could be made to my reasons; and the | had approved of the conduct of General

king, Murat, did not take the trouble to refute them. He thought a great deal more of escaping himself, and of returning to Naples — a step he took without informing the emperor. He handed the command over to Prince Eugène; it was unfortunate that the emperor did not give it to the prince when he left the army."

The garrisons were thus left to their fate, and this unfortunate course not only deprived the shattered French army of valuable support, but had a disastrous effect in 1813, for it was a main cause of the ruinous efforts Napoleon made to attain the fortresses, and of the extravagance of his strategy in that year. Murat transmitted Macdonald's plans to Napoleon without an explanation of the real state of affairs, and the marshal was naturally much displeased: "I asked him if he had not carried out, at least in part, the project which I had sent him at his request. 'No,' he said, 'I have transmitted it to the emperor, and shall receive his orders in three days at farthest.' 'How,' I exclaimed. 'You have transmitted what I gave you in confidence. The emperor who, doubtless, is ignorant of all that has taken, and is taking place, will be justly indignant if the plan is not explained with all the parts in detail.'"

York, but that he had allied himself to
Russia, and that all his subjects were
taking up arms against us.
The em-
peror acknowledged that he had been
misinformed about my conduct, and the
treacherous policy of Prussia; that I
had acted judiciously; that he had not
been exactly made aware of the later
disasters of Kowno and Wilna. He
said that our reverses had been great,
but not irreparable; that we had both
conducted war at the same time, and
both would have to conduct it together;
that this would be the final campaign,
and that he requested me to prepare for
it; he added that he had perfect confi-
dence in his father-in-law, the emperor
of Austria. I shook my head, and said,
'Beware; distrust the artful policy of
that Cabinet.'"

Macdonald held an important command in the eventful campaign of 1813, and though not a personal friend, and unsuccessful in his operations, as a whole, retained his master's complete confidence. His "Reminiscences" from this time forward are not altogether fair to Napoleon; they breathe the discontented and soured spirit of a patriotic and clear-sighted man, himself smarting from the effects of defeat, and indignant that the fortunes of France should be made the sport of utterly reckless ambition. These sentiments, however, were, in the main, just, and were shared by most of his companions-in-arms; all that can be truly said is that he dwells too much on the faults and mistakes of his great master, and not enough on The narra

The French army was driven to the Elbe; and Napoleon, not aware at first of the facts, and believing that the retrograde movement was largely due to Macdonald's advice, treated his prudent lieutenant with marked coldness. The emperor, however, when better in- Napoleon's genius in war. formed, did Macdonald the justice he tive is instructive in some parts, if it certainly deserved. The following in- does not add much to our previous terview took place between them; and knowledge, and it illustrates clearly the it will be observed that, if undeceived author's character. Macdonald was as to the state of his military power in sceptical as to the good faith of Austria, Germany, Napoleon still trusted in the after the armistice of Pleistwitz-an good faith of Austria. The conqueror opinion still held by some able writers, long clung to this and other illusions in in spite of Metternich's protests and the 1813: "I was indignant that all my ex- published State papers. We have not ertions, and the devotion I had shown met the following remark before: "Auswas so i recompensed; I did not re-tria was the soul of the Congress of turn to court. A few days afterwards, Prague; she had pretended to be neuhowever, I was sent for; it had become tral during the late hostilities; but, as known that the king of Prussia not only transpired afterwards, she had pledged

tolif by a treaty with Russia and relieving the beleaguered garrisons; and dssia since February. There were he was defeated by Blucher upon the indications of this in the position taken by the allies in their retreat before the armistice; they gathered together at the foot of the Bohemian hills, instead of recrossing the Oder; had these armies been defeated in this position they would have been obliged to lay down their arms, if Austria had meant to make her feigned neutrality respected this was as clear as daylight."

