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dixæloruns, Rom. iii. 25. which when it is done, as pardon is a fruit or effect of mercy, so it is consistent with the severity of justice. See 2 Cor. v. 21. Rom. viii. 3. Gal. iii. 13, 14. Heb. ix. 14, 15. And the whole ensuing discourse of Socinus in that chapter, may be reduced unto these two heads. First, A supposition that Christ did not, nor could undergo the punishment due to our sins; which is to beg the matter in question, contrary to Scripture-testimonies innumerable, many whereof I have elsewhere vindicated from the exceptions of himself and his followers. For let this be granted, and all his discourse about the impossibility of pardoning any sin, upon the supposition of such a righteousness in God, falls to the ground. And if he will not grant it, yet may he not be allowed to make a supposition on the contrary, to be the ground of his argument, whereby he endeavours to overthrow it.

Secondly, He confounds the habits of justice and mercy, with the acts of them. Hence would he prove an inequality betwixt justice and mercy, because there is so between punishing and pardoning. And so also God declares that he delights in mercy, but is slow to anger. But actually to pardon, is no way opposite to justice, where satisfaction is made; nor to punish, unto mercy, where the law of obtaining an interest in that satisfaction is not observed. And all that God declares in the Scripture concerning his justice and mercy, with the exercise of them towards sinners, is grounded on the supposition of the interposition and satisfaction of Christ. Where that is not, as in the case of the angels who sinned, no mention is made of mercy more or less, but only of judgment according to their desert.

$ 21. The author of the Racovian Catechism manageth the same plea against the vindictive justice of God, and gathers to gether the objections which Socinus more largely debated on cap. 8. De morte Christi. And although little be added therein, to what I have already recited, yet, as it contains the substance of what they are able to plead in this cause, I shall take a view of it in the words of these Catechists. Eam misericordiam et justitiam qualem hic adversarii inseri volunt, negamus Deo inesse naturaliter. Nam quod attinet ad misericordiam eam Deo non ita natura inesse ut isti sentiunt hinc patet ; quod si natura Dco inesset non potest Deus ullum peccatum prorsus punire ; atque vicissim si ea justitia natura Deo inesset ut illi opinantur, nullum peccatum Deus remitteret. Adversus enim ea, quæ Deo insunt natura, nunquam potest quidquam facere Deus. Exempli causa ; cum Sapientia Deo insit natura nunquam contra eam quidquam Deus facit, verum quæcunque facit, omnia facit Sapienter. Verum cum Deum constet remittere peccata et punire, quando velit, apparet Deo ejusmodi misericordiam et justitiam, qualem illi opinantur non inesse natura, sed esse effectus ipsius voluntatis. Præterea eam justitiam quam adversarii misericordiæ opponunt ; qua Deus peccata punit, nusquam literæ sacræ hoc nomine justitiæ insigniunt, verum iram et furorem Dei appellant ; immo justitia Dei in Scripturis hoc attribuitur cum Deus peccata condonat, 1 John i. 9. Rom. iii. 25, 26. And hereon they conclude that there was no need, nor can there be any use of the satisfaction of Christ, Ans. 1. The design of this discourse is to prove, that justice and mercy are not properties of the divine nature. For if they are, it cannot be denied but that the sufferings of Christ were necessary, that sin might be pardoned. Now herein we have against our adversaries the light of nature; and that not only as teaching us by the conduct of right reason, that there is a singular perfection in these things, which must therefore be found in him, who is so the Author of all goodness and limited perfections to others, as to contain essentially and eminently all goodness and perfection in himself; but also it is not difficult to evince the actual consent of all mankind, who acknowledge a deity, unto this principlethat God is just and merciful, with that justice and mercy which have respect unto the sins and offences of men. There is indeed this difference betwixt them, that justice is ascribed to God properly as a habit, or an habitual perfection; mercy analogically and reductively as an affection. And therefore mercy in God is not accompanied with that sympathy and condolency which are mixed with it in our human nature. But that natural goodness and benignity, whenee God is ready to relieve, whereof his sparing and pardoning are proper effects, are that mercy of God, which he represents to us under the highest expressions of tenderness and compassion; see Psal. ciii. 814. And in such declarations of himself, he instructs us, what apprehensions we ought to have of his nature, which if it be not gracious and merciful, we are taught by him to err and mistake. So, when God shewed unto Moses his glory, and made a declaration of himself by his name, he did it, not by calling over the free acts of his will, or shewing what he would or could do if so be he pleased ; but described his nature unto him by the essential properties of it, that the people might know who and what he was with whom they had to do, Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7. And yet among them is that merey reckoned, which is exerted in the pardoning of iniquity, transgression and sin.

