checks and restraints, which he could not entirely get over; acting in the most palpable contradiction to their very nature. he therefore casts about for ways to reconcile this wicked- But if there be any such thing in mankind as putting halfness with his duty. How great a paradox soever this may deceits upon themselves; which there plainly is, either by appear, as it is indeed a contradiction in terms, it is the very avoiding reflection, or (if they do reflect) by religious equiv account which the scripture gives us of him. ocation, subterfuges, and palliating matters to themselves; But there is a more surprising piece of iniquity yet behind. by these means conscience may be laid asleep, and they may Not daring in his religious character, as a prophet, to assist go on in a course of wickedness with less disturbance. All the king of Moab, he considers whether there might not be the various turns, doubles, and intricacies in a dishonest found some other means of assisting him against that very heart, cannot be unfolded or laid open; but that there is somepeople, whom he himself by the fear of God was restrained what of that kind is manifest, be it to be called self-deceit, or from cursing in words. One would not think it possible, by any other name. Balaam had before his eyes the authorthat the weakness, even of religious self-deceit in its utmost ity of God, absolutely forbidding him what he, for the sake excess, could have so poor a distinction, so fond an evasion, of a reward, had the strongest inclination to: he was likewise to serve itself of. But so it was: and he could think of no in a state of mind sober enough to consider death and his last other method, than to betray the children of Israel to provoke end: by these considerations he was restrained, first from his wrath, who was their only strength and defence. The going to the king of Moab; and after he did go, from cursing temptation which he pitched upon, was that concerning which Israel. But notwithstanding this, there was great wickedSolomon afterward observed, that it had "cast down many ness in his heart. He could not forego the rewards of unwounded; yea, many strong men had been slain by it:" and righteousness: he therefore first seeks for indulgences; and of which he himself was a sad example, when "his wives when these could not be obtained, he sins against the whole turned away his heart after other gods." This succeeded: the meaning, end, and design of the prohibition, which no considpeople sin against God; and thus the prophet's counsel brought eration in the world could prevail with him to go against the on that destruction, which he could by no means be prevailed letter of. And surely that impious counsel he gave to Balak upon to assist with the religious ceremony of execration, against the children of Israel, was, considered in itself, a which the king of Moab thought would itself have effected it. greater piece of wickedness, than if he had cursed them in Their crime and punishment are related in Deuteronomy and words.

Numbers. And from the relation repeated in Numbers, it If it be inquired what his situation, his hopes and fears appears, that Balaam was the contriver of the whole matter. were, in respect to this his wish; the answer must be, that It is also ascribed to him in the Revelation, where he is said consciousness of the wickedness of his heart must necessarily to have "taught Balak to cast a stumbling-block before the have destroyed all settled hopes of dying the death of the children of Israel. righteous; he could have no calm satisfaction in this view of his last end: yet, on the other hand, it is possible that those partial regards to his duty, now mentioned, might keep him from perfect despair.

This was the man, this Balaam, I say, was the man who desired to "die the death of the righteous," and that his "last end might be like his:" and this was the state of his mind, when he pronounced these words.

Upon the whole, it is manifest, that Balaam had the most So that the object we have now before us is the most as-just and true notions of God and religion; as appears, partly tonishing in the world: a very wicked man, under a deep from the original story itself, and more plainly from the pas sense of God and religion, persisting still in his wickedness, sage in Micah, where he explains religion to consist in real and preferring the wages of unrighteousness, even when he virtue and real piety, expressly distinguished from superstihad before him a lively view of death, and that approaching tion, and in terms which most strongly exclude dishonesty period of his days, which should deprive him of all those ad- and falseness of heart. Yet you see his behaviour: he seeks vantages for which he was prostituting himself; and likewise indulgences for plain wickedness; which not being able to a prospect, whether certain or uncertain, of a future state of obtain, he glosses over the same wickedness, dresses it up in retribution: all this joined with an explicit ardent wish, that, a new form, in order to make it pass off more easily with himwhen he was to leave this world, he might be in the condi- self. That is, he deliberately contrives to deceive and impose tion of a righteous man. Good God, what inconsistency, upon himself, in a matter which he knew to be of the utmost what perplexity is here! With what different views of things, importance.

