can fo feldom be retrieved or repaired. It is not believed or confidered, that thereby not only the well-being and comfort of the individual against whom the offence is committed are disturbed, but even the good of the whole fociety is injured in various ways. Hence it is, that we so often give full fcope to the tongue in judging of our neighbour; fo often facrifice veracity to wit, and christian affection and forbearance to the defire of pleafing; fo often utter injurious or ambiguous expreffions of others, without being thoroughly aware of it, or making ourfelves the flighteft reproaches. This being the cafe, my friends, there can be no better means of attacking this failing, and of rendering us more circumfpect on that head, than by attentively viewing the matter in queftion, and thus to excite in our fouls a deep fense of its importance, This is the scope and design of my present discourse. I fhall fhew you the great value of a good repu tation, and remind you of the obligations we are under in this refpect both to ourselves and to our neighbour. This confideration will, I doubt not, fully convince you of the truth of Solomon's expref fion in our text: "A good name is rather to be chofen than great riches, and loving favour rather than filver or gold." By the reputation or good name of a man, I understand the general consideration wherein he stands with all thofe that know him perfonally or from the report of others; and this confideration is grounded од on the good opinion the public has of his underftanding, of his integrity, of his temper and manners, of his skill in certain bufineffes, arts and fciences, or arifes from other accomplishments and merits attributed to him. On this good character, I fay, extremely much depends; it is of very great value; for by it we are rendered much happier, much more generally useful, and not unfrequently morally better, than we fhould or could be without it. Our good name, in the first place, promotes our happiness, especially, fo far as it depends on our outward welfare. To this happiness thousands of perfons must contribute their fhare. It is a large and fpacious edifice, that we indeed must plan ourfelves, muft lay the foundation of, to the carrying on and confolidation whereof we must constantly labour; but can neither bring to any confiderable degree of perfection without the affistance of others, nor properly maintain it when finished. One while we are in want of the fagacity and advice, then of the greater abilities and force, now of the affiftance and fupport, then of the encouragement of our fellowbeings, for attaining our object, for fuccessfully profecuting our affairs and undertakings, for quietly enjoying our privileges and endowments, or for foothing our minds under adverse events. But is it expedient that our fellow-creatures should serve us with their fagacity and advice; em, ploy their abilities and force for our intereft; assist, support, fupport, and encourage us: they will require a stronger motive to it than mere felf-intereft can give them. Those advantages are not always; they are but feldom; and fome of them are never to be purchafed. They are the fruit of the efteem and the benevolence with which our brethren are affected towards us; and this efteem, this benevolence, is founded on the good opinion they entertain of us. In proportion as this good opinion is contravened and leffened, as fufpicion or difeftcem take place; in the fame proportion will the readiness of their endeavours to promote our happiness be diminished, and their benevolence and obliging carriage towards us will change into coldness and indifference. — Only put the queftion to yourselves, my friends: why do you fo readily, why is it fo agreeable to you to afford all poffible service to certain perfons; and why do you find it fo unpleasant, why does it coft you much constraint and self-denial, to do for others anything beyond what the strictest justice requires ? Does it not principally proceed from your having a good opinion of the former, and a bad opinion of the latter; that you esteem the one, and defpife the other? How readily do we communicate our intelligence and our best advice to him whom we account a fenfible and an honeft man, that knows how to value and to ufe good counfel! How cheerfully do we lend a part of our confequence or our property to the perfon on whofe fincerity and up. rightness we can safely rely! How willingly do we afford afford effectual countenance and fupport to those whom we believe to have no other than lawful in tentions and projects, and would be ready, in fimilar cafes to afford the fame countenance and fupport. to us! How heartily do we comfort him whose. misfortunes cannot be imputed to his own faulty conduct, but to unavoidable and unaccountable events, and whom we could fincerely wish to have been fuccefsful, for the fake of his good qualities and deferts! On the other hand, who would offer advice to the fool, or open himself to the crafty? Who would trust his property or his intereft to the notorious cheat? Who would readily afford countenance and support to the malignant or the ungrateful? Who would endeavour to comfort the wilful offender? As certainly therefore as a great part of our happiness or of our outward welfare depends on the behaviour of our fellow-creatures towards us; fo certainly is their behaviour towards us determined by the good or the bad repute in which we ftand with them. This is not all. We are defigned for focial life, for intercourse with other perfons, for participation in our reciprocal joys and fatisfactions. Apart from all our rational fellow-creatures, excluded from their focieties and pleafures, left alone to ourselves and our folitary reflections and feelings, we could either not be happy at all, or not in fo high a degree. The genial sentiment of benevolence and friendship, that pure and abundant fource of pleafure, would foon foon be extinct, for want of a fupply; and the oppofite fenfations of fpleen, of vexation, of misanthropy, would fucceed in its place. But in order that focial life fhould have charms for us; that our commerce with others should be agreeable, that they may take an interest in what befalls us, and admit us to a share in their joys and their pleasures; we must stand in good repute with them. They must afcribe to us fuch qualities or difpofitions as are of some value in their eyes, that render us not unworthy of their friendship and converse. At least, they must not be able to charge us with anything, they must not believe us to be capable of anything that merits contempt or abhorrence. A natural and unaffected behaviour, a free and eafy communication of our fentiments and feelings; a frank but inoffenfive opinion of what we fee and hear, of what is faid and done; a mutually earnest, but not a studied and anxious endeavour to be agreeable: are undoubtedly the real delights of focial life, the greatest charms of friendly intercourfe. But can these fubfift where the members of the fociety are not connected by reciprocal esteem? Will any one, who, whether by his own fault or not, stands in bad repute among the rest, be admitted to the enjoyment of thefe fatisfactions? Will not people fhun the converfation of one that lies under the imputation of a weak understanding or a wicked heart, who is reckoned a hypocrite, or a flanderer, or a harsh and sarcastic cenfor, or a fower of difcord, or to whofe charge any other bad difpofitions or actions |