prehend the greatness and expansion of other men's views, on account of the inferiority of their own abilities and understandings;" and that those who dissent from Mr Huskisson's schemes, are prevented by their incapacity from "soaring to the heights that enable men to look down correct ly on great questions," and from perceiving the vast and superhuman powers of the said Mr Huskisson. The very Mr Grant, whose exploits in Ireland are not forgotten, although he admits that Political Economy is still in its infancy, sneers in the most valorous fashion at the " imbecility" of those who cannot deign to go to him for opinion. It seems that we have got, another "ALL THE TALENTS" Ministry; and we imagine that in the upshot, ALL THE TALENTS THE SECOND will cut a worse figure in point of ta lent than was cut by ALL THE TALENTS THE FIRST. Is there a single English stomach that has not been turned by this nauseous arrogance, bombast, and swagger? In so far as we are concerned, we honestly avow that we have seen that in the world which has taken away our passion for "soaring," and that we are exceedingly well content to cleave to our mother earth. If our humble powers will not suffer us 80 to " soar," as to be able to "look down" upon the measures of public men, we trust we may be permitted to look up at them as we crawl upon the sod; and people may sometimes see an object as well when they are below, as when they are above it. Men may chance to "soar" too high for seeing things accurately. The airballoon soarers" tell us that when they get into the clouds they cannot see the world so well as he whose feet never "soar" from the King's highroad-they even cannot see it at all! We shrewdly suspect, and we will declare it, even if it give huge offence to the Right Honourable George Canning, that the talented secretary and his talented colleagues, by means of their prodigious abilities and stupendous philosophical wings, have “ ed" until they have lost sight of this country altogether. We suspect that they are at this moment far above the clouds, and much nearer the moon than Old England. It is difficult to arrive at any other conclusion, when we look at the astonishing ignorance -the incredible ignorance, as Mr Atwood termed it-which they have re

soar

cently manifested touching the condition, feelings, and opinions of the nation. The conceit and boasting cut but a silly appearance when contrasted with the planning and acting; those who have conducted the affairs of this empire for the last two months, ought, we think, to be extremely silent touching the incapacity of other people. We never knew the Ministry possess so little of public confidence as it possesses at present-we never knew public opinion so decidedly opposed to the Government and Parliament, as it has been since the Session opened; yet, forsooth, we are to think exactly as Mr Canning and his colleagues think, if it be only for " uniformity's sake."

We will now say a word touching the proposed changes.

The panic, as it was called, produced a tremendous run upon the town and country banks, and many of them stopped payment. In proportion, quite as many London banks failed as country ones. Of such of the latter as the storm overpowered, some have opened again; the chief portion will pay in full, or nearly in full, and there are very few that will not pay a good dividend. It must be recollected, that the London banks could communicate with the Bank of England in a few moments, and that the country ones required some days for such communication.

What followed? Many of the leading traders of the metropolis held a public meeting, at which they declared that it was scarcely possible for any bank, whatever its resources might be, to stand against such a run as had occurred. In the truth of this, the people of London and their press acquiesced, in so far as the London banks were concerned. It was thought to be natural enough for the latter to be overthrown by such a run, and nothing was said against them. The country banks fared differently-for them no excuse could be discovered. A stunning outcry was raised against them-which would only have excited laughter by the stupid absurdities which it put forth, had it not been for its destructive tendency-and they were covered with execrations. A body of men, who were second to none in respectability, integrity, and claims upon the gratitude of the nation, whose interests were so interwoven with those of the community, that they could not

have been ruined without involving the community in ruin-these men were held up to scorn at such a moment as beggars and swindlers, and nothing was left unsaid that was calculated to blast their credit, and sink both them and the community into bankruptcy.

Now, who raised this outcry? Doubtlessly it was raised by the inhabitants of those parts in which the obnoxious banks were established-by those who were well acquainted with the operations of these banks, and the property, character, and conduct of the country bankers? No such thing. The ten millions of English people, amidst whom these bankers dwelt, who were supplied by them with notes, and who were the only losers from their failure, made no complaint. They asked for no change, they called not for sovereigns and Bank of England notes; they were willing to intrust their property with these penny less swindlers, and to stand forward as their defenders. The outcry was raised exclusively by the people and newspapers of London, and such other places as were not visited by the notes of the country bankers. It was raised solely by those who were strangers to these bankers, who took not their notes,-who suffered not from them, -and who raised it, merely because, in a run which operated more severely against the country banks than the London ones, as many in proportion of the former failed as of the latter.

