Institutions and Social Conflict
Many of the fundamental questions in social science entail an examination of the role played by social institutions. Why do we have so many social institutions? Why do they take one form in one society and quite different ones in others? In what ways do these institutions originally develop? And when and why do they change? Institutions and Social Conflict addresses these questions in two ways. First it offers a thorough critique of a wide range of theories of institutional change, from the classical accounts of Smith, Hume, Marx and Weber to the contemporary approaches of evolutionary theory, the theory of social conventions and the new institutionalism. Second, it develops a new theory of institutional change that emphasizes the distributional consequences of social institutions. The emergence of institutions is explained as a by-product of distributional conflict in which asymmetries of power in a society generate institutional solutions to conflicts. The book draws its examples from an extensive variety of social institutions.
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action alternatives analysis argument asymmetries of power average rule behavior choice choose cial claims collective benefits competition compliance conception consider constraints coordination costs creditors criterion decentralized decision distributional advantage distributional conflict distributional consequences distributional effects division rules economic emphasize equilibrium outcome establish evolutionary example exchange existing expectations expected utility expected value explanations externally enforced favor focus formal institutions future important informal institutions informal rules insti institutional arrangements institutional change institutional development institutional forms institutional rules interests logic mechanism mixed strategies natural selection nomic noncompliance organization Pareto Pareto optimality particular payoffs players political preferences primogeniture Prisoner's Dilemma procedures produce property rights question rational rational-choice relationship relevant selection self-interested social actors social conventions social institutions social interactions social outcomes socially efficient society spontaneous emergence spontaneous order stability status quo stitutions strategic actors strategies structure theories of institutional tional tions tutional union unit of selection workers
Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'new Institutionalism'
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Ingen forhåndsvisning - 2005
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