Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated SystemDuke University Press, 17. maj 2004 - 202 sider In Constitutional Deliberation in Congress J. Mitchell Pickerill analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions on Congressional debates and statutory language. Based on a thorough examination of how Congress responds to key Court rulings and strategizes in anticipation of them, Pickerill argues that judicial review—or the possibility of it—encourages Congressional attention to constitutional issues. Revealing critical aspects of how laws are made, revised, and refined within the separated system of government of the United States, he makes an important contribution to “constitutionalism outside the courts” debates. Pickerill combines legislative histories, extensive empirical findings, and interviews with current and former members of Congress, congressional staff, and others. He examines data related to all of the federal legislation struck down by the Supreme Court from the beginning of the Warren Court in 1953 through the 1996–97 term of the Rehnquist Court. By looking at the legislative histories of Congressional acts that invoked the Commerce Clause and presented Tenth Amendment conflicts—such as the Child Labor Act (1916), the Civil Rights Act (1965), the Gun-Free School Zones Act (1990), and the Brady Bill (1994)—Pickerill illuminates how Congressional deliberation over newly proposed legislation is shaped by the possibility of judicial review. The Court’s invalidation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act in its 1995 ruling United States v. Lopez signaled an increased judicial activism regarding issues of federalism. Pickerill examines that case and compares congressional debate over constitutional issues in key pieces of legislation that preceded and followed it: the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1997. He shows that Congressional attention to federalism increased in the 1990s along with the Court’s greater scrutiny. |
Fra bogen
Resultater 1-5 af 93
... Supreme Court Decision and Congressional Response 46 Congressional Responses and Nature of Supreme Court's Findings of Unconstitutionality 46 Conditions Influencing Constitutional Deliberation in Congress 67 Legislative Timeline of the ...
The Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated System J. Mitchell Pickerill. acknowledgments. * I have read a number of ... Supreme Court, Congress, and the Constitution (especially federalism). And second, I wanted to write a book. In an ...
... Court - Congress scholars in the United States , who have graciously given some of their valuable time to provide me with feedback . In particular , I thank Bob Katzmann , Louis Fisher , and Keith Whittington for their insightful com ...
... Supreme Court scholars . For the first time in sixty years , the Court had invoked the limits of the commerce power to strike down a federal law . In fact , the Rehnquist Court has actively exercised judicial review to strike down Acts of ...
... Congress do sometimes engage in constitutional deliberation , but that deliberation is often motivated and shaped by the Court's ... Congress and perhaps elsewhere outside the courts . We should not expect members of Congress to routinely or ...
Indhold
1 | |
Constitutional Deliberationin a Separated System | 11 |
Judicial Review Roadblock Speed Bump or Detour? | 31 |
The Shadows of Uncertain Scrutiny Legislating in a Period of Judicial Dualism | 63 |
The Missing ConstitutionLegislating in the Darkness of Judicial Deference | 95 |
The Nature of Things Anticipation and Negotiation Interaction and Reaction | 133 |
Judicial Review Decisions and Relevant Legislation Chapter 2 Dataset | 155 |
InDepth Interviews | 161 |
Notes | 167 |
Table of Cases | 175 |
Bibliography | 177 |
Index | 183 |
Andre udgaver - Se alle
Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a ... J. Mitchell Pickerill Ingen forhåndsvisning - 2004 |