action: such action therefore is natural. But suppose a man, others: insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this foreseeing the same danger of certain ruin, should rush into it faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, for the sake of a present gratification; he in this instance superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that would follow his strongest desire, as did the brute creature: is, of the faculty itself: and, to preside and govern, from the but there would be as manifest a disproportion between the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had nature of a man and such an action, as between the meanest it strength, as it had right; had it power, as it had manifest work of art and the skill of the greatest master in that art: authority, it would absolutely govern the world. which disproportion arises, not from considering the action This gives us a further view of the nature of man; shows singly in itself, or in its consequences; but from comparison of us what course of life we were made for: not only that our it with the nature of the agent. And since such an action is real nature leads us to be influenced in some degree by reflecutterly disproportionate to the nature of man, it is in the strict- tion and conscience; but likewise in what degree we are to est and most proper sense unnatural; this word expressing be influenced by it, if we will fall in with, and act agreeably that disproportion. Therefore instead of the words dispropor- to the constitution of our nature that this faculty was placed tionate to his nature, the word unnatural may now be put; within to be our proper governor; to direct and regulate all this being more familiar to us: but let it be observed, that it stands for the same thing precisely.

under principles, passions, and motives of action. This is its right and office: thus sacred is its authority. And how often soever men violate and rebelliously refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest, which they cannot otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion, which they cannot otherwise gratify; this makes no alteration as to the natural right and office of

Now what is it which renders such a rash action unnatural? Is it that he went against the principle of reasonable and cool self-love, considered merely as a part of his nature? No: for if he had acted the contrary way, he would equally have gone against a principle, or part of his nature, namely, passion or conscience. appetite. But to deny a present appetite, from foresight that Let us now turn this whole matter another way, and supthe gratification of it would end in immediate ruin or extreme pose there was no such thing at all as this natural supremacy misery, is by no means an unnatural action: whereas to con- of conscience; that there was no distinction to be made betradict or go against cool self-love for the sake of such grati- tween one inward principle and another, but only that of fication, is so in the instance before us. Such an action then strength; and see what would be the consequence. being unnatural; and its being so not arising from a man's Consider then what is the latitude and compass of the acgoing against a principle or desire barely, nor in going against tions of man with regard to himself, his fellow-creatures, and that principle or desire which happens for the present to be the Supreme Being? What are their bounds, besides that strongest; it necessarily follows, that there must be some of our natural power? With respect to the two first, they other difference or distinction to be made between these two are plainly no other than these: no man seeks misery as such principles, passion and cool self-love, than what I have yet for himself; and no one unprovoked does mischief to another taken notice of. And this difference, not being a difference for its own sake. For in every degree within these bounds, in strength or degree, I call a difference in nature and in kind. mankind knowingly from passion or wantonness bring ruin And since, in the instance still before us, if passion prevails and misery upon themselves and others. And impiety and over self-love, the consequent action is unnatural; but if self- profaneness, I mean, what every one would call so who belove prevails over passion, the action is natural: it is man- lieves the being of God, have absolutely no bounds at all.— ifest that self-love is in human nature a superior principle to Men blaspheme the Author of nature, formally and in words passion. This may be contradicted without violating that renounce their allegiance to their Creator. Put an instance nature; but the former cannot. So that, if we will act con- then with respect to any one of these three. Though we formably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love should suppose profane swearing, and in general that kind of must govern. Thus, without particular consideration of con- impiety now mentioned, to mean nothing, yet it implies wanscience, we may have a clear conception of the superior nature ton disregard and irreverence towards an infinite Being, our of one inward principle to another; and see that there really Creator; and is this as suitable to the nature of man, as revis this natural superiority, quite distinct from degrees of erence and dutiful submission of heart towards that Almighty strength and prevalency. Being? Or suppose a man guilty of parricide, with all the