The same is to be said concerning the justice of God. For this vindictive justice is nothing but the absolute rectitude of the nature of God, with respect to some outward objects, namely sin and sin

Had there indeed never been any sin or sinners, God could not in any outward acts have exercised either vindictive justice or sparing mercy; but yet he had been notwithstanding eternally just and merciful.


And there is this difference between the justice and mercy of God on the one hand, and his power and wisdom on the other; that these latter being absolutely properties of the divine nature, without respect to any other thing, do constitute their own objects; so that in all the works of God, he doth not only not act against them, but he cannot act without them, for all that he doth, must necessarily be done with infinite power and wisdom. But for the other, they cannot outwardly exert nor act themselves, but towards objects antecedently qualified; whence it is enough that God neither doth nor can do any thing against them. And this he cannot do; for, secondly, It is weakly pleaded, that if God be merciful, he cannot punish any sin. For to punish sin absolutely, is no way contrary to mercy. If it were, then every one who correcteth or punisheth any for sin, must needs be unmerciful. Nor is it contrary to justice to pardon sin, where satisfaction is made for it, without which God. neither doth nor can pardon any sin, and that for this reason, namely, that it is contrary to his justice so to do. Thirdly, Whence God is said to pardon sin in his righteousness, or because he is righteous, hath been declared before. His faithfulness in his promises, with respect unto the mediation of Jesus Christ is so called, which our adversaries cannot deny.

$ 22. Crellius, in almost all his writings, opposeth this justice of God, oft-times repeating the same things, which it were tedious to pursue. Besides, I have long since answered all his principal arguments and objections, in my Diatriba de Justitia Divina. I shall therefore here only call one of his reasons to an account, whereby he would prove, that there was no necessity of making any satisfaction to God for sin, because I find it to prevail among many who are less skilled in disputations of this nature. And this is that which he insists on, lib. de Deo, cap. 3. de Potestate Dei. He lays down this as a principle : Deus potestatem habet infligendi poenam, et non infligendi ; justitia autem divinæ nequaquam repugnat peccatori quem punire jure possit, ignoscere. He is treating in that place about the dominion and free power of God. And hereunto he saith, it belongeth to inflict punishment, or to spare and pardon. But he is herein evidently mistaken. For although he who is absolutely supreme over all may punish and spare, yet it belongs not to him, as such, so to do. For punishing and sparing are the acts of a governor or judge, as such. And unto God, as such, are they constantly ascribed in the Scripture, James iv. 12. Psal. ix. 8; 9. Gen. xvii. 25. Psal. 1. 6. xciv. 2. Heb. xii

. 23. Now it is one thing what may be done by virtue of absolute sovereignty and dominion, setting aside the consideration of rule and government; and another what ought to be done by a


righteous ruler or judge. And whereas he says it is not contrary to justice to spare one who might de jure be punished, if he means by saying that a ruler may punish him by right, no more but that he

may do so and do him no wrong, were there no more in the case, it might be true. But it is not thus at any time with sinners; for not only may God punish them and do them no wrong, but his own holiness and righteousness require that they should be punished. And therefore the assertion, if accommodated to the cause in hand, must be this, It is no wrong to justice to spare them who ought to be punished, which is manifestly false. And Crellius himself grants, that there are sins and sinners, which not only God may punish de jure, but that he ought so to do, and that it would be contrary to his justice not to punish them: Adu. Grot. ad cap. 1. p. 98. Deinde nec illud negamus rectitudinem ac justitiam Dei nonnunquam eum ad peccata punienda movere ; irum nempe quibus veniam non concedere, non modo æquitati per se est admodum consentaneum, verum etiam divinis decretis ut ita loquar debitum, quales sunt homines.non resipiscentes, atque in peccatis contumaciter perseverantes ; maxime si illud peccati genus in quo persistunt, insignem animi malitiam, aut apertum divina majestatis contemptum spiret, si enim hujusmodi hominibus venia concederetur, facile supremi Rectoris Majestas, et legum ab ipso latarum evilesceret, et gloria ipsius, qua precipuus operum ejus omnium finis est, minueretur.