with what contradictory principles of action, must such a To bring these observations home to ourselves: it is too mind be torn and distracted! It was not unthinking care- evident, that many persons allow themselves in very unjustilessness, by which he run on headlong in vice and folly, with- fiable courses, who yet make great pretences to religion; not out ever making a stand to ask himself what he was doing: to deceive the world, none can be so weak as to think this no; he acted upon the cool motives of interest and advantage. will pass in our age; but from principles, hopes, and fears, Neither was he totally hard and callous to impressions of re-respecting God and a future state; and go on thus with a sort ligion, what we call abandoned; for he absolutely denied to of tranquillity and quiet of mind. This cannot be upon a curse Israel. When reason assumes her place, when con- throrough consideration, and full resolution, that the pleasures vinced of his duty, when he owns and feels, and is actually and advantages they propose are to be pursued at all hazards, under the influence of the divine authority: whilst he is car- against reason, against the law of God, and though everlastrying on his views to the grave, the end of all temporal great-ing destruction is to be the consequence. This would be ness; under this sense of things, with the better character doing too great violence upon themselves. No, they are for and more desirable state present-full before him-in his making a composition with the Almighty. These of his comthoughts, in his wishes, voluntarily to choose the worse-mands they will obey: but as to others-why they will make what fatality is here! Or how otherwise can such a charac-all the atonements in their power; the ambitious, the covetter be explained? And yet strange as it may appear, it is out, the dissolute man, each in a way which shall not connot altogether an uncommon one; nay, with some small alter-tradict his respective pursuit. Indulgences before, which ations, and put a little lower, it is applicable to a very con- was Balaam's first attempt, though he was not so successful siderable part of the world. For if the reasonable choice be in it as to deceive himself, or atonements afterwards, are all seen and acknowledged, and yet men make the unreasonable the same. And here perhaps come in faint hopes that they one, is not this the same contradiction; that very inconsist-may, and half-resolves that they will, one time or other, make ency, which appeared so unaccountable? a change.

To give some little opening to such characters and beha- Besides these, there are also persons, who, from a more viour, it is to be observed in general, that there is no account just way of considering things, see the infinite absurdity of to be given in the way of reason, of men's so strong attach-this, of substituting sacrifice instead of obedience; there are ments to the present world: our hopes and fears and pursuits persons far enough from superstition, and not without some are in degrees beyond all proportion to the known value of real sense of God and religion upon their minds; who yet are the things they respect. This may be said without taking guilty of most unjustifiable practices, and go on with great The same disinto consideration religion and a future state; and when these coclness and command over themselves. are considered, the disproportion is infinitely heightened. honesty and unsoundness of heart discovers itself in these Now when men go against their reason, and contradict a another way. In all common ordinary cases we see intuimore important interest at a distance, for one nearer, though tively at first view what is our duty, what is the honest part. of less consideration; if this be the whole of the case, all that This is the ground of the observation, that the first thought can be said is, that strong passions, some kind of brute force is often the best. In these cases doubt and deliberation is within, prevails over the principle of rationality. However, itself dishonesty; as it was in Balaam upon the second mesif this be with a clear, full, and distinct view of the truth of sage. That which is called considering what is our duty in things, then it is doing the utmost violence to themselves, a particular case, is very often nothing but endeavouring to

explain it away. Thus those courses, which, if men would ple, which appears the direct contrary to benevolence? Now fairly attend to the dictates of their own consciences, they the foot upon which inquiries of this kind should be treated would see to be corruption, excess, oppression, uncharitable- is this: to take human nature as it is, and the circumstances ness; these are refined upon-things were so and so circum-in which it is placed as they are; and then consider the corstantiated-great difficulties are raised about fixing bounds respondence between that nature and those circumstances, or and degrees: and thus every moral obligation whatever may what course of action and behaviour, respecting those cirbe evaded. Here is scope, I say, for an unfair mind to ex- cumstances, any particular affection or passion leads us to. plain away every moral obligation to itself. Whether men This I mention to distinguish the matter now before us from reflect again upon this internal management and artifice, and disquisitions of quite another kind; namely, Why we are not how explicit they are with themselves, is another question. made more perfect creatures, or placed in better circumstanThere are many operations of the mind, many things pass ces? these being questions which we have not, that I know within, which we never reflect upon again; which a by- of, any thing at all to do with. God Almighty undoubtedly stander, from having frequent opportunities of observing us foresaw the disorders, both natural and moral, which would and our conduct, may make shrewd guesses at. happen in this state of things. If upon this we set ourselves That great numbers are in this way of deceiving them-to search and examine why he did not prevent them; we selves is certain. There is scarce a man in the world, who shall, I am afraid, be in danger of running into somewhat has entirely got over all regards, hopes, and fears, concerning worse than impertinent curiosity. But upon this to examine God and a future state; and these apprehensions in the gen-how far the nature which he hath given us hath a respect to erality, bad as we are, prevail in considerable degrees; yet those circumstances, such as they are; how far it leads us to men will and can be wicked, with calmness and thought; act a proper part in them; plainly belongs to us: and such we see they are. There must therefore be some method of inquiries are in many ways of excellent use. Thus the thing making it sit a little easy upon their minds; which, in the to be considered is, not, Why we were not made of such a superstitious, is those indulgences and atonements before nature, and placed in such circumstances, as to have no need mentioned, and this self-deceit of another kind in persons of of so harsh and turbulent a passion as resentment: but, taking another character. And both these proceed from a certain our nature and condition as being what they are, Why, or for unfairness of mind, a peculiar inward dishonesty; the direct what end such a passion was given us: and this chiefly in contrary to that simplicity which our Saviour recommends, order to show what are the abuses of it. under the notion of becoming little children, as a necessary The persons who laid down for a rule, "Thou shalt love qualification for our entering into the kingdom of heaven. thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy," made short work with But to conclude: How much soever men differ in the course this matter. They did not, it seems, perceive any thing to of life they prefer, and in their ways of palliating and excus-be disapproved in hatred, more than in good-will: and, acing their vices to themselves; yet all agree in the one thing, cording to their system of morals, our enemy was the proper desiring to die the death of the righteous. This is surely natural object of one of these passions, as our neighbour was remarkable. The observation may be extended further, and of the other of them.

