Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated SystemDuke University Press, 17. maj 2004 - 202 sider In Constitutional Deliberation in Congress J. Mitchell Pickerill analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions on Congressional debates and statutory language. Based on a thorough examination of how Congress responds to key Court rulings and strategizes in anticipation of them, Pickerill argues that judicial review—or the possibility of it—encourages Congressional attention to constitutional issues. Revealing critical aspects of how laws are made, revised, and refined within the separated system of government of the United States, he makes an important contribution to “constitutionalism outside the courts” debates. Pickerill combines legislative histories, extensive empirical findings, and interviews with current and former members of Congress, congressional staff, and others. He examines data related to all of the federal legislation struck down by the Supreme Court from the beginning of the Warren Court in 1953 through the 1996–97 term of the Rehnquist Court. By looking at the legislative histories of Congressional acts that invoked the Commerce Clause and presented Tenth Amendment conflicts—such as the Child Labor Act (1916), the Civil Rights Act (1965), the Gun-Free School Zones Act (1990), and the Brady Bill (1994)—Pickerill illuminates how Congressional deliberation over newly proposed legislation is shaped by the possibility of judicial review. The Court’s invalidation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act in its 1995 ruling United States v. Lopez signaled an increased judicial activism regarding issues of federalism. Pickerill examines that case and compares congressional debate over constitutional issues in key pieces of legislation that preceded and followed it: the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1997. He shows that Congressional attention to federalism increased in the 1990s along with the Court’s greater scrutiny. |
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... Responses to Striking Down of Statutes by the Supreme Court 41 Congressional Responses to Judicial Review, 1954–1997 42 Congressional Response, by Chief Justice 43 Time between Passage of Federal Statute and Supreme Court Decision 45 ...
... judicial review to strike down Acts of Congress for violating federalism principles in the Constitution.1 The ... respond ? When , where , and why do members of Congress deliberate ( or fail to deliberate ) over constitutional issues , and ...
... law is repassed , how has judicial review affected the form and substance of the legislation or policy ? Quantitative analysis of congressional responses alone can only tell part of the story . As King , Koehane , and Verba note , “ If ...
... responses to judicial review rarely indicate congressional challenges to Court decisions . Instead , Congress is more likely to amend legislation in a manner that reflects deference to or compliance with the Court's interpretations and ...
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Indhold
1 | |
Constitutional Deliberationin a Separated System | 11 |
Judicial Review Roadblock Speed Bump or Detour? | 31 |
The Shadows of Uncertain Scrutiny Legislating in a Period of Judicial Dualism | 63 |
The Missing ConstitutionLegislating in the Darkness of Judicial Deference | 95 |
The Nature of Things Anticipation and Negotiation Interaction and Reaction | 133 |
Judicial Review Decisions and Relevant Legislation Chapter 2 Dataset | 155 |
InDepth Interviews | 161 |
Notes | 167 |
Table of Cases | 175 |
Bibliography | 177 |
Index | 183 |
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Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a ... J. Mitchell Pickerill Ingen forhåndsvisning - 2004 |