of his court. And this judgment does her the more honour, as it is fo very feldom that the great and mighty of the earth are impartial enough to do juftice to eminent endowments of the mind, and to esteem them more than their own dazzling dif tinctions.

Let us then, my pious hearers, endeavour alfo to fettle our judgment on this matter. Many of my audience are learned themfelves, or make literature their principal employment; and most of the rest have much connection and intercourfe with that defcription of men. For both the one and the other it is highly important to form a proper estimate of learning; and though I may poffefs but a small stock of it myself, yet its properties, nature and quality, and its influence on human happinefs, may not be utterly unknown to me; and it is more than poffi. ble that I may be able to pronounce upon it with the ftricter impartiality, as I renounce on that score all pretenfions to fame. Let us therefore investigate the value of learning; and to this end first make fome remarks for properly afcertaining its worth; then fet that value in its proper light; and laftly thence draw fome rules for our conduct towards it.

By erudition or learning, I here understand the whole circle of human fciences and knowledge, that do not immediately relate to the fatisfying the first, wants of nature; all knowledge and sciences that are rather neceffary and peculiar to a particular clafs or body of men, than to mankind at large; whe

ther

ther otherwise they be diftinguished for diverfity and extent, or for folidity and method, be they of the historical or philofophical fpecies, and of more or lefs general utility. Whoever addicts himself to any one clafs or kind of fuch knowledge and fcience, devotes the greater part of his time and faculties to it, and therein excels others, bears and deferves the appellation of a man of learning. And, for rightly appretiating the value of this learning, we must previously make several remarks.

The first and most material is this: the value that learning has is not generally proper to it as a final object, but as means fubfervient to ultimate ends; and this it has in common with most of the other privileges and endowments that have a reference to human happiness. Particular kinds of knowledge, certain branches of learning, poffefs indeed an inherent value, an intrinfic and lafting worth; but thefe are few in number. Under this head we may perhaps reckon most of our mathematical and aftronomical knowledge, fome of the more recondite philofophical studies, a part of our religious notions; whatever is eternal, unalterable, and everlastingly serviceable truth; all conceptions and ideas that are of account, in heaven as well as upon earth, among fuperior intelligences as well as among mankind; and though we may not poffefs a great many fuch ideas and conceptions, yet are we not totally destitute of them, and they indisputably compose the most precious part of our knowledge. All that comes under this denomination befides has no value whatever, as an ultimate

ultimate object, but only as fubordinate means.

It

is only fo far defirable, and is only fo far deferving of our esteem, of our attention and our application, as it exercises the mental faculties, procures ourfelves and others innocent, elevated pleasure, guides us in the track of truth and facilitates the knowledge of it, diffufes activity among mankind, improves their outward welfare, provides for their accommodation, promotes their security, and helps them in the profecution of their affairs, or procures them any other tranfitory benefit. To this head belong the generality of hiftorical, most of the mechanical and philological fciences, and the greatest part of the learning of the theologian, of the phyfician, of the lawyer. They are only means, nothing more than implements, by which we may forward and attain certain good purposes in our present state; and which, when these ends are once obtained, lose abfolutely all their value, and become ufelefs, like fcaffoldings that have ferved their purpose. It would however be a folly of the first magnitude in any one to despise and reject them now, fince they are still neceffary to the building which is not yet finished.

Hence fpontaneously arifes a fecond rule, of use to us in forming proper estimates of learning and the feveral branches of it. It is this: the greater fervice and general utility it is of, the greater is likewife its value. Studies, abfolutely unprofitable, when confidered at least as means to farther views, are indeed no part at all of learning; many parts

of

of it however are unworthy of the painful and indefatigable industry, the great application of time and abilities that are beftowed upon them. Many debafe and relax the mind, inftead of elevating and ftrengthening it; and benumb and contract the heart, instead of enlarging it, and ftimulating it to great and generous emotions. Many alienate fuch as are employed in them from the true ends of their creation, from their proper perfection, rather than facilitate them in the profecution of it. Such learned attainments and occupations are indeed of but trifling value; often of much lefs value than the at⚫tainments and occupations of the artificer or the labourer; and he that makes them his principal em-ployment has no right to complain, if he be neither more refpected, nor more happy, than fo many others of the unlearned, who trifle away their time like him, and diffipate their powers. No, he alone deferves to be fo, and that in a high degree, whose learning is in any remarkable mannner beneficial and generally useful; who can give an account to himself and to others, of what he is attempting and performing for the interest of his fellow-creatures; who is effectually kindling more light and calling forth more activity, in himself and about him; who is learning to think and to live better himfelf; and is likewife mediately or immediately, the occafion that others think more juftly and live more prudently or happily.

A third

A third circumftance, which falls under confideration in our refearches into the real value of learning, especially in regard to particular persons, is this the more modefty and true wifdom it has to accompany and guide it, the greater is its value. The learning that gives fcope to pride, foon degenerates into infolence and tyranny; not unfrequently prevents its poffeffor from making greater progrefs in knowledge and science; often renders it unferviceable to others, or of but little ufe; and how very much muft this detract from its worth! Still lefs value has the learning which has no morally good influence on the mind and manners of the learned man; which allows him to think as meanly, and to act as perverfely and foolishly, and as flavishly to follow the calls of his lufts and paffions, as the ignorant and the unlearned; and in proportion as it procures but little real and durable advantage to himself, fo much must this defect diminish its utility in regard of others, and weaken its influence on human happiness. No, then alone does learning display herself in her native dignity, in her full fplendor, and fuffer none to doubt of her high value, when fhe appears in the company of modefty and wisdom; when she is not blind to her own defects and failings, and is not ashamed of her limitations; when the readily communicates herself to others; when she rather informs in the spirit of meekness, than decides in a haughty imperious

tone;