put thus: Even without determining what that is which we This was all they had to say, and all they thought needful call guilt or innocence, there is no man but would choose, to be said, upon the subject. But this cannot be satisfactory; after having had the pleasure or advantage of a vicious action, because hatred, malice, and revenge, are directly contrary to to be free of the guilt of it, to be in the state of an innocent the religion we profess, and to the nature and reason of the man. This shows at least the disturbance and implicit dis- thing itself. Therefore, since no passion God hath endued satisfaction in vice. If we inquire into the grounds of it, we us with can be in itself evil; and yet since men frequently shall find it proceeds partly from an immediate sense of hav-indulge a passion in such ways and degrees that at length it ing done evil, and partly from an apprehension, that this becomes quite another thing from what it was originally in inward sense shall one time or another be seconded by a our nature; and those vices of malice and revenge in partihigher judgment, upon which our whole being depends. cular take their occasion from the natural passion of resentNow to suspend and drown this sense, and these apprehen-ment: it will be needful to trace this up to its original, that sions, be it by the hurry of business or of pleasure, or by we may see, what it is in itself, as placed in our nature by its superstition, or moral equivocations, this is in a manner one Author; from which it will plainly appear, for what ends it and the same, and makes no alteration at all in the nature of was placed there. And when we know what the passion is in our case. Things and actions are what they are, and the con- itself, and the ends of it, we shall easily see, what are the sequences of them will be what they will be; why then should abuses of it, in which malice and revenge consist; and which we desire to be deceived? As we are reasonable creatures, are so strongly forbidden in the text, by the direct contrary and have any regard to ourselves, we ought to lay these being commanded.

things plainly and honestly before our mind, and upon this, Resentment is of two kinds: hasty and sudden, or settled act as you please, as you think most fit; make that choice, and deliberate. The former is called anger, and often passion; and prefer that course of life, which you can justify to your-which, though a general word, is frequently appropriated and selves, and which sits more easy upon your own mind. It confined to the particular feeling, sudden anger, as distinct will immediately appear, that vice cannot be the happiness, from deliberate resentment, malice, and revenge. In all but must upon the whole be the misery, of such a creature as these words is usually implied somewhat vicious; somewhat man; a moral, an accountable agent. Superstitious obser- unreasonable as to the occasion of the passion, or immodevances, self-deceit, though of a more refined sort, will not in rate as to the degree or duration of it. But that the natural reality at all mend matters with us. And the result of the passion itself is indifferent, St. Paul has asserted in that prewhole can be nothing else, but that with simplicity and fair- cept, Be ye angry, and sin not: which though it is by no ness we "keep innocency, and take heed unto the thing that is right; for this alone shall bring a man peace at the last."

SERMON VII.

UPON RESENTMENT.

means to be understood as an encouragement to indulge ourselves in anger, the sense being certainly this, Though ye be angry, sin not; yet here is evidently a distinction made between anger and sin; between the natural passion, and sinful anger.

