that with such reverence, as we would the word of no philosopher or prophet that ever lived. It is farther to be inquired, if the facts alledged as discoveries are true, what is their philosophy? Are they due to a magnetic power in animal bodies, such that merely stroking with the bands, breathing on a person, or fixing the eyes upon him for a length of time, does of itself produce the effects stated? This is not determined. Are they due to the principle of sympathy? This is not determined; neither is it determined how far sympathy with living forms, (as for example with a public speaker.) is ordained to be an inlet of valid impressions, or what is the same, of truth. Are they due to the imagination? This is not determined; neither is it decided how far the imagination is ordained to beget, in the soul, by means of its images and expectations, truths of the loftiest and most practical nature. If there is a susceptibility to such effects, as the magnetists alledge, in human nature, it must be one of its deep-founded and comprehensive elements; and one therefore, as true philosophy will at once conclude, that is wrought in to serve some of the most important and necessary ends, and not to be a mere faculty of folly and infatuation. We go then a step farther. Whatever this faculty, this susceptibility, may be in its nature, no man can show, that as between man and man, it is the precondition of those effects alledged by the magnetists; so between man and God, it is not the precondition of spiritual agency; as much so as reason, conscience and social capacities are preconditions of the same. We affirm nothing here, because we know nothing and believe nothing: we only expose the prematureness and rashness of such speculations as are beginning to be thrown upon the community. It is not yet time to preach against animal magnetism,-it is premature,-and whoever does it, knows not whereof he affirms. We warn every friend of religion to desist; it cannot fail to excite suspicions against the Spirit of God, which are dangerous and fatal to souls. As to the enemies of religion, they are ever ready, in their upstart wisdom, to combat the gospel with new discoveries; but it has ever been found, that as soon as science is ripe, it is in the hands of religion; and so we dare prophesy it ever will be.

We venture, in conclusion, to propose two rules, which ought to be observed in all judgments on this subject.

First: Let no man attempt to judge, or at least to make up a final and decisive judgment, till he has become fixed in such a course of life as he solemnly intends to prosecute as long as he is permitted to live; and then let him hold an even judgment, applying the same test to other matters or modes of action, which he does to religion. By this, we design to check improper haste, to secure candor, and if possible, experience of heart; for "the natural man," it is declared by a voice of infallible truth, "receiveth not

the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned."

Again: Let nothing be judged fanatical, which results in good feeling; that is, in love, meekness, forbearance, charity. Good feeling is never the result of mad or blind excitement; neither is such excitement the product of good feeling. It is only when pride, censoriousness, malice,-the mad passions,-flame out to scorch and sting, as by divine authority, and the woes of hell itself are denounced on men with exulting satisfaction; then it is, that we discover madness: this, by consent of all sober and intelligent christians, is fanaticism. For ourselves, we call by that name nothing else; and we little care to expose any thing, which does not result in this, to suspicion. If any man will canvass the merits of revivals on this basis, and do it without malicious partiality, we open to him the field, and consent to abide the result.

ART. VI.-ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

Illustrations of the Divine Government; designed to show that all mankind will, ultimately, be restored to perfect purity and happiness. By T. SOUTHWOOD SMITH, M. D. First American from the last London edition. Boston: 1831. 12ino. pp. 347.

In opposing the assumption that "sin is the necessary means of the greatest good," we have heretofore alluded to its tendencies, and the use which might be made of it to sustain the doctrine of the final restoration of all men. We have long felt, that were Universalists to intrench themselves behind this dogma, their position would be impregnable by its advocates. We have been deemed uncharitable by many, for imputing such results to their favorite assumption. Here, however, in the work before us, we have a practical verification of our opinion on this subject. This misnamed "Illustrations of the Divine Government," is nothing more or less than an elaborate attempt to uphold the doctrines of Universalism now preached, on the principle that sin is necessary to the perfection of the universe; and hence, that God must finally save all who have been concerned in promoting such an important object of the divine counsels. The author, who is a man of eminence in the medical profession, has undertaken to grapple with some of the most abstruse points of metaphysical theology. He has collected the various reasonings of predecessors, and stated the argument in a form as specious perhaps as any of them. The book has been published for a number of years; and if we may judge from other works which have since appeared in support of the same doctrine, Dr. Smith's work is regarded as a sort of textbook of philosophical principles, by the advocates of universal res

toration. It is written in a pleasing style, suited to interest a certain class of readers, who readily fall in with the general strain of an author's remarks, without subjecting them to a rigid investigation. In this respect it is a dangerous work. More than once we have taken it up and laid it aside, resolved to leave those who will connect their religious faith with such crudities and unfounded assumptions, to test their schemes by its legitimate effects. But for the sake of such persons as are perplexed and yet unsatisfied. with its specious philosophy, and who, but for certain theories found in it, might come to the acknowledgment of the truth, we have determined to notice it.

All reasoning on the doctrine of the final restoration of all mankind, it will be admitted, must be a priori; and so far as it has any appropriateness, it must be hypothetical and analogical. Dr. Smith thus aims to settle the question, before appealing to the scriptures. And if the groundless assumptions with which he begins and proceeds are granted, his doctrine follows.

Without attempting any direct argument against the doctrine of the final restoration, or even to follow Dr. S. through all the fallacies in which his work abounds, we propose to give certain points of essential importance in his work, a brief examination.