The admirable Malachi Malagrow ther, Esq. has protested against the affairs of Scotland being managed by the people of London, and we, in like manner, protest against the affairs of the country parts of England being managed by the people of London. The sages of Cockaigne are intermeddling with the affairs of other people in a way that is not to be endured, and in a way that is very likely to bring their own into grievous disorder. If they would only have "looked at home," they would have seen that amidst their own banks, which ought to have kept them silent touching the country ones. It is the curse of the age that everything is to be managed by Political Economy and Philosophy, and that local knowledge is to be utterly disregarded in the management of local interests. The local interests of Scotland are to be managed by Eng

lishmen, and the local interests of England are to be managed by Scotsmen and Irishmen. No one could read the speeches of Ministers regarding the country banks without perceiving that they were almost every syllable taken from certain London newspapers; and all who were acquainted with country matters knew that these newspapers were thoroughly ignorant touching the question. The people of the country who were principally interested in the business were not consulted; their opinion was not asked; their wishes were of no moment; the sages of Cockaigne commanded, and the sages of the Cabinet, as in duty bound, obeyed.

It cannot be necessary for us to speak to the general respectability of the country banks. They have just been twice put to the most severe ordeal, and seven-eighths of them have given the most decisive proofs of their solidity. The chief part of those that have failed, notwithstanding the sacrifices they made to support themselves, and the waste of property that must take place in the winding up of their affairs, will pay twenty shillings, or nearly twenty shillings, in the pound. To speak of a banker's beginning business in the country without capital is ridiculous. Who would take his notes, or open an account with him? With respect to system, a man without capital could more easily open a bank in London than in the country; and in regard to public sentiment, he could as easily do it in the one as in the other. People in the country are not so totally destitute of common sense as the omniscient Cockneys imagine.

We do not, however, say, that the system of our country banks cannot be improved; but we do say, that it will not be so easily improved as many people imagine. We highly approve of the establishment of joint stock banks; the great practical defect of the existing ones is, some of the bankers are too much addicted to speculation, and the affairs of joint stock ones must be conducted in such a way as will, to a great extent, preclude speculation. If, however, all our banks were like those of Scotland, we imagine that there would still be failures among them. It is very idle to argue that the same things must of necessity produce the same fruits in both coun

tries, when there is so much difference in extent, population, &c. between one country and the other.

Nothing more, in our poor judgment, ought to have been done at present, beyond granting permission for the establishment of these joint-stock banks. To the branch ones of the Bank we have many strong objections; they will give much additional power to a corporation that has quite sufficient already, they will operate very mischievously against their rivals, and we think that, instead of preventing, they will multiply failures.

To the change in the currency we are decidedly opposed, in common with almost every man in the nation. A more wild and destructive measure was never devised in such a moment.

No reasons have been assigned for this change, save the most simple and unsatisfactory ones. It is said that it will prevent frequent and violent fluctuations in prices. In reply to this, we have already shown that prices fluctuated as frequently and violently when the currency was gold, as they have done since it became paper. Once in every three or four years commerce and manufactures will have a fit of suffering, let the currency be what it may, so long as this country shall be reasonably wealthy. Production and consumption cannot possibly be kept together; the powers of the former have been rendered gigantic by capital, machinery, and knowledge, and the market must be very frequently overloaded with merchandise and manufactures. If the trade in corn be made free, agriculture will be rarely free from distress arising from superabundance. To prevent convulsions like that from which the country is now suffering, excessive supply must be prevented; and this, with regard to commerce and manufactures, is impossible. We can prevent it in respect of agriculture, but, like fools, we are determined to cast away the ability.