Sudden anger, upon certain occasions, is mere instinct: as merely so, as the disposition to close our eyes upon the apprehension of somewhat falling into them; and no more necessarily implies any degree of reason. I say, necessarily : for to be sure hasty, as well as deliberate, anger may be occasioned by injury or contempt: in which cases reason sugYe have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, gests to our thoughts that injury and contempt, which is the and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies, occasion of the passion: but I am speaking of the former bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray only so far as it is to be distinguished from the latter. The for them which despitefully use you and persecute you.-Matt. only way in which our reason and understanding can raise v. 43, 44. anger, is by representing to our mind injustice or injury of some kind or other. Now momentary anger is frequently Since perfect goodness in the Deity is the principle from raised, not only without any real, but without any apparent whence the universe was brought into being, and by which reason; that is, without any appearance of injury, as distinct it is preserved; and since general benevolence is the great from hurt or pain. It cannot, I suppose, be thought, that law of the whole moral creation; it is a question which im- this passion in infants; in the lower species of animals; mediately occurs, Why had man implanted in him a princi- and, which is often seen, in men towards them; it cannot, I

say, be imagined, that these instances of this passion are the ever is, not that bare pain or loss raises resentment, but, that effect of reason: no, they are occasioned by mere sensation it gives a new, and, as I may speak, additional sense of the and feeling. It is opposition, sudden hurt, violence, which injury or injustice. According to the natural course of the naturally excites the passion; and the real demerit or fault passions, the degrees of resentment are in proportion, not only of him who offers that violence, or is the cause of that oppo-to the degree of design and deliberation in the injurious persition or hurt, does not, in many cases, so much as come into son; but in proportion to this, joined with the degree of the thought. evil designed or premeditated; since this likewise comes in The reason and end, for which man was made thus liable to make the injustice greater or less. And the evil or harm to this passion, is, that he might be better qualified to pre- will appear greater when they feel it, than when they only vent, and likewise (or perhaps chiefly) to resist and defeat, reflect upon it: so therefore will the injury and consesudden force, violence, and opposition, considered merely as quently the resentment will be greater. such, and without regard to the fault or demerit of him who The natural object or occasion of settled resentment then is the author of them. Yet, since violence may be consi- being injury, as distinct from pain or loss; it is easy to see, dered in this other and further view, as implying fault; and that to prevent and to remedy such injury, and the miseries since injury, as distinct from harm, may raise sudden anger; arising from it, is the end for which this passion was implantsudden anger may likewise accidentally serve to prevent, or ed in man. It is to be considered as a weapon, put into our remedy, such fault and injury. But, considered as distinct hands by nature, against injury, injustice, and cruelty: how from settled anger, it stands in our nature for self-defence, it may be innocently employed and made use of, shall preand not for the administration of justice. There are plainly sently be mentioned.

cases, and in the uncultivated parts of the world, and, where The account which has been now given of this passion is, regular governments are not formed, they frequently happen, in brief, that sudden anger is raised by, and was chiefly inin which there is no time for consideration, and yet to be pas- tended to prevent or remedy, mere harm distinct from injury: sive is certain destruction; in which sudden resistance is the but that it may be raised by injury, and may serve to prevent only security. or to remedy it; and then the occasions and effects of it are But from this, deliberate anger or resentment is essentially the same with the occasions and effects of deliberate anger. distinguished, as the latter is not naurally excited by, or in- But they are essentially distinguished in this, that the latter tended to prevent mere harm without appearance of wrong or is never occasioned by harm, distinct from injury; and its injustice. Now, in order to see, as exactly as we can, what natural proper end is to remedy or to prevent only that harm, is the natural object and occasion of such resentment; let us which implies, or is supposed to imply, injury or moral wrong. reflect upon the manner in which we are touched with read- Every one sees that these observations do not relate to those, ing, suppose, a feigned story of baseness and villany, pro- who have habitually suppressed the course of their passions perly worked up to move our passions. This immediately and affections, out of regard either to interest or virtue; or raises indignation, somewhat of a desire that it should be who, from habits of vice and folly, have changed their nature. punished. And though the designed injury be prevented, But, I suppose, there can be no doubt but this, now described, yet that it was designed is sufficient to raise this inward feel-is the general course of resentment, considered as a natural ing. Suppose the story true, this inward feeling would be passion, neither increased by indulgence, nor corrected by as natural and as just: and one may venture to affirm, that virtue, nor prevailed over by other passions, or particular there is scarce a man in the world, but would have it upon habits of life.

