doctrine-the best possible proof that the decree of 1616 was not regarded as a final decision emanating from 'supreme ecclesiastical authority.'

I have no desire to gloss over the conduct of Galileo's enemies in the interval between the decree of the Index in 1616 and that of the Inquisition in 1633, but no unprejudiced reader of the history of the period can deny that his own conduct tended very largely to bring on the trial before the Inquisition. At all events the trial came, and resulted in a very long decree, part of which is given by Mr. Mivart. The decree is much too long for insertion here. It reviews in detail all that was done in the case. It refers to Galileo's various writings, to the two propositions censured by the qualifiers, to Bellarmine's admonition and the mandate alleged to have accompanied it, to the decree of 1616 which it tells us was issued by the Congregation of the Index, and also to Bellarmine's certificate. The doctrine of Copernicus is undoubtedly regarded as heretical, on the ground that it is contrary to Scripture; and for holding such doctrine Galileo is adjudged 'suspected of heresy' and sentenced to certain penalties in consequence. The abjuration followed, in which he says, With a sincere heart and faith unfeigned, I curse, abjure, and abhor the above-named errors and heresies.' Now what is the authority from which this severe sentence emanated? Who are the 'WE' that 'pronounce, decide, define, and declare' in this case? Simply the cardinals. The decree begins' We, Cardinal Gasper of the title S. Croce in Jerusalem, Borgia,' and nine other names follow. These, then, are the 'WE' that speak throughout the decree, that pronounce, define, and declare' everything that is declared in it, that invoke the sacred name, that pronounce Galileo' suspected of heresy,' and give their reasons for the suspicion. At the conclusion of the decree the number dwindles down to seven, who again pronounce, sentence, declare, ordain, and condemn,' &c. The document concludes thus, 'So we the undersigned cardinals pronounce, F. Cardinal de Asculo,' and six other names follow. From first to last, then, this decree is the work of the cardinals. It has no authority beyond what they could impart to it, and infallible authority they certainly could not impart. It received no authoritative papal confirmation or approbation, and consequently Catholics are in no sense bound by the doctrinal allegations contained in it. The cardinals who issued it were no doubt commissioned by the Pope to try the case. In all probability the Pope shared their views with regard to Galileo and his doctrine. But the decree is not a papal act, and could not become so unless it were specially (by special mandate) approved and promulgated. This is the teaching of Catholic theologians and canonists with reference to such decrees as those we are considering. I shall merely refer to a few of the many authorities on this point:Lacroix, Theol. Mor., De Cons. lib. i. 934; Lehmkul, vol. i. p. 132;

Schmalzgrueber, Dis. Proxm. Nos. 384-385; Craisson, vol. i. No. 732; Grandclaude, vol. i. p. 53; Bouix, De Curia, p. 3, s. 3, &c. Without a special mandate of the Pope, then, approving of congregational decrees and authorising their promulgation, they are not regarded as ex-cathedra pontifical acts, and doctrinal statements embodied in them have no claim on the internal assent of the faithful.

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But Mr. Mivart fancies that he finds this special mandate of approbation in the bull Speculatores' of Alexander the Seventh published on the 5th of March, 1664, with that Pontiff's issue of the Index. Mr. Mivart labours under more than one extraordinary hallucination with reference to this bull. In a note (p. 38) he says this fact has been discovered and published for the first time by the Rev. W. Roberts.' The very novelty of this discovery casts very serious doubt upon its value. Papal infallibility has had very many hostile critics who were not wanting in determination or in ability, and it is simply incredible that so powerful, so useful an argument would have escaped their notice. But the fact which Mr. Mivart regards as a discovery has been perfectly notorious for two hundred years. Benedict the Fourteenth referred to it in the bull prefixed to his own issue of the Index. St. Liguori referred to it in his Dissertation on Prohibited Books. Ferraris discusses it at considerable length. It is then no discovery, though the use now made of it is, I admit, new, and I attach no importance to the matter except as showing how conversant Mr. Mivart is with the history of the seventeenth century,' of which he supposes me to know so very little. Now the fact is that this bull, so far from being a special approbation of each decree contained in the Index to which it is prefixed, is not a special approbation of even one of them. It is merely a guarantee that we have an authentic copy of the Index, containing all the decrees published by the Congregation up to that time. It is a reissue by public authority of all these decrees, but it leaves each decree just as it was, and this Mr. Mivart would have seen had he read the bull for himself. The Pope begins by saying that the mission of the Church is mainly concerned with the faith and morals of her children, and that faith and morals are very intimately affected by the reading of good or bad books. He then refers to the origin of the Index, and he says that though many books were prohibited and condemned both by the Pope and by the cardinals of the Congregation' since Clement the Seventh issued his Index, yet there was no catalogue issued by public authority embracing systematically and clearly those prohibited books and condemned authors, on which account great confusion has arisen, and is every day likely to increase unless a remedy be provided. Accordingly, to meet the difficulty of finding out the truth in this matter,' the Pope says that with the advice of the Cardinals he has decreed to issue a new Index.' He then proceeds to state the plan on which the new Index was to be drawn up, and in this the aim was, first, that we may have a

