tleman need have been ashamed of his acquaintance. But could the jury infer Mr. O'Bryen's guilt from this circumstance? How had the evidence connected Mr. O'Bryen with the atrocious conduct of Franklin ? What had he done? Had he been seen giving any of those bills to any of the printers? Had he been heard saying any one word which could in any manner prove a knowledge on his part, of what Franklin had been doing? The only thing on which the supposed guilty connexion of Mr. O'Bryen rested, was that which he did not for a moment deny-that he had been on terms of close intimacy with, and had given him shelter in his house, and received him in his family. But as to the hackney-coach in which Mr. O'Bryen was said to have gone with Fletcher, he (Mr. Scarlett) had received instructions most positively to deny that he had done so. He never was in a hackney-coach with him; he had known him under circumstances of better fortune; he knew that he had been in embarrassed circumstances, and he gave him that shelter in his house, which did credit to his feelings as a man. Mr. Scarlett then proceeded into a minute examination of the evidence, and commented with much force on what he contended were strong contradictions in the evidence of Seale and Hockley-and particularly in Hockley's account of the hour at which he arrived at Mr. O'Bryen's house, when he followed the hackney-coach in July. He also contended, that the circumstance of Mr. O'Bryen's having discharged both his servants on the 2nd of January last,

was a proof of conscious innocence. If he knew that there was any thing objectionable in his conduct of which they had a knowledge, was it to be believed, that he would have discharged them at a time when he must have known that their testimony against him would be sought for with avidity? with avidity? As to his little knowledge of the circumstances of Fletcher's conduct, it was proved that he was ignorant of them, for the servant girl swore that they waited dinner for two hours on the Sunday he had been taken into custody. The circumstance of the burning of the papers was too trivial to be dwelt upon for a moment, and

the servant herself never made any inquiry about it. The change of name, of which Mr. O'Bryen had a knowledge, was, he contended, still less to be relied upon as any proof of guilt on his part. But it was said, that Mr. O'Bryen had denied knowing such a man as Mr. Franklin. What could be more natural? He had seen a policeofficer inquiring for a person who was charged with such a serious offence, and it was very natural for him to say that he knew no such person-that was, that he had no acquaintance with any man capable of such conduct. It was, however, charged that one of those seditious placards was found in Mr. O'Bryen's room. What proof was that? or if it was to be considered one, was it of such a nature as would be sufficient to convict the most respectable and innocent individuals? He had no doubt that his learned friend, who addressed the jury, had some of those placards in his possession; but

nobody would, for a moment, suppose that that was evidence of any participation in them. "I had some of them in my room (continued Mr. Scarlett), and, God knows, I had no hand in, or knowledge of, their composition." The whole of the case sought to be established against Mr. O'Bryen was circumstantial, and of course he would admit that such evidence would be sufficient, if it were connected. But it was absolutely necessary, that that connexion should be full and unbroken. Was it the case here? Were not the circumstances alleged in contradiction to each other? But there was one circumstance, which it was almost impossible to believe. One of the placards produced, contained a gross attack on the character of that great statesman, the late Mr. Fox. Now, the jury would have it in evidence, that Mr. O'Bryen had, for a long time, been intimately connected with Mr. Fox, and honoured with his friendship. He had been, and still was, on terms of intimate acquaintance with many eminent men, friends of that great man. Was it then to be supposed that he would have written or sanctioned an attack on his memory? He would now call several honourable and noble persons, who would give Mr. O'Bryen a character. From them the jury would hear, whether they considered Mr. O'Bryen capable of writing such libels as had been given in evidence. He then called

His grace the duke of Bedford, who was examined by Mr. Bolland. How long has your grace known Mr. O'Bryen?-I think

my first acquaintance with Mr. O'Bryen was in the year 1784.

What is your grace's belief of him with respect to the libels which you have heard read?—I should imagine that Mr. O'Bryen was not capable of publishing such papers, from my recollection of those he was connected with, and from what I heard of him formerly.

Examined by Mr. Pearson.Will your grace allow me to ask whether your acquaintance with Mr. O'Bryen has continued up to the present time ?-It has not.