some occasions. It seems in us plainly connected with a As to the abuses of anger, which it is to be observed may sense of virtue and vice, of moral good and evil. Suppose be in all different degrees, the first which occurs is what is further, we knew both the person who did and who suffered commonly called passion; to which some men are liable, in the injury neither would this make any alteration, only that the same way as others are to the epilepsy, or any sudden parit would probably affect us more. The indignation raised ticular disorder. This distemper of the mind seizes them by cruelty and injustice, and the desire of having it punished, upon the least occasion in the world, and perpetually without which persons unconcerned would feel, is by no means malice. any real reason at all: and by means of it they are plainly, No, it is resentment against vice and wickedness: it is one every day, every walking hour of their lives, liable and in of the common bonds, by which society is held together; a danger of running into the most extravagant outrages. Of a fellow-feeling, which each individual has in behalf of the less boisterous, but not of a less innocent kind, is peevishness ; whole species, as well as of himself. And it does not appear which I mention with pity, with real pity to the unhappy that this, generally speaking, is at all too high amongst man- creatures, who, from their inferior station, or other circumkind. Suppose now the injury I have been speaking of to stances and relations, are obliged to be in the way of, and to be done against ourselves; or those whom we consider as serve for a supply to it. Both these, for aught that I can see, ourselves. It is plain, the way in which we should be af-are one and the same principle: but, as it takes root in minds fected would be exactly the same in kind: but it would cer- of different makes, it appears differently, and so is come to be tainly be in a higher degree, and less transient; because a distinguished by different names. That which in a more sense of our own happiness and misery is most intimately feeble temper is peevishness, and languidly discharges itself and always present to us; and from the very constitution of upon every thing which comes in its way; the same principle, our nature, we cannot but have a greater sensibility to, and in a temper of greater force and stronger passions, becomes be more deeply interested in, what concerns ourselves. And rage and fury. In one, the humour discharges itself at once; this seems to be the whole of this passion, which is, properly in the other, it is continually discharging. This is the acspeaking, natural to mankind: namely, a resentment against count of passion and peevishness, as distinct from each other, injury and wickedness in general; and in a higher degree and appearing in different persons. It is no objection against when towards ourselves, in proportion to the greater regard the truth of it, that they are both to be seen sometimes in one which men naturally have for themselves, than for others. and the same person.

From hence it appears, that it is not natural, but moral evil; With respect to deliberate resentment, the chief instances it is not suffering, but injury, which raises that anger or re- of abuse are: when, from partiality to ourselves, we imagine sentment, which is of any continuance. The natural object ae injury done us, when there is none: when this partiality of it is not one, who appears to the suffering person to have represents it to us greater than it really is: when we fall into been only the innocent occasion of his pain or loss; but one, that extravagant and monstrous kind of resentment, towards who has been in a moral sense injurious either to ourselves one who has innocently been the occasion of evil to us; that or others. This is abundantly confirmed by observing what is, resentment upon account of pain or inconvenience, without it is which heightens or lessens resentment; namely, the same injury; which is the same absurdity, as settled anger at a which aggravates or lessens the fault: friendship, and former thing that is inanimate when the indignation against injury obligations, on one hand; or inadvertency, strong temptations, and injustice rises too high, and is beyond proportion to the and mistake, on the other. All this is so much understood particular ill action it is exercised upon: or, lastly, when pain by mankind, how little soever it be reflected upon, that a or harm of any kind is inflicted merely in consequence of, person would be reckoned quite distracted, who should coolly and to gratify, that resentment, though naturally raised. resent a harm, which had not to himself the appearance of It would be endless to descend into and explain all the injury or wrong. Men do indeed resent what is occasioned peculiarities of perverseness and wayward humour which through carelessness: but then they expect observance as might be traced up to this passion. But there is one thing, their due, and so that carelessness is considered as faulty. which so generally belongs to and accompanies all excess It is likewise true, that they resent more strongly an injury and abuse of it, as to require being mentioned; a certain dedone, than one which, though designed, was prevented, in termination, and resolute bent of mind, not to be convinced or cases where the guilt is perhaps the same: the reason how-set right; though it be ever so plain, that there is no reason

for the displeasure, that it was raised merely by error or mis- dom and goodness, when even pain in the natural world, and understanding. In this there is doubtless a great mixture of the passion we have been now considering in the moral, come pride: but there is somewhat more, which I cannot otherwise out instances of it!

express, than that resentment has taken possession of the temper and of the mind, and will not quit its hold. It would be too minute to inquire whether this be any thing more than bare obstinacy: it is sufficient to observe, that it, in a very particular manner and degree, belongs to the abuses of this passion.

SERMON IX.