That a paper currency should of necessity keep prices constantly very high, is a doctrine that we can never subscribe to. If the banks should give away their notes, or sell them at half price, to be expended solely in consumption, we would then readily believe in the doctrine. But they do no such thing. The loans that their Rotes enable them to make are em

ployed, not in consumption but production. We will never believe that the high prices of the war were occasioned solely, or principally, by the paper currency; we are convinced that if any miracle had added a few millions of rich land to our island, wheat would have been sent down to thirty shillings the quarter in spite of the war, the taxes, and the banknotes. Every one knows that the farmers employed the aid which they received from the banks in carrying production to the highest point possible; the old land was forced with extra manure-waste land was cultivated-a vast quantity of corn and number of cattle were brought to market, that never would have seen it but for the bank-notes. Still there was no superabundance, and why? Because Father Ocean would not suffer us to ruin ourselves by forming too many new farms. Perhaps had the currency been gold, prices would not have been regularly so high, but then we believe they would sometimes have been much higher-we believe that, at times, there would have been very great scarcity. At the peace, when foreign corn was suffered to come, prices fell almost fifty per cent, in spite of the paper currency. Again, the means of obtaining articles of commerce, and raw produce for manufacturing, were very precarious, and the supply was often scanty; yet the merchants and manufacturers frequently suffered greatly from losing prices. Colonial produce was often at ruinous ones.

For some years before the sovereigns were issued, bank-notes strove in vain to raise prices, even to their proper level. The Bank called in its small notes and circulated the gold, and behold prices rose throughout the country! When we look at the price of corn in America, nothing can persuade us that a paper currency must of necessity keep it high in England. Open the ports only for foreign corn, and all the notes that the banks can force into circulation will not keep our farmers from ruin.

We believe the circulating medium, and the solid, unborrowed capital of individuals, to be distinct thingsPhilosophers confound them with each other. That such capital may be superabundant, is sufficiently proved by the history of the last two years; but we are not sure that the circula

ting medium, separating it from such capital, can be superabundant. Granting, however, that the issues of banknotes, considered separately, can be excessive, they must operate as an excess of trading capital; and we deny that there can be such an excess of such capital, for a term of years, as will keep prices constantly high. An excess of such capital must always, in the nature of things, resolve itself at once into an excess of goods, dissipate itself, and create a scarcity of money and low prices.

At any rate, high prices are a certain indication of prosperity; they cannot possibly exist in a poor and distressed nation. If bank-notes raise them at all, they can do it in no other way than by increasing trade and employment for labour. If gold reduce them, it must inevitably do it by diminishing trade, and depriving labour of employment. Low prices can only be found in a poor and suffering country; a rich and thriving one they cannot enter. That a metallic currency will greatly reduce prices for a time is certain. At a period when a yast number of trading capitals have been wholly lost-when the capital of almost every trader has been seriously reduced-when every bank has had its capital greatly diminished by the withdrawal of deposits, or other causes -at such a time, an immense sum must be taken from the capitals of the banks, and the use and profits of it lost to the community. The change itself will force prices down, and then their lowness will prevent the accumulation of balances of account and deposits, which form so large a part of the trading capital of every banker. The banking capital of the nation will be less reduced by the withdrawal of the notes, than by the loss of such balances of accounts and deposits. Prices, however, will still fluctuate they will be at times very high-but then they will be raised, not generally by the beneficial effects of prosperity, but partially by the injurious consequences of scarcity.

Every Member of Parliament, whatever his creed may be, protests that he is the enemy of high prices. If this country, with its tremendous debt, which is kept so carefully from diminution, can prosper with low prices, in Heaven's name let us have them! But we say that it cannot-we

say that, if prices be not reasonably high, this nation cannot employ its labour, reduce its debt, and pay its taxes. We say further, that high prices cannot outlive public prosperity

that low ones cannot outlive national poverty and suffering-that, in so far as a paper currency raises prices, it raises them by promoting trade and creating employment for labour, and that it never can raise them permanently above what public prosperity calls for. We maintain, that, if the banks contributed to produce the present distress by making advances to the merchants, &c. they were enabled to make these advances chiefly by the solid capital which was placed in their hands by their connexions. We maintain that this distress was mainly produced, not by excessive issues of notes by the bankers, but by a superabundance of real unborrowed capital possessed by other members of the community.