Let us now take a view of the nature of man, as consisting circumstances of cruelty which such an action can admit of. partly of various appetites, passions, affections, and partly of This action is done in consequence of its principle being for the principle of reflection or conscience; leaving quite out all the present strongest and if there be no difference between consideration of the different degrees of strength, in which inward principles, but only that of strength; the strength beeither of them prevail, and it will further appear that there is ing given, you have the whole nature of the man given, so this natural superiority of one inward principle to another, far as it relates to this matter. The action plainly corresand that it is even part of the idea of reflection or conscience. ponds to the principle, the principle being in that degree of Passion or appetite implies a direct simple tendency to- strength it was: it therefore cerresponds to the whole nature wards such and such objects, without distinction of the of the man. Upon comparing the action and the whole nameans by which they are to be obtained. Consequently it ture, there arises no disproportion, there appears no unsuitawill often happen there will be a desire of particular objects, bleness between them. Thus the murder of a father and the in cases where they cannot be obtained without manifest in- nature of man correspond to each other, as the same nature jury to others. Reflection or conscience comes in, and dis- and an act of filial duty. If there be no difference between approves the pursuit of them in these circumstances; but the inward principles, but only that of strength; we can make no desire remains. Which is to be obeyed, appetite or reflec- distinction between these two actions, considered as the action? Cannot this question be answered, from the economy tions of such a creature; but in our coolest hours must apand constitution of human nature merely, without saying prove or disapprove them equally than which nothing can which is strongest? Or need this at all come into consider- be reduced to a greater absurdity.

ation? Would not the question be intelligibly and fully answered by saying, that the principle of reflection or conscience being compared with the various appetites, passions, and affections in men, the former is manifestly superior and chief, without regard to strength? And how often soever the latter happens to prevail, it is mere usurpation: the former remains in nature and in kind its superior; and every instance of such prevalence of the latter is an instance of breaking in upon and violation of the constitution of man.

SERMON III.

The natural supremacy of reflection or conscience being thus established: we may from it form a distinct notion of All this is no more than the distinction, which every body what is meant by human nature, when virtue is said to conis acquainted with, between mere power and authority: only sist in following it, and vice in deviating from it. instead of being intended to express the difference between As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it united what is possible, and what is lawful in civil government; strength, various subordinations, under one direction, that of here it has been shown applicable to the several principles in the supreme authority; the different strength of each particuthe mind of man. Thus that principle, by which we survey, lar member of the society not coming into the idea; whereas, and either approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and if you leave out the subordination, the union, and the one actions, is not only to be considered as what is in its turn to direction, you destroy and lose it: so reason, several appchave some influence; which may be said of every passion, tites, passions, and affections, prevailing in different degrees of the lowest appetites: but likewise as being superior; as of strength, is not that idea or notion of human nature; but from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all that nature consists in these several principles considered as

having a natural respect to each other, in the several passions under to attend to and follow it?" I answer: it has been being naturally subordinate to the one superior principle of proved that man by his nature is a law to himself, without reflection or conscience. Every bias, instinct, propension the particular distinct consideration of the positive sanctions within, is a natural part of our nature, but not the whole of that law; the rewards and punishments which we feel, add to these the superior faculty, whose office it is to adjust, and those which from the light of reason we have ground to manage, and preside over them, and take in this its natural believe, are annexed to it. The question then carries its own superiority, and you complete the idea of human nature.-answer along with it. Your obligation to obey this law, is its And as in civil government the constitution is broken in upon, being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves and violated by power and strength prevailing over authority; of and attests to such a course of action, is itself alone an so the constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the lower faculties or principles within prevailing over that the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own which is in its nature supreme over them all. Thus, when it authority with it, that it is our natural guide; the guide asis said by ancient writers, that tortures and death are not so signed us by the Author of our nature: it therefore belongs contrary to human nature as injustice; by this to be sure is not to our condition of being, it is our duty to walk in that path, meant, that the aversion to the former in mankind is less and follow this guide, without looking about to see whether strong and prevalent than their aversion to the latter: but that we may not possibly forsake them with impunity. the former is only contrary to our nature considered in a par- However, let us hear what is to be said against obeying tial view, and which takes in only the lowest part of it, that this law of our nature. And the sum is no more than this. which we have in common with the brutes; whereas the lat-" Why should we be concerned about any thing out of and ter is contrary to our nature, considered in a higher sense, as beyond ourselves? If we do find within ourselves regards to a system and constitution contrary to the whole economy of others, and restraints of we know not how many different kinds; yet these being embarrassments, and hindering us And from all these things put together, nothing can be from going the nearest way to our own good, why should we more evident, than that, exclusive of revelation, man cannot not endeavour to suppress and get over them ?" be considered as a creature left by his Maker to act at ran- Thus people go on with words, which, when applied to hudom, and live at large up to the extent of his natural power, man nature, and the condition in which it is placed in this as passion, humour, wilfulness, happen to carry him; which world, have really no meaning. For does not all this kind is the condition brute creatures are in: but that from his make, of talk go upon supposition, that our happiness in this world constitution, or nature, he is in the strictest and most proper consists in somewhat quite distinct from regard to others; sense a law to himself. He hath the rule of right within: what and that it is the privilege of vice to be without restraint or is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it. confinement? Whereas, on the contrary, the enjoyments, in

man.'

