utterly unable to sustain our belief in the existence of a Supreme Being. He not only discredits the proofs referred to, but affirms the incapability of reason in its speculative capacity to recognise as valid any proof whatever; and he then has recourse to what he term the practical reason' for arguments to construct the edifice which he had so laboriously overthrown. "But thus discarding the argument from pure reason' as insufficient in any strict philosophical sense, he entirely concedes the appeal to 'practical reason' or moral sense, for proofs, sufficient for moral and practical ends of the three great points, the being of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul. He refers to 'moral sense' as a general fact, and thus adopts the commonly-received inferences of the connection between virtue and happiness, and that to dispense the one in proportion to the other, implies a supreme moral will, or governor. But as this proportion is not preserved in this life, there must be a future state, in which it is to be carried out and perfected." After some remarks on Locke's argument-the same as the cosmological one of Kant-and on one of the forms of Descartes' proof, he observes, "Such are some of the clever combinations of words with which acute minds often delude themselves and others into a belief that they have fixed a firm grasp on grand realities." He then briefly alludes to Cousin's criticism on Kant's inconsistency in conceding to the "practical reason" what he had denied to the "pure"-an inconsistency both censured and praised, but on different grounds, by Cousin; and maintains that, "perhaps a closer attention to Kant's design. and method, might shew that there is less inconsistency than Cousin supposes. Kant," he adds, "in fact, draws with a clear and masterly hand the important distinction between strict philosophical reasoning and that kind of moral persuasion which prevails among mankind at large, and suffices for all practical purposes. He then adduces Cousin's own view of this subject. He is represented as defending both the 'ontological' and the cosmological' arguments from Kant's unsparing criticisms. "His defence, however, (by his own confession), in either instance, resolves itself into an appeal, not to strict logical argument, but to what is the same with the Cartesian idea divested of its syllogistic form'-the mere assertion of an internal consciousness or intuitive persuasion which, he contends, gives men a natural and perfectly satisfactory conviction of a Deity without further reasoning." It seems perfectly clear, we apprehend, that Professor Powell has no precise idea of the relation which "a strict logical argument" bears to science, or of what Cousin means by an "internal consciousness or intuitive persuasion"-that is, by a primi

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tive judgment. He evidently imagines that, supposing the reality of the divine existence, logical argument—that is, syllogistic reasoning a priori, ought to be applicable to such a subject, and that this "internal consciousness" is a ground of belief lower in value than what belongs to the "strict logical argument." But let us follow him out to his conclusion. "We may cite the authority of the late Sir W. Hamilton as bearing eminently worthy testimony to the same admission as that of Kant. After the most careful examination of the abstract and so-called a priori arguments, that distinguished metaphysician entirely gives up the claims of his own science to being able to supply those demonstrations of the being of a God, which a former age found so much to its taste, and so extensively followed up. But in abandoning this abstract ground, he seizes upon the practical, and fully acknowledges that the only valid arguments for the existence of a God, and for the immortality of the human soul, rest on the ground of man's moral nature."" Here, then, Sir W. Hamilton is represented as acquiescing in Kant's supposed antagonism between the "pure" and the "practical" reason. Professor Powell's conclusion on the relation between metaphysical science and natural theology is now given in these few words: -"Such has been the progress, and such, we conceive, must be the termination, of these questions, as discussed on grounds professedly philosophical. The high metaphysical claims of the theistic a priori argument subside into the more modest assertion of a moral persuasion"—that is, on whatever other grounds natural theology may rest, it is not and cannot be sustained on grounds professedly philosophical. Argument has been employed, and has failed. Natural theology, therefore, is not a branch of philosophical science, and this conclusion, instead of being regarded as a proof of fallacy in the premises, is in fact looked upon as absolutely certain-drawn though it be from premises, which, if applied to other departments of science, would also inevitably deprive them of their scientific character-not excepting even that peculiar science which justly boasts of the highest possible kind of necessity.

The whole of this portion of Professor Powell's essay is far from being satisfactory-not, however, on account so much of what it contains, as of what it does not contain. The author virtually undertook to exhibit the relation which metaphysical science bears to natural theology. This is a subject of fundamental importance, and ought either to have been entirely left out, or to have been thoroughly discussed. No doubt, the subject is of extreme difficulty, and is otherwise not particularly interesting to many minds. But there is no alternative. It is impossible to separate natural theology from such discus

sions; and in the present state of the great question before us, there is really nothing more desiderated than a clear exposition of the bearing of metaphysics on this question. When our author referred to Kant's refutation of the theological proofs, he was bound, we think, to shew that whether these proofs had been presented in their legitimate forms or not, Kant, whose vast powers of criticism and logic we fully admit, constructed in his critique of the pure reason, a system which, if true, cuts up natural theology by the roots-a system, however, possessed of such destructive powers as to involve us in absolute scepticism. In referring also to Sir W. Hamilton's authority, the author was equally bound to shew the whole bearing of this distinguished metaphysician's views on our subject; and had he thoroughly examined these views, he would have found that no two men are more opposed to one another than Kant and Hamilton, and that although the latter may have given forth questionable deliverances on some points, yet the whole bearing of his system is in perfect harmony with the reality of natural theology as a science.