UPON FORGIVENESS OF INJURIES.

and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you.—Matt. v. 43, 44.

But, notwithstanding all these abuses, "Is not just indignation against cruelty and wrong one of the instruments of death, which the Author of our nature hath provided? Are not cruelty, injustice, and wrong, the natural objects of that Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, indignation? Surely then it may one way or other be innocently employed against them." True. Since therefore it is necessary for the very subsistence of the world, that injury, injustice, and cruelty, should be punished; and since compassion, which is so natural to mankind, would render that execution of justice exceedingly difficult and uneasy; indig As God Almighty foresaw the irregularities and disorders, nation against vice and wickedness is, and may be allowed both natural and moral, which would happen in this state of to be, a balance to that weakness of pity, and also to any things; he hath graciously made some provision against them, thing else which would prevent the necessary methods of by giving us several passions and affections, which arise severity. Those who have never thought upon these sub- from, or whose objects are, those disorders. Of this sort are jects, may perhaps not see the weight of this: but let us sup- fear, resentment, compassion, and others; of which there pose a person guilty of murder, or any other action of cruelty, could be no occasion or use in a perfect state: but in the preand that mankind had naturally no indignation against such sent we should be exposed to greater inconveniences without wickedness and the authors of it; but that every body was them; though there are very considerable ones, which they affected towards such a criminal in the same way as towards themselves are the occasions of. They are encumbrances inan innocent man: compassion, amongst other things, would deed, but such as we are obliged to carry about with us, render the execution of justice exceedingly painful and dif- through this various journey of life: some of them as a guard ficult, and would often quite prevent it. And notwithstand- against the violent assaults of others, and in our own defence; ing that the principle of benevolence is denied by some and some in behalf of others; and all of them to put us upon, and is really in a very low degree, that men are in great measure help to carry us through a course of behaviour suitable to insensible to the happiness of their fellow-creatures; yet they our condition, in default of that perfection of wisdom and are not insensible to their misery, but are very strongly moved virtue, which would be in all respects our better security. with it: insomuch that there plainly is occasion for that feel-] The passion of anger or resentment hath already been largely ing, which is raised by guilt and demerit, as a balance to that treated of. It hath been shown, that mankind naturally feel of compassion. Thus much may I think justly be allowed some emotion of mind against injury and injustice, whoever to resentment, in the strictest way of moral consideration. are the sufferers by it; and even though the injurious design The good influence which this passion has in fact upon the be prevented from taking effect. Let this be called anger, affairs of the world, is obvious to every one's notice. Men indignation, resentment, or by whatever name any one shall are plainly restrained from injuring their fellow-creatures by choose; the thing itself is understood, and is plainly natural. fear of their resentment; and it is very happy that they are It has likewise been observed, that this natural indignation so, when they would not be restrained by a principle of vir- is generally moderate and low enough in mankind, in each tue. And after an injury is done, and there is a necessity particular man, when the injury which excites it doth not that the offender should be brought to justice; the cool con- affect himself, or one whom he considers as himself. Theresideration of reason, that the security and peace of society fore the precepts to forgive, and to love our enemies, do not rerequires examples of justice should be made, might indeed late to that general indignation against injury and the authors be sufficient to procure laws to be enacted, and sentence pas- of it, but to this feeling, or resentment when raised by private sed: but is it that cool reflection in the injured person, which, or personal injury. But no man could be thought in earnest, for the most part, brings the offender to justice? Or is it not who should assert, that, though indignation against injury, resentment and indignation against the injury and the author when others are the sufferers, is innocent and just; yet the of it? I am afraid there is no doubt, which is commonly the same indignation against it, when we ourselves are the suffercase. This however is to be considered as a good effect, ers, becomes faulty and blameable. These precepts therenotwithstanding it were much to be wished that men would fore cannot be understood to forbid this in the latter case, act from a better principle, reason and cool reflection.

The account now given of the passion of resentment, as distinct from all the abuses of it, may suggest to our thoughts the following reflections.

more than in the former. Nay, they cannot be understood to forbid this feeling in the latter case, though raised to a higher degree than in the former: because, as was also observed further, from the very constitution of our nature, First, that vice is indeed of ill desert, and must finally be we cannot but have a greater sensibility to what concerns punished. Why should men dispute concerning the reality ourselves. Therefore the precepts in the text, and others of virtue, and whether it be founded in the nature of things, of the like import with them, must be understood to forwhich yet surely is not matter of question; but why should bid only the excess and abuse of this natural feeling, in this, I say, be disputed, when every man carries about him cases of personal and private injury: the chief instances of this passion, which affords him demonstration, that the rules which excess and abuse have likewise been already remarkof justice and equity are to be the guide of his actions? For ed; and all of them, excepting that of retaliation, do so plainly every man naturally feels an indignation upon seeing instan- in the very terms express somewhat unreasonable, disproporces of villany and baseness, and therefore cannot commit the tionate, and absurd, as to admit of no pretence or shadow of same without being self-condemned. justification.