It is said that a paper currency, instead of expanding, contracts itself in times of trading suffering, and that a gold one does the reverse. This is sad drivelling. How does a paper currency contract itself? The market becomes heavy-prices fall-the traders are all rendered poor-confidence is shaken-the bankers hear unfavourable reports, and dare not continue to discount and lend as they have done. Would the case be different with a gold currency? Would the bankers lend to suspected houses, and discount doubtful bills, merely because their money would consist of sovereigns instead of bank-notes? We think not. A run upon a country bank throws in its paper, but then it takes out gold instead; it takes away a large portion of the Bank's capital in the shape of deposits, &c. but then it would do just the same if the Bank had no notes. Low prices and distress throw a large part of the currency out of employment, whether it consist of gold or paper. The fall of the market price of gold does not make it more cheap and plentiful to those who want to borrow it.

Our conviction is, that a sufficiency of gold cannot be kept in the country. The balance of trade is only in our favour with those countries that cannot send us any gold, and that pay their debts to us with goods. With France and those countries that really

have gold, the balance of trade, from the new system, will be almost always against us, and we shall have to pay them with gold. What has been the case recently? The Bank called in its small notes and issued sovereigns: almost immediately, the latter began to go abroad, and their export increased, until it excited the most serious alarm. This was the case when only two millions of the population were supplied with gold. If the nation enjoy a few months of prosperity, the sovereigns will fly abroad for the purchase of foreign manufactures; the bankers will set to work to bring down prices, and produce bankruptcy and distress, in order to disable the community from buying outlandish silks and other foolery. If the nation cannot possess gold without keeping itself continually in penury, and suffering, we think it would be better without it; we think it would act wisely in cleaving to its paper. Our notions are eminently unphilosophical. We would at any time prefer roast beef and plum-pudding with bank-notes, to salt and potatoes with sovereigns. We wish for that circulating medium, without giving ourselves any concern touching its description, that will give to our country the greatest measure of prosperity and happiness.

The Philosophers of Parliament are prodigiously puzzled to account for the fact, that country bank-notes force sovereigns out of circulation. They charge it, with their usual ignorance, upon the country bankers. The truth is, that excepting Philosophers, all men, and especially men in business, prefer that circulating medium which is the most convenient. The notes of country bankers are scarcely ever counterfeited-there is no trouble in weighing them they are more portableand the risk is very trifling, for it is only two or three times in a man's life that one bank, amidst several, fails in a particular district. Notes are almost universally preferred to gold, and that is the reason why they keep it out of circulation. Let the circulating medium of the country be Bank of England notes-let forged ones be pretty plentiful-let sovereigns be of full weight and free from counterfeits, and then gold will drive paper out of circulation.

With regard to Scotland, here is a country in which Bank failures are

unknown, which for a very long period has drawn the most signal advantages from a paper currency, which is in circumstances very different from those of England, and of which the inhabitants, almost to a man, protest against the change. Now, why is a positive, long-tried, and highly-valued good, to be thus wrenched from Scotland, not only without necessity, but without anything whatever to excuse it? Why is Scotland to be thus crammed by main force into the crucible of experiment, when it cannot even be alleged that she will derive the least benefit from it? With regard to Ire land, the want of banks and capital in it has been long lamented. Yet now a measure is resorted to that must prevent the spread of banks in it, and the introduction of that capital which they would circulate. Who can contemplate without shuddering, the effects that low prices must produce in Ireland?

We are an unaccountable people. Banks have long been cried up as things of inestimable public value; and the banker who has been liberal in his advances, has been always praised as a benefactor to his country. All things must now be made new, and therefore banks are spoken of as though they were public evils, and the banker, who is generous in making loans, is thought to be little better than a trai

tor.

We have boasted of our capital until we are weary, and now we are execrating it, and sighing for the be nefits that the loss of it will yield us. We shall soon be somewhat wiser than we are. We shall soon find, that if we have banks at all, we must have the evils that are inseparable from them; and that a crash cannot take place amidst merchants and manufacturers, without its producing a crash amidst bankers. We shall soon find that if we have riches, we must have with them the evils that are inseparable from riches. We shall soon discover that the want of capital is even a more grievous thing than the excess of it-that occasional paroxysms of gout are to be preferred to the neverceasing effects of atrophy-and that the pains produced by high living are more endurable than the gnawings of eternal hunger. We shall soon be heartily sick of experiments-Would to God that we could as soon get rid of their consequences!