It is impossible for us to present our readers with a view of the respective systems of these two metaphysicians. We can merely express our conviction, that a careful survey of them. would establish the opinion we have just expressed, and that Sir William Hamilton's system tends directly to support the conclusion, that natural theology has its foundation in a primitive necessary judgment, formed by the mind in the view of our own conditioned being, and of the conditioned existence of the external world. The finite mind of man has no immediate intuition of the Supreme Being; and it is logically impossible to construct any argument demonstrative of His existence. But the mind is conscious of its own finite and dependent existence, as also of its own intellectual and moral nature. We are conscious of our own conditioned being; and this consciousness is irresistibly accompanied with the idea of, and the belief in, an infinite and all-perfect, an unconditioned Being, our Creator and moral Governor. This belief is corroborated by the contemplation of the world around us, which we are of course compelled to regard as equally conditioned with ourselves, and as owing its origin to the same self-existent, all-mighty, and all-perfect Creator. Our conception of this Being is necessarily imperfect; but as personality is essential to every being, reason teaches us to regard Him as a living, personal God-as one whose incomprehensible being neither excludes nor absorbs the finite beings who depend on His power. Resting on this ground, natural theology is secure in its basis, and is entitled to take its place-the highest

place in the order of the sciences. Atheism is condemned as involving a contradiction by the testimony of our whole consciousness, for it supposes the conditioned to be the unconditioned; and Pantheism is also condemned as self-contradictory; for it confounds the conditioned with the unconditioned -the finite, dependent and responsible creature, with the infinite, the independent, and irresponsible Creator. Theism alone is in harmony with the testimony of consciousness, that is, with the judgment of reason; and this judgment is confirmed by those feelings and affections which are native to the mind springing up along with the judgment, and which find their appropriate object only in one whom we can adore, in whom we can place confidence, and from whom we can supplicate direction, protection, and comfort. This judgment is also corroborated by a detailed examination of the innumerable instances of intelligence, wisdom, and goodness which meet us wherever we turn our eyes. The whole system of nature, material, intellectual, and moral, furnishes proofs the most numerous and the most convincing, that the primitive judgment of our reason is the only judgment which is worthy of intelligent beings, surrounded as we are with a scene so marvellous in every aspect in which it can be viewed.

II. THE PHYSICAL ARGUMENT.--Passing over the portion of the essay which refers to the two extreme schools formerly alluded to, we come to Professor Powell's discussion of the physical branch of the argument, in other words, to the a posteriori argument, founded on empirical facts for the existence of God. His main design here is to show the nature of this argument; and, in particular, the very narrow limits to which, in his opinion, it extends. We shall just state at present, in general, the view which we entertain of this argument. It does not appear to us as essentially different from the one already discussed, but to be only the same argument applied to details; and we acknowledge that we regard the a posteriori argument, as it is termed, as subservient rather to fix the attention on particular facts, and thus to enlarge and elevate our conceptions of the Divine attributes, than to give origin to our belief in the Divine existence. It is, however, a perfectly valid argument for the latter as well as for the former purpose; for, as we have said, it is just the general argument viewed in details. The general one is as much an a posteriori argument as the other, both being founded on facts, and the conclusion in each case being not strictly a logical, but a psychological or primitive judgment. That order, arrangement, adaptation of means to an end, imply mind, intelligence, design, is a judgment which we necessarily pro

Hence, to

nounce by the laws of our mental constitution. question this judgment is just to question this mental constitution; and with the man who does so there can be no reasoning on this subject. It is to be also carefully observed that this argument is not, as is generally said, an inductive argument. The facts are obtained by induction, but the argument itself is strictly a judgment spontaneously formed by the mind on the view of these facts. By no possible inductive process can we arrive at a belief in a Supreme Being; for such process is only one which generalizes facts, and does not of itself allow us to pass beyond the sphere of these facts. There is, we apprehend, but one valid argument for the Divine existence; and that consists in a necessary judgment which the mind pronounces, whether in respect to conditioned existence as a whole, or in respect to individual facts presented to us in the world of mind or in that of matter. But we shall now examine Professor Powell's laboured account of the physical argument, and shall then offer our own reflections on his reasonings.

After stating that those who in former times took up this branch of the argument, "employed themselves rather in commenting on the illustrations furnished by different parts of the natural world to the assumed truth of a supreme being, and of a primæval creation, than thought of attempting to deduce the latter from the former; much less did they engage in the philosophical enquiry: What are the inferences to which an examination of the order and arrangement of the material world legitimately leads as to the source of that order?" he proceeds to make some general remarks on the manner in which, even at the present day, this argument is conducted, finding fault with writers for dwelling almost exclusively on indications of design, for proceeding in their discussions on these, on the presupposed belief in a Deity, and for even then not drawing precise conclusions, but indulging in most vague and undefined notions or modes of expression, "in which they rather seek to fall in with popular anticipation of the conclusion, than to define it with clearness, or guard it from sceptical assaults." He in particular charges the argument of Paley with having "throughout a greater infusion of the appeal to popular sense and common prepossessions than of the more philosophical analysis of abstract truth." Having gone such a length in remarks of this sort, he records "an emphatic protest:"-" When we say we cannot legitimately infer this or that conclusion, when we assert that such or such a doctrine is beyond the limits of strict philosophy, when we deny that this or that inference is a precise or logical one from the premises, there is a constant tendency to object, to misconceive,