which arose from the debris of the Western Empire. For example, the Greek Church was never entangled in the famous Freewill controversy which for fifteen centuries has resounded through the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. What is the reason of this? The long training of the best mind of the West in Roman Jurisprudence furnishes the reply. This question arose among a people who had been trained to analyze obligation, or, as our author happily puts it, the controversy "arises when we contemplate a metaphysical problem under a legal aspect." Greek philosophy suggested to the Eastern Church their manifold problems concerning the Divine Nature, throwing up to the surface such names as Arius, Athanasius, and Socinus; but the Latin Church, having no real genius for such speculations on these topics, could only passively accept the Greek conclusions. But after the division of the empire, as soon as the Latin Church begins to possess an independent life, its long legal training displays its fruits in the manifold controversies concerning moral obligation, sin and atonement, the nature of man's debt and of Christ's payment, satisfaction and forgiveness, and manifold kindred topics. As we turn the leaves of Church history, and pass from the earlier to the later great Christian controversies, we really pass from the sphere of Greek metaphysics to that of Roman Law.*

But it is, by this time, well to take a look at our author's plan. Surveying the history of Ancient Law, he discusses in the first

*From such statements, made even by so high authority as Mr. Maine, we record our frank dissent. The notion that the Greek mind was less metaphysical than the Roman is unhistorical. Upon the doctrines both of Free-will and the Trinity the Greek Church went through a profound and satisfactory discussion; and having fundamentally based herself upon them, there was no room left for dispute. The earlier discussion, that upon Free-will and Predestination, was waged against the Gnostic Fatalists, in which Irenæus and Justin Martyr used the same arguments as we use at this day against Edwards. The Chrysostomean theology denounced Predestination as of the devil. That theology was not merely Arminian, but "Arminio Arminior;" it was more anti-Calvinian than Arminius himself. The first great systematic Theology ever written, that by the celebrated Greek, John of Damascus, constituting an epoch in Theological history, was as systematically anti-Predestinarian as the works of John Wesley. The entire fact is, that the Greek Church having settled her doctrines, both of Free-will and the Trinity, very wisely gave no listening ear to any advocate of either the Socinian or Predestinarian heresies. Her grand title was, "The Holy Orthodox Church;" why should she adopt the pestilent little heterodoxies of Hippo and Geneva? So on a smaller scale our own Church, having adopted a similar theology, has had, in a great judaical age, a history of internal theological quietism. Divisions and secession we have had in plenty; but never one upon a point of theodicy. In regard to what follows, would it not be more accurate to say that as the mind of any nation matures its sense of public right and mutual justice, the study of both the

five chapters its philosophy, origin of Law, principles that govern its progress, helps and hinderances. In the last five he unfolds, illustrates, and applies these principles in the discussion of the origin and development of several classes of laws, that is, those concerning Inheritance, Wills and Testamentary Succession, Property, Contract, and Crime. These are the bones which the author's learning and eloquence make to live.

I. Law is older than legislation, older than government as we use the word, older than lawgivers themselves. Primarily it is simply a habit, “it is in the air." It is first outwardly enunciated when this habit is disregarded in some specific instance, and then not in a general but in a specific form. The family head, or patriarch, (no lawgiver as yet,) declares the given act a violation of Law. Thus the first laws are specific judgments, the Oéμotes and dikaι of Homer. Precedents now become established, and then custom is Law. Aristocracy succeed the patriarchal monarchy, and the privileged caste are simply those who monopolize a knowledge of these customs. With writing comes publication of these customs, that is, codification. Now the spontaneous growth of Law is arrested, for "litera scripta manet.' The era of this codification has great if not decisive influence in determining whether the Society shall henceforth be stationary or progressive. Progress in society, we do not generally realize, is the exception; the larger part of mankind have made no effort to change their codes from almost immemorial time. But in progressive society this modification proceeds in three modes: (1.) By Legal Fiction; (2.) By Equity; (3.) By Legislation. In the Roman Jurisprudence the influence of Legal Fiction is seen in the effect of the opinions of the leading lawyers of the Republic upon the interpretation of the Twelve Tables. The Equity Jurisprudence is seen in the effect of the annual Pretorian Edict upon the same celebrated code, from Augustus to Hadrian, and the commentaries thereon from Hadrian to Severus. With Severus the Roman Equity Jurisprudence ceases, as the English Equity and Jurisprudence exhausted itself under the chancellorship of Lord Eldon.

II. But the second portion of the work brings us among wider and still more fruitful generalizations. Most writers on legal history, following the à priori method, have really guessed out the human and divine government becomes prominent? Jurisprudence and Theodicy are always likely to grow together. They are both based upon our innate sense of equity; but some nations, as the Greek, arrive at ultimate and settled because Just results much earlier than others. It was the stupendous genius of Augustine which disturbed and unsettled the western Theodicy.-ED.

past by the use of modern principles. Thus arose the " compact theories" of the origin of government, made so famous by the names of Locke and Hobbes, the utilitarian theory of Bentham, the Natural Society theory, borrowed from the Roman lawyers by Grotius, and then by Blackstone, whose introductory chapters have sown it over the whole field of modern civilization. Note now how one historic fact, extracted from archaic Law, scatters all these theories like a puff of vapor. Modern Law deals with Individuals, Ancient Law recognized only Families.

