Atonement, it is to be superseded by the Morality; but it should, in all cases, be preceded by the moral doctrine. We can never be expected to comprehend the character of Christ, in its more recondite principles, till we have imbibed his moral spirit, and be renewed in his moral image. The doctrine of his person ought to be investigated with the greatest candour and humility. It is difficult, and above us, in many respects. It can only be entertained properly, by persons who have made some proficiency in his morality. It belongs to them, and not to the world. "He that hath done the will of God, shall know the doctrine." It is a thing better conveyed to a pure and experienced mind, in the words of Scripture, than it can be by logical definitions and metaphysical distinctions. In truth, such attempts are only like darkening counsel by words without knowledge. Yet it was in such a manner that the controversies on the subject were managed, and that, too, by persons notoriously deficient in charity, in temper, yea, even in decency and common justice. It was an intrusion of profane persons into the most holy place. And God struck them with blindness, and made them wander to weariness in the labyrinths of their own foolish disputations.

The numberless sects and diversities of opinion which arose out of the controversies concerning the person of Christ, and the previous dreams of the Gnostics, constitute a prominent part of Church history, but are altogether unworthy the detailed study of any person who values his time. They were followed by a new set of disputes in the fifth and following centuries, about the moral constitution of man; but the disputants having, as yet, no idea of the true theory, and pursuing their investigations under the influence of an intolerant theology, and of a captious logic, they made no progress in the subject, or rather they involved it, as they did other topics, in greater darkness and intricacy. The decay of learning among the Romans, and the subsequent conquest of the empire by barbarians, increased the general ignorance, and sunk the contending visionaries and dialecticians into deeper and deeper absurdities. But all these absurdities they attempted to dignify with the name of orthodox doctrine; that is, each party assumed themselves to be exclusively orthodox, and it was only the accident of the one or the other having the majority, which decided their right to that appellation

an accident that was frequently determined by the caprice or the fortune of an emperor, a king, a bishop, or some eminent polemic. The examples and opinions of such persons, frequently changed the whole face of the subject with the ignorant multitude.

Now all this confusion, and the evils springing out of it, were consequent on a certain fundamental principle, which it never entered into the mind of any one to dispute, viz. "that the matters about which they were contending, were essential articles of the Christian religion, and necessary to obtain the favour of God." They had completely forgotten that the true and essential doctrine of Christianity—namely, its moral doctrine, was entirely unconnected with their dreams and controversies; but this was above their capacity to feel and to comprehend.

In another point of view, the chief and radical cause of all these mistakes about the true nature and object of Christianity, arose from the age of the public mind, as not yet having its intellectual and moral faculties matured; and this immaturity was prolonged for many centuries by the conquests of the barbarians, and by the suppression of all the arts and sciences of civilized life. In such "times of ignorance" and of social childhood, men only searched after truth by the light of an unbridled imagination, or by the wranglings of a crude and conceited logic. And even in that way, few thought for themselves. All ranged themselves under the standard of some eminent leader, and contended not so much with the enthusiasm of personal conviction, as with the blind devotion of a faction, attached merely to a name, or to a shibboleth.

I have adverted more than once, to this view of the progress of the general mind through the region of imagination and intellect, as illustrating its history. It may be useful in this stage, to dwell a little more particularly on the evidence of this doctrine displayed in the character of the middle ages.

The tribe of Gnostics, as we have said, sprung up at the very commencement of the Christian era, and their principles had prevailed before they assumed a Christian dress. At that time, the imaginative systems of philosophythe Oriental and Platonic, were in vogue. But the con

troversies resulting from what was called the Arian question, arose in the fourth century. These controversies, in their progress, were modified by the increasing credit

and prevalence of the Aristotelian philosophy, or the method of Aristotle's dialectic and logic in the discussion of all questions of theology and morals.

"The credit of the Platonic philosophy (says Mosheim, cent. v.) in the first centuries, did not prevent the doctrine of Aristotle from coming to light after a long struggle, and forcing its way into the Christian Church. The writings of Aristotle (particularly his Dialectics) were recommended to such of the youth as had a taste for logical discussions, and were fond of disputing. In this, the Christian doctors imitated the manner of the heathen schools, and thus was the first step to that universal dominion, which the Stagirite afterwards obtained in the republic of letters. This predilection for the Aristotelian philosophy, which had commenced with some of the opponents of Origen (a great visionary, although a man of talent and genius), was greatly increased during the Arian, Eutychean, Nestorian, and Pelagian controversies. These controversies were managed, or rather drawn out, on both sides, by a perpetual recourse to subtle distinctions and captious sophisms. And no philosophy was so proper to furnish such weapons, as that of Aristotle; for that of Plato was far from being adapted to form the mind to the polemic arts."