The inquiries which have been made by men of leisure a manner all the common enjoyments of life, even the pleaafter some general rule, the conformity to, or disagreement sures of vice, depend upon these regards of one kind or anfrom which, should denominate our actions good or evil, are other to our fellow-creatures. Throw off all regards to others, in many respects of great service. Yet let any plain honest and we should be quite indifferent to infamy and to honour; man, before he engages in any course of action, ask himself, there could be no such thing at all as ambition; and scarce Is this I am going about right, or is it wrong? Is it good, any such thing as covetousness; for we should likewise be or is it evil? I do not in the least doubt, but that this ques-equally indifferent to the disgrace of poverty, the several netion would be answered agreeably to truth and virtue, by glects and kinds of contempt which accompany this state; almost any fair man in almost any circumstance. Neither and to the reputation of riches, the regard and respect they do there appear any cases which look like exceptions to this; usually procure. Neither is restraint by any means peculiar but those of superstition, and of partiality to ourselves. Su- to any course of life; but our very nature, exclusive of conperstition may perhaps be somewhat of an exception: but science and our condition, lays as under an absolute necessity partiality to ourselves is not; this being itself dishonesty. of it. We cannot gain any end whatever without being conFor a man to judge that to be the equitable, the moderate, the fined to the proper means which is often the most painful and right part for him to act, which he would see to be hard, un- uneasy confinement. And in numberless instances a prejust, oppressive in another; this is plain vice, and can pro- sent appetite cannot be gratified without such apparent and ceed only from great unfairness of mind. immediate ruin and misery, that the most dissolute man in But allowing that mankind hath the rule of right within the world chooses to forego the pleasure, rather than endure himself, yet it may be asked, "What obligations are we the pain.

a view of. But it is the inward frame of man considered as a system

Is the meaning then, to indulge those regards to our fellow*Every man in his physical nature is one individual single agent. creatures, and submit to those restraints, which upon the He has likewise properties and principles, each of which may be whole are attended with more satisfaction than uneasiness, considered separately, and without regard to the respects which they and get over only those which bring more uneasiness and inhave to each other. Neither of these are the nature we are taking convenienee than satisfaction? "Doubtless this was our or constitution: whose several parts are united, not by a physical meaning." You have changed sides then. Keep to this; be principle of individuation, but by the respects they have to each consistent with yourselves; and you and the men of virtue other; the chief of which is the subjection which the appetites, pas-are in general pefectly agreed. But let us take care and sions, and particular affections have to the one supreme principle of avoid mistakes. Let it not be taken for granted that the reflection or conscience. The system or constitution is formed by temper of envy, rage, resentment, yields greater delight than and consists in these respects and this subjection. Thus the body is

a system or constitution: so is a tree: so is every machine. Consider meekness, forgiveness, compassion, and good-will: especially all the several parts of a tree without the natural respects they have when it is acknowledged that rage, envy, resentment, are in to each other, and you have not at all the idea of a tree; but add themselves mere misery; and the satisfaction arising from these respects, and this gives you the idea. The body may be im- the indulgence of them is little more than relief from that paired by sickness, a tree may decay, a machine be out of order, misery; whereas the temper of compassion and benevolence and yet the system and constitution of them not totally dissolved. is itself delightful; and the indulgence of it, by doing good, There is plainly somewhat which answers to all this in the moral affords new positive delight and enjoyment. Let it not be constitution of man. Whoever will consider his own nature, will see that the several appetites, passious, and particular affections, have taken for granted, that the satisfaction arising from the repudifferent respects amongst themselves. They are restraints upon, tation of riches and power, however obtained, and from the and are in a proportion to each other. This proportion is just and respect paid to them, is greater than the satisfaction arising perfect, when all those under principles are perfecily coincident with from the reputation of justice, honesty, charity, and the esconscience, so far as their nature permits, and in all cases under its teem which is universally acknowledged to be their due. And absolute and entire direction. The least excess or defect, the least if it be doubtful which of these satisfactions is the greatest, alteration of the due proportions amongst themselves, or of their