Up to what period did your intimacy with him continue ?-I have had very little acquaintance with Mr. O'Bryen since the year 1806.

Will your grace allow me to ask, whether any thing has oc curred since that time calculated to lessen your good opinion of Mr. O'Bryen?

Mr. Scarlett objected to this question-not that he had any fear, that the answer could be such as would affect his client, but he thought it a bad precedent, and he thought it was almost new to cross-examine any witness, who came to speak to character only.

Mr. Pearson said, he would wave the question; but he first begged to remind his learned friend, that it was quite competent to him to cross-examine any witness on the subject of character.

The Lord Chief Justice concurred in this. Counsel had certainly a right to put the question.

Mr. Pearson resumed the examination.-Am I to understand, that up to the year 1806 your grace knew Mr. O'Bryen as be

longing to that political party of which I may look upon your grace as the head, or as a private friend? I had no knowledge of Mr. O'Bryen, except as a member of the Whig party.

Lord Holland, lord Erskine, and sir James Macintosh were afterwards examined as to their belief whether Mr. O'Bryen was capable of writing a libel on Mr. Fox. Lord Holland said, he should consider Mr. O'Bryen, as the last man who would write a libel on Mr. Fox. He had seen very little of him since Mr. Fox's death. Lord Erskine said, he thought Mr. O'Bryen incapable of endeavouring to produce a revolution in this country. He had once some difference with him, and on that occasion, Mr. O'Bryen conducted himself as a man of honour and a gentleman. He had seen very little of him of late years. Sir James Macintosh had seen little of Mr. O'Bryen since 1804. From what he knew of him, he thought him incapable of attacking Mr. Fox: The case being now closed, The Lord Chief Justice summed up the evidence, which occupied an hour.

The Jury turned round in the box, and, after consulting together for a few moments, returned a verdict of-Not Guilty.

The trial lasted nearly nine

hours.

The King v. Edmonds, Wooler, Cartwright, and others.

This was the case of unlawful assembly tried before the lordchief baron, at the last summer assizes for Warwick. The object of the meeting was, to elect

what the parties termed a legis` latorial attorney: the jury found the defendants guilty.

Early in Michaelmas term, a rule Nisi for a new trial was obtained by Mr. Denman. The case was argued at very considerable length in Hilary term following, by the attorney-general, and Mr. Denman.

The grounds, upon which a new trial was demanded, were three in number: First, that the defendants had been refused permission at the trial to challenge the array; secondly, that they had not been permitted to make their challenges to the poll: thirdly, that one of the special jurors, a gentleman of the name of Peache, had not been duly summoned by the sheriff. The cause set up by the defendants for seeking to challenge the array was alleged unindifferency in the master of the Crown-office; and, to show that unindifferency, four circumstances were urged,-1st, that the master had selected the special jurors by name, instead of striking them by chance; 2nd, that he had selected such persons only as were designated as esquires; 3rd, that some of the jurors selected were persons in the commission of the peace; and 4th, that individuals had been put upon the special jury panel, who had previously served on the grand jury by which the bill against the defendants had been found. The ground of challenge to the poll was, that opinions hostile to the cause of the defendants were supposed to be entertained by a portion of the jury. The question as to Peache rested upon affidavits; from which it appeared, on the one hand,

that Mr. Peache did not receive the summons to attend the defendants' jury in sufficient time; and, on the other hand, that from his ill state of health he was in the habit of neglecting similar calls, and had actually neglected to attend upon another jury at the same assizes, to which second jury he had been duly summoned. The lord-chief-justice disposed of the various points in the following manner :-First, as to the unindifferency of the master of the Crown-office, the custom was, to select the special jurors by name; and as each party had the right of striking off twelve, the panel was likely to be as favourable to himself as though it had been chosen by the chance of the die: the nomination of esquires only was also a proceeding according to custom, the object being, to put upon special juries persons of a higher rank than, under ordinary circumstances, would try the cause; there was no reason to suppose, that persons in the commission of the peace would act under any undue influence, nor was it fair or reasonable that such persons should be excluded from special juries; and the selection of gentlemen who had served upon the grand jury-though made, no doubt, by the master, under a conscientious conviction that he was acting legally-had afterwards been set aside, and could not therefore, in any way, have prejudiced the defendants. With respect to the second ground of complaint, the non-summoning of Mr. Peache, it did not appear that the neglect of summons had proceeded from partiality on the part of the sheriff: on the contrary, it seemed probable, that

