The impracticability of justice is occasioned among other things by the sudden force of temptation, of passion, of circumstances, and of mistakes, against which no man can at all times guard. Benevolence counteracts and opposes these errors, by a calm, steady, and growing principle of action, which it is practicable for any man to admit and to cherish, and which will increase in power, in proportion as he does so. For example, a man may be prejudiced or incensed against his neighbour, and therefore say or do, on the spur of the occasion, what he ought not. That is a sudden impression. But if he wish to do his neighbour a service, to repair or to forgive an injury, these things require coolness and premeditation. In the first case, he fails because he is surprised. In the second, he succeeds because he is prepared. Hence, it is more practicable to do good than to avoid sin; that is to say, if we are desirous of doing so. This is equally characteristic of human nature and of the system of Benevolence; and therefore, when they are brought into harmonious correspondence with each other, effects will be produced far beyond our former experience. The victory is not to be gained by the negative qualities of justice, and by remaining on the defensive, but by the positive energies of benevolence and by active operations.

(Chapter XII. to be concluded in our next.)

On Uniformity of Causation.

(Continued from p. 129.)

LET it be distinctly understood, that by the "uniformity" spoken of in four different expressions, the author only means uniformity of sequence; and that the Essay professes only to prove the fact implied in the definition (with, of course, its legitimate inferences), that when causes are the same, effects are the same. Whether causes are always the same or not, he does not discuss. The first six Chapters of the Essay, are employed in developing and proving the alleged uniformity in the sequence of causes and effects; and the seventh, applies the principle to the subject of evidence, particularly to the evidence of testimony. With the remaining three chapters, I have no direct concern at present. Chapter I. maintains, that the assumption of the uniformity of sequence is among the number of those "truths which necessarily arise in the

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mind in certain circumstances, and which are not the result of any logical deduction." The author does not call it an instinctive principle, but a primary principle of reasoning a "principle of immediate belief," not logically deducible from any simpler principle, but involuntarily assumed by the mind. With this representation I perfectly accord. The subsequent Chapters illustrate the matter, not by attempting to bring logical proof of the correctness of the principle, but by showing in a multitude of instances, that it is beyond logical proof, and is perpetually assumed by the mind in every process of reasoning. Chap. II. shows that "the uniformity of causation [sequence] is assumed with regard to the past as well as to the future." Chap. III. that it "cannot be established by experience and testimony." Chap. IV. that it is assumed in all our conclusions respecting mental as well as physical phenomena." Chap. V. and VI. that "our certainty and uncertainty in relation to moral, are of the same nature as in relation to physical events.' And Chap. VII. is entitled, "on the uniformity of causation [sequence] as the fundamental principle of physical and moral evidence." The doctrine of each of the first six Chapters, appears to me irrefragably true (so little illustration does the doctrine of the uniformity of sequence seem to need); but not a few of the illustrations appear to me inapplicable, and to betray the double meaning which I maintain the writer has attached to his principal terms. This I shall endeavour to show presently. But first, supposing these terms never to have lost, in the course of the Essay, the simple meaning given by the definition; let me ask, how the premises bear out the conclusions in the seventh Chapter?

On the subject of the credibility of testimony, our author remarks (p. 257), "Assertions are frequently made, which in themselves imply a breach of the uniformity of causation. From such cases, the conclusions already established remove all difficulty. To weigh probabilities, to determine what credit is due to two sets of conflicting circumstances, neither of which, as far as our knowledge extends, is irreconcileable to the usual course of nature, is often a nice and arduous task; but if the principles of this Essay are correct, it is easy to see what reception ought to be given to assertions professedly implying a deviation from the uniform succession of causes

and effects. Suppose, for instance, any person to affirm that he had exposed a cubic inch of ice to a temperature of 200 degrees of Fahrenheit, and that, at the expiration of an hour, it had retained its solidity. Here is a sequence of events asserted, which is entirely at variance with the admitted course of nature; and the slightest reflection is sufficient to show, that to believe the assertion, would involve a logical absurdity. The intrinsic discrepancy of the facts could never be overcome by any possible proofs of the truth of the testimony."

Again, p. 265, “To reject testimony in any case where it is brought to establish a professed deviation from the uniform sequence of causes and effects, can never imply a departure from that uniformity, while to admit it, would, by the supposition, necessarily involve one."

