mystery of eternal existence must be admitted equally on both sides. Shelley's cavil, then, raised on an unfair interpretation of Paley's expression was not relevant. But our author embraces the opportunity afforded by the mention of this cavil to administer another rebuke to the metaphysicians; and we also see farther into the whole purport of his reasoning. "But it is by no means an unfair rebuke to this entire class of so-called metaphysical reasonings, to point out the monstrous absurdities to which we are unavoidably led, if we once commence reasoning upon mere analogical expressions, as if they constituted the essential realities of the case. If we thought," adds our author, "that any such abuse could be perpetrated on the terms 'intelligence' or 'mind,' which we have used as implied in, or in fact almost synonymous with 'arrangement' and 'order,' we would endeavour to find some phrase more unexceptionable. But we believe these terms are not susceptible of such perversion, carefully limited in their use, to the exact sense we have defined." Our author thus sets aside our mental constitution as having nothing whatever to do in this great question; and his meaning of the terms employed by him is surely now sufficiently palpable. The doctrine then is; the physical branch of the argument does not enable us strictly to infer that there is a personal God. No sooner, however, was the preceding section finished than our author-his own better belief, we doubt not, entering its "emphatic protest "-tells us that he does "not, of course, refuse the use of the term person;" only he" would carefully restrict the application of it to such a meaning as effectually to exclude anthropomorphism;" adding these words, "while we conceive that the use of it, in any sense, is derived, not from any philosophical considerations, but wholly from quite other sources," meaning, we apprehend, from revelation. Like some others in our day, our author is in great dread of anthropomorphism. We confess to be in much greater dread of nihilism. And we concur in the following words of Sir W. Hamilton, referring to Schelling's theory, and to a sentiment of the poet Manilius: "Each is himself a miniature of God," he says, "For we should not recoil to the opposite extreme; and, though man be not identical with the Deity, still he is created in the image of God.' It is indeed, only through an analogy of the human with the divine nature, that we are percipient and recipient of divinity" (Dis. p. 19, note). This opinion, expressed by one whose metaphysical authority even Professor Powell will acknowledge to be of some weight, is in harmony with what we learn from a higher authority-from the Supreme Being himself, who employed anthropomorphic expressions, when revealing His character and will to His creature, man. The fact is simply

this; we must either think of God in this way, or not think of Him at all.

We must now briefly condense the remainder of our author's remarks on this subject. He refers to Comte's objection to our ascribing "volition" to the Deity; seeing that the laws of nature are invariable; whereas volition, as Comte thinks, would necessitate them to be arbitrary and variable. "Doubtless," says our author, "the language of many writers on the subject fairly lays it open to such an inference;" that is, by ascribing personality and consequently volition to the Creator, we are at the same time affirming that "all laws and phenomena must be essentially arbitrary and variable, while all science assures us they are essentially fixed and invariable." Science, we submit, gives us no such assurance, nor do we conclude from the Divine volition, that laws and phenomena must be essentially different from what they are. What we affirm is, that these laws and phenomena are what they are, simply because the Creator appointed them; and all that science assures us is, that so long as the Creator wills it, they must continue to be what they are. All laws and phenomena are essentially the ordinances of Divine volition, power, and intelligence. The uniformity of external nature, arises, in fact, from the very circumstance that matter being itself void of power, will, and intelligence, cannot possibly alter its own properties and laws; but this uniformity cannot possibly exclude the operation of the Divine intelligence and will. Our author, however, has another way of meeting the objection: "But the objection appears in all its littleness and fallacy to those who have been trained to take the more comprehensive view of the real argument, of universal intelligence based essentially on that very principle of the universal and invariable order of physical causes;" that is, only infer universality of intelligence without ascribing this to a personal God, distinct from nature-to a being possessed of the power of volition-and you discern the littleness and fallacy of the atheistical objection. That this is our author's meaning is evident from the next section, in which, after referring to Mr Mill's socalled conclusive argument on this point, he asserts: "In point of fact, the more we consider the narrow limits of all strict philosophical reasoning on such subjects, the more must we acknowledge how inadequate are the mere results of science, whether physical or metaphysical, really to support those more sublime inferences which involve a moral personality, and those elevated conceptions of volition and power, which any moral relations imply-to say nothing of higher religious and spiritual influences; such conclusions are altogether beyond the function and province of scientific deduction, they can