The author's various positions and reasonings, may, we think, be fairly arranged under the following assumptions: That God, in the design of his government, can fix upon nothing but the final and perfect happiness of all his creatures, as the result of his administration: that, to accomplish this in the best munner, he resolves what the conduct of his creatures must be; and then takes such measures as infallibly secure the conduct he requires. His argument is as follows: God, as perfect in benevolence, must desire the ultimate happiness of all his intelligent creatures; and since he is infinite in wisdom and power, he will compass the end. We need not say, that all who argue in favor of the restoration of all mankind to final holiness and happiness, rely substantially upon the same species of argumentation.

Dr. Smith, in his views of the mode of the divine administration, seems desirous of avoiding the scheme of a direct divine efficiency, and holds, that the Deity is mediately the author of all events. But whether he does not, after all, virtually subject the freedom of the creature to the same fatality that the divine efficiency scheme involves, will be better seen in the sequel. A few quotations may serve to develop his views.

The Deity must have some wise and benevolent object to accomplish, as the result of his administration, and that object can be nothing but the final and perfect happiness of his intelligent creatures. With this view, every thing must be planned, and to this end both the natural and moral disorders which prevail must necessarily conduce.' p. 46. VOL. VIII.

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That the object of God in the creation and government of the world, is both wise and benevolent, we do not question. But that the results of his acts of creation and government will be the final and perfect happiness of all his creatures, or that the only design of God in creation terminates upon creatures, is not so clear. "For thy pleasure they are and were created," is the scriptural account of this design. Our view of the subject is, that the design of God in creation and government has respect to himself and his creatures, and terminates wholly upon the good results which he foresaw he could secure; though those results fall short of the final and perfect happiness of all his creatures. So far as we know, the results of the divine government fall far short of the object which Dr. S. ascribes to God in creation. In the statements which he has made, indeed, he has begged the whole question at issue; and if they are allowed, without hesitation, there is no longer any room for argument. We think, however, that such bold assumptions, on a subject so momentous, need proof. But let us attend further to the determination of that conduct which is ordained to secure the anticipated results,-a perfectly holy universe, and the measures which God, as it is supposed, takes to accomplish them.

If then the world be indeed the production of a being who is infinite. in wisdom, power and goodness, the proof of his constant superintendence of it, seems to be irresistible. For since he is perfect in wisdom, he could not have created it without some design, and that design, whatever it be, he must be careful to accomplish. Whether we suppose he created it with a view to display to his intelligent creatures his wisdom and power, or with a design to impart enjoyment to an inconceivable number and variety of beings, we must believe, in the one case, that he will at all times provide against the interruption of that order which alone can illustrate his perfections, and the destruction of those faculties which are necessary to perceive them; and in the other, that he will suffer no event to happen, which can prevent or impair the happiness he determines to bestow.' p. 17.

Here we have Dr. Smith's theory of providence. Is there then, in point of fact, no "interruption in our world," of "that order, which alone can illustrate the divine perfections"? Is there "no destruction of faculties," which might otherwise "perceive" the glory of God, and be enraptured by it? Is there no obscuration of the divine perfections on intelligent minds,-no mental and moral darkness coming up from scenes of drunkenness, debauchery, profanity and lust,-from war and bondage, that have caused this earth to travail and groan until now? Is the intellectual atmosphere of our world all light,-its moral, all love? Has God pledged himself, in the outset, not only to overrule the perverse conduct

of men, so as to reduce the evil of it; but also to see that no event takes place, no conduct ensues, under his administration, but such as is better than any that could have taken its place? In a word, is that leading infidel dogma, All that is, is right, a baptized truism? The argument, if it proves any thing, proves too much, and shows that the assumed premises are too broad. Again he says:

What is maintained then, is, that with respect to every individual in the world, there is this exact adaptation of circumstances to his temper, his habits, his wants, so that while he is left to the full and free exercise of every faculty he possesses, he can feel and act only as the Sovereign of the universe appoints; because the circumstances which excite his sensations and volitions are determined by him. It is not just to suppose, that the Deity exercises any such control over his creatures as to force them to act contrary to their will, or to violate any principle of their nature: they always act, and must act, according to their will, and in conformity to their nature; but at the same time, he secures his own purpose by placing them in circumstances which so operate upon their nature as certainly to induce the conduct he requires.' p. 33.

We may here pause and inquire, what is free-agency? Is it the mere consequent, in a couplet, of which external objects form the antecedent? Is it so? God creates man, arranges all the circumstances of his being, and then gives him a nature, such that he must unavoidably conform to those circumstances. And now his

will is so nicely balanced between circumstances and nature, that "he can feel and act only as the Sovereign of the universe appoints." So says our author. God places men "in circumstances which so operate upon their nature, as certainly to induce the conduct he requires." What then is the difference, (so far as the freedom of creatures is concerned,) between that sovereign agency of God, which, operating upon surrounding objects, invariably and designedly secures the sinful actions of men, and that direct efficiency of God, which also secures the same kind of action? We reply, none at all. Both alike make God the author of sin in a way which we do not, and which, as we believe, can be reconciled only with the ultimate happiness of all men. Both alike virtually, though not professedly, take the power of voluntary action out of the agent. The one lodges the power in the hands of God, to be exerted directly upon the mind; the other supposes him to exert it disguisedly through the medium of external objects. In either 66 case, man can feel and act only as the sovereign of the universe appoints." What then becomes of his accountability? The influence exerted over him is designed and sure. It matters

not whether it be direct or indirect.

But let us test this circumstantial agency a little farther. Is it not opposed to the law of the divine kingdom which aims to regu