodford their heirs and assigns for ever, upon the trusts and to and for the intents and purposes hercin after-mentioned expressed and declared of and concerning the "And that the premises included in the remaining lot, which shall compose the same, shall be conveyed to the use of THE ELDEST

same.

MALE

MALE LINEAL DESCENDANT THEN LIVING of my said son Charles Thellusson in tail male, with remainder to the SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH,

AND ALL AND EVERY OTHER MALE LINEAL DESCENDANT OR DESCENDANTS THEN LIVING, WHO SHALL BE INCAPABLE OF TAKING AS HEIR IN TAIL MALE OF ANY OF THE PERSONS TO WHOM A PRIOR ESTATE IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO BE LIMITED, OF MY SAID SON CHARLES THELLUSSON SUCCESSIVELY IN TAIL MALE, with remainders in equal moieties to the eldest and every other male LINEAL DE

SCENDANT OR DESCENDANTS THEN LIVING OF MY SAID SONS PETER ISAAC THELLUSSON AND GEORGE WOODFORD THELLUS SON, AS TENANTS IN COMMON IN TAIL MALE, in the same way as berein before directed with respect to the eldest and every other male lineal descendant or descendants as aforesaid of my said son Charles Thellusson, with cross remainders between or among such male lineal descendants as aforesaid of my said sons Peter Isaac Thellusson and George Woodford Thellusson in tail male, or in case there shall be but one such male lineal descendant then to such one in tail male; with remainder to the use of the said Matthew Woodford James Stanley and Emperor John Alexander Woodford their heirs and assigns for ever, upon the trusts and to and for the intents and purposes herein after-mentioned expressed and declared of and concerning the same."

On the determination of this entail on the future male descendants of his three sons, he creates a farther trust for selling the whole of the accumulated property; and for applying the money from the sale to the use of the sinking fund towards paying off the national debt.

Such is this most extraordinary testamentary disposition of an immense fortune; in which the testator at the same time evinced his avarice, his vanity, and his cruelty to his nearest connections; and such is the will which engrossed the conversation and the thoughts of the profession, and occupied the attention of the Chancellor, assisted by the Master of the Rolls, and two Judges, for à considerable portion of time. We have necessarily been thus long and minute in our extract, for the purpose of enabling our readers to form a competent judgment on so singular a subject..

Mr. Hargrave attempted to invalidate this testamentary disposition of property on the three following grounds. 1st, An infringement of the boundary of executory devise; and this in six different points, on any one of which, the charge, if proved, (he contended,) was sufficient to nullify the trusts in question. In this division of his argument, the author gives a distinct and able view of one of the most abstruse and difficult topics in our law, namely the origin and progress of executory devise, as applied to estates of inheritance, terms of years, and personal chattels. He then proceeds to shew that the trusts, created by the will, were guilty of an excess of accumulation; and in this respect of being so grossly against public good, and so extremely improper, exclusively of

the limits prescribed to executory devise, as to justify a court of equity in condemning them. Lastly, he charges these trusts with being so vague, so obscure, and so uncertain, in the description of the primary beneficial devises and legacies, as to be rejectable on the ground of unintelligibility and impracticability. These were the principal points maintained by Mr. H. in the course of an argument, which in the volume before us has filled 182 pages, and which distinctly manifests the author's laborious industry and depth of research on this trying' occasion. We believe that it is unnecessary for us to add, that all these exertions were unsuccessful, and that the Chancellor's decree was in favour of the will.

The second case in this collection, on Mr.Perry's commitment by the House of Lords for a breach of privilege, in a paragraph inserted in The Morning Chronicle, involves in it nice constitutional questions, by which the boundaries of our civil libertyare in a great measure affected.

To the following points, the author's attention was directed: 1st. Though the House of Lords, as every other court of justice, has the right of protecting it's proceedings from unlawful resistance and obstruction of any kind by commitment, can this right extend to the summary punishment of libel, such libel not being upon any judgment or decision of the House of Lords, either as a house of parliament, or as a court of justice?

ad. Can this right be legally exercised, or at least justly and agreeable to precedent, against an individual upon the mere proof of his being only the proprietor of a newspaper, though upon an interrogatory put to him by the House he denies all knowledge of the existence of the libel, and expresses his sorrow that it should have appeared in print?

3d. Supposing the right of commitment to exist, can the House of Lords commit any individual for any cause, as for breach of privilege, for a time certain, and adjudge him to pay a fine? And. you are particularly requested by Mr. Perry to advise on the whole of his case, and what mode of redress by Habeas Corpus or by action or otherwise he has on this occasion.'

It was the opinion of that eminent, pure, and enlightened. Judge Sir Matthew Hale that, "for matters remediable in the ordinary courts, remedy ought not to be given in the Lords' House;" and he subjoins the following reason, "that indeed. it is against all reason it should invert the whole economy of the laws of England." Yet notwithstanding this remark, proceeding from so high an authority, and our author's observation that it would be best not to consider libel as a case of privilege,' it is added, but whatever may be the objections to construing mere libel a contempt against the Lords or Commons, the practice of so treating it has in some degree con

tinued ;

tinued; and however my mind may be affected with the doubts I have on the subject, I do not feel myself at liberty to declare an opinion, that the practice is an excess of constitutional power.'