coincidence with conscience, though not proceeding into action, is as there are persons who think neither of them very considersome degree of disorder in the moral constitution. But perfection, able, yet there can be no doubt concerning ambition and covetthough plainly intelligible and unsupposable, was never attained by ousness, virtue and a good mind, considered in themselves, any man. If the higher principle of reflection maintains its place, and as leading to different courses of life; there can, I say, and as much as it can corrects that disorder, and hinders it from be no doubt, which temper and which course is attended with breaking out into action, this is all that can be expected from such a most peace and tranquillity of mind, which with most perplexcreature as man. And though the appetites and passions have not

their exact due proportion to each other; though they often strivey, vexation, and inconvenience. And both the virtues and for mastery with judgment or reflection: yet, since the superiority vices which have been now mentioned, do in a manner of this principle to all others is the chief respect which forms the equally imply in them regards of one kind or another to our constitution, so far as this superiority is maintained, the character, fellow-creatures. And with respect to restraint and confinethe man, is good, worthy, virtuous. ment: whoever will consider the restraints from fear and

In treating upon this subject, I will consider, First, What is the general vice or fault here referred to: or what disposition in men is supposed in moral reflections and precepts concerning bridling the tongue.

chame, the dissimulation, mean arts of concealment, servile who seemeth to be religious, and bridleth not his tongue, but compliances, one or other of which belong to almost every in that particular deceiveth his own heart, this man's resourse of vice, will soon be convinced that the man of virtue ligion is vain; we may observe somewhat very forcible and is by no means upon a disadvantage in this respect. How expressive in these words of St. James. As if the apostle many instances are there in which men feel and own and cry had said, No man surely can make any pretences to religion, aloud under the chains of vice with which they are enthralled, who does not at least believe that he bridleth his tongue : and which yet they will not shake off! How many instances, if he puts on any appearance or face of religion, and yet does in which persons manifestly go through more pains and self- not govern his tongue, he must surely deceive himself in that denial to gratify a vicious passion, than would have been particular, and think he does: and whoever is so unhappy as necessary to the conquest of it! To this is to be added, that to deceive himself in this, to imagine he keeps that unruly when virtue is become habitual, when the temper of it is ac- faculty in due subjection, when indeed he does not, whatever quired, what was before confinement ceases to be so, by be- the other part of his life be, his religion is vain; the governcoming choice and delight. Whatever restraint and guard ment of the tongue being a most inaterial restraint which upon ourselves may be needful to unlearn any unnatural dis virtue lays us under: without it no man can be truly retortion or odd gesture; yet, in all propriety of speech, natural ligions. behaviour must be the most easy and unrestrained. It is manifest that, in the common course of life, there is seldom any inconsistency between our duty and what is called interest: it is much seldomer that there is an inconsistency between duty and what is really our present interest; meaning Secondly, When it may be said of any one, that he has a by interest, happiness and satisfaction. Self-love, then, due government over himself in this respect. though confined to the interest of the present world, does in I. Now the fault referred to, and the disposition supposed, general perfectly coincide with virtue; and leads us to one in precepts and reflections concerning the government of the and the same course of life. But, whatever exceptions there tongue, is not evil-speaking from malice, nor lying or bearing are to this, which are much fewer than they are commonly false witness from indirect selfish designs. The disposition thought, all shall be set right at the final distribution of to these, and the actual vices themselves, all come under things. It is a manifest absurdity to suppose evil prevailing other subjects. The tongue may be employed about, and finally over good, under the conduct and administration of a made to serve all the purposes of vice, in tempting and deperfect mind. ceiving, in perjury and injustice. But the thing here supThe whole argument, which I have been now insisting posed and referred to, is talkativeness: a disposition to be upon, may be thus summed up, and given you in one view. talking, abstracted from the consideration of what is to be The nature of man is adapted to some course of action or said; with very little or no regard to, or thought of doing, other. Upon comparing some actions with this nature, they either good or harm. And let not any imagine this to be a appear suitable and correspondent to it: from comparison of slight matter, and that it deserves not to have so great weight other actions with the same nature, there arises to our view laid upon it; till he has considered, what evil is implied in some unsuitableness or disproportion. The correspondence it, and the bad effects which follow from it. It is perhaps of actious to the nature of the agent renders them natural: true, that they who are addicted to this folly would choose their disproportion to it, unnatural. That an action is cor- to confine themselves to trifles and indifferent subjects, and respondent to the nature of the agent, does not arise from its so intend only to be guilty of being impertinent, but as they being agreeable to the principle which happens to be the cannot go on for ever talking of nothing, as common matters strongest for it may be so, and yet be quite disproportionate will hot afford a sufficient fund for perpetual continued disto the nature of the agent. The correspondence therefore, or course: when subjects of this kind are exhausted, they will disproportion, arises from somewhat else. This can be noth-go on to defamation, scandal, divulging of secrets, their own ing but a difference in nature and kind, altogether distinct secrets as well as those of others, any thing rather than be from strength, between the inward principles. Some then silent. They are plainly hurried on in the heat of their talk are in nature and kind superior to others. And the corres- to say quite different things from what they first intended, pondence arises from the action being conformable to the and which they afterwards wish unsaid: or improper things, higher principle; and the unsuitableness from its being con- which they had no end in saying, but only to afford employtrary to it. Reasonable self-love and conscience are the ment to their tongue. And if these people expect to be heard chief or superior principles in the nature of man: bacause an and regarded, for there are some content merely with talking, action may be suitable to this nature, though all other prin- they will invent to engage your attention: and, when they ciples be violated; but becomes unsuitable, if either of those have heard the least imperfect hint of an affair, they will out Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true of their own head add the circumstances of time and place, happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest and other matters to make out their story, and give the apare perfectly coincident: for the most part in this world, but pearance of probability to it, not that they have any concern entirely and in every instance if we take in the future, and about being believed, otherwise than as a means of being the whole; this being implied in the motion of a good and heard. The thing is, to engage your attention; to take you perfect administration of things. Thus they who have been up wholly for the present time: what reflections will be made so wise in their generation as to regard only their own sup-afterwards, is in truth the least of their thoughts. And posed interest, at the expense and to the injury of others, shall further, when persons, who indulge themselves in these libat last find, that he who has given up all the advantages of erties of the tongue, are in any degree offended with another, the present world, rather than violate his conscience and the as little disgusts and misunderstandings will be, they allow relations of life, has infinitely better provided for himself, and themselves to defame and revile such a one without any modsecured his own interest and happiness.

