79

ART. VIII. Remarks on the Principal Features of the Foreign and Domestic Policy of Great Britain, since the year 1793; in the course of which are interspersed occasional Discussions on the leading Political Topics of the Day. By the Rev. Law Moyes, Minister of Forglen, Aberdeenshire. 8vo. pp. 132. London. Longman and Co. 1826. THOUGH We disagree on one important question of our domestic policy with the reverend writer before us, yet we must in justice say, that his pamphlet does him great honour. It is written in a free and energetic style; and the view which it takes of the foreign relations, and the leading internal interests of this country, is, with the exception we have noticed, masterly and remarkably sound. It is hardly necessary after this to add, that Mr. Moyes does not belong to "that small and contemptible faction," which, for the sake only of contradiction and notoriety, has made repeated, but ineffectual attempts to raise its puny voice against the recent measures of the government. A clergyman of the Scottish church, he has, like most of the best men of his religion and order, espoused that generous and manly policy, which becomes every day more and more identified with the general wishes and the best interests of our empire; and if upon the Catholic Question alone he has still to combat his early prejudices, yet even in his errors he has exhibited himself as an antagonist worthy of being reasoned with, and of being subdued with the weapons of truth.

Upon this part of his pamphlet, however, and, indeed, upon all that portion of it which relates to our domestic policy, we shall at present abstain from offering any remark. The Corn Laws, the Currency Question, and the measures adopted for the establishment of Free Trade, have been so recently discussed in this journal, and our opinions upon those topics are so much in unison with those of the legislature, and the public at large, that we have nothing further to say concerning them. Upon the Catholic Question we shall offer some observations in some future number, when we shall undertake to answer the objections of Mr. Moyes in detail. There is another subject also which he has passed over, that of emigration—a subject of infinite importance to this country, to which, perhaps, we shall also invite the consideration of our readers. But for the present we shall confine ourselves to that divison of his pamphlet, which treats of the foreign policy of Great Britain, as there is a question connected with it, that claims our earliest attention-the invasion of Portugal by Spain.

It is justly remarked by Mr. Moyes, that ever since the ratification of Magna Charta, the constitutional principle, which had an embryo existence even before that time, has been gradually unfolding itself, and assuming a more defined and systematic form.'

At no period has it been more fully understood, or more powerfully acted upon, than since the accession of his late Majesty; and more espe

cially since the peace with America, in 1782. About, and a little after that time, the political machine seems to have attained a greater degree of exactness and energy in its operations. The Three Estates seem to have arrived at a just sense of their respective rights and limits; and the strength of the nation rose in proportion as the constitutional principle approached to its proper level, and maintained its due rank. Thus, in full constitutional vigour, Great Britain felt conscious of her own strength, and of that weight which she ought to maintain in the scale of European politics. An opportunity soon occurred of developing her energies, by occupying a prominent place in that combined resistance, which was made to the alarming progress of the French arms and principles, in 1793.

"Continental, hereditary connections had, on many occasions brought her forward to take an active part in continental disputes; and at times to bear the chief burthen in expensive and protracted warfare, in pursuit of some object in which she was not immediately or principally concerned; -thus mingling her interests still more closely with those of other states. But her interference in 1793, was more an act of public spirit, more the prompt result of public feeling, than of any thing connected with political speculation. Formerly, the fate of Hanover, or some cold calculation about the balance of power, or a remote contingency, brought us upon the field. But here the appeal was made, as it were, to the heart, and to the common feelings of men. The remorseless cruelties inflicted by the leaders of the revolutionary factions-the murder of the king, followed up by other crimes of equal atrocity-the threatened subversion of religion and goverument-the fatal and irresistible attraction to the awful vortex-altogether exhibited a scene which was beheld by the great body of the people, with pity, indignation and terror.'-pp. 1—3.

The arduous and protracted contest to which the French revolution gave rise, and the conquest which at last was effected over its principles and creatures, produced a reaction throughout Europe in favour of legitimacy, which was the foundation of the Holy Alliance. To the main object of that confederacy, the preservation of peace on the continent, England could not be inimical, after the quantity of blood and treasure which she had expended in order to attain it. But at the same time, it was impossible for a British minister, considering the developement of constitutional principles which had taken place in this country, to be a party to a compact, which insisted upon the passive obedience of the people, and permitted the supposition of no case, under any circumstances, when the resistance of subjects against the acts of their sovereign might be justifiable and lawful. The revolution in 1688, the independence of America, and the avowed and recognised rights of our people, prescribed to our statesmen a different principle; and however willing Lord Castlereagh might personally have been to postpone that integral maxim of our constitution, to what he called "the monarchical principle," yet he dared not venture so far as to sign the treaty, which gave existence to the Holy Alliance.

We have seen the first result of this compact reduced to action at Naples, by Austria. The same compact forced France to rescue

the king of Spain from the dominion of the Cortes, and although upon both those occasions the opinion of the government and people of this country was strongly expressed against those aggressions, yet we did not think it necessary to resist them by force of arms. To fit out a British expedition for the defence of Naples against Austria, was indeed a vision that never entered into the heads of our wildest politicians. There were, however, many persons, who thought very differently of the interference of France, in the affairs of Spain, and contended that it was the duty of England to have prevented it. Thus we would have been called upon, not merely to protest against the principles of the Holy Alliance, but to draw the sword against them, and to transfer all our arguments from the mouths of our ministers to those of our

cannon.