So, p. 266,"Should any man affirm himself to have been an eye-witness of any event contrary to the usual succession of causes and effects, such as those above adduced, I might consistently reply to him in the following terms:-'I have no grounds whatever for believing what you say. You assert that an event has taken place quite at variance with the observed course of nature; but if I once give up the uniformity of causation or of the laws of nature, I may account for what I hear, by supposing that your senses have deceived you, or that your tongue utters words which you do not intend, or that my ears have acquired the property of changing the sounds transmitted to them, or any other mutation which it is possible to conceive."

Now, remembering our definition, I in vain attempt to suppose any assertion which can "in itself imply a breach of the uniformity of sequence." No man, as far as I know, has ever offered his testimony "to establish a professed deviation from the uniform sequence of causes and effects." When any one alleges uncommon effects, he attests or supposes uncommon causes. If any man declared he had exposed ice to a heat of 200 degrees, and that it had not melted, he would declare it as proof of the intervention of a preternatural cause. When a person attests a miracle, he still involuntarily assumes the "fundamental principle of evidence and expectation," that like causes have like effects, and that unlike effects must consequently spring from unlike causes; he still maintains the " uniformity of sequence in causes and effects," only

he maintains, that, in the language of the author already quoted, "there is a different assemblage of causes; that some essential circumstance has been left out, or some unusual one has crept into the accustomed combination." (p. 225.)

Assertions are indeed often made, which (in the ordinary use of language) are "irreconcilable to the usual course of nature," "entirely at variance with the admitted course of nature," "quite at variance with the observed course of nature," as our author asserts in the above quotations. But we are bound to suppose that by these three additional phrases, he still means no more than uniformity of sequence, which uniformity of sequence has never in fact been alleged to be broken. They are obviously used as synonimous to the other expressions, designating the uniformity defined at the beginning. The author had an unquestionable right to affix what meaning he chose to these terms; but we ought to have been apprised of it, as we were of the meaning assigned to the others. But, in fact, I am convinced any thinking person must perceive, that all the terms in question in the above passages, are used in a different meaning from that given by the definition. The defined terms are used synonimously with the others as ordinarily understood; not these synonimously with those. The definition is forgotten, and the words have recovered their usual acceptation. Either this is the case, or the argument finds no application. If the usual, the observed, the admitted course of nature, mean any thing different from the fact, that the same causes have the same effects, then the main terms of the argument have found two different senses in the course of the Essay. If the sense of the terms be the same throughout, then there is not an instance supposed by the Essayist. I know not how an instance is supposable, of testimony being given to any professed deviation from the uniformity of sequence. The argument is, on the one hand, unsound, if the main term is defined in one sense, and used in another; and on the other hand, if the argument is logical in itself, it is inapplicable to the consideration of the weight of testimony in cases of alleged miracles.

That the former is the real state of the matter, I have no doubt of making apparent. Only compare the two following passages (both already quoted), and say whether "uniformity of causation" means the same thing in both.

"If my correspondent is unable to read my letter, if he no longer connects any meaning with the written words, I am convinced that some extraordinary calamity has befallen him; * * * all proving, not that there is a want of uniformity in the sequence of causes and effects, but that there is a different assemblage of causes." (p. 224). Yet, at p. 264, the writer thus replies to a supposed attestor of an event contrary to the usual succession of causes and effects:-"If I once give up the uniformity of causation, or of the laws of nature, I may account for what I hear, by supposing that your senses have deceived you, or that your tongue utters words which you do not intend, or that my ears have acquired the property of changing the sounds transmitted to them; or any other mutation which it is possible to conceive." And why not suppose, in the latter case as well as in the former, that " some such extraordinary calamity has befallen" either your friend's s tongue, or your own ears? No mutation which it is possible to conceive, will destroy uniformity of sequence. Change both the cause and the effect, and the relation is preserved. A different assemblage of causes— some essential circumstance having been left out, or some unusual one having crept in-may account for a man giving false testimony at one time, and true at another; for one event being accordant with our expectations, and another contrary to them. Uniformity of sequence characterises every case alike. This is the uniformity of sequence of the definition and of the former passage, but not of the latter passage. Here the "6 uniformity of the laws of nature" has acquired its customary meaning. There the language is that of the reasoner who maintains the unbroken uniformity of causes. And this is the fallacy in the argument of the Essay. Terms are defined in an unusual acceptation, and unconsciously used sometimes as defined, sometimes as understood before being defined.

The commencement of the 7th Chapter, which proposes to apply the principle developed in the preceding ones, to the subject of evidence, may furnish another proof, that at that stage of the Essay the double meaning of the phrase had been admitted. "It is manifest from the foregoing representations, that it is solely by assuming the uniformity of causation, that we can penetrate into the future. Without this assumption, we could not predict the commonest occurrence, nor calculate on