are.

SERMON IV.

UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TONGUE.

If any man among you seem to be religious, and bridleth not his tongue, but deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain.

James i. 26.

eration or bounds; though the offence is so very slight, that they themselves would not do, nor perhaps wish him an injury in any other way. And in this case the scandal and revilings are chiefly owing to talkativeness, and not bridling their tongue; and so come under our present subject. The least cccasion in the world will make the humour break out in this parlicular way, or in another. It is like a torrent, which must and will flow; but the least thing imaginable will first of all give it either this or another direction, turn it into this or that channel: or like a fire; the nature of which, when in a heap of combustible matter, is to spread and lay waste all around; but any one of a thousand little accidents will occasion it to break out first either in this or another particular part.

The translation of this text would be more determinate by The subject then before us, though it does run up into, being more literal, thus: " If any man among you seemeth and can scarce be treated as entirely distinct from all others; to be religious, not bridling his tongue, but deceiving his own yet it needs not be so much mixed or blended with them as heart, this man's religion is vain." This determines, that the it often is. Every faculty and power may be used as the words, but deceiveth his own heart, are not put in opposition instrument of premeditated vice and wickedness, merely as to, seemeth to be religious, but to, bridleth not his tongue. The the most proper and effectual means of executing such decertain determinate meaning of the text then being, that he signs. But if a man, from deep malice and desire of revenge,

should meditate a falsehood with a settled design to ruin his way inconsistent with the strictest virtue. But the truth is, neighbour's reputation, and should with great coolness and such sort of conversation, though it has no particular good deliberation spread it; nobody would choose to say of such a tendency, yet it has a general good one: it is social and one, that he had no government of his tongue. A man may friendly, and tends to promote humanity, good-nature, and use the faculty of speech as an instrument of false-witness, civility.