But those who wished that we should go to war for the civil liberty of Spain, never considered that a principle, analogous to that which saved our sovereign from being a party to the Holy Alliance, would prevent him also from interposing in the domestic affairs of that, or of any other independent state. If he could not, without violating the law, oppose the principle of popular resistance, neither could he in common justice assist it. It would little comport with the dignity of his crown, that he should become the knight errant of the continent, and throw up his cap in every town where the mob might be in rebellion against their sovereign. He and his government, and his subjects, might, as we believe they do, most earnestly desire to see every part of Europe in the enjoyment of free institutions; but if they attempted to carry that wish into execution by embarking in a crusade for the purpose, they would be the most odious of all tyrants-the tyrants of opinion.

In abstaining from an armed interference in the internal concerns of Spain, our government has therefore acted not only in strict conformity with our constitution, but has shewn by its forbearance the true path which the foreign policy of England should pursue, through the new era which has arisen on the continent. That policy is to leave the sovereign and the people of each state to arrange their own institutions among themselves, and to take no part at least no armed part-in the intestine contentions which may spring up between them.

In order to demonstrate the wisdom of this policy, we may ask, what would be the situation of Spain at this moment, had we sent out troops to defend the Cortes when it was attacked by France? It is possible that not a French soldier would have crossed the Pyrenees, and in that case we must have identified ourselves with the Cortes, and supported all its measures. If we refused to do so, they would have voted our departure forthwith, and declaimed against us as the dictators of Spain. If we coincided with them, we would have had to oppose a decided majority of the people, whom they had inflamed against them by their open

VOL. IV.

G

extensive, and precipitate spoliation of the church property and the monasteries. We would be parties to their measures for extinguishing the aristocracy, and to a constitution which allowed nothing more than the shadow of a king. Either the Cortes should rule our councils, or we should rule theirs, for the government of the Peninsula. Thus we should have no medium-we must either be the slavish instruments, or the stern tyrants, of a popular assembly, composed now of one set of men, and now of another. Embarrassment, degradation, and disgrace, would be our portion in either way; our troops would be recalled with more ardour than they would have been sent out, and the battle of the constitution would remain to be fought over again.

If, in the second place, we came to blows with the French, not to speak of any other consequences than those affecting the Peninsula, what would have been the result? Either they or we should be the conquerors. If we had expelled them back to France, we should still have been in the situation already described, with respect to the Cortes. If the French were the victors, their condition would not have been in any degree better than it has been during the last three years. It is true that they have formed a Bourbon army, but what have they gained besides? Have they suppressed for ever the voice of liberty in Spain? They have only taught the sound and enlightened part of the community its value; and as soon as they quit the Peninsula, the constitution will be reestablished. Have they given strength to Spain to recover her colonies? They have only hastened the recognition by England of the independence of those colonies, and thus secured it beyond all chance of failure. Have they augmented the commerce of the country which they garrison? They have plunged it in deeper distress than it ever before experienced. Have they acquired any real influence over the councils of Ferdinand? Let the violation of the dauphin's amnesty and the invasion of Portugal answer that question.

But although we may readily believe that the French government was no party to that perfidious invasion, yet we can also suppose that the suppression of the constitution in Portugal would be highly acceptable, not to France alone, but to all the other states of the continent. To Spain it would be peculiarly so, as it is in the nature of things, that liberty cannot long exist in one part of the Peninsula, without finding its way into the other. It was not, however, this motive alone, which induced Ferdinand to risk the experiment which has been made. It has been, for a long time, a secret policy with Spain, to regain that section of territory, which was severed from it by the house of Braganza. Under the rule of the Cortes, as well as of the absolute Ferdinand, this object, though never openly pursued, has been a favourite national speculation. The bare contemplation of the thing, argues the excess of folly to which nations, as well as individuals, can sometimes pro

ceed; but those who are at all acquainted with the feelings of the Spaniards, know that what we state, is nevertheless perfectly true. It was thought that the abdication of Don Pedro, the promulgation of a constitution, the appointment of a regency, and the absence of Don Miguel, were so many circumstances favourable to the views of Spain and in order to precipitate and embarrass things as much as possible, the Portuguese princess, de Beira, who has been living with her son, in the attics of Ferdinand's palace at Madrid, for the last ten or twelve years, has been employed as the principal instrument of intrigue, aided, no doubt, by that arch-enemy of liberty, the queen dowager, who resides at Queluz. It is more than probable, that neither the princess, nor the queen dowager, knows the ultimate object to which their proceedings were intended to lead. Their view would, we presume, be limited to the investiture of Don Miguel with the functions of absolute power; but although that would of itself be also an acceptable event to Ferdinand, yet he was glad, under any circumstances, to try the chances which the destinies had in store for him, and if he succeeded, there is no doubt that the French government would have exulted in this aggrandizement of the Bourbons.

Nor can it appear strange that, during the dark and sinister operations which have recently come to light, Ferdinand's camarilla imagined that England would-or rather could, offer no impediment to their manœuvres. The resources of England were so exhausted, her national debt so tremendous, her taxes so onerous, her trade reduced to such a state of ruin, her merchants producing so many bankrupts, her artizans declining into so many paupers, that, however prodigal she might be of diplomatic threats, she would not venture to fire a single gun in defence of her ancient ally. Since language like this has been used by some of our patriots at home, it is little wonder if it was held in Spain by those who wished it to be true; and if, moreover, it was generally believed there, that the first announcement of a resolution to assist Portugal, would be the trumpet of rebellion throughout this country, and an empty boast, an impracticable tender, of relief which it was not in our power to realize.

But our government well knew what they were about. They knew that the existence of Portugal, as an independent state, was in jeopardy; and without compromising their principles, without seeking to meddle in the internal affairs of that country, they resolved, upon a fair case being laid before them, to maintain inviolate the faith of treaties, and to preserve Portugal from the grasp of the Bourbons. It is not their object to uphold the constitution, if a majority of the people of that country do not approve of it. The authorities established by that constitution are, indeed, those only which our government acknowledges; but should the sovereign choose to give them another form of government, it is no part of the business of England to dispute it. The