Katzbach. His sketch of the battle is feeble and confused; and certainly he committed a decided mistake, in fighting with a flooded river in his rear, and in permitting or carrying out a plan, which would have been good, but for this accident. Towards the close of the campaign, when the scales of fortune were evidently inclining against Napoleon, the emperor asked for his advice; and, like most of the French military chiefs, he counselled a general retreat to the Saale. "One morning the emperor sent me one of his orderly officers, to find out what I thought about the situation of affairs, and what it was proper to do. October had come; we had no supplies but what we could seize by using force; the soldiers, however, had potatoes dug up on the ground where they were encamped. I told the officer frankly, that if the emperor did not immediately take the offensive, with good prospect of success-and this seemed to me improbable, for up to this time it had been found impossible to enter Bohemia - he would expose us to a serious catastrophe. The army was every day becoming weaker through sickness and the want of food; a lost battle would increase its weakness, and would cause the expenditure of munitions, that could not be replaced; the magazines were empty, the country ruined; and in this position of affairs prudence required that we should at once fall back to the Saale, leaving a strong garrison in Leipzig, and that we should strengthen the fortresses on the Oder, with which we could still communicate, and especially those on the Elbe. The officer was frightened at the idea of being the bearer of a message like this; Go,' I said, 'the emperor will understand its importance; he will thank me for my plain speaking.'"

The "Reminiscences" do not retrace the main incidents of the campaign of 1813. Historically these form the second act in the drama of the fall of Napoleon, and show how the conditions of the Revolutionary War had changed; how the cause of France was now that of a despotism of the sword, and that of old Europe the cause of the rights of nations. From a military point of view they are instructive in the extreme; they illustrate, by most striking examples, how Napoleon's ambition and lust of power occasionally marred his conceptions in war, and yet they abound in instances of his extraordinary skill and capacity as a great commander. Beyond question he aimed at too much, if we recollect how inferior he was in force, and he wasted his resources and courted defeat by trying to trample Germany down, and to disengage his garrisons on the Oder and Vistula. Yet he exhibited over and over again the genius of the warrior of 1796, in this gigantic and long doubtful contest; and had he had the troops of Arcola and Rivoli, he probably would have retained his hold on the Elbe, as he had retained his hold on the Adige, and have triumphed over the ill-directed allies. Macdonald looks back at the struggle with an eye disposed to see Napoleon in an unfavorable light; and he scarcely alludes to Lützen and Baützen, to Dresden, and to the fine operations on the Such a retreat would, probably, have Elbe, operations which, but for unfore- averted Leipzig; but it ultimately inseen defection, would probably have volved a retreat to the Rhine; and Nabroken the coalition up. The marshal, poleon would not as yet abandon his as is well known, was given the chief command of one of the secondary armies, thrown forward, too far from its supports, towards the Oder, in the hope of

great central position upon the Elbe. He hesitated, however, perhaps for a moment: "The officer returned within some hours, and told me he had fulfilled

his mission. The emperor was in his Rhine was scarcely less disastrous eral bath, and had admitted him. He had that from Moscow. Even Marbot te to listened attentively, and had only this us that the French soldiery were indigobjection to make, that the Saale was nant at the shameful neglect which had not a defensive line, that the Rhine was, caused the sacrifice of thousands of and that as I thought he ought to re- lives, and stood sullenly aloof from the treat, we should fall back to the Rhine. emperor. Macdonald was naturally full Go, tell the marshal so,' he said to the of resentment, and places Napoleon's officer." conduct in the worst aspect. This was The Grand Army was forced at last his first interview with the defeated conupon Leipzig; and after a struggle of queror: "The emperor listened to my three days, in which the German auxil- story without interrupting me, the byiaries attacked it in the field- a defec-standers were deeply moved, and showed tion naturally denounced by Frenchmen, their sympathy in their attitude. I but which Napoleon might have fore-ended my remarks by saying that the seen - it was driven across the Elbe in losses of the army in men and material defeat and ruin. Macdonald throws no were immense, and that not a moment fresh light on the scenes of the battle; was to be lost to save its wreck, and to and only confirms all that has been said regain the Rhine. We were at Markrespecting the fatal neglect of not bridg- randstadt; I had walked several leagues, ing the rivers which crossed the path of I was still wet through, and very tired. the French in retreat, and the catas- The emperor saw this, and coolly said, trophe of destroying the only bridge'You had better take rest.' I left his which gave the army an avenue of es- presence indignant at this callous indifcape, before thousands of the troops ference."