What here he grants concerning some sins, we contend to be true concerning all. Neither doth that justice, equity and rule, which require these sins of contumacy and impenitency to be punished, depend on a free decree or act of the will of God only; for then no sin of itself, or in its own nature, deserves puinishment. And it implies a contradiction to say that it doth so, and yet that it depends so merely on the will of God. And in that book, de Deo, he hath other conceptions to this purpose, cap. 23. p. 180. Est ratio aliqua honestalis, circa quam Deus juste dispensare non potest ; and p. 186. Deo indignum est contu'macium scelera impunita demittere; and cap. 28. Nec sanctitas nec majestas Dei usquequaque fert ut impune mandata ejus violentur.

If it be thus with respect to some sin, it must not be because of sin, but only of some degrees of sin, if it be not so with all sin whatever. And who can believe that the nature of sin is not contrary unto the holiness and majesty of God, but that some certain degrees only of it are so. And who shall give in that degree of sin, when it becomes so inconsistent with God's holi. ness and majesty ?. It is said that this is stubbornness and impenitency. But whoever sins once against God, will be impenitent therein, unless relieved by the grace of Jesus Christ, which supposeth his satisfaction. And this is evident in the in- , stance of the angels that sinned.

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$ 23. The defence which he makes of his former assertion, containing the substance

of what remains of their plea against the necessity of the satisfaction of Christ, I shall now particularly examine, and put an end to this Exercitation. He therefore pleads : Nemini sive puniat, sive non puniat facit injuriam ; siquidem de jure ipsius tantum agitur ; neque enim nocenti debetur peena, sed is eam debet ; et debet quidem illi injuria omnis ultimo ren dundat cui, qui in nostro negotio Deus est ; jus autem suum si rem spectes ut persequi cuique licet, ita et non persequi; ac de ea quantumlibet remittere: hæc enim juris proprii, ac dominici natura est.

Answ. Jus Dei, doxa.wpce.T* 088, the right of God, in this matter, is neither jus proprium, which answers the right of every private person, nor jus dominicum, or the right of absolute dominion; but the right of a ruler or supreme judge, whereunto the things here ascribed to the right of God in this matter do not belong, as we shall see. For whereas he saith, 1. That whether he punish or do not punish, he doth wrong to none, it is granted that no wrong is done to men, for by reason of his sovereignty he can do them none. But where punishment is due to any sin, it cannot be absolutely spared without the wrong or impeachment of that justice in whose nature it is to require its punishment. It is not then properly said, that if God should not punish sin, he should wrong any, for that he cannot, do he what he will ; but not to punish sin, is contrary to his own holiness and righteousness. And for what he adds, secondly, That punishment is not due to the offender, but that he owes his punishment to him against whom the injury is done, who in this case is God; I say, certainly no man ever imagined that punishment is so due to the offender, or is so far his right, as that he should be injured if he were not punished, or that he might claim it as his right. Few offenders will pursue such a right. And whereas it is said, that the injury in sin is done to God, it must be rightly understood. For the injury that is done to him, hath no analogy with that which is done by one private man to another. Neither doth our goodness add any thing to him, nor our sin take any thing from him. Job xxxv. 6–8. “ If thou sinnest, what dost thou against him? Or if thy transgressions be multiplied, what dost thou unto him ? If thou be righteous, what givest thou him ? or what receiveth he of thine hand ? Thy wickedness may hurt a man as thou art, and thy righteousness may profit the son of man." But that which is here called injury, is the transgression of the law of the righteous Judge of all the world. And shall he not do right? Shall he not recompence to men according to their ways ? And therefore that falls to the ground, which he adds as the proof of the whole ; for as it is lawful for every one to prosecute his own

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