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clear knowledge of all that was done from the beginning in this matter;' secondly, to facilitate reference for 'readers,' and for booksellers especially, whose error in this matter would be a source of error to others.' And the Pope says: "When all this was, according to our desire, carefully, diligently, and accurately put into execution, and the new Index formed... this same general Index as aforesaid composed and revised by our order, and printed at our apostolic press, we confirm and approve,' &c.; and then follows all the usual technical phraseology of such documents. Here, then, is the object aimed at by Alexander the Seventh-to give an accurate authoritative copy of the decrees issued by the Index up to his time; to do this, in order that all that was done in each case may be accurately known, and that readers and booksellers may be relieved from the annoyance and confusion inseparable from the old system of publishing the decrees. No new decree is issued, no new obligation imposed, no change in the character of any of the decrees is made by this bull. It is, then, an issue, by public authority, of an authentic copy of the Index of Prohibited Books, and no one capable of forming an opinion on such documents has ever regarded it as anything more. And no Catholic theologian would for a moment regard this bull as equivalent to an approbation by special mandate of any decree contained in the volume to which it is prefixed, and it is only such special approbation that would render the decrees pontifical acts. The bull is a purely disciplinary act, perfectly valid until it is cancelled by an authority equal to that which issued it, but it condemns no new error, and defines no new truth. If Mr. Mivart's version of Galileo's case were correct, then Copernicanism must at that time be regarded as heresy publicly and solemnly so defined. But at the time no one regarded it in this light, no one quoted against it a solemn ex-cathedra definition. Gassendi, Riccoli, and De Cartes deny that the doctrine is heretical after the condemnation. Caramuel says that it is improbable, not heretical.' Tiraboschi says that the condemnation came not from the Catholic Church, but from a secondary and fallible tribunal.' F. Fabri, S.J., in 1665, and Ricci, Consultor of the Holy Office, in 1666, speak to the same effect even after the issue of the bull of Alexander the Seventh. Now can we fancy men of high character and in responsible ecclesiastical positions speaking in such terms of a man whose doctrine was solemnly defined to be heretical, whose person was condemned by the Holy Office, and whose condemnation in both senses was solemnly and publicly endorsed by the Pope? There is but one reasonable answer. No one at that time, when men could form a reliable judgment on the matter, put upon the case of Galileo that construction which prejudice and passion have so often put upon it in recent times. The conclusion is then inevitable that there was no ex-cathedra pronouncement on the truth or falsehood of Galileo's doctrine, and his condemnation, such as it was, comes to us as the act, the judgment of a number of fallible

men. And as such what is its value to Mr. Mivart as an argument? It proves, what requires no proof, that a number of theologians may err. Nothing more than this logically follows from it; and, granting all this, Mr. Mivart would have to show that the authorities quoted by me not only may err, but actually have erred. But he declines to consider them at all, and quietly takes it for granted, as the outcome of Galileo's case, that theologians in such circumstances 'always turn out to have been in the wrong'-a process of reasoning quite unworthy of one so saturated with science as Mr. Mivart professes to be. But it is not the opinions of a few isolated theologians that I have set in opposition to Mr. Mivart's theory. I have set against him a consensus of Catholic teaching founded on Scripture, and handed down to us by the principal Fathers and theologians in every age from the early dawn of Catholic tradition down to our own time. All along it is unbroken, consecutive, consistent, affirming a doctrine that is inconsistent with the application of Mr. Mivart's theory to man. This consensus is the voice of the ordinary magisterium of the Catholic Church, and to it all Catholics, no matter how profound their knowledge or how loud their boasting, are bound to bow. Mr. Mivart's parallel then breaks down on all points, and his headlong and unaccountable onslaught on 'supreme ecclesiastical authority' is a complete, a lamentable break-down. And if he desires to establish the complete orthodoxy of the evolution theory as applied to man, it must be by arguments taken from some source other than the condemnation of Galileo.

