cate. But still a predominancy of the one or the other quality in the mixture is often visible.

Mus. 1. The power of delicacy is chiefly seen in discerning the true merit of a work; the power of correctness, in rejecting false pretensions to merit. Delicacy leans more to feeling; correctness, more to reason and judgment. The former is more the gift of nature; the latter, more the product of culture and art.

*

2. Among the ancient critics, Longinus possessed most delicacy; Aristotle, most correctness. Among the modern, Addison is a high example of delicate taste; and had Dean Swift written on criticism, he would perhaps have afforded the example of a correct one. Campbell, Kames, Allison, and Dugald Stewart, are examples of correct and deli

cate taste.

366. The diveRSITY OF TASTES, which prevails among mankind, does not in every case infer a corruption of taste, or oblige us to seek for some standard, in order to determine who are in the right.

Some

Illus. The tastes of men may differ very considerably as to their object, and yet none of them be wrong. One man relishes poetry, while another takes pleasure in nothing but history. One prefers comedy; another tragedy. One admires the simple; another the ornamented style. The young are amused with gay and sprightly compositions; the elderly are more entertained with those of a graver cast. nations delight in bold pictures of manners, and strong representations of passions; others incline to a more correct and regular elegance, both in description and sentiment. Though all differ, yet all pitch upon some beauty which peculiarly suits their turn of mind; and therefore no one has a title to condemn his neighbour.

367. In questions of mere reason, there is but one conclu sion that can be true; and there is some foundation for the preference of one man's taste to that of another.

Illus. Truth, which is the object of reason, is one; beauty, which is the object of taste, is manifold. Taste, therefore, admits of latitude and diversity of objects, in sufficient consistency with its goodness or justness.

368. This admissible diversity of tastes, can only have place where the objects of taste are different. When one condemns as ugly what another admires as beautiful, there is no longer diversity, but direct opposition of taste. One must be right, and the other wrong.

Illus. One man prefers Virgil to Homer; another, admires Homer more than Virgil, yet there is no reason to say that their tastes are contradictory. The one is more struck with the elegance and tenderness of Virgil; the other with the simplicity and fire of Homer. As long as neither of them denies that both Homer and Virgil have great beauties, their difference falls within the compass of that diversity of tastes, which is both natural and allowable. (Art. 366.)

2. But if a third man should assert that Homer has no beauties whatever, and that Virgil is devoid of elegance and tenderness,—that he

holds the one to be a dull, spiritless writer, and the other to be a mere copyist, that in distinction to the Eneid he would as soon peruse Robinson Crusoe, or Jack the Giant Killer to the Iliad; both the other men would pronounce him void of all taste, or exclaim that his taste was corrupted in a miserable degree.

3. Or if either of the two men who disputed about the pre-eminence of Virgil or of Homer, should evince the same disposition as the third man showed; his antagonist would appeal to whatever he thought the standard of taste to show him that he was in the wrong.

369. A STANDARD properly signifies that, which, being fixed by convention, is of such undoubted authority as to be the test of other things of the same kind.

Illus. 1. Thus a standard weight or measure is that which is appointed by law to regulate all other weights and measures.

2. Thus, also, the Court is said to be the standard of good breeding; and the Scripture, of theological truth.

370. In all cases where an imitation is intended of some object that exists in nature, as in representing human characters and actions, nature is the standard of taste, because conformity to it affords a full and distinct criterion of what is truly beautiful.

Obs. Reason hath in such cases full scope for exerting its authority, for approving or condemning; by comparing the copy with the original.

But there are innumerable cases in which this rule cannot be applied; and conformity with nature is an expression frequently used, without any distinct or determinate meaning. The standard of taste must, therefore, be something which is clear and precise, without any imperfection, irregularity, or disorder.

371. The general sentiments of mankind must be consid ered the standard to which the ultimate appeal must ever lie, in all works of taste.

Illus. If any one should maintain that sugar was bitter, and tobacco sweet, no reasonings on his part could avail to prove this position; mankind would infallibly hold the taste of such a person to be diseased, merely because it differed diametrically from the taste of the species to which he belonged. In like manner, with regard to the objects of sentiment or internal taste, the common feelings of men carry the same authority, and become an universal standard to regulate the taste of every individual.

372. There is nothing but the taste, as far as it can be gathered, of human nature, of sufficient authority to be the standard of the various and opposite tastes of men.

Illus. That which men concur the most in admiring must be reckoned beautiful. His taste must be esteemed just and true which coincides with the general sentiments of men. He who, in any dispute, appeals to the common sense of mankind as the ultimate rule or standard by which he will be judged, evinces a conviction of a common standard to which his taste is right or good if conformable, while that of his opponent must be wrong or bad, if disconformable. The taste of a whole

people, guided by reason and virtue, must generally be exquisite and just, their internal senses unerring and sure. He who allows submission to be due to the determinations of all mankind, acknowledges a perfect standard for the taste of all others.

373. But besides the approbation of the majority, there are principles of reason and sound judgment which can be applied to matters of taste, as well as to the subjects of science and philosophy.

Illus. He who admires or censures any work of genius, is always ready, if his taste be improved, to assign some reasons for his decision. He appeals to principles, and points out the grounds on which he proceeds. Taste is, therefore, a sort of compound power, in which the light of the understanding always mingles, more or less, with the feelings of sentiment.

374. The ultimate conclusions to which our reasonings lead, in judging concerning works of taste, refer at last to sense and perception.