who yet has so entire a command over that faculty, as never As the end and use, so likewise the abuse of speech, relates to speak but from forethought and cool design. Here the to the one or other of these; either to business or to conversacrime is injustice and perjury: and, strictly speaking, no more tion. As to the former: deceit in the management of business belongs to the present subject, than perjury and injustice in and affairs does not properly belong to the subject now before any other way. But there is such a thing as a disposition to us; though one may just mention that multitude, that endless be talking for its own sake; from which persons often say number of words with which business is perplexed; when a any thing, good or bad, of others, merely as a subject of dis- much fewer would, as it should seem, better serve the purcourse, according to the particular temper they themselves pose: but this must be left to those who understand the matter. happen to be in, and to pass away the present time. There The government of the tongue, considered as a subject of itis likewise to be observed in persons such a strong and cager self, relates chiefly to conversation; to that kind of discourse desire of engaging attention to what they say, that they will which usually fills up the time spent in friendly meetings, speak good or evil, truth or otherwise, merely as one or the and visits of civility. And the danger is, lest persons enterother seems to be most harkened to, and this, though it is tain themselves and others at the expense of their wisdom sometimes joined, is not the same with the desire of being and their virtue, and to the injury or offence of their neighthought important and men of consequence. There is in some bour. If they will observe and keep clear of these, they may such a disposition to be talking, that an offence of the slight-be as free, and easy, and unreserved, as they can desire. est kind, and such as would not raise any other resentment, The cautions to be given for avoiding these dangers, and yet raises, if I may so speak, the resentment of the tongue, to render conversation innocent and agreeable, fall under the puts it into a flame, into the most ungovernable motions. following particulars: silence; talking of indifferent things; This outrage, when the person it respects is present, we dis- and which makes up too great a part of conversation, giving tinguish in the lower rank of people by a peculiar term: of characters, speaking well or evil of others. and let it be observed, that though the decencies of behaviour The wise man observes, that "there is a time to speak, and are a little kept, the same outrage and virulence, indulged a time to keep silence." One meets with people in the world when he is absent, is an offence of the same kind. But not who seem never to have made the last of these observations. to distinguish any farther in this manner: men run into faults And yet these great talkers do not at all speak from their and follies, which cannot so properly be referred to any one having any thing to say, as every sentence shows, but only general head as this, that they have not a due government from their inclination to be talking. Their conversation is over their tongue. merely an exercise of the tongue; no other human faculty has And this unrestrained volubility and wantonness of speech any share in it. It is strange these persons can help reflecting is the occasion of numberless evils and vexations in life. It that unless they have in truth a superior capacity, and are in begets resentment in him who is the subject of it; sows the an extraordinary manner furnished for conversation; if they seed of strife and dissension amongst others; and inflames are entertaining, it is at their own expense. Is it possible, little disgusts and offences, which if let alone would wear that it should never come into people's thoughts to suspect, away of themselves: it is often of as bad effect upon the whether or no it be to their advantage to show so very much good name of others, as deep envy or malice: and, to say the of themselves? "O that you would altogether hold your least of it in this respect, it destroys and perverts a certain peace, and it should be your wisdom." Remember likewise equity of the utmost importance to society to be observed; there are persons who love fewer words, an inoffensive sort namely, that praise and dispraise, a good or bad character, of people, and who deserve some regard, though of too still should always be bestowed according to desert. The tongue and composed tempers for you. Of this number was the son used in such a licentions manner is like a sword in the hand of Sirach; for he plainly speaks from experience, when he of a madman; it is employed at random, it can scarce pos- says, "As hills of sands are to the steps of the aged, so is one sibly do any good, and for the most part does a world of mis- of many words to a quiet man." But one would think it chief; and implies not only great folly and a trifling spirit, should be obvious to every one, that when they are in combut great viciousness of mind, great indifference to truth and pany with their superiors of any kind, in years, knowledge falsity, and to the reputation, welfare and good of others. So and experience: when proper and useful subjects are dismuch reason is there for what St. James says of the tongue. coursed of, which they cannot bear a part in; that these are "It is a fire, a world of iniquity, it defileth the whole body, times for silence: when they should learn to hear and be atsetteth on fire the course of nature, and is itself set on fire tentive; at least in their turn. It is indeed a very unhappy of hell." This is the faculty or disposition which we are way these people are in: they in a manner cut themselves out required to keep a guard upon these are the vices and fol- from all advantage of conversation, except that of being enlies it runs into, when not kept under due restraint. tertained with their own talk: their business in coming into II. Wherein the due government of the tongue consists, company not being at all to be informed, to hear, to learn, when it may be said of any one in a moral and reli- but to display themselves, or rather to exert their faculty, gious sense that he bridleth his tongue, I come now to con- and talk without any design at all. And if we consider conversation as an entertainment, as somewhat to unbend the The due and proper use of any natural faculty or power, mind; as a diversion from the cares, the business, and the is to be judged of by the end and design for which it was sorrows of life; it is of the very nature of it, that the discourse given us. The chief purpose, for which the faculty of speech be mutual. This, I say, is implied in the very notion of what was given to man, is plainly that we might communicate we distinguish by conversation, or being in company. Atour thoughts to each other, in order to carry on the affairs tention to the continued discourse of one alone, grows more of the world; for business, and for our improvement in painful often than the cares and business we come to be diknowledge and learning. But the good Author of our na- verted from. He, therefore, who imposes this upon us is ture designed us not only necessaries, but likewise enjoy- guilty of a double offence; arbitrarily enjoining silence upon ment and satisfaction, in that being he hath graciously given, all the rest, and likewise obliging them to this painful atand in that condition of life he hath placed us in. There tention.