Secondly, That we should learn to be cautious, lest we But since custom and false honour are on the side of retaliacharge God foolishly, by ascribing that to him, or the nature tion and revenge, when the resentment is natural and just; he has given us, which is owing wholly to our own abuse of and reasons are sometimes offered in justification of revenge it. Men may speak of the degeneracy and corruption of the in these cases; and since love of our enemies is thought too world, according to the experience they have had of it; but hard a saying to be obeyed: I will show the absolute unlawhuman nature, considered as the divine workmanship, should fulness of the former; the obligations we are under to the methinks be treated as sacred: for "in the image of God latter; and then proceed to some reflections, which may have made he man." That passion, from whence men take occa- a more direct and immediate tendency to beget in us a right sion to run into the dreadful vices of malice and revenge; temper of mind towards those who have offended us. even that passion, as implanted in our nature by God, is not In showing the unlawfulness of revenge, it is not my preonly innocent, but a generous movement of mind. It is in sent design to examine what is alleged in favour of it, from itself, and in its original, no more than indignation against the tyranny of custom and false honour, but only to consider injury and wickedness: that which is the only deformity in the nature and reason of the thing itself; which ought to the creation, and the only reasonable object of abhorrence and have prevented, and ought now to extirpate, every thing of dislike. How manifold evidence have we of the divine wis-that kind.

First, Let us begin with the supposition of that being inno-mankind as a community or family, and himself as a member cent, which is pleaded for, and which shall be shown to be of it.

altogether vicious, the supposition that we were allowed to Let us now take this in another view. Every natural aprender evil for evil, and see what would be the consequence. petite, passion, and affection, may be gratified in particular Malice or resentment towards any man hath plainly a tendency instances, without being subservient to the particular chief to beget the same passion in him who is the object of it; and end, for which these several principles were respectively this again increases it in the other. It is of the very nature implanted in our nature. And, if neither this end, nor any of this vice to propagate itself, not only by way of example, other moral obligation, be contradicted, such gratification is which it does in common with other vices, but in a peculiar innocent. Thus, I suppose, there are cases in which each of way of its own; for resentment itself, as well as what is done these principles, this one of resentment excepted, may innoin consequence of it, is the object of resentment: hence it cently be gratified, without being subservient to what is the comes to pass, that the first offence, even when so slight as main end of it; that is, though it does not conduce to, yet it presently to be dropped and forgotten, becomes the occasion may be gratified without contradicting, that end, or any other of entering into a long intercourse of ill offices: neither is it obligation. But the gratification of resentment, if it be not at all uncommon to see persons, in this progress of strife and conducive to the end for which it was given us, must necesvariance, change parts: and him, who was at first the injured sarily contradict, not only the general obligation to benevoperson, become more injurious and blameable than the ag-lence, but likewise that particular end itself. The end, for gressor. Put the case then, that the law of retaliation was which it was given, is to prevent or remedy injury; i. e. the universally received and allowed, as an innocent rule of life, misery occasioned by injury; i. e. misery itself: and the gratiby all; and the observance of it thought by many (and then fication of it consists in producing misery; i. e. in contradicting it would soon come to be thought by all) a point of honour: the end for which it was implanted in our nature. this supposes every man in private cases to pass sentence in This whole reasoning is built upon the difference there is his own cause; and likewise, that anger or resentment is to between this passion and all others. No other principle, or be the judge. Thus, from the numberless partialities which passion, hath for its end the misery of our fellow-creatures. we all have for ourselves, every one would often think him- But malice and revenge meditates evil itself; and to do misself injured when he was not: and in most cases would repre- chief, to be the author of misery, is the very thing which sent an injury as much greater than it really is; the imagined gratifies the passion: this is what it directly tends towards, dignity of the person offended would scarce ever fail to mag- as its proper design. Other vices eventually do mischief: nify the offence. And, if bare retaliation, or returning just this alone aims at it as an end.