Illus. Just reasonings concerning propriety of conduct in a tragedy, or an epic poem, will correct the caprice of unenlightened taste, and establish principles for judging of what deserves praise. These reasonings, in the last resort, appeal always to feeling. Their foundation is deeply laid in whatever has been found from experience to please mankind universally.

2. Upon this ground, we prefer a simple and natural, to an artificial style; a regular and well-connected story, to loose and scattered narratives; a catastrophe which is tender and pathetic, to one which leaves us unmoved.

Corol. It is from consulting our own imagination and heart, and from attending to the feelings of others, that any principles are formed which acquire authority in matters of taste.

375. When we refer to the concurring sentiments of men as to the ultimate test of what is to be accounted beautiful in the arts, this is always to be understood of men placed in such situations as are favourable to the proper exertions of

taste.

Illus. The sentiments of mankind in polished and flourishing nations, where arts are cultivated, and manners refined, where works of genius are subject to free discussion, and taste is improved by science and philosophy, become the principles of authority which must necessarily be decisive of every controversy that can arise upon matters of

taste.

376. We conclude, therefore, that taste is not an arbitrary principle, subject to the fancy of every individual, and admitting no criterion by which to determine whether it be true or false. Its foundation is the same in all human minds. It is built upon sentiments and perceptions which belong to our nature; and which in general operate with the same uniformity as our other intellectual principles.

Obs. When these sentiments are perverted by ignorance and prejudice, they are capable of being rectified by reason. Their sound and natural state is ultimately determined, by comparing them with the general taste of mankind.

377. In every composition, what interests the heart pleases all ages and all nations. There is a certain string to which, when properly struck, the human heart is so made as

to answer.

Ilus. 1. Hence the universal testimony which the most improved nations of the earth have conspired, throughout a long succession of ages, to give to some few works of genius; such as the Iliad of Homer and the Eneid of Virgil.

2. Hence the authority which such works have acquired as standards, in some degree, of poetical composition; since from them we are enabled to collect what the sense of mankind is, concerning those beauties which give them the highest pleasure, and which, therefore, poetry ought to exhibit.

378. Uniformity of taste and sentiment, resulting from our conviction of a common standard, leads to two important final causes; the one respecting our duty; the other, our pastime or amusement.

Obs. Barely to mention the first, shall be sufficient, because it does not properly belong to the present undertaking. Unhappy it would be for us did not uniformity prevail in morals: that our actions should uniformly be directed to what is good and against what is ill, is the greatest blessing of society; and in order to uniformity in action, uniformity of opinion and sentiment is indispensable.

379. With respect to pastime in general, and the fine arts in particular, the following illustrations make the final cause of uniformity abundantly obvious.

Illus. 1. Uniformity of taste gives opportunity for sumptuous and elegant buildings, for fine gardens, and extensive establishments which please generally.

2. The reason is obvious: without uniformity of taste, there could not be any suitable reward, either of profit or honour, to encourage men of genius to labour in such works, and to advance them to perfection.

3. The same uniformity of taste is equally necessary to perfect the arts of music, sculpture, and painting, and to support the expense which they require after they are brought to perfection.

4. Nature is, in every particular, consistent with herself; we are framed by nature to have a high relish for the fine arts, which are a great source of happiness, and friendly in a high degree to virtue: we are, at the same time, framed with uniformity of taste to furnish proper objects for that high relish; and, if uniformity did not prevail, the fine arts would never have made any figure.

380. Another final cause, no less obvious, is the separation of men into different classes, by birth, office, or occupation. How much soever this separation might tend to relax the

connexion that ought to subsist among the members of the same state, its effects are prevented by the access of all ranks of people to public spectacles and amusements. These assemblages of people of one country are best enjoyed in company. In this common fellowship every one partakes of the same pleasures. Such meetings are, therefore, no slight support to the social affections* and to uniformity of taste.

CHAPTER II.

CRITICISM.

381. TASTE, criticism, and genius, are words currently employed, without distinct ideas annexed to them.

Definition. True criticism is the application of taste and of good sense to the several fine arts. The object which it proposes is, to distinguish what is beautiful and what is faulty in every performance; from particular instances to ascend to general principles; and so to form rules or conclusions concerning the several kinds of beauty in works of genius.

Illus. The rules of criticism are not formed by any induction, a priori, as it is called; that is, they are not formed by a train of abstract reasoning, independent of facts and observations. Criticism is an art founded wholly on experience; on the observations of such beauties as have come nearest to the standard which we before established; that is, of such beauties as have been found to please mankind most generally. (Art. 371.)

2. For example; Aristotle's rules concerning the unity of action in dramatic and epic composition, were not first discovered by logical reasoning, and then applied to poetry; but they were rules drawn from the practice of Homer and Sophocles: they were founded upon observing the superior pleasure which mankind received from the relation of an action which was one and entire, beyond what they received from the relation of scattered and unconnected facts.

3. Such observations taking their rise at first from feeling and experience, were found, on examination, to be so consonant to reason, and to the principles of human nature, as to pass into established rules, and to be conveniently applied for judging of the excellency of any performance. This is the most natural account of the origin of criti cism. *

382. A masterly genius, it is true, will of himself, untaught, compose in such a manner as shall be agreeable to

*On works of taste, the student may now consult Dr. Gerrard's Essay on Taste D'Alembert's Reflections on the use and abuse of Philosophy in matters which relate to taste-Reflections Critiques sur la Poesie et sur la Peinture-Kames' Elements of Criticism-Hume's Essay on the Standard of Taste-Introduction to the Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful-Blair's Lectures, and Allison on Taste.