Mr. Peache, even if his summons had been delivered in time, would have pleaded his ill health, and avoided serving upon the jury. The last ground of objection was, the point which went to the challenge of the poll. Now, there was no proof offered at the trial of any expressions hostile to the defendants having been used by the jury; but it was proposed, without any proof, to put questions to them as to their opinions. Such a course could not be taken: in refusing to permit such challenge to the special jurymen, the lord-chief-baron had done right; and, in permitting it even to the talesmen, that learned judge had done wrong. It stood upon the most indisputable authorities, that opinions expressed by a juryman arising from his knowledge or belief, as to the facts of a cause, formed no sufficient ground for challenge; the only tenable ground of such challenge was a declaration of favour or preference between the parties.-Rule discharged.

MAY 1.-In Banco. Brunton and others v. Hawkes.

This was an action upon the case. The plaintiffs are patentees of certain improvements, alleged to be of their invention, in the construction of ships' anchors, windlasses, and cables, and they charged the defendant with invasion of their right. The action was tried, in the sittings after Trinity term last, before the lord chief-justice, at Westminster, when the matter as to the windlasses was put aside by consent, and a verdict, establishing their rights as to the anchor and cable, was taken for the plaintiffs.

In Michaelmas term last, a rule Nisi for a new trial was obtained upon the following grounds :First, with respect to the chain cable, it was denied that in the form of link used by the plaintiffs (an elliptical link, the sides prevented from collapsing by a broadended stay placed crosswise), there was any novelty: upon the cable, therefore, no patent could be maintained: 2dly, as to the anchor, the difference between the plaintiffs' improvement and the old machine was stated to be this in the old anchor, the flukes were made in distinct pieces, and united, by welding, to the shank; whereas the plaintiffs' formed the flukes in one piece, and united them to the shank by passing the conical end of the shank through a corresponding aperture in the centre of the flukes. Now, in this arrangement it was contended no novelty appeared; the principle, as regarded the construction of the flukes, having been applied in the mushroom anchor, and in the adze anchor, and being, as to the union of the flukes with the shank, used in the mushroom anchor and in the kedge anchor, and being also of daily occurrence in the pick-axe, and in the common hammer. The third point maintained in argument for the new trial was, that failure upon either branch of the patent, the anchor or the cable, vitiated and made void the patent altogether.

Cause was shown upon different days, and at considerable length, by Mr. Scarlett, Mr. Marryat, and Mr. Chitty.

The points chiefly insisted upon were three-that the employment of the elliptical link with the broad-ended stay in the chain

cable was, at least, a new combination; that the adze and mushroom anchors, set up by the other side, were mere mooring posts, totally distinct, in use and construction, from the ship's anchor; for improvement upon which the plaintiffs' claimed, and that failure of one branch of the patent would not void the other branch, any more than a grant of three estates would be made wholly inoperative by a defect as regarded any one of those estates in the title of the granter.

The Court this morning delivered its opinion.

The Lord Chief Justice regretted, extremely, that the author of a highly beneficial invention should from any cause be deprived of his personal advantage in it. That the plaintiffs' chain cable involved novelty of combination, he had no doubt; and he thought that, upon that part, taken distinctly, of the improvements in question, a patent might have been sustained, In the construction of the plaintiffs' anchor, however, there was, according to his lordship's view, no originality; and he thought it evident, both upon the principles of patents, and upon the decided case of " Hill v. Thomson," which had gone through very elaborate discussion in the court of Common-pleas, that the failure of any part of a patent, of necessity, rendered void the whole.

Mr. Justice Bayley concurred in opinion with the lord-chiefjustice, and felt the less regret at being compelled to do so, as the plaintiffs, if they went to a new trial, might take, by means of a special verdict, the opinion of a court of error. The learned judge had no doubt that a patent, bad as