had effected the passage. These appall- It was not, however, only men like ing scenes have been often described, Macdonald, who felt indignation during the account of Marbot is especially the retreat from Leipzig. The favorgood; and we shall not recur to fright-ites of the old army of Italy, loaded by ful incidents again, which strikingly Napoleon with wealth and honors, show how the staff of Napoleon, as the Duc de Fezensac has well pointed out, was on many occasions far from efficient, and how the imperial lieutenants would not take the simplest precautions, or do anything, without the express command of their master. Macdonald, more fortunate than Poniatowski, contrived to get over the swollen Elster, and thus describes the heartrending spectacle presented by his troops on the opposite bank: "The firing continued on the other side of the Elster, suddenly it ceased. Our unhappy soldiers were driven in multitudes upon the river; whole platoons rushed in, and were carried away by the flood; cries of despair burst forth from the bank on the town side; my men saw me, and above the shouting and confusion, I distinctly heard these exclamations, Marshal, save your soldiers, save your children!' I could do nothing for them. Agitated by passion, anger, fury, I shed tears."

The retreat of the beaten army to the

joined in the general chorus of complaint. The authority of the emperor, founded on success, had, in fact, begun to slip away from him; and the sons of the Revolution had no scruples in denouncing their chief in adverse fortune. Augereau broke out in characteristic Billingsgate: "He answered me with an oath: Does the b-know what he is doing? Have you not already seen this? Have you not heard that during the late events, and especially since the catastrophe which has followed, he has lost his head? The coward! He deserted and sacrificed us all; and do you think me such a fool, or a madman, that I should allow myself to be slain or taken prisoner in the outskirts of Leipzig? You ought to have done as I did, and gone away.'"

Even Murat, the emperor's near kins-' man, and raised by him to the throne of Naples, could not refrain from expressions like these; in truth he was already plotting treason: "The king of Naples

told me that the emperor intended to a victory due to his admirable skill, that direct me to make out a good defensive threw a gleam of light on the last stage position, for he wished to make a halt of of the retreat. It is puerile to make a five or six days. 'F,' added Mu- charge of this kind, which reveals the rat, make out a bad one, otherwise he animus of the discontented marshal: will ruin himself, as well as ourselves."""The emperor appeared followed by Macdonald fearlessly urged his master his Guards and by other corps; he asked not to lose a moment to attain the Rhine. me for information, which I gave; I had In good and evil fortune he was always estimated the enemy's force at thirty frank, to the astonishment of imperial thousand men at least. Can we excourtiers: "I was introduced. The amine his position without danger,' he emperor gave me the commission which added. Without danger, no; but we I had heard of from Murat. This must run risks, as I have done myself.' reconnaissance is, at present, impossi- Well, let us retreat.' As we were ble,' I said. The fog is so thick that moving forward, a shell fell and burst nothing can be seen clearly at a distance near him, but no one was hurt. He of fifteen paces. But do you really in- stopped, dismounted, and it was impostend to halt here?' The troops are sible after this to get him out of the fatigued,' replied the emperor, and the wood.” enemy pursues slowly; they are all in need of repose.' 'That,' I retorted, would be all very well in different circumstances; but in the actual state of disorganization, and I must add, of demoralization of the army, it would be of no use. You must, as quickly as possible, fall back on the Rhine; besides, the men are hurrying to the river in disorder. Nevertheless,' he said, 'I am informed that a great number had been stopped, and that fifteen battalions of those fugitives had been pursued.' You are flattered and deceived,' I firmly expressed. It was the same thing after the death of Turenne and the rout of his army.'"

The old republican soldier spoke out his mind to his great master as to the extreme imprudence of rejecting the offers of Austria in 1813; even if Austria was acting a double part, the acceptance of her terms would have put her in the wrong, and rallied opinion in France to the emperor. It may seem strange that Napoleon allowed such freedom; but, even in the days of his absolute power, he sometimes bore much from the chiefs of his armies: "Why,' I said, 'did you not agree to the conditions sooner? The army wished it extremely; the honor of its arms had been restored; its chief commanders begged for this in its name, and in that of France in distress. I myself explained the danger of the situation to you; I represented to you that it was difficult enough to contend against the emperor of Russia and the king of Prussia, and what would it be when Austria, Sweden, and other lesser States should join them? Our losses, no doubt, had been in some measure repaired, but with what means? With children of the new levy, with young horses, not trained, and already worn out by long and forced marches; the return of hostilities would cause our communications to be intercepted; a serious defeat would ruin us; we had Macdonald, however, is not just in neither a store of provisions nor magainsinuating that Napoleon gave proof of zines; above all, demoralization was to want of personal courage before Hanau, be avoided.' All this reasoning had VOL. LXXX. 4106

