Enlightened times are fifthly propitious to virtue. It is true, that proficiency in knowledge and virtue do not always proceed with equal pace. Nay, the former may eventually be detrimental to the latter: but affuredly not upon the whole. Yes, the virtues of the cœnobite, the virtues of the hermit, the vir tues of the fanatic of every denomination, if any will call them by that name, are confeffedly fufferers by the diffemination of knowledge; they are plants that thrive better in the bofom of darkness than by an influx of light. But certainly not the virtues of the useful citizen, of the fenfible man, of the true christian! What is virtue, if it be not founded on examination and choice, but is the effect of neceffity, of constraint, of fervile fear, or of mere mechanical habit? Does it deferve that venerable name? Is it indeed confiftent with itself? Can it have much inward ftrength and folidity? Does it confer any honour upon the man? Will it guide and govern him in concealment as well as in the eyes of the world, in common and familiar life as well as in the folemn offices of devotion or in civil affairs, in the enjoyment of liberty and pleafure as well as under the heavy hand of power, or beneath the preffure of misfortunes? No, only that virtue is thoroughly deferving of the name which is a daughter of light, the refult of plain perceptions and inward conviction, which is founded on a true knowledge of our nature, our present and future appointment, our carriage towards God and man, towards vifible and in vifible vifible things. She alone is always equal; refts upon firm, immoveable foundations; is ever the fame in all times, in all places, in all conditions; exalts and dignifies whatever a man does; accompanies him wherever he is, and never deprives him of her counsel and fupport. She alone wants neither outward coercion nor mechanical impulfe, and finds in herself inducement and ability enough for doing constantly what is right and convenient, what is fair and honourable, what is the best in every emergency. Admit that we may fuppofe fuch a virtue where there is no great degree of intellectual improvement: but muft not whatever promotes and extends the latter be, fooner or later, favourable to the former? How much more fenfible and tender must the moral sense, the conscience of the enlightened man, be! How many more arguments, and how much higher and nobler arguments must he bring forward to his mind, whenever he has to chufe between good and evil, or between good and better! How much farther must his fight pierce into the remoter confequences of his undertakings and actions! How much more accurately must he apply the general rules of his conduct to every particular circumftance; how much more eafily connect the prefent with the future! How much more nicely will he difcern femblance from truth, what has only the specious appearance of virtue, from virtue herself! How much lefs will he be fatisfied with only the inferior degrees of it! No, fear not, ye friends of Virtue, that the respect of your friend can be diminished among mankind, or her dominion contracted, by your enlargement of the kingdom of light. Truth and virtue are fifters, they are infeparably connected together; the true votaries of the one are alfo true votaries of the other; the prevalence of the latter is fo much the more unrestrained, by how much the former is extended and advanced; their empire is one and the fame. In enlightened times fixthly mankind are more fociable, are brought nearer together, connect themfelves more intimately with each other, and by more various ties. Their manners are rendered milder, more agreeable; their converfation more entertaining; their intercourfe more pleasant and affectionate; their defires and endeavours to ingratiate themfelves with each other are greater. The higher and lower ftations and claffes of men are lefs diffevered, intermingle more, have more common pursuits and pleasures; and thus the pride of the one is abated, and the decent confidence of the other encouraged. Social pleasures in enlightened times are multiplied, refined, heightened. They are, in part, derived from fources abfolutely fhut up to an unenlightened people. The hiftory of nature and art, of the generations of men and the planting of nations, perfonal and foreign experiences and obfervations, in one cafe, furnish the richest and most ample materials for discourse, for a useful as well as agreeable exercise of the understanding, the fagacity, the dif cernment, VOL. II. P cernment, the wit, the imagination, for the maintenance and fupport of rational cheerfulness and mirth. Every man is more earnest to prefent himfelf on the most favourable fide, to exchange information of one kind for information of another, and to impart as much fatisfaction and delight, as to receive. And must not this be a covetable privilege above the condition of unenlightened men, whose manners are generally rude and ferocious, whofe pleasures are altogether fenfual, whofe diverfions are merely riotous and noify, whose perceptions are to the last degree contracted, whofe converfations are commonly frivolous, whofe mental faculties are undeveloped and unexercifed, and whofe deportment is feldom agreeable, but much oftener infolent and disgusting? And must not the advantages of the former be in perfect harmony with the intentions of religion and nature? Is it not the aim of both to unite men progreflively more, to infpire them with more and more love and esteem for each other, to render them continually more useful and agreeable to one another, uniformly more inclined to unfold their mutual capacities and powers by focial wants and propenfities, by focial bufineffes and pleafures, by all thefe means to improve the fum of their focial happiness, and thus conftantly to approximate them to the true end of their existence, as one fingle closely compacted family of relatives, dwelling together and making each other happy? Grant however that this greater fociableness, this refine ment 1 ment of manners, this intermixture of ranks, this extended action and activity, may have their unavoidable inconveniences and difadvantages. Grant that they often degenerate into vanity and frivolity; that they frequently are accompanied by diffimulation and falfehood; allow that they diffipate too much the attention and the faculties of many; allow that at times they infringe on the rules of strict propriety. Upon the whole, they always effect by far more good than harm, occafion far more happiness than mifery; are always a step in advance towards the perfection of human nature, an alleviation and sweetener of the troubles of this terreftrial life. Enlightened times are productive of still more good. The fituation and profeffions of man are more dignified; and therefore he has inducements to fill more worthily the former and better to profecute the latter. Indeed the first beams of stronger light often produce quite contrary effects. The youth who thinks he has acquired fome knowledge and refined his tafte, may eafily be mifled to defpife the fituation and profeffion of his forefathers, and to neglect the affairs of it, imagining himself capable of greater and more elevated concerns. But is this evil, which only obtains in particular inítances, and for the most part is foon remedied by the punishment that follows it, or by maturer judgment, is this to be compared with the general and lasting evils which the defect of improvement in this refpect naturally P 2 |