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From his version of Galileo's case Mr. Mivart seeks to deduce another conclusion that is wider and more important by far than the theological character of evolution. He infers from it that scientists, in all their pursuits and speculations, are completely independent of supreme ecclesiastical authority,' and that therefore in every imaginary conflict (for real conflict there cannot be) between science and revelation, to reason and not to ecclesiastical authority' does the last appeal lie. He admits, it is true, that 'a loyal Catholic must of course say that when any matter is clearly of faith his conclusions must be wrong if they are opposed to it' (p. 45). But the value of this admission is completely neutralised by the statement that, whenever a conflict arises, the loyal Catholic has always the choice whether to distrust the fact of the decision or the fact of physical science.' In other words, loyal Catholics are free to believe just what they please. The perfect intellectual freedom of Catholics' is, he thinks, unanswerably demonstrated by Galileo's case' (p. 36). It proves not only our freedom with reference to such passages of Scripture, but also . . . our freedom, as good Catholics, with reference to ecclesiastical decrees also' (p. 39). Catholic men of science should in no wise allow their efforts after truth to be checked by the declarations of ecclesiastical authorities' (p. 43). Now it must be

borne in mind that, in Mr. Mivart's argument, the ecclesiastical congregations' and 'ecclesiastical authorities' include the Pope, and that, too, in his official capacity as teacher of the Universal Church. Just as the Pope is included in that ecclesiastical authority which condemned Galileo, so, too, is he included in that ecclesiastical authority which, according to Mr. Mivart, has no right to interfere with science or scientific men—that is, Catholic men of science are in their speculations completely independent of the supreme teaching authority of the Church-almost a literal translation of the 14th condemned proposition of the syllabus. And to certain good Catholics' Mr. Mivart offers these considerations, which he thinks will effectually dissipate their scruples,' and which I think would effectually dissipate' their faith also. For the 'intellectual freedom' which Mr. Mivart claims is not freedom but wanton license, the offspring of intellectual pride, a license which loyal Catholics have never claimed, and which the Catholic Church has never granted. Mr. Mivart knows well that the Catholic Church claims to be not only the divinely appointed teacher of all that is contained in the divine deposit of faith, but its divinely commissioned custodian as well. This claim Mr. Mivart, as a Catholic, of course admits. And admitting it, he cannot deny that it is part of the office of the Church to watch carefully all such theories and speculations as bode danger to the faith. Hence it is that her jurisdiction extends indirectly to many things that form no part of the divine deposit of faith at all. That there are many sciences and many scientific conclusions with which the Church is in no way concerned is abundantly clear. The natural sciences as such are outside her province. They are founded on natural truths out of which they are deduced by processes of reasoning with which the Church has nothing to do. Between reason and faith, between any truth clearly established by reason and any truth of faith, there can be no real contradiction. Reason is as much God's gift as faith is, and both therefore must be always in harmony. If, then, there be a real conflict between a revealed truth and an alleged conclusion of science, the fancied scientific conclusion must be at fault. It must have been deduced from false principles, or by reasoning that is unsound. Hence it is that the Church, while indifferent to the facts and arguments of the natural sciences, is always vigilant as to the conclusions at which scientists profess to have arrived. She measures these conclusions by the standard of revealed doctrine, and if they be found inconsistent with that standard, she has indirect jurisdiction over them, and in virtue of her office as infallible guardian of the faith, and to ward off danger from her children, she condemns them; and in her judgment loyal Catholics are bound submissively to acquiesce. Then there are mixed questions which, besides being conclusions of natural science, are also revealed either explicitly or implicitly; and over all such questions, inasmuch as they are revealed, the Church