the mischief received, always begets resentment in the person Nothing can with reason be urged in justification of revenge, upon whom we retaliate, what would that excess do? Add from the good effects which the indulgence of it were before to this, that he likewise has his partialities-there is no going mentioned to have upon the affairs of the world; because, on to represent this scene of rage and madness: it is manifest though it be a remarkable instance of the wisdom of Provithere would be no bounds, nor any end. "If the beginning dence to bring good out of evil, yet vice is vice to him who is of strife is as when one letteth out water," what would it guilty of it. "But suppose these good effect are foreseen:" come to when allowed this free and unrestrained course? that is, suppose reason in a particular case leads a man the "As coals are to burning coals, or wood to fire; so" would same way as passion? Why then, to be sure, he should folthese "contentious men be to kindle strife." And since the low his reason, in this as well as in all other cases. So that, indulgence of revenge hath manifestly this tendency, and does turn the matter which way ever you will, no more can be actually produce these effects in proportion as it is allowed; allowed to this passion, than what hath been already.† a passion of so dangerous a nature ought not to be indulged,| As to that love of our enemies, which is commanded; this were there no other reason against it. supposes the general obligation to benevolence or good-will Secondly, It hath been shown that the passion of resent- towards mankind: and this being supposed, that precept is ment was placed in man, upon supposition of, and as a pre-no more than to forgive injuries; that is, to keep clear of those vention or remedy to, irregularity and disorder. Now whether abuses before mentioned: because that we have the habitual it be allowed or not, that the passion itself and the gratifica- temper of benevolence is taken for granted. tion of it joined together are painful to the malicious person; Resentment is not inconsistent with good-will; for we it must however be so with respect to the person towards often see both together in very high degrees; not only in whom it is exercised, and upon whom the revenge is taken. parents towards their children, but in cases of friendship and Now, if we consider mankind, according to that fine allusion dependence, where there is no natural relation. These conof St. Paul, as "one body, and every one members one of trary passions, though they may lessen, do not necessarily another;" it must be allowed that resentment is, with respect destroy each other. We may therefore love our enemy, and to society, a painful remedy. Thus then the very notion or yet have resentment against him for his injurious behaviour idea of this passion, as a remedy or prevention of evil, and towards us. But when this resentment entirely destroys our as in itself a painful means, plainly shows that it ought never natural benevolence towards him, it is excessive, and beto be made use of, but only in order to produce some greater comes malice or revenge. The command to prevent its having good. this effect, i. e. to forgive injuries, is the same as to love our

It is to be observed, that this argument is not founded enemies; because that love is always supposed, unless desupon an allusion or simile; but that it is drawn from the troyed by resentment.

very nature of the passion itself, and the end for which it was "But though mankind is the natural object of benevolence, given us. We are obliged to make use of words taken from yet may it not be lessened upon vice, i. e. injury?" Allowed: sensible things, to explain what is the most remote from but if every degree of vice or injury must destroy that benevothem and every one sees from whence the words prevention lence, then no man is the object of our love; for no man is and remedy are taken. But, if you please, let these words without faults.

be dropped: the thing itself, I suppose, may be expressed "But if lower instances of injury may lessen our benevolence, why may not higher, or the highest, destroy it?" The

without them.

That mankind is a community, that we all stand in a rela- answer is obvious. It is not man's being a social creature, tion to each other, that there is a public end and interest of much less his being a moral agent, from whence alone our society which each particular is obliged to promote, is the obligations to good-will towards him arise. There is an obsum of morals. Consider then the passion of resentment, as ligation to it prior to either of these, arising from his being a given to this one body, as given to society. Nothing can sensible creature; that is, capable of happiness or misery. be more manifest, than that resentment is to be considered Now this obligation cannot be superseded by his moral charas a secondary passion, placed in us upon supposition, upon acter. What justifies public executions is, not that the guilt, account of, and with regard to, injury; not, to be sure, to or demerit of the criminal dispenses with the obligation of promote and further it, but to render it, and the inconven- good-will, neither would this justify any severity; but, that iences and miseries arising from it, less and fewer than they his life is inconsistent with the quiet and happiness of the would be without this passion. It is as manifest, that the world: that is, a general and more enlarged obligation necesindulgence of it is, with regard to society, a painful means of sarily destroys a particular and more confined one of the obtaining these ends. Considered in itself, it is very unde- same kind inconsistent with it. Guilt or injury then does sirable, and what society must very much wish to be without. not dispense with or supersede the duty of love and goodIt is in every instance absolutely an evil in itself, because it will. implies producing misery: and consequently must never be indulged or gratified for itself, by any one who considers

VOL. II.-3 Q

Serm. VIII. p. 520.

+ Ibid.