In the eye of Ancient Law, the father of the family is absolute ruler of his household; he represents it for the time, but has only this representative value. Individually he is nothing in the commonwealth; he dies, but the family-the real and only person that the Law recognizes-is perpetual. Archaic Law recognizes only family action and responsibility, and dispenses family punishment. We would that we had space to show how this fact sends a broad beam of sunshine far back through the haze of primeval society; how it puts into our hand the key that unlocks manifold mysteries of ancient customs, jurisprudence, theology, and religion. We comprehend, for the first time, ancient and modern legislation and opinion upon the status of woman, of children, and slaves; we understand the apparent deficiencies of the Mosaic legislation, the blessing and the curse of the Second Commandment, the extermination of the Canaanites, the hopeless misery of Edipus, the strange blending of contradictory qualities in Achilles and Ulysses. And more, the light, pouring from this principle upon the past, is reflected back upon the present, and Ancient Law unriddles what to our Western understanding are the strange social anomalies, the hopeless, soulless inertia, the stereotyped barbarism, or semi-civilization, of those Eastern races which constitute the great majority of the human family.

N.

The Negro Problem Solved; Or, Africa as She Was, as She Is, and as She Shall Be. Her Curse and Her Cure. By Rev. HOLLIS READ, author of "God in History," "India and Its People," "Palace of the Great King," etc. 12mo., pp. 418. New York: A. A. Constantine. 1864. In spite of its assuming title this is a valuable book. Mr. Read finds the solution of what he calls the "negro problem” in African colonization. And a very valuable collection of facts upon that subject it is, expressed in a clear and attractive style, animated with a philanthropic spirit. Mr. Read is an earnest friend and defender of the Afric-American in America. But we have nevertheless one very serious issue with his book.

So far as the improvement of Africa is concerned, we have both

faith and hope in the colonization enterprise. And for the AfricAmericans we greatly desire that every facility should be afforded so far as they may wish to emigrate to the home of their ancestors. But Mr. Read goes further than this, and commits the grave offense against good sense and Christianity which has implicated colonizationism in much wickedness theoretical and practical, and damaged its cause to an almost fatal extent. It is a smooth saying, but it embraces a very cruel doctrine, that it is the "duty" of the Afric-American to abandon the land of his birth. There is a mighty mischief lurking under that ethical talk. Of course if it is his duty to go it is our right to make him go. Somebody there must be who is authorized to enforce that duty. And when we are shown how feasible is the project, in this day of stupendous enterprises, to send four million sables to the sable soil, we can readily see how the Spanish expulsion of the Jews can be re-enacted on a more extended scale and with a more idiotic folly in this nineteenth century in this free Christian land. Mr. Read's ethics is but the bland echo to Senator Saulsbury's fierce slaveholder's bluster, "This is the white man's country;" though how the white man honestly came by it would cost even a man-owner some trouble to show. Of the three colors that occupy the soil the white can show the least excuse for being here. It is no more Frederick Douglass's duty or Bishop Payne's to leave the country than Mr. Read's or mine. Besides, in our opinion, the time is coming when we may need not merely the negro labor but the negro vote.

The negro, when educated and intelligent, will ever think, speak, act, and VOTE on the side of freedom, civilization, republicanism, loyalty, and the Protestant religion. Educate him and put a vote in his hand, and no truer patriot walks the American soil. On the other hand there is a contrasted element-the Irish Catholic-that goes by the solid column, perhaps a hundred thousand strong, for slavery, retrogression, drunkenness, mobocracy, and disloyalty. It is a compact instrument in the hands of the priest, and by him handed over for a consideration to the mobocrat. It constitutes the demagogue's first sure capital in organizing a profligate party. While, however, we speak in terms of scathing indignation of the priest and the mobocrat, let us speak in tenderness of the victimized Celt himself. Alas! how much of all this degradation with which he curses us Protestants is the result of ages of Protestant oppression upon him! He is of a generous, noble stock, as many a cultured and brilliant specimen of Irish genius attests. And when Patrick comes here to build our railroads, dig our canals, and create our material prosperity, let us not with the old Know-nothings proscribe and

disfranchise him. Just as little must he proscribe and disfranchise the negro. That negro is a native-born American. He is all we have above described him-loyal, progressive, republican, Protestant. The home-born negro is far better entitled to his vote than the immigrant. He will use it far better than the Romanist immigrant. And what is more, his vote will more than neutralize the power of the disloyal vote for our country's ruin. And we may add, by the way, that in moral influence over our political destinies Methodism would have nothing to lose by an enfranchisement that might double the Methodist vote in the nation.

The Romish vote has to a great degree ruled our country. It elected Jackson, Buchanan, and the entire series of proslavery Presidents between them. It sustained all the aggressions of slavery, and so produced the rebellion. Could the negro vote have counterbalanced it, as it had a right to do, the entire history of our country would have been widely different from the time of John Quincy Adams's defeat to the present hour. And when we reflect that if the Southern rebellion is subdued a new field of immigration will be opened, pouring in an overwhelming foreign vote, it will be seen at once that the negro is at last our true protector from its sway. Mr. Read, then, will see that we are unable to sympathize with his monster project of sending out four millions of native-born Americans to be replaced with double the number of foreigners. On the contrary, nothing would be wiser than for our countrymen to unite in adopting into our national Constitution something like the following article: No native-born male, adult, sane American, resident of any state, who is able to read and write the English language, shall be deprived of the right to vote for President, Vice-president, and Representative in Congress, except for disloyalty or other crime. And by the way, though hardly germane to the subject, another amendment should enable us to vote for President and Vice-president directly, (without an intervening electoral college,) and irrespective of state boundaries.

But can you admit the negro to political rights without accepting him in social life? The man, we reply, who would disfranchise the negro in order to secure the negro's inferiority not only pays the negro a high compliment but shows himself already the negro's inferior. Surely no one can be the inferior of the man who is obliged to maintain his superiority by brute force and oppressive laws over his competitor. But the two things, political rights and social equality, do not belong to the same sphere of thought. Political rights are a matter of public law and constitution; social intercourse belongs to individual taste and choice. Your purple