To the second question, Mr. H. considers the proceeding by the House of Lords in this particular instance as a conclusive answer, being a direct precedent for holding the proprietor of a newspaper presumptively privy to every thing published in it. On this part of the subject, Mr. H. feelingly and sensibly observes that he fears that the prevalent licentiousness of the press will undermine its liberty, by provoking the adoption of doctrines, which perhaps would otherwise scarcely have been risked in argument.

Although several precedents exist in favour of the power of the House of Lords to punish the breach of their privileges, by fine and by imprisonment, for a term certain, yet the author entertains a doubt whether such power is maintainable in point of law and constitution, either by the strength of the practice, or by that strength assisted by any principle which can be stated for the purpose. These doubts, on the same subject, Mr. H. formerly expressed in an opinion which he wrote in the year 1793, in the case of a commitment by the Irish House of Lords, which was inserted in the first volume of these Juridical Arguments, and again in the preface to Lord Hale's Treatise. Mr. H. concludes his minute and impartial inquiry into this interesting topic with the following remark: Upon the whole, the further I penetrate into the foundation of the powers in question, the more I am encouraged to doubt the legality of them.'

In respect to the proper manner of controverting the legality of the punishment, there are, as Mr. H. observes, four modes of proceeding on the part of the defendant. These are, suing out a writ of habeas corpus-bringing an action of false imprisonment-petitioning the House of Commons-and petitioning the House of Lords. With Mr. H.'s observations on each of these remedies, we shall conclude our account of this important argument:

The most immediate remedy is the habeas corpus. During the term it may be moved for in the court of chancery or in any of the four common law courts of Westminster Hall. Both in and out of term, either the lord chancellor or any single judge may be applied to for it. Of obtaining the writ, I presume, there cannot be a doubt. It is the right of the subject secured by statutes. But I cannot encourage the least hope, that any relief would be obtained through this mediam. Our judges have repeatedly declined examining the legality of a commitment by either house of parliament for contempt. The language of the king's bench, in lord Shaftesbury's

.

H

Shaftesbury's case of imprisonment by the house of lords in 1679, was, that the commitment was by too high a power to be con troulable by the courts of Westminster Hall. Something of the same kind fell from some of the judges of the same court in lord Danby's case in 1682. Lord chief justice Holt, indeed, in the famous Ailesbury case in 1704, was of a different opinion. But he was overruled by the three other judges of the king's bench, and so the prisoners committed by the house of commons were remanded. On the commitment also of Mr. Crosbie lord mayor of London by the house of commons in 1771, there appears to have been a concurrence of opinion, not only of lord Mansfield and lord chief justice De Grey, acting separately, but of the courts of common pleas and exchequer successively, against meddling with such matters.

The remedy by action for false imprisonment is liable to the same difficnity. If such an action was brought, the commitment by the house of lords might be pleaded, either to the jurisdiction, or in bar. In the case of Jay v. Topham, which was in the 34th of Charles the second, on a commitment by the house of commons, the defendant pleaded to the jurisdiction of the king's bench: and the plea was overruled. But after the revolution the house of commons voted so overruling the plea to the jurisdiction, and the judgment of the same court in some other actions of the same kind, a breach of privilege; and called lord chief justice Pemberton and judge Jones to an account for their conduct in that respect; and it is observable, that in their defence they admitted the order of the house to be a good plea in justification. This, with what passed in the habeas corpus cases I have mentioned, leaves room for supposing, that in case of an action by Mr. Perry, the only point would be, whether the proceeding should be stopped by a plea to the jurisdiction or by a plea in bar.

The remedy by petition to the house of commons, as I have explained in a former part of this opinion, was resorted, to in the several cases of Fitton Carr and Barnadiston in the reign of Charles the second and in the first of those cases the commons appointed a committee, and afterwards heard solemn argument at the bar of the house and in the second they appointed a committee: and in the third they voted the fine by the lords illegal. But should the house of commons interfere in the present case by vote or otherwise, it might lead to a serious dispute with the house of lords: and this alone, in the present critical state of public affairs, would probably be deemed a sufficient reason for declining to take up the business.

The remedy by petition to the house of lords to revoke the punishment awarded by themselves, is not open to the same objection, as a petition to the house of commons. In case of such a petition to the lords, it should be framed in the most respectful language; and should, I think, pray, that Mr. Perry might be heard by counsel against the sentence of the lords on the ground of error. Whether such a hearing would be granted, appears to me uncertain. There may be several precedents of such a hearing. But hitherto I have not met with any instance, except the case, which, according to Mr. Grey's account of Mr. Offley's argument at the bar of the commons on the case of Fitton, was argued at

the