eloquence, intellectual progress, liberality, and independence. We are content with his reluctant concession that the Old School are outspoken, consistent, and, on the basis of the creeds professed by both parties, have fairly and honourably vanquished their opponents. As to all else, we should begin to tremble for our own fidelity, if such a writer could give a more favourable estimate than the following: "We can conceive of nothing more utterly ineffective, hopeless, or dismal, than the pleadings of the Old School divines of our day, in defence of their antiquated system," p. 365.

purpose.

He concedes that Unitarianism cannot bring its "forces to bear, as do the orthodox, in combined zeal and earnestness of Unitarianism has certainly exhibited some marked deficiency, either of power, or of skill, or of ingenuity, or of enthusiasm," p. 40. The impracticability of framing a creed is avowed as a principal cause of the comparative failure of the American Unitarian Association-the only attempt to organise the fraternity into effective co-operation. He also concedes that the vagueness and diversity of opinion among them are such, as to everything except a few negations, that an adversary finds it almost "impossible to define and identify his foe." This, one would think, solves the mystery. Men cannot live and work on mere negations. There must be something positive, definite, certain, momentous, to awaken zeal, and sustain effort. Simply to pronounce the cardinal doctrines of orthodoxy absurd, confounding, revolting, "hideously heathenish," may indeed for a while rally around a blank standard a crowd of unbelievers. But unless there be inscribed on it a creed, a credendum, a somewhat to be believed, loved, obeyed, sustained, propagated, because the eternal weal or woe of men hangs upon it; a somewhat, too, that is positive, definable, and knowable, it never can permanently enlist the religious zeal and activity of large numbers of men. Even tender maidens will desert those, who, when they ask the bread of divine truth, give them some undefined platitude which "it is impossible to identify." The adherents of such a system will become more and more unable and indisposed to teach it to their children, from generation to generation. Smitten with sterility and impotence, it must die out, and give way to a better, or to that only heresy which can be developed from it, according to our author-sheer infidelity.

We should not completely unfold the animus of this book, if we failed to quote one of the passages which more distinctly indicate whom he honours as chief coadjutors in propagating the seminal principles among the orthodox, which are among the tokens of ultimate affiliation with Unitarians. While we

* See Introduction, p. 17.

† Ib. p. 24.

only expect the vituperation which he vents upon the class to which we belong, we shall rejoice if it turn out that the objects of this laudation are here honoured with encomiums which they neither covet nor deserve.

"When we read in the controversial pamphlets of a half-century ago, the positive assertions made by orthodoxy, . . . and then turn to the pages of the eminent orthodox writers of the present day, we stand amazed at the change. True, some lean, and querulous, and stingy souls, still give forth their dreary or petulant utterances; but they are not the ones that win a large hearing, or speak for their party. The tone and manner of Dr Edward Beecher's Conflict of Ages,' compared with the sulphurous preaching of his now venerable father, when he was leader of revival meetings about this neighbourhood, tells an interesting tale of the work that has been wrought here in the interval between the father's manhood and that of the son. True, the very problematical hypothesis by wifich the son has sought to relieve the orthodox dogma of its dogmatism, is but a poor device. But he is not to blame for that, as he did the best he could; better indeed than could have been expected, for in assailing one dogma he has not substituted another. The true orthodox men who now have the most influence over the higher class of minds to which orthodoxy is to look for its advocacy in the next generation, are Professor Park and Dr Bushnell, men of brilliant genius, of eminent devotion, of towering ability, and regarded by large circles of friends with profound regard and confidence. Those two noble expositors of truth, as they receive it, have added a century of vigorous life to many orthodox churches, and have deferred the final dismay of that system for at least the same period of time. Professor Park's Convention Sermon is, in our judgment, one of the most remarkable pieces in all our religious literature. For subtlety, skill, power, richness of diction, pointedness of utterances, and implications of deep things lying behind its utterances, it is a marvellous gem of beauties and brilliants. Dr Bushnell's writings, in some sentences unintelligible to our capacity, and in some points inexplicable as to their meaning, are rich in their revelations of a free and earnest spirit which keep him struggling between the wings that lift him, and the withs that bind him. These two honoured men have relieved orthodoxy in some of its most offensive metaphysical enigmas. How have they blunted the edge of Calvinism! How have they reduced the subtle and perplexing philosophy of the Westminster Catechism, by the rich rhetoric with which they have mitigated its physic into a gentle homoeopathy? Unitarianism aimed thus to abate and soften religious dogmatism. It has succeeded; and the noblest element in its success is, that it must divide the honour with champions from the party of its opponent." Pp. 42, 43.

With this, which gives out so strongly the aroma of the book, we close our protracted comments upon it. None would rejoice more than ourselves to know that these praises are wholly unmerited, and that the eminent divines on whom

they are bestowed, have here suffered the infliction of gratuitous and unmerited eulogy. We hope it will turn out that they are "more sinned against than sinning" in the premises. But let all concerned know where Unitarianism fixes "its heart and hope," and why it does so. "The New Theology has, (says Mr Ellis) I believe, dealt a mortal blow upon the Old Orthodox." Multitudes have thought so before. But it still lives, and will live when all rival systems are dead; for it stands, not in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God.

ART. IX.-Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education, and University Reform. By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart. Second Edition. London, 1853.

In the conclusion of a former article, in which we exposed the extraordinary blundering and inaccuracy of Sir William Hamilton on the subject of the Doctrine of Assurance, we intimated (vol. v. p. 962) an intention of noticing another theological demonstration, of a somewhat imposing kind, which had been made by him. It is contained in the following passage.

"Averments to a similar effect might be adduced from the writings of Calvin, and certainly nothing can be conceived more contrary to the doctrine of that great divine than what has latterly been promulgated as Calvinism, (and, in so far as I know, without reclamation), in our Calvinistic Church of Scotland. For it has been here promulgated as the dogma of this church (though in the face of its Confession as in the face of the Bible) by pious and distinguished theologians, that man has no will, agency, moral personality of his own, God being the only real agent in every apparent act of his creatures; in short, (though quite the opposite was intended) that the theological scheme of the absolute decrees implies fatalism, pantheism, the negation of a moral governor, as of a moral world. For the premises, arbitrarily assumed, are atheistic, the conclusion, illogically drawn, is Christian. Against such a view of Calvin's doctrine and of Scottish orthodoxy, I for one must humbly though solemnly protest, as (to speak mildly) not only false in philosophy, but heretical, ignorant, suicidal in theology."-(Discussions, second edition, 1853, p. 628.)

This strange passage, which bears upon the face of it such unequivocal marks of folly and ferocity, was intended as a deadly assault upon Dr Chalmers, and upon the views which he had promulgated upon the subject of philosophical necessity. No person of ordinary discernment can read the passage

without seeing that its origin is to be traced to a blind determination to have a blow at "pious and distinguished theologians," rather than to an accurate knowledge of the subject, or to any zeal for truth upon the point. The passage as it stands would be wholly unintelligible, without the key furnished by some knowledge derived from other sources, as to the author's real motive and object in penning it. The doctrine here so vehemently denounced cannot, from the nature of the case, be any other than that commonly called the doctrine of philosophical necessity, and though many will regard what is here said as very unjust and unfair if viewed as applied to that doctrine, there is manifestly no other doctrine to which these statements can have any appearance of applying. When it is settled that the doctrine which Sir William here denounces is that of philosophical necessity, and that of course the pious and distinguished theologians who are here held up to scorn and contempt are Dr Chalmers, and all who, professing like him to receive the Westminster Confession, have concurred with him in maintaining the doctrine of necessity as taught by Jonathan Edwards, men will be able to understand something more of the import and object of the passage; while those who know something of Sir William's history and temper, will see in it one of the melancholy instances in which he allowed the expression of his opinions to be greatly influenced by the operation of low and degrading motives.

We promised to shew that this assault upon Dr Chalmers and the doctrine of philosophical necessity is unwarranted and untenable, while at the same time we intimated, that we did not altogether approve of the way in which this subject had been treated by Dr Chalmers and Jonathan Edwards. We do not of course intend to plunge into the mare magnum of the general subject of philosophical necessity as connected with "absolute decrees," "fatalism," "pantheism," negation of a moral governor," &c., on which Sir William here declaims. The general subject brought before us by these statements is the most perplexing and mysterious that has ever occupied the mind of man. No one acquainted with the discussions which have taken place regarding it, can fail to have reached these two conclusions:-1st, that everything of any worth or value that can be said upon the subject, has been said in substance a thousand times; and, 2d, that after all that has been said, there are difficulties and mysteries connected with it which never have been fully solved, and which manifestly never will be fully solved, at least until men get either more enlarged mental faculties or a fuller revelation from God. The practical result of the adoption of these conclusions, which must have forced themselves upon all who have intelligently surveyed

this subject, is to render men rather averse to unnecessary discussions regarding it, to make them less anxious about answering objections and clearing away difficulties, and more willing to rest upon those fundamental principles which constitute the direct and proper evidence of what seems to be the truth upon the point. This state of mind and feeling, the reasonable result of a deliberate survey of the discussions which have taken place upon the matter, is sanctioned also by the example of the Apostle Paul, who when the same objections were brought against his doctrines as have in all ages been brought against Calvinism, resolved the whole matter into the inscrutable sovereignty of God and the ignorance and helplessness of man, instead of directly and formally grappling with the objection. Sir William Hamilton's own views upon the subject are of a kind fitted to discourage if not to preclude discussion, especially discussion conducted in the way of bringing the opposite doctrines face to face, and trying to make an estimate of the comparative force of the objections against them. His views are briefly indicated in the following passages :

"The philosophy, therefore, which I profess, annihilates the theoretical problem,-How is the scheme of liberty or the scheme of necessity to he rendered comprehensible ?-by shewing that both schemes are equally inconceivable; but it establishes liberty practically as a fact, by shewing that it is either itself an immediate datum, or is involved in an immediate datum of consciousness." (Reid's Works, p. 599, note).

"How the will can possibly be free must remain to us, under the present limitation of our faculties, wholly incomprehensible. We are unable to conceive an absolute commencement; we cannot, therefore, conceive a free volition. A determination by motives cannot, to our understanding, escape from necessitation.”—(Discussions, p. 624.)

"How, therefore, I repeat moral liberty is possible in man or God, we are utterly unable speculatively to understand. But practically, the fact, that we are free, is given to us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability."-(Discussions, p. 624.)

"Liberty is thus shewn to be inconceivable, but not more than its contradictory necessity; yet though inconceivable, liberty is shewn also not to be impossible. The credibility of consciousness to our moral responsibility, as an incomprehensible fact, is thus established." -(Discussions, p. 630.)

"This hypothesis alone accounts for the remarkable phenomenon which the question touching the liberty of the will-touching the necessity of human actions, has in all ages and in all relations exhibited. This phenomenon is the exact equilibrium in which the controversy has continued, and it has been waged in metaphysics, in morals, in theology, from the origin of speculation to the present