tives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the purse-strings." 1

How, Sir, can the people hold the purse-strings, unless they hold the bills by which the purse is appropriated?

And Colonel Mason broke forth in language clearly revealing his sense of danger against which to guard.

"If the Senate can originate, they will, in the recess of the legislative sessions, hatch their mischievous projects for their own purposes, and have their money bills cut and dried (to use a common phrase) for the meeting of the House of Representatives." 2

I repeat, then, according to the reason of the rule, the great appropriation bills must be embraced by the prohibition.

Secondly. There is a further consideration, founded on the familiar use of the term money bills throughout the debates in the Convention, as applicable to bills which the Senate cannot originate. I need not occupy time by reference to instances; but whoever takes the trouble to investigate the matter in Mr. Madison's report of the debates, and also in the report of the Virginia Convention, will find that this term is universally employed, -unless, indeed, where Mr. Gouverneur Morris uses the broader term "money plans," and Mr. Gerry "money matters."4 Now all these phrases are clearly applicable to "appropriation bills," by which the Government is carried on; and the inference seems irresistible, that the parties who used them must have had such bills in mind.

8

1 Madison's Debates, June 18, 1787, pp. 855, 856.

2 Ibid, August 18, p. 1307.

Ibid., July 6, p 1041.

4 Ibid., p. 1043.

In the Virginia Convention objection was made by Mr. Grayson" to the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to money bills." The objection is even to "amendments." He pronounced this "a departure from that great principle which required that the immediate representatives of the people only should interfere with money bills. . . . . The Lords in England had never been allowed to intermeddle with money bills. He knew not why the Senate should." 1

Thirdly. This brings me to another consideration, founded on the example of England, which was obviously present to the framers of the Constitution. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. HUNTER] is clearly mistaken on this point. It was often adduced in debate in the National Convention, and, as we have just seen, in the Virginia Convention also. In England the rule is explicit, and of ancient date. As early as July 3, 1678, the Commons resolved:

"That all aids and supplies, and aids to his Majesty in Parliament, are the sole gift of the Commons; and all bills for the granting of any such aids and supplies ought to begin with the Commons; and that it is the undoubted and sole right of the Commons to direct, limit, and appoint, in such bills, the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants, which ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords." "

In pursuance of this rule, estimates for the annual expenditure are submitted by the Ministry to the House of Commons, sitting as a Committee of Supply. This process is explained as follows.

1 Elliot's Debates, June 14, 1788, Vol. II. p. 283, ed. 1828.

2 Journals of the House of Commons, Vol. IX. p. 609. May's Law of Parliament, p. 407, ed. 1851.

"The member of the Administration representing the department for which the supplies are required first explains to the Committee such matters as may satisfy them of the correctness and propriety of the estimates, and then proceeds to propose ench grant in succession, which is put from the Chair in these words: That a sum not exceeding — be granted to her Majesty, for the object specified in the estimatc.'. . . . The Committee of Supply votes every sum which is granted annually for the public service, the army, the navy, the ordnance, and the several civil departments."1

At the close of the session all the grants are embodied in a bill, which is known as "Appropriation Bill," and, as it is kindred in character to that under our system, doubtless has given its name to ours. This bill is thus described: :

"It enumcrates every grant made during the whole session, and authorizes the several sums, as voted by the Committee of Supply, to be issued and applied to each service." 2

Thus, on three grounds, first, by the reason of the thing, secondly, by the familiar use in all the debates of the descriptive term, "money bills,"—and, thirdly, by the example of England, the conclusion is inevitable, that "appropriation bills," by which the Government is carried on, are within the spirit of the interdict upon the Senate, and that this body cannot originate such bills without violation of a well-established principle inherited from English jurisprudence, and also without unhinging, according to the language of Colonel Mason, that compromise by virtue of which the small States are admitted to equality of representation on this floor.

1 May's Law of Parliament, pp. 415, 418.

2 Ibid.,

p. 425.

I am not unmindful of the fact, on which the Senator from Virginia has dwelt so emphatically, that the Senate is in the habit of originating pension bills, also bills for payment of private claims, and kindred measures. I was glad, to-day, to vote for the bill originating in this body for the relief of our late distinguished Minister at Constantinople. But against this usage, which is exceptional in character, and has probably attracted little attention, from its considerable convenience and little importance, may be opposed the uniform practice by which the great bills providing for the necessities of the Government have always originated in the House of Representatives. And you will bear in mind, Sir, that the question is now on these bills.

Mr. President, it is a received maxim, that it is the part of a good judge to amplify his jurisdiction; but it will hardly be accepted, that it is the part of the American Senate to amplify its powers, particularly in derogation of the popular branch. And it surely cannot escape observation, that the present effort is launched at a moment when the popular branch promises to differ from the Senate on important questions of national policy. I am not insensible to the public convenience, which has been pressed in this debate; but permit me to say, Sir, that, should this convenience require the proposed departure from our standing policy, we shall be wise, if we hearken to the counsels of the Senator from New York, and refrain from any innovation, unless assured of the consent and coöperation of the other House.

1 Hon. George P. Marsh.

RELIEF OF VESSELS IN DISTRESS ON THE

COAST.

LETTER TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE EXCHANGE NEWS-ROOM, BOSTON, FEBRUARY 18, 1856.

DE

SENATE CHAMBER, February 18, 1856. EAR SIR,-I have pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of the memorial, forwarded by you from the underwriters and merchants of Boston, and addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, asking the despatch of immediate relief to the large fleet of vessels now distressed by the rigors of this severe winter on our northern const. It reached me Sunday morning; but its charitable object did not allow delay, and on that day I placed the memorial in the hands of the Secretary.

I have his verbal answer to-day, expressing great interest in the object of the memorial, but saying, that, beyond the revenue cutter, the Treasury Department has no vessel at Boston which can be detached on this service, and that the cutter was directed some weeks ago to do what it could for the relief of distressed vessels.

Though the memorial was addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, I felt it my duty to apply to the Secretary of the Navy. He entered into the plan with much benevolence, and expressed a desire to do all that the means at his command would permit. The only vessel at Boston in readiness is the steam-frigate Merrimack, which is about to start on a "trial-trip" of one week,