only be derived from some other and more worthy sources. There can be no doubt that ideas of the Divine will and power are in reality, with the vast majority, derived entirely from the language of the Bible, from which even those who attempt to reason on the subject philosophically, find a difficulty in abstracting their conceptions. It is thus that they so constantly spend their labours in fruitless attempts to raise a superstructure of reasoning larger than the foundation will support, and do not perceive that their imagined purely philosophic speculations are in reality only unconscious reminiscences of early impressions; and their supposed deductive inferences only plausible arguments in support of a foregone conclusion, really derived from quite another source." Professor Powell here distinctly affirms that, apart from divine revelation, we are unable to support, on any philosophical grounds whatever, those inferences which involve the moral personality of God, or those elevated conceptions of volition or power which any moral relations imply; "such conclusions are altogether beyond the function and province of scientific deduction," and it is from revelation alone that they are derived. Now this is a most serious affirmation; for, in the first place, revelation itself addresses man as capable of attaining to such conclusions, and as morally bound to know them and to act upon them-appealing as it does both to internal and to external facts as bearing decided testimony to the personality of God, to his power and will, and to our moral relation towards Him as our Sovereign Ruler. Revelation proclaims man as chargeable with guilt, and as being altogether without excuse in not discerning the proofs furnished by external nature of the eternal power and Godhead-that is, divinity-of the Creator, and in not yielding obedience to the "law written in the heart." Revelation then implies that there are grounds of evidence in the works of creation, in the moral constitution of our nature, and in the scheme of providence exercised over us-of evidence so clear and so abundant as to leave us without excuse-in support of those very conclusions to which reference is made as "altogether beyond the function and province of scientific deduction." But, secondly, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conceive the possibility of revelation to beings constituted as the theory of Professor Powell implies. That a revelation be possible, it seems to be absolutely necessary that those to whom it is addressed possess an intellectual and a moral constitution, adapted of itself to know God as a personal God, standing to them in the relation of supreme moral ruler. And while we acknowledge the spiritual darkness and moral depravity of our race, and the absolute need of revelation to dispel this darkness and overcome this depravity, yet we must

not, under the idea of sustaining its high claims, and setting forth our obligations for such an unspeakably precious boon, adopt a theory respecting man's real constitution which would annihilate the very ground on which alone revelation seems to be possible. We are, however, the less surprised that such a theory should proceed from our author, when we consider his views on the origin of man, as set forth in his Unity of Worlds. The theory may not be inconsistent with the hypothesis that the rudiments of all organic as well as inorganic products and structures-man as a living and intellectual being not excepted, (the spiritual man, however, belonging to another order of things), must have been evolved by the operation of regular laws out of a primæval mass of fused, vaporised, nebulous matter-an hypothesis which professes to give us a sublime idea of the unity of the whole system of nature, but which, while apparently excepting man's moral or spiritual nature, does in reality reduce man to be the mere product of physical causes-strangely, however, ascribing to him a power of intellect sufficient to discern this primæval mass in which the very elements of his being were to be found, but not sufficient, even in conjunction with his higher nature, which was of special creation, to discern the operation of a living, personal Creator, himself possessed of power and will, and standing towards man in the relation of moral governor.

Our author again alludes to the strong objection against making design a part of the physical argument; for this implies "forethought, deliberate contrivance, a succession of intellectual acts, evolving consequences"-a view of the argument which has been objected to on the ground that it is derogatory to the idea of the divine perfections," and which, "in fact, gives the argument an anthropomorphic tendency." Atheists for the objectors must belong to this class-are indeed exceedingly solicitous about the dignity of the divine perfections; and they are in special dread of anthropomorphism. "The objection," our author conceives, "is entirely removed by the more comprehensive view of order; the character of mind stamped upon order is not at all that of laboured contrivance. Does our author really mean that the production of 'order' implies less of deliberate contrivance' than the adaptation of means to an end? We cannot possibly see the reality of the distinction which he here attempts to make, and on which he dwells with such pertinacity in his Unity of Worlds. We admit that the idea of mere order is a more comprehensive one than that of special arrangement for particular ends; and we also admit that we are able to discern order in the system of nature when we cannot discover the

particular end which such arrangement in that system may have been intended to subserve. But strictly speaking, order itself is an instance of design, and must imply what our author terms forethought' and deliberate contrivance;' and to represent the "character of mind stamped upon order as not being at all that of laboured contrivance," which, according to our author, is the character of mind stamped on an arrangement for the production of a special end, appears to us as a most unphilosophical view of the operation of the divine intelligence, and as tending rather to misrepresent this operation, than to rectify our conceptions, imperfect at the best, of the intelligence and wisdom of Him whose very will is power. The great question is, Does the system of nature merely impress our minds with the idea of order? Does it not along with this idea impress us with the conviction of purposed order of special arrangements for the production of special ends? This is the real question-and not, whether there is more of laboured contrivance in a system constructed for special ends than in one where mere order among the constituent parts is discerned. In either case, supreme intelligence is exhibited; but in the adaptation of means to manifest ends, and to ends perceived to be for the good of living beings, we have a proof of the same intelligence operating in union with supreme beneficence. And the strictest possible philosophy will irresistibly conduct every man, not blinded by atheistical prepossessions, to the conclusion that there is a purpose aimed at in the whole system of nature; and in many particular cases, the special ends included in this divine intention are abundantly manifest. We of course do not attribute such prepossessions to our author, but we must say that he appears to us as by far over-anxious to discriminate between mere order and design. After all, the main point here is, what is this mind which is stamped upon order? Is it a mere abstraction? Is the mind identical with the order? or is it the mind of an allpowerful and intelligent Creator that the order displays? This is the point of real importance in the theistic argu

ment.

After some further remarks on the idea of order, as superior to that of mere design as usually understood, Professor Powell assails the notion of "causation" in the old sense of efficient power. "In a similar way, we may trace much of the confusion, and many sources of objection which have arisen in the argument, to the strong prejudice with which so many have continued, in spite of the elucidations which modern philosophy has afforded, to cling to the notion of causation' in the old sense of efficient power, the connection of cause and effect with personal agency, and the whole of the old scholastic