sider.

are secondary uses of our faculties: they administer to de- I am sensible these things are apt to be passed over, as too light, as well as to necessity: and as they are equally adapt- little to come into a serious discourse; but in reality men are ed to both, there is no doubt but he intended them for our obliged, even in point of morality and virtue, to observe all gratification, as well as for the support and continuance of the decencies of behaviour. The greatest evils in life have our being. The secondary use of speech is to please and be had their rise from somewhat which was thought of too little entertaining to each other in conversation. This is in every importance to be attended to. And as to the matter we are respect allowable and right: it unites men closer in alliances now upon, it is absolutely necessary to be considered. For and friendships; gives us a fellow-feeling of the prosperity if people will not maintain a due government over themselves, and unhappiness of each other; and is in several respects in regarding proper times and seasons for silence, but will serviceable to virtue, and to promote good behaviour in the be talking, they certainly, whether they design it or not at world. And provided there be not too much time spent in first, will go on to scandal and evil speaking, and divulging it, if it were considered only in the way of gratification and secrets.

delight, men must have strange notions of God and of reli- If it were needful to say any thing further to persuade men gion, to think that he can be offended with it, or that it is any to learn this lesson of silence, one might put them in mind

how insignificant they render themselves by this excessive ence, and gives us, in point of virtue, much greater latitude talkativeness; insomuch that, if they do chance to say any in speaking well than ill of others. Secondly, A good man is thing which deserves to be attended to and regarded, it is friendly to his fellow-creatures, and a lover of mankind; and lost in the variety and abundance which they utter of another so will, upon every occasion, and often without any, say all the good he can of every body: but so far as he is a good

sort.

The occasions of silence then are obvious, and one would man, will never be disposed to speak evil of any, unless there think should be easily distinguished by every body: namely, be some other reason for it, besides barely that it is true. If when a man has nothing to say; or nothing but what is better he be charged with having given an ill character, he will unsaid; better, either in regard to particular persons he is scarce think it a sufficient justification of himself to say it was present with; or from its being an interruption to conversation a true one, unless he can also give some further account how itself; or to conversation of a more agreeable kind; or better, he came to do so; a just indignation against particular inlastly, with regard to himself. I will end this particular stances of villany, where they are great and scandalous; or with two reflections of the wise man; one of which, in the to prevent an innocent man from being deceived and betrayed, strongest manner, exposes the ridiculous part of this licen- when he has great trust and confidence in one who does not tiousness of the tongue; and the other, the great danger and deserve it. Justice must be done to every part of a subject viciousness of it. When he that is a fool walketh by the when we are considering it. If there be a man who bears a way side, his wisdom faileth him, and he saith to every one fair character in the world, whom yet we know to be without that he is a fool." The other is, "In the multitude of words faith or honesty, to be really an ill man; it must be allowed there wanteth not sin." in general, that we shall do a piece of service to society, by

As to the government of the tongue in respect to talking letting such a one's true character be known. This is no upon indifferent subjects; after what has been said concern- more than what we have an instance of in our Saviour himing the due government of it in respect to the occasions and self; though he was mild and gentle beyond example. Howtimes for silence, there is little more necessary than only to ever, no words can express too strongly the caution which caution men to be fully satisfied that the subjects are indeed should be used in such a case as this.

of an indifferent nature; and not to spend too much time in Upon the whole matter: If people would observe the obconversation of this kind. But persons must be sure to take vious occasions of silence, if they would subdue the inclinaheed that the subject of their discourse be at least of an indif- tions to tale-bearing, and that eager desire to engage attenferent nature; that it be no way offensive to virtue, religion, tion, which is an original disease in some minds; they would or good manners; that it be not of a licentious dissolute sort, be in little danger of offending with their tongue; and would, this leaving always ill impressions upon the mind; that it be in a moral and religious sense, have due government over it. no way injurious or vexatious to others; and that too much I will conclude with some precepts and reflections of the time be not spent this way, to the neglect of those duties Son of Sirach upon this subject. "Be swift to hear; and, if and offices of life which belong to their station and condition thou hast understanding, answer thy neighbour; if not, lay in the world. However, though there is not any necessity thy hand upon thy mouth. Honour and shame is in talk. A that men should aim at being important and weighty in every man of an ill tongue is dangerous in his city, and he that is sentence they speak: yet since useful subjects, at least of rash in his talk shall be hated. A wise man will hold his some kinds, are as entertaining as others; a wise man, even tongue till he see opportunity; but a babbler and a fool will when he desires to unbend his mind from business, would regard no time. He that useth many words shall be abhorchoose that the conversation might turn upon somewhat in- red; and he that taketh to himself authority therein, shall be structive. hated. A backbiting tongue hath disquieted many; strong

The last thing is, the government of the tongue as relating cities hath it pulled down, and overthrown the houses of to discourse of the affairs of others, and giving of characters. great men. The tongue of a man is his fall; but if thou love These are in a manner the same; and one can scarce call it to hear thou shalt receive understanding." an indifferent subject, because discourse upon it almost per

petually runs into somewhat criminal.

SERMON V.

UPON COMPASSION.

Rom. xii. 15.

And first of all, it were very much to be wished that this did not take up so great a part of conversation, because it is indeed a subject of a dangerous nature. Let any one consider the various interests, competitions and little misunderstandings which arise among men, and he will soon see that he is not unprejudiced and impartial; that he is not, as I may speak, neutral enough to trust himself with talking of the character and concerns of his neighbour, in a free, careless Rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep. and unreserved manner. There is perpetually, and often it is not attended to, a rivalship amongst people of one kind or another, in respect to wit, beauty, learning, fortune, and that Every man is to be considered in two capacities, the private one thing will insensibly influence them to speak to the dis- and public; as designed to pursue his own interest, and likeadvantage of others, even where there is no formed malice wise to contribute to the good of others. Whoever will conor ill design. Since, therefore, it is so hard to enter into this sider, may see, that in general there is no contrariety between subject without offending, the first thing to be observed is, these; but that from the original constitution of man, and the that people should learn to decline it; to get over that strong circumstances he is placed in, they perfectly coincide, and inclination most have to be talking of the concerns and be-mutually carry on each other. But, amongst the great varihaviour of their neighbour. ety of affections or principles of action in our nature, some in

But since it is impossible that this subject should be wholly their primary intention and design seem to belong to the single excluded conversation; and since it is necessary that the char- or private, others to the public or social capacity. The affecWhen we acters of men should be known: the next thing is, that it is a tions required in the text are of the latter sort. matter of importance what is said; and, therefore, that we rejoice in the prosperity of others, and compassionate their should be religiously scrupulous and exact to say nothing, distresses, we, as it were, substitute them for ourselves, their either good or bad, but what is true. I put it thus, because interest for our own; and have the same kind of pleasure in it is in reality of as great importance to the good of society, their prosperity, and sorrow in their distress, as we have from Now there is nothing strange or that the characters of bad men should be known, as that the reflection upon our own. characters of good men should. People, who are given to unaccountable in our being thus carried out, and affected toscandal and detraction, may indeed make an ill use of this wards the interests of others. For, if there be any appetite, observation; but truths which are of service towards regu- or any inward principle besides self-love; why may there not lating our conduct, are not to be disowned, or even concealed, be an affection to the good of our fellow-creatures, and delight because a bad use may be made of them. This however would from that affection's being gratified, and uneasiness from be effectually prevented, if these two things were attended to. things going contrary to it.*

First, That though it is equally of bad consequence to society,

that men should have either good or ill characters which they There being manifestly this appearance of men's substituting do not deserve; yet, when you say somewhat good of a man others for themselves, and being carried out and affected towards which he does not deserve, there is no wrong done him in them as towards themselves; some persons, who have a system which particular; whereas, when you say evil of a man which he excludes every affection of this sort, have taken a pleasant method to solve it; and tell you it is not another you are at all concerned does not deserve, here is a direct formal injury, a real piece about, but your self only, when you feel the affection called compasof injustice done him. This, therefore, makes a wide differ-sion, i. e. Here is a plain matter of fact, which men cannot recon