This is a pretty clear evidence, that the state of religion was affected by the state of philosophy. In other words, that the moral sentiments of mankind depend upon the development of their mental faculties. Our historian, indeed, seems to insinuate that the prevailing disputes on theology, imposed the taste for a specific philosophy; but probably he did not reflect on the other view of the subject, and meant merely to state the fact of their connexion. At any rate, the fact is all we are bound to take upon the authority of a historian; and the subsequent progress of the public taste for the Aristotelian philosophy, sufficiently proves, that it proceeded from the condition of the existing intellectual attainments of the world.

After having been employed in the controversies about the person of Christ, in which it was partially blended with the Platonic philosophy, the logic of Aristotle was more exclusively applied in the investigation of what were called the Pelagian heresies. These did not admit of so much room for the exercise of the imagination, as of the reasoning powers; being versant about the moral

character and history of man. I mean, that the Pelagian questions did not admit of the same room for fancy as the Arian and Gnostic. But they were still treated with an abundant mixture of fanciful conceits. The progress, however, forward in the march of intellect, beyond imagination, was obvious; so that from the Pelagian questions, the schools proceeded at a later date to the duties of man, and treated of them in that style of acute logical distinction and definition, which was ultimately embodied in the systems of Casuistry. Nor was it alone on topics of theology and morals, that the learned of those ages delighted to exercise their dialective powers. Questions of all sorts, many of them absurd and ludicrous, some of them even indecent, occupied their attention. At length, as if it were for want of external topics, the logic of Aristotle was turned upon itself, and a controversy about the nature of its categories (or classes into which things were divided by Aristotle) was carried on with the most violent animosity in every kingdom of Europe. One party asserted that the categories were real things or substances; the other asserted that they were mere names, adopted for the sake of convenient classification. The first sect was called Realists, and the second Nominalists, and these parties were as eager in disputing and sometimes fighting for their opinions, as were the proper theologians.

The history of the Saracens in the East, during the same period, confirms our observation respecting the intellectual state of the world in those days. They had imbibed a taste for learning, and prosecuted it more successfully than the Christians for several centuries. For, while the whole of Europe was in a state of anarchy and ignorance, the flourishing empires of the Caliphs at Bagdad and of the Moors in Spain, cultivated the arts and sciences of civilised life; and among other studies, that of the Aristotelian philosophy received a distinguished at

tention.

It was not, to be sure, applied to such silly disputes, as among the Christians, and it was associated with the elements of that more perfect philosophy, which received the name of the inductive after the days of Bacon. This new philosophy, was not, indeed, formally distinguished, and was but obscurely understood; but the collection of facts, and the practical mode of experiments, was commenced, and applied to the study of physic and of che

mistry. What of the sciences of mathematics and astronomy known to the ancients, was about the same time revived, and the grand improvement in arithmetic, by using figures instead of letters, was introduced. I have made these remarks about the Saracens, to show, that from the ninth to the twelfth century, and after the Platonic or imaginative philosophy had been in a great measure abandoned in the schools of Europe, in favour of the Aristotelian-the same cause, and which was independent of religious controversies (as an exciting motive), had recommended this philosophy also to the attention of a totally different people.

All this not only illustrates our doctrine about the successive development of the human faculties, but it gives a certain order and connection to the confused mass of events and controversies with which the ecclesiastical history of the middle ages is filled; and without reference to which, it is scarcely worth while to wade through it, and very difficult to preserve the recollection.

SALTCOATS, April, 1833.

W. B.

REVIEW.

2d

The Literary History of Galloway; by Thomas Murray, A. M. Edition. Edinburgh 1832. Printed for Waugh & Innes. THE writer of this work is of the sacred profession, and appears to be an orthodox churchman. But he is a fair, impartial man, of good sense and of good feelings, from whose heart the gloomy creed of Calvin has not expelled the milk of human kindness. The work consists of a series of biographical sketches of eminent persons connected with Galloway. It displays great research and very accurate information; is written in a very perspicuous style, and with great felicity of expression; and is, on the whole, one of the most entertaining biographical volumes we have ever met with. When we say that the author's prepossessions occasionally appear, we say that which is true of all such compositions; but he has evidently no disposition to "set down aught in malice," or to sacrifice truth wilfully at the shrine of party, or of theological or political partialities. His greatest error is that of being occasionally rather too favourable to the subjects of his sketches; but it is not to such an extent as to be any impeachment of his candour. It rather seems to arise from a generous desire, to think as well as possible of the illustrious dead, which, tempered as it is by a sound judgment and an honest purpose, is, in a biographer, a failing that "leans to virtue's side.

The history of the Reformation in Scotland, of which we find many interesting sketches in the work before us, is replete with