Napoleon more than once showed, in his wonderful career, after Moscow and in 1814 and 1815, that he was not equal to himself in extreme misfortune. He gives proof of this defect during the retreat from Leipzig: "I joined the emperor, and spoke strongly to him about the position of affairs. 'What would you have me do,' he replied, with apathy; 'I give orders and no one attends to them.' . . . On other occasions, at a sign, at a gesture, at a signal, and from his lips, every one was in movement, otherwise he would have been frantic."

LIVING AGE.

had no effect on him during the nego- | tresses on the Meuse and the Moselle, tiations; to-day he admitted it was and to fall on the communications of right."

the allies, with an army largely increased by the garrisons, the last great manœuvre of the campaign of 1814. He informs us that he urged the emperor to persist in the movement, though Paris should fall, wise counsel from a military point of view, but rejected by Napoleon on political grounds: "Whatever ordeis you may give," I said, "Paris left without defence will have succumbed before

In the winter of 1813, as Macdonald was in command on the Lower Rhine, charged with an impossible task, the defence of Holland, the allies, surprising Napoleon by their bold movements, invaded France even before he expected; and the marshal, with most of his brother chiefs, was forced back to the plains of Champagne, to endeavor to resist the hosts of Europe. Mac- we can arrive, if you go there, whatdonald had been promised large rein- ever may be the celerity of your moveforcements, but Napoleon had hardly a ments. In your place, I would march man to send him; and he contemplates on to Lorraine and Alsace, and collectthe grand contest of 1814, like that of ing part of their garrisons, would carry 1813, with a jaundiced eye. Undoubt- on an internecine war on the rear of the edly, in this instance also, the emperor enemy, cutting his communications and tried to accomplish more than was pos- intercepting his envoys and reinforcesible with his actual military strength; ments; he will be compelled to fall back, he aimed at defending three-fourths of and you can make the fortresses your his empire, whereas he should have base of operations." thought only of defending France; and The Empire had fallen in a few days; his strategy, as a whole, reveals this and the most striking feature of this error. But his operations on the Marne immense catastrophe was the extravaand the Seine are masterpieces of war gance of Napoleon's conduct, as a leader of the highest order; they recall the of armies, and chief of a State, during achievements of 1796-7, and they shed the years immediately before his overa splendid light of glory on his fall. throw. Macdonald was not the only Macdonald scarcely alludes to these adviser who had warned him that his grand passages of arms, though his po- efforts to keep down Europe by military sition on the Marne gave Napoleon an force, and to refuse offers of peace, opportunity to strike down Blücher, and would be attended by the gravest disasto win a series of triumphs almost un- ters. His lieutenants had urged him in paralleled. The marshal was engaged 1812 not to advance on Moscow; they towards the close of the contest in re- had entreated him in 1813 not to stand sisting Schwartzenberg upon the Seine; on the Elbe, and to attempt to hold all and this short anecdote again illustrates Germany in his grasp; in 1814 Soult how the special privileges of the Impe- had plainly told him that the defence of rial Guard were often attended with bad France should be his only object; he results: "I found Marshal Oudinot at had been advised by Caulaincourt to Grey and the Granges; and on my ask-accept the terms offered to Austria long ing him why he had left his position in before Leipzig. How was it then that the morning, he said that the Young the greatest of captains, and certainly Guard was not made to be a rear-guard. the ablest sovereign of his time, did not 'In that case,' I replied, 'I have no see what was seen by very inferior men; more orders to give you, seek them from overleaped himself in his vaulting amthe emperor.' bition; ran into wild excesses in war and in peace; and exhibited, in this phase of his career, the perversion of genius, which is akin to foolishness? The answer to the question is, in part, to be found in a consideration of Napoleon's natural character; over-confidence

Macdonald asserts that he was the only marshal who warned Napoleon that the enemy was at hand, when the emperor was surprised at Arics-surAube. He accompanied